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THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE
WITH A
COMMENTARY
BY THE LATE
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(In the notes.)

VOL. III.

p. 12, line 21, read 'II 4. 9.'
p. 30, line 1, for 'by' read 'at.'
p. 42, line 17, for 'Naturum fassend,' read 'Natur umfassend.'
p. 62, line 19, read 'writings.'

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Γ.

ούκ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἂ δεῖ λέγειν
ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη καὶ τάγμα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ
ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ.

CHAP. I.

'Επειδή τρία ἐστὶν ἀ δεὶ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τοῦ λόγου, ἐν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύ-

In the Introduction, pp. 276—370, I have already given a complete paraphrase of the contents of this book, exhibiting the main divisions and general principles of arrangement and the connexion of its several parts: and have added, in five appendices, dissertations on some special points which seemed to require a more detailed treatment than they could conveniently receive in mere notes. Referring to this for information on all such general matters, I may confine myself in the commentary to special details of language, allusion, and such like particulars. This book, by the extreme brevity of expression which characterises it, leaving even more than usual to the reader's ingenuity to supply, by the consequent difficulty of translation, and the obscurity of many of the allusions, offers at least as many impediments and stumbling-blocks to the embarrassed commentator as either of the two preceding; and it is to be feared that the explanation and illustration are not likely to be much shorter than before, in spite of what has been already done in the Introduction.

With the end of Book II we finish the treatment of what (according to the Latin division) is termed inventio, the invention and supply of all the various kinds of arguments, which the orator has to invent, or find for himself; and we now proceed to the analysis of (1) λέξεις, elocutio, verbal style, including ἐπόκρισις, delivery, pronuntiatio and actio, (Aristotle omits the latter, at all events in the treatment of it, confining ἐπόκρισις to the mode of speaking, declamation, § 4): and (2) τάξις, the order and disposition, together with the ordinary topics, of the several divisions of the speech. The first is examined in the first twelve chapters, the second from the thirteenth to the end. These three general divisions of the art are expressed by Cicero, Orator § 43, tria videnda sunt oratori, quid dicat (πίστεις), quo quidque loco (τάξις), et quomodo (λέξεις).

§ 1 commences with a partial repetition of the concluding summary of the preceding chapter. The three modes of proof are enumerated, πίστεις, ἡδος, πάθος: (1) the direct logical proof, by argument; (2) the con-

AR. III.
tering a favourable impression by the exhibition of character in and by
the speech; and (3), working on the feelings of the audience, so as to
bring them to that state of mind which is favourable to the orator’s pur-
pose; to excite an angry or a calm temper, love or hatred, envy, jea-
losy, righteous indignation, and so on, according to circumstances and
the immediate occasion.

‘The enthymemes too have been stated, whence they are to be sup-
plied; for of enthymemes there are special (εἰδῆ) as well as common
topics (τόποι).’ See the quotation from Spengel’s Study of Ancient Rhetor-
ic prefixed to II 23.

§ 2. ‘The next subject to be treated of is style’ (the manner of
expressing oneself; including not only the language, but the manner of
delivery; both in voice, declamation, the pronunciation, tone, rhythm,
&c.; and—here Aristotle stops, and the Latin rhetoricians add—action,
the appropriate gesticulation, management of the hands and the body in
general, and especially the features): ‘for it is not sufficient to know
what to say, it is necessary also to know how to say it; and this con-
tributes greatly to the impression conveyed of a certain character in the
speech’. The tone of voice, the expression of the features, the gestures
employed, the kind of language used, quite independently of the argu-
ments, will materially assist the impression of moral (or any particular)
character which the orator wishes to assume, on the minds of the audi-
ence. The ἡδος of III 16.8 is part of this, the moral character imparted
by the choice of language, of terms, tone and expression, significant of
moral purpose, πρῶτον εὔθυμηθίν

§ 3. ‘Now first of all, inquiry was naturally directed to that which is
first in the natural order, the sources from which things themselves
derive their plausibility or power of persuasion’ (i.e. what are the sources
of rhetorical proof of facts themselves; which of course is the basis of
the entire art or practice, and therefore ‘first in the order of nature’);
‘and secondly, the due setting out (disposal) of these by the language;
κατὰ φύσιν, ὃ περ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι. τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἐχει μεγίστην, οὕτω δ᾽ ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπὸ-
and thirdly (τρίτων), of such things as these, the divisions of Rhetoric),
what has the greatest force (or influence, is especially effective as a means of persuasion), but has not yet been attempted (regularly, systematically, as an art, no serious attempt has yet been made upon it), that which relates to delivery'. § 3. πρῶτον ἐξητήθη κατὰ φύσιν] A similar phraseology occurs at the beginning of the Poetics, I 1, ult. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων. And de Soph. El. init. ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων. Victorius.

διαθέσθαι] denotes the ‘disposal’ or ‘disposition’, i.e. the investing of the speech with a certain character, putting it in a certain state, by the use of language: as the ἀκοουάτικ of a speech are said διαθέσθαι ποιεῖσθαι, to be brought into such and such a disposition or state of feeling by it: a common use of the verb. It does not mean here distribution, ordering, arrangement, which is not the special office of the graces and proprieties of language or style. There is another sense in which this verb is used by later writers, as Polybius, Dionysius, Diodorus, with λόγους and the like, disposere, in publicum proponere, in medium proferre, to dispose or set out (διά), as wares in a market for sale, etaler; which may possibly be the meaning here, though, I think, it would be less appropriate. Victorius renders it explanare. διάθεσις, in Longinus quoted below, seems to correspond to διαθέσθαι here in the sense in which I have explained it.

ἐπικεχείρηται] is a striking instance of that abnormal formation of the passive, which I have explained and illustrated in Appendix B on I 12.22 [Vol. I. p. 297].

ὑπόκρισις, ‘acting’, properly includes, besides declamation, the management of the voice, to which Aristotle, as already mentioned, here confines it, § 4, that of the features, arms, hands, and the entire body: and so it is treated by the Latin rhetoricians, Cicero, Quintilian, &c. Longinus, Ars Rhet., (apud Spengel, Rhet. Gr. I 310), has a chapter upon it, following another περὶ λέξεως. His description of it is, μῦρος τῶν καθαλάθειν ἕκαστο παραταμένον ἠθῶν καὶ παιδῶν καὶ διάθεσις σύμπατος τε καὶ τῶν φυσις πρόσφορος τοῖς ὑποκείμενοις πρόγνωσιν. δύναται δὲ μέγιστον εἰς πίστως κ.τ.λ. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 22, p. 1023 (Reiske), says of the great orator, κοσμούς ἀπαντα καὶ χρηματίζοντος (αχρηματίζοντος, Syllburg) τῇ πρεπούσῃ ὑποκρίσει ἡ δευτεράτος ἀσκητὴς ἔγνετο, ὡς ἀπαντέε τῇ ὑμολογουσί καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἱδεῖν ἐστι τῶν λόγων, κ.τ.λ. See Quint. XI 3. 5, on the effect of pronuntiatio, ‘delivery, declamation’, where he says that even an indifferent speech set off by the vigour and grace of action will have more weight or effect than the very best without it: in § 6 he quotes the opinion of Demosthenes, who assigned successively the first, second, and third place to declamation (pronuntiatio), and so on till his questioner stopped. In § 7 he quotes Aeschines’ saying to the
Rhodians, who were admiring the de Corona as he recited it to them, Quid si ipsum audissetis? et M. Cicero unam in dicendo actionem dominari putat. Cic. de Or. 111 56. 213, from which the whole passage of Quintilian is taken. Also Brutus, LXVI 234, Lentulus’ opinion. XXXVIII 141, 142. XLIII 168 (Spalding ad loc. Quint.). On Demosthenes’ dictum, Bacon, Essays, Of Boldnesse, init., has this remark: A strange thing that that part of an Oratour which is but superficially, and rather the virtue of a Player, should be placed so high above those other noble parts of Invention, Elocution, and the rest; not almost alone, as if it were all in all. But the reason is plain. There is in humane Nature generally more of the foole then of the wise; and therefore those faculties by which the foolish part of men’s mindes is taken are most potent.

‘(And this is not at all surprising) because in fact it was not till late that it made its way into the tragic art and rhapsody; for the poets at first (in the earliest stages of the drama) used to act their tragedies themselves’ (and therefore, as there was no profession of acting or professional actors, it was not likely that an art of acting should be constructed; the poets acted, as they wrote, as well as they could by the light of nature, without any rules of art).


ὄψε παρηλθὲν] in fina § 5, ὄψε προῆλθεν; Poet. IV 17, τὸ μέγεθος (τῆς τραγῳδίας)...ὑπεσμενύθη, also ν 3.

ὑπεκρίνοντο αὐτοὶ[ Plut. Sol. XXIX (Vitorius), ὁ Ἐδώκων ἐθάσατο τῶν Θέατων αὐτῶν ὑποκράτουσαν ὀπίστερ ἤθος ἕν τοῖς παλαιοῖς. Liv. VII 2, Livius —idem scilicet, id quod omnem tum erant, suorum carminum actor. Vitorius thinks that this statement is confirmed by Hor. A. P. 277, quae canerent aferentque peruncti faciebus ora, which means that ‘the poets themselves had their faces smeared’. Donaldson, Theatre of the Greeks, Ed. vii. p. 59, n. 10.

‘It is plain then that there is something of this kind in Rhetoric also as well as in poetry’ (declaration may be studied and practised for the purposes of Rhetoric, as well as for those of acting in tragedy and comedy or of rhapsodical recitation): ‘which, in fact, (i.e. the poetic declaration), has been dealt with (treated artistically, see note on 1 1. 3), besides others, by Glaucon of Teos in particular’.

This tautological repetition of καί, καί περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, καί περὶ τὴν παρατηρικὴν, is not unfrequent in Aristotle. Compare Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, ὀπίστερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδο—οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. 1b. 1253 a 31, ὀπίστερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν—οὕτω καὶ χορησθὲν.

Glaucón of Teos, an Ionian city on the coast of Asia Minor, is most probably the same as a Glaucón mentioned by Ion, Plat. Ion 530 D (so Stallbaum’s note ad loc.), as following his own profession as a rhapsodist, which seems suitable enough for one who writes on the art of tragic declamation, especially as acting and rhapsodizing are actually coupled
ηταί τὸ πρῶτον. δὴ λοι οἶν ὁτί καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἕστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ῥήστερον καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν· ὃ περὶ ἑτεροί τινες ἐπαγγελματίδιαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήνος. 4 ἐστι δὲ αὐτή 1 μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτή δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἐκαστὸν πάθος, οἶνον πότε μεγάλη καὶ πότε μικρὰ καὶ πότε μέση, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἶνον ὡς ἐκείνα καὶ βαρεία καὶ μέση, καὶ ῥυθμοὶ τίσι πρὸς ἐκαστὸν. τρία γὰρ ἐστι περὶ ἃν σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν

1 αὐτῆ

together by Aristotle in the preceding sentence. I should be disposed also to identify with him of Teos, the Glaucon quoted in Poet. xxv 23—seemingly as a poetical critic, which is also a kindred pursuit. See in Smith's Biogr. Dict. the third article on Glaucon.

Tyrwhitt ad loc. Poet. seems in favour of the supposition that the three Glaucons are one. A Glaucon who wrote a work on γλῶσσαι (sic), Athen. xi 480 f, was at all events not far removed from the same studies. Schneider, ad Xen. Conv. III 6.

§ 4. ἐστι δ' αὐτή] So all mss and Edd., except Buhle, who reads αὐτή. This surely must be right: αὐτή seems to have no meaning here. Victorius retaining αὐτή translates 'hacce'.

'This (declamation, ἑπόκρισις) resides in the voice, in the mode of employing It, that is, for (the expression of) any emotion; that is to say, sometimes loud, sometimes low, sometimes intermediate (between the two, middling, neither the one nor the other); and in the mode of employing the accents (or lones of voice), that is to say acute, grave, middle' (circuit, from the combination of the two others, Λ = ~), and certain measures (times) in respect of each. For there are three things that are the subjects of such enquiries, magnitude (intensity, volume of sound), tune, time.'

οἶνον] is here in both cases videlicet, 'that is to say'; a direct specification of certain definite things; not, as usual, 'for instance', as an example or specimen, which supposes other things of the same kind, besides those expressly mentioned. Thus οἶνον here does not mean that the three kinds of sounds and accents mentioned are mere examples of a much larger class, but they specify the exact number of kinds which are intended to be distinguished in either case. This is common in Aristotle. Instances are, few out of many, Pol. I 6, sub fin., δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἶνον ἐμφυκον...μέρος. c. 7 sub fin. ἢ δὲ κτητικὴ...οἶνον ἡ δικαία. c. 8, 1256 a 36, οἶνον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας κτ.λ. c. 13, 1260 a 6, οἶνον τοῦ λόγου ἑκούσῃ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. II 5, 1264 a 26, οἶνον φρούρους. Ib. c. 6, 1265 a 35, οἶνον, 'I mean to say.' De Sens. c. 5, 443 a 10, τὰ στοιχεῖα, οἶνον πώ χόρων ὧδορ γῆ. Plat. Gorg. 502 D. [ Cf. supra II 19. 26.]

On the modulation of the voice in the expression of the various emotions, see Cic. de Or. III. cc. 57, 58, §§ 215—219, where it is illustrated at length.

On the accents, and μέγεθος, ἀρμονία, ῥυθμός, and their application to Rhetoric, see Introduction, Appendix C to Book III, p. 379 seq.
RHODES Γ I §§ 4, 5.

μέγεθος ἀρμονία ρυθμοῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀθλα σχεδοῦν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνοντες καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δίνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ύποκριται, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν 5 πολιτειῶν. οὖπω δὲ σύγκεται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεῖ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὅγου προφηθεν καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ύπολαμβανόμενον. ἀλλ’ ὅλης Ρ.

'Now one might almost say (it is pretty nearly true to say) that these are the men that gain all the prizes in (lit. out of, as the produce or profit derived from, got out of them,) the contests (dramatic and rhapsodical), and as in these the actors have more power, influence, effect (over the audiences, and those who adjudicate the prizes), than the poets nowadays, so likewise (has acting or declamation) in civil and social contests (the contests of the law-courts, and public assembly—comp. III 12. 2) by reason of the defects (the vicious, depraved character) of our constitutions' (as that of Athens, where I, Aristotele, am now writing).

The vice or defect, which permits these irregular and extraneous appeals to the feelings, and the influence which 'acting' thereby acquires, are attributed here to the constitution—comp. I 1. 4, where 'well-governed states', εὐνομοῦμενα πόλεις, states which are under good laws and institutions, are said to forbid them: if that of Athens were sound and healthy and right, ἴσως, ὁρθῆ, opposed to μοχθηρά, they would not be allowed there. In the next section, 5, the defect is attributed to the audience: in the one case the institutions themselves are in fault, in the other the tempers and disposition of the hearers, whose taste and judgment are so depraved that they require the stimulus of these distorting (διαστρέφοντα, I 1. 5) emotions.

On the influence of acting in producing emotion, and thereby persuasion, see by all means Cicero's description, de Or. III 56 § 213, seq., which furnishes an excellent illustration of what is here said. Note particularly the case of Gracchus, § 214. After a quotation from his speech Cicero adds, quae sic ab illo esse acta constabat oculis voce gestu, inimici ut lacrimas teneere non possent. And Orat. c. XVII, est enim actio quasi corporis quaedam eloquentia, quam constet e voce et motu, § 55 and the rest.

§ 5. 'But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance: and it (ἵν ύποκριτική) is thought low and vulgar' (in the sense of popular and unsubstantial, directed to show, not substance) 'and rightly so considered' (or, 'when considered aright'; so Victorius. But the other is the more natural interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνειν; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius 'Si vere indicare volumus': 'consider' in the two renderings has different senses).

φορτικός, see note on II 21. 15, opposed to χαριείς in the sense of mental refinement and cultivation, Molostos et illepidos, quos Graeci μοχθηροῖς καὶ φορτικοῖς dicerent; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticæ 18. 4
οὺσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τήν ρητορικήν, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον τήν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέων, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλεῖον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς μὴτε λυπεῖν μὴτε εὐφραίνειν. δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τὰλλα ἐξω τοῦ ἀποδείξει περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὀμοιό μεγά δύναται, καθάπερ εἰρηται, διὰ τήν τοῦ

(Gaisford). See Twining on Poet. note 263, pp. 540—544, where a number of examples illustrative of its various applications are collected. φορτικός, ἐπαχθῶς, ἐπιπλάστως (Suidas). The last of these two equivalents helps to explain a distinction in Eth. Eudem. 1 4, 2, of arts φορτική, περὶ χρηματισμῶν (engaged in money-making, mercenary), ἑώασσι (mechanical), which is subsequently explained, λέγω δὲ φορτικὰ μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευόμενα μόνον. This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν: and ἐπιπλάστως 'beplastered' seems to correspond to this.

And this same signification is plainly conveyed by the word here in the Rhetoric, which is immediately followed by ἀλλ' ὀμοιό οὖσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας, i.e. not only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικῶν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind, want of mental cultivation in persons: and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial, and in this point of view too low and vulgar to be entertained by a man of science or philosopher. It has precisely the same meaning in Pol. 1 11, 1258 b 35. See Eaton ad loc.

'But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific, (directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ ἐίναι: I 7. 36—37, see note,) we must bestow the requisite (τὴν) pains and attention upon it, not that it is right (to do so), but as necessary (for success in persuading): for, as to strict justice, that implies, (requires, subaudī ἐστὶ,) looking for no more in the delivery of the speech than (to speak it) in a manner which will give neither offence nor delight: for fairness requires that the case be fought on the facts alone, and therefore everything else outside the direct proof (of them) is superfluous: but still, as has been already said, they have vast influence by reason of the vice or defects (depraved taste and judgment) of the hearer.' Quint. II 17. 27 seq. Imperiti enim iudicant, et quī frequenter in hoc ipsis fallendi sunt, ne errent. Nam si nihî sapientes indices dentur, sapientium conciones, atque omne concilium, nihil iûndia valeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio præsumpta falsique testes: perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus, et prope in sola delectatione ponatur. Sin et audientium Mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia veritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt. §§ 28, 29.

οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος] If it be supposed (with Vater) that ὡς is omitted in this clause, comp. c. 3 § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἣδυσματι χρηται ἀλλ' ὡς ἔδεσματι.
§ 6. 'Now (attention to) style (mode of speaking) is nevertheless in some slight degree necessary (has some slight portion of necessity) in every kind (department) of instruction: for it makes some difference in the clearness of an explanation whether we speak in one way or another; not however so much (as is generally supposed), but all this is mere fancy (phantasia, 'the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality, note on I 11. 6), and addressed to (for the sake of, to gratify) the hearer: for no one teaches geometry in this way. These tricks and graces of style, declamation and acting, have no power of instruction, and therefore are never addressed to any student; but only to a popular audience like that of the orator, which requires to be flattered or have its cars tickled (as Plato says in the Gorgias [463 c, κολακεῖας μόριον τὴν ρητορικήν, and 503 e, ὃστερ παιο... χαρίζεσθαι]); to be amused and conciliated, as well as instructed and convinced

§ 7. 'Now that (the art which applies ὑποκριτικὴ to Rhetoric, whenever it reaches us (arrives), will produce the same effects as the art of acting (i.e. the application of it to dramatic poetry, § 3): some indeed have already to a trilling extent made the attempt to treat of it, as Thrasymachus in his Ἐλεον; in fact, a capacity for acting is a natural gift (part of that general love of imitation which is the foundation of all the imitative or fine arts, Poet. c. 1) 'and less subject to rules of art' (more, or somewhat, spontaneous, οὐσιοχειδιαστική, extemporaneous, Poet. IV 14, of tragedy in its earliest stage), 'but when applied to language (declamation) it (the practice of it) may be reduced to an art. And therefore those who have the faculty (of ὑποκριτικὴ κατὰ λέξιν) obtain prizes in their turn (again, πάλιν; of which τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρυσιν ρήτοροις is an explanation, Victorius), 'as do also rhetoricians in respect of (by) their acting or declamation: for written speeches (in the ἐπιδεικτικῶν γένος) owe more of their effect to the style and language than to the thought or intellectual part'; διάνοιαν (Rhet. II 26. 5, Poet. XIX 2) meaning here the logical part of Rhetoric, the direct and indirect arguments.

Thrasymachus and his Ἐλεον are described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C, τῶν γε μὴν ὀικτρόγοις ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πεῦκων ἐλκυμένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Ἑλκυρίδου σβήνοι. ὀργίσατε τε αὐτού πολλοὺς ἀμα δεινῶς ἀνήρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὁργιζόμενος ἐπάθον κηλέως, ὥς ἐφ' διαβάλοντε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολάς ὀμοθετή κράτιστος.

§§ 7, 8.

υποκριτική, ἑγκεχειρήκασι δὲ ἐπὶ ὄλγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινὲς, οἴον Θασσύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἑλέοις; καὶ ἐστὶ φύσεως τὸ υποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἐντεχνόν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τούτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἀθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑποκρισιν ῥήτορισιν, οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μείζον ἵσχύονται διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἡ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

8 ἧρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινήσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὦσπερ πέ- p. 112. ψε, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ οὐνόματα μμήματα ἔστιν,

Gottingen, 1848, pp. 15, and Mayor's note on Juv. vii 204, pæcinuit multos vanae sterilis cathedrae, sicut Tharsymachus probat exitus. Quint. iii 3. 4, Nec audiendi quidam...qui tres modo primas esse partes volunt, quoniam memoria atque actio natura non arte contingent...dicet Thrasymachus quoque idem de actione crediderit (sc. ἀτεχνότερον εἶναι), where Quintilian must be referring to the present passage, though he is misled by the words οἶον Θασσύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἑλέοις, into supposing that the sentence, καὶ ἐστὶ φύσεως τὸ υποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, is a quotation from Thrasymachus.]

οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. iii 12. 5, ἢτε δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνικριτή κ.τ.λ. at the end of the section.

§ 8. 'Now the origin of this was due, as is natural, to the poets: for not only are all names imitations (copies of things, which they are supposed to represent), but there was also the voice ready for use, the most imitative of all our members; and so it was (in virtue of the same imitative faculty, Victorius) that the arts were composed, that of rhapsodizing and of acting and of course (γε, to be sure) others'.

κυνίν, in the sense of originating anything, 'to stir, set in motion', is found in Plut. Solon. 95 b, ἀρχομένον δὲ τῶν περὶ τῶν Θέσσιν ἡδὶ τὴν πραγμαχίαν κυνίν (Victorius). Sext. Empir., adv. Math. vii 6, quotes Aristotle as having said that Empedocles πρῶτον ῥητορικὴ κεκινήθη: and Quintilian, III 1. 8, doubtless also with reference to Aristotle, repeats this, primus post eos...movisse aliqua circa rhetoricien Empedocles dicitur. Sext. Empir. again, p. 546, Bekk. adv. Math. x. πρὸς ἡθικὸς § 2, of Socrates' 'origination' of the study of Moral Philosophy, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξαν κεκινήθη. See Spalding ad loc. Quint., who quotes Athen. xiv 629 c, ὅθεν ἐκφέβησαν αἱ καλοῦμενα πτυρίχας. Movere codem sensu apud Quint. iii 6. 10, 103, iv 1. 29.

ὀνόματα μμήματα] This is the Platonic theory, Cratyl. 423 A seq.

1 Wecker, Nachtrag, p. 239, note 175, accuses Bentley of a 'wonderful blunder' in the interpretation of κυνίν in this passage, in saying, viz., that it signifies 'the first beginning of tragedy'—which it most undoubtedly does—and understands it himself of 'disturbing, altering', as κυνίν νόμισε (and the proverb μὴ κίνει Καγάρων, "let well alone," quidem non movere, "let sleeping dogs lie"). He says that Bentley's rendering is längst widerlegt. [Bentley, On Phalaris, 1 pp. 284, 386, ed. Dyce, pp. 262, 309, ed. Wagner.]
The conclusion is, 423 B, ὁνόμα ἄρα ἐστὶν, ὡς ἔοικε, μὴ μὴ ἰδοὺ ἐκεῖνον, ὁ μιμεῖται καὶ ὁνόμαζε ὁ μιμοῦμενος τῇ φωνῇ, ὃ ἦν μιμήτα. "Οlympiodorus ad Philoeleum Platonis tradit Democritum nomina vocales imagines rerum appellare consenuevse, ὅτι ἀγάλματα φωνῆντα καὶ ταῦτα ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὡς Δημόκρητος." Victorius. Aristotle himself, de Interpretatione, sub init. 16a 3, calls words τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, and afterwards, line 7, ὁμοιώματα, signs or representatives, and copies, of mental affections, i.e. impressions, a theory quite different from that of Plato, which is here adopted. On the terms applied by Aristotle to express the nature of words, see Waitz, on Organon 16 a 4. Of the four employed, he says, σύμβολον is a subjective σημείον, and ὁμοίωμα an objective μὴμα. On imitation and the natural love of it, the origin and foundation of all the fine arts, see the first three chapters of the Poetics. In c. 4, init. imitation or mimicry is described as natural to man from infancy, and characteristic of humanity. [Dionysius Halic. de comp. verb. p. 94 (quoted in Farrar's Chapters on Language, chap. xii)], η μοιά τούτων ἰδίως καὶ διδακτόν ἡ φύσις, ἡ παραποίησις μιμητικοῦ ὑμάς καὶ θετικοῦ τῶν ὁμοσμάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα.

τὰ γὰρ ὄνομα κ.τ.λ.] This is introduced to account for the poets having been the first who devoted themselves to the study of style or language, in this sense. Words being the copies of things, the poets, whose object is imitation, addicted themselves to the study of them, in order to be able better to represent the things of which they were images. Victorius.

αἱ τέχναι συνεσθέναι] Some of the writers on rhapsodizing, with which was naturally combined the criticism of Homer, are mentioned in Plat. Ion. 530 c, Metrodorus of Lampasacus, Stesimbrotus of Thasos (Xenoph. Conv. 111 5), and Glaucōn, probably of Teos, mentioned above, § 3.

§ 9. 'And as the reputation which the poets acquired in spite of the simplicity of what they said (the silliness of the thoughts expressed) was thought (by those who imitated them) to be due to their language, it was for this reason that the language (of prose) first took a poetical colour, as that of Gorgias. And still, even at this day, the mass of the uneducated think the discourses of speakers of this kind mighty fine. Such however is not the fact, but the language of prose and poetry is distinct'.

To the same effect Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 3, (v. 457, Reiske). Lysias' predecessors were not of his opinion about style—his was the ἀθελής λόγος, the 'smooth and simple' style—ἀλλ' οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τινὰ προσέταν τοῖς ὀλίκεσι ἐξηλαπτῶν ἰδιώτης, καὶ κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολαῖς τε πολλαίς χρώμοιν καὶ υπερβολαίς καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς τροπικοῖς ἰδεάσις, ὁμορμαῖς τε γλωσσήμοροι καὶ ἰδίων χρήσει, καὶ τῶν οὐκ εἰσ-δύστων σχηματισμῶν τῇ διαλαγῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κανονολογίᾳ καταπληκτῶμεν τῶν ἰδιωτῆς, κ.τ.λ. This was the new style introduced by Gorgias and his followers Polus and Licymnnius (Alcidamas, &c.). Hermogenes, περὶ
RHITORIKHΣ Γ I § 9.

ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὑθὺς δια τῆν λέξιν εἰδόκουν πο-
ρίσασθαι τίνιδε τῆν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικῇ πρώτῃ
εγένετο λέξις, οἶνον ἡ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἐτι οἱ πολλοὶ
tῶν ἀπαίδευτων τοὺς τοιούτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι
cάλλιστα, τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐκ ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ εἶτερα λόγου
καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. ἐντολὴ δὲ τὸ συμβαίνον·

идей, Β', περὶ δεινοτῆτος (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 395); on the
third kind of dei nou̇es represented by Gorgias and his school, οἱ σοφισταὶ; ὁ
φανόμενος λόγος δεινὸς οὐκ ὁ τοιοῦτος. γίνεται γὰρ τὸ πλεῖστον περὶ τὴν
λέξιν, ὅταν τραχείας καὶ σφυραῖς τίς ἡ καὶ σεμνὰς συμφορήσεις λέξεις εἰς
εξαγγέλλη τούταις ἔννοιαις ἐπιτολαίους καὶ κοινὰς.

λέγοντες εὐθύς κ.τ.λ.] Cic. Orat. LII 175, of Isocrates, also a follower
of Gorgias, Quum enim viderit oratores cum severitate audiri poetas
autem cum voluptate, tum dicitur numeros secutus quibuscumiam in ora-
tione uterum, quum incunditatis causa tum ut varietas occurreret
satiati. So Theophrastus, Dion. Lys. Iud. c. 14, condemns this
affected poetical language of the Sicilian school of rhetoricians as childish,
tὸ ἵππον καὶ ὁμονοιον παιδώδης, and unworthy of a serious purpose, καθάπερεπο-

On Gorgias' novel and poetical style and the figures that he introduced
into Rhetoric, see Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philology,
No. VII Vol. III pp. 66—7, 73—5, and on the rhetorical figures, which are
classified, 69—72. Comp. Cic. Orat. § 175 [paria paribus adiuncta et
similiter definita itemque contraris relata contraria, quae sua sponde,
etiamis id non agas, cadunt plerumque numerose, Gorgias primus invenit,
sed etsi est usus intemperantius. See also Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit,
i esp. pp. 57—64. As a specimen of the poetical style of Gorgias we have
his metaphorical term for vultures, ἐκυψαῖοι τάφοι, parallels to which may
be found in the poets Lucretius and Spenser, Lucr. v 924, videa videns vīno
sepeliri viscera busto, and Faery Queen II 8. 16 (quoted by Munro), To be
entombed in the raven or the kite. That this fancy for poetic prose was
with Gorgias a 'ruling passion strong in death', is proved by the phrase
used at the close of his life, 'At last Sleep lays me with his brother
Death'. Another of his death-bed utterances, ὥσπερ ἐκ σαπροῦ καὶ ἰόντος
σφυραίον δαμένοις ἀπαλλάττομαι (Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 184),
may be illustrated by Waller's lines, The soul's dark cottage, battered
and decayed, Lets in new light through chinks that time has made).

λόγοι] prose, opposed to ποίησις. infra § 9, c. 2 §§ 3 and 6, ψιλοί λόγοι,
Plato Rep. III 390 A, ἐν λόγῳ ἦ ἐν ποίησι. 'This is shewn by the result:
for even the tragic writers no longer employ it (sc. τῇ λέξις) in the same
way (as the earlier tragedians did), but just as they passed from the
(trochaic) tetrameter to the iambic measure because of all other metres
this most resembles prose, so also in the use of words (names or nouns)
they have dropped all that are contrary to the usage of ordinary con-
verson, and have dropped also those with which the earliest (dramatic)
writers (subauli ποιήσεως; especially ΑEschylus) used to adorn (their
οὖθε γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας τοιοῦτες ἐτὶ χρώνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ ὁσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τοῦ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατων εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὅνομάτων ἁφείκασιν ὁσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτον compositions), a practice which is even now retained by the writers of hexameters (Epics): it is absurd therefore to copy those who themselves no longer employ that (the original) style'.

ὁσπερ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ] This tautological repetition of καὶ in an antithesis is characteristic of Aristotle's style. [ Cf. supra § 3.]

ἐκ τῶν τεταρμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν] Poet. IV 17, 18, 19. μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτίκων τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖον ἐστὶ πλείστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διάλεκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλον κ.τ.λ. III 3. 3 ult. where this passage is referred to. III 8. 4. Welcker, Nachtrag, p. 239.

ὁμοιότατον τῶν ἄλλων] In translating this I have purposely retained the ungrammatical and illogical 'other' with the superlative, because the same blunder is equally common in our own language, Swift, Tale of a Tub, 'The most perfect of all others', Hooker, Eccl. Pol. 'of all other, they are...most infallible'. Bacon, Essay Of Envy, 'one of the most able of his predecessors' (of whom he is not, and cannot be, one), 'of all other affections (envy) the most importune and continual'. The examination of this, and the other irregular use of ἄλλος, (πολύτικα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξένοι [Plat. Gorg. p. 473 c]), and the analogies in English, is reserved for an Appendix [this Appendix was apparently never written, though its intended preparation is also hinted in Mr Cope's translation of the Gorgias, p. 11. Compare note 1 to II 9. 9, τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτούργοι μάλιστα].

διάλεκτον] for 'common conversation' (properly dialogue): compare c. 2. 5, ἡ εἰσοδία διάλεκτος, and Poet. XXII 14. In a somewhat different application διάλεκτος is the third and highest stage of 'sound', (1) noise, ὕφος, which even inanimate things, brute matter, wood and stone, are capable of producing: (2) φωνή, φθόγγος, the indistinct voice of an animal: and (3) διάλεκτος, the distinct utterance of the μέροτες ἄνθρωποι, the power of conversation, characteristic of humanity. This distinction lies in the power which man has, and other animals (I believe) want, of pronouncing consonants, which produce distinct, articulate words. On speech, as the characteristic of man, see Pol. I 2, 1253 a 10, seq. where λόγος is substituted for διάλεκτος, [also Isocr. Paneg. § 48, τοῦτο μόνον (sc. τούς λόγους) εἰς ἀπάτων τῶν ζωῶν ζῳον ἔχουσιν ἔχοντες, and Cicero, de Off. I 16. 50, (jure) rationis et orationis expertes, de Oratore I §§ 32, 33].

οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὅνομάτων ἁφείκασιν] Of this change, the lowering of the language of tragedy to the level of common life, the earliest author (as we are told in c. 2. 5) was Euripides, in his later plays, which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus, and Ion. The change was completely carried out in the New Comedy of Menander, Philemon Diphilus, &c. On this everyday character of Euripides' later and worse compositions—which are to be carefully distinguished from such as the Medea, Hippolytus and Ion—to which the language was
§§ 9, 10; 2 § 1.

1 1st, 1 δ' 1 πρότερον 1 ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἑτὶ νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξαμέτρα ποιοῦντες. διὸ γέλοιον μιμεῖσθαι πούτους οἱ 10 αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρωνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ πρόπω. ὡστε φανερῶν ὅτι οὐχ ἁπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἐστιν εἰπεὶν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης ὅις λέγομεν. περὶ δὲ ἐκείνης εὑρηταὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

2 ἐστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὡρίσω τι λέξεως ἀρετῇ σαφῆ εἶναι. σημεῖον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ λόγος, εὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἐργον καὶ μὴ ταπεινην

11 [The rendering given at the foot of p. 11 follows Bekker's Oxford ed. of 1837, which has οἷς θ (sic) οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἑτὶ νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξαμέτρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφελεσθιτ' but there is nothing to show that Mr Cope deliberately preferred this to the text as printed in Bekker's third edition; which is also approved in Spengel's note, except that he would strike out the first ἀφελεσθιτ, and not the second.]

made to conform, see Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. xxv. §§ 2, 3. In Arist. Ran. 959, Euripides is made to take credit for it, οἰκεία πράγματ' εἰσάγων, οἷς χρώμεθ', οἷς ἐφερομεν.

§ 10. 'And therefore it is plain that we must not go into exact detail in describing all that may be said about style, but confine ourselves to the kind of which we are now speaking (i.e. the use of it in Rhetoric). The other (the general view of the subject) has been treated in the Poetics'.

There is a useful note on the various senses of ἀκριβεία in Aristotle in Grant's Ethics, 1 7. 18. Here it is used in the first of these, of accuracy, or exactness, as shewn in minute detail, a complete survey of an entire subject.

CHAP. II.

Some general remarks upon Style and its virtues, and the various classifications of these in ancient and modern systems of Rhetoric, are given in the Introduction, as preliminary to the paraphrase of this chapter, pp. 279—282. [Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 43.]

§ 1. 'Let so much suffice for the consideration (observation) of that (τὰ περὶ ποιητικῆς, c. 1. 10); and (now) let it be regarded as settled (or determined) once for all that one virtue of style is to be perspicuous: for a sign of this is, that if the speech (or language) do not explain its meaning, it will fail to perform its own proper function'.

This is a reference to the rule first laid down by Plat. Rep. I 352 d seq., and adopted by Aristotle who constantly recurs to it—see especially Eth. Nic. II 5, init.—that the virtue or excellence of anything, knife, horse, or anything that can be employed as an instrument, is determined by its ἐφούν or special function, in the due performance of which it lies. If the special function of language is to explain one's meaning, it is plain that if it fail to do that—if it is not perspicuous—it does not answer its intended purpose.
'And neither mean nor exaggerated' (beyond or above the true valuation of the subject it is employed upon, turgid, pompous, inflated), 'but decent, appropriate, suitable' (a precept of propriety): 'for though it may be (ἰσος) poetical language is not tame, yet it is by no means suitable to prose.' Comp. Poet. XXII 1, λέξεως δὲ ἀριθμὸς σαφῆς καὶ μη ταπεινῶν εἰσά. These are the two indispensable excellences of style, (1) clearness or perspicuity, and (2) propriety. On these see Introduction, p. 280.

§ 2. 'Of nouns and verbs' (the ultimate elements, and principal components, of language: see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III. p. 371. Poet. XXI 8—9) 'perspicuity is produced by (the use of) proper names, a character not tame but ornate is imparted by all the rest of the (kinds of) words which are enumerated in the Poetics (c. XXI 4): to alter language in this way' (from the received and familiar expressions to which we are accustomed), 'invests it with a higher dignity' (because it makes it unusual, and strange; not familiar, which 'breeds contempt'); 'for men have the same feeling in regard of language as they have to strangers as compared with their fellow-citizens' (they disregard those whom they are in the habit of seeing every day, but are struck with the appearance of strangers, and pay them attention, if not always respect). To the note on κύρια ὄνομα, Introd. p. 282, note 2, add that in the Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, and 30 (31) 6, these are called εἰκεία 'proper', by a different metaphor.

ἐξαλλάζει] ἔνση § 5, ἐξαλλάττειν τοῦ πρόσωπος, c. 3. 3, τὸ εἰσώδες ἐξαλλάττειν (which explains it: comp. Poet. XXII 3 ἔνση). So Poet. XXI 4, and 20, ὄνομα ἐξηλαμβάνον, XXII 3, (λέξις) ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἱδιωτικόν, Ib. § 8, ἐξαλλαγαί τῶν ὄνομάτων. From which it results that the meaning of the term is 'a change out of, or departure from ὄνομα κύρια, the vulgar language, the ordinary mode of expression', for which something novel, unusual, striking is substituted. Ἰσορ. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 179, λόγους διεξόν πολὺ τῶν εἰσαμένων λέγεσθαι παρ' ὑμῖν ἐξηλαμβάνοις; Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας, περὶ συγκρίσεως ult. (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 280), λέξιν περιττῆς καὶ ἐξηλαμβάνης, καὶ ἀνωνήσῃ. Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene, c. 10, ἐξηλαμβάνον τοῦ συνθέους χαρακτήρος, Ib. c. 15, περιττά καὶ ἐξηλαμβάνον τοῦ συνθέους, de Thuc. Lid. c. 28, τὴν διάσωραν ἐξαλλάττειν ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθους, Ep. II ad Amm. c. 3 ἡ ἐξηλαμβάνη τῆς συνθέους χρήσεως. Erernsti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v.

§ 3. 'And therefore a foreign air must be given to the language; for people are admirers of (or wonder at) what is far off, remote, and
all that is wonderful (excites surprise, raises our curiosity) is agreeable. Poet. XXIV 17, τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἦδ' σήμειον δὲ, πάντες γὰρ προστάθειντες ἀπεγείλοντο ὡς χαρίζομεν. Comp. I 11. 21, on the pleasure of 'wonder', and the gratification of curiosity in learning: see the note.


'Now in verse of all kinds there are many ways of producing this effect, and there they are appropriate, because the subject (circumstances) and the characters (persons) of the story (the fable or poem) are further removed' from common life; stand out of, and above, the ordinary level of humanity, Hist. An. I 14. 1)—'but in prose compositions these (modes of giving novelty and variety to the language) must be much more sparingly used' (χρηστῶν, or are appropriate to fewer occasions, τοῦτο, or rather ταῦτα, ἀρμότει, Buhle), 'because the subject (theme, argument) is less (lower, less elevated),—(and this is true a fortiori in prose) for even in the other (in poetry) if a slave or a very young man were to use fine language it would be rather unbecoming, or (if any one else did so) on a very trifling subject, but on the contrary even in that' (poetry, not 'prose' as Victorius), 'propriety consists in a due contraction and expansion (amplification); the adaptation of the language to the circumstances, raising or lowering it as the occasion requires. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 38. 153. Orat. I.X 202. Also XXI 70, ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilior quam quid debeat videre. Πρέπον appellare hoc Graeci; nos dicamus sane decorum. § 72, Quam enim indecorum est de stilicidiis quorum apud unum indicem dicās amplexissimīs verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summis et subtilibus! De stilicidiis dicere illustrates peri λίαν μικρῶν. On the language of poetry and prose, comp. Isocr. Evag. §§ 8—11.


1 οὐκόθεσιν, anything that is subjected as a foundation, a supposition or hypothesis, the basis of an argument, a first principle assumed, a theory, an underlying principle on which a scheme is to be built, the plot (ground plan) of a play, and so forth.
§ 4. ‘Hence—from the necessity of paying attention to the selection of appropriate language in respect of characters and subjects—may be inferred (διὸ) the necessity of disguising the art employed, and of avoiding the appearance of speaking, not naturally, but artificially’ (πλάττειν ψεύτερ, of fiction, or artificial composition), ‘for the one is persuasive, the other the contrary’, (comp. c. 8 § 1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον, πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ.) ‘For people take offence at (lit. are at variance with, in opposition to) (one who employs artifice) as at one who has a design upon them, just as they do at mixed wines’.

Victorius quotes Plut. Symp. IV p. 661 D, διὸ φιεῖγοσι τὸν μεμψημένον οἶνον οἱ πίνοντες: οἱ δὲ μεγαλύτερα πεπλάσθαι λαμβάνειν, οὐ ἐπιβουλεύονται. From this curious coincidence it seems that “mixed wine” must have been proverbal for a concealed enemy: mixed wine, ‘the mixing of liquors’, being, as was supposed, of a much more intoxicating character than unmixed. Philonis is arguing against ποικίλῃ τροφῇ: simple food is always best.

‘And as is the case with Theodorus’ voice (lit. Theodorus’ voice is affected) in comparison with that of all the rest of the actors’ (there should be a colon, instead of a comma, at μεμψημένων: καὶ οἶνον ἡ Θεοδώρου is continued from τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν: it is an instance of the art disguising art, an artificial voice assuming the appearance of one natural and simple): ‘for his voice appears to be that of the speaker (though it is in reality disguised), but the others as though they belonged to other people’ (were assumed, with the character represented).

Theodorus, a celebrated tragic actor, is mentioned—generally with Polus or Aristodemus—by Dem. de F. L. § 274, ἔσι; Arist. Pol. IV (vii) 17, sub fin., 1336 b 28, from which it appears that, like other great artists and performers, ancient and modern, he presumed upon his reputation and artistic skill: also by Plutarch, frequently, as Bellone an pace cl. f. Ath. c. 6. 348 F, de sui laud. c. 7, 545 F (a dictum of his to Satyrus the comic poet), Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, c. 21, 816 F, Theodorus and Polus taken as types of τῶν ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ πρωταγωνιστῶν: probably, by Diogenes Laertius, who at the end of his account of Aristippus, 11 § 8, § 103, 4, enumerates twenty Theodoruses (including the philosopher who gives occasion to this digression), and amongst them one οὗ τὸ φωνασκαλίαν (on the exercise of the voice) βιβλίον παγκαλόν: a subject so germane to the profession of a tragic actor, that, although Diogenes says no more about him, one cannot help suspecting that he must be the same with the one here mentioned. Fabricius in his catalogue of Theodoruses, Vol. x, names him with a special reference to the passage of Aristotle’s Politics, and a general one to Plutarch,
5 εἶναι, αὖ δ' ἀλλότρια. κλέπτεται δ' εὖ, εἰάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰσωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθή. ὁ περ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος. ὄντων δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εἷς ὄν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαυτ' ἐχόντων εἰδῆ ὁσα τεθεώρηται εὖ τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, τούτων γλῶτται μὲν καὶ διπλωίς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ χρηστέουν (όπου δ' ὑστερον ἐρούμεν, Valckenæer Diatribe ad Eur. Fragm. p. 182 b. He is omitted in Smith's Biographical Dictionary.

§ 5. 'And this cheat (disguise, delusion) is fairly effected' (the assumed character escapes observation, is stolen from the view), 'if the composer selects for his composition words out of the ordinary language (of common life); such as are the verses of Euripides, who gave us the earliest specimen (hint or glimpse, ὑπὸ) (of this kind of writing)'.


ὑπέδειξε] as I have pointed out, Introd. p. 284, note 2, q. v., may also signify 'traced as a guide'; for his successors to follow. See also p. 285, note 1, on Euripides' style, and Archimelus' epigram there given.

'And of the nouns and verbs' (or subject and predicate, Introd. p. 371, Appendix A to Bk. III), 'of which the speech (or language, in general) is composed, of which the nouns have so many kinds as have been considered in the treatise on Poetry' (c. XXI, where, in § 4, eight varieties are enumerated, and then defined seriatim, §§ 5—20), 'of these words, foreign or obsolete, and (long) compound words' (Aeschylean compounds), 'and words invented (manufactured for the occasion), are to be rarely employed, and in rare places (on rare occasions); where (these are), we will state by and by: (in cc. 3 and 7). The why, has been already stated; and that (the why) is because it (the use of them) varies (from the ordinary standard) towards, in the direction of, exaggeration (or excess) beyond propriety (what is becoming).

On γλῶτται, διπλά ὀνόματα, see Introd. on c. 3, pp. 287, 8. πεποιημένον δ' ἐστιν ὁ ὄλως μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶς τίθεται ὁ ποιητής' οίον τὰ κέρατα ἐρυνας καὶ τὸν ἱερὰ ἀρητῆρα (Poet. XXI. 17).

AR. III.
§ 6. 'The proper (ordinary) name, and the special name of anything,' (οἶκεῖον, the thing's own or right name, its special designation, Victorius), 'and the metaphor, are alone serviceable for the language of prose. And a sign of this is, that these alone are used by everybody (are of universal application); for everyone makes use of metaphors\(^1\), and the common (sanctioned by common usage) 'and appropriate words in his ordinary conversation: and therefore it is clear that good composition will have a foreign air (an air of novelty, something unusual, above the flatness and monotony of ordinary, vulgar, talk: § 3), that (the art employed in it) may escape detection (pass unobserved, § 4), and that it will be clear and perspicuous, (in virtue of the κύριον and οἰκεῖον ὄνομα). And in these, as we said (ἡ, in §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), consists the excellence of the rhetorical speech.\(^2\)

With the 'foreign', unusual character of good composition, comp. Demetr. περὶ ἐρμηνείας § 77, (Spengel, Ῥήτ. Gr. III 280), τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι τούτῳ περιττήν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἐξηλλαμμένην καὶ ἀσυνήθη μᾶλλον. οὕτω γὰρ ἔτει τῶν ὄγκων, ἡ δὲ κύρια καὶ συνήθης σαφῆς μὲν, λειτή δὲ καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητος.

κύριον ὄνομα is δ ἔρωται ἐκαστοι (Poet. XXI 5), opposed to γλώττα ὑπ’ ἔτερου: the common, usual, established, term, for expressing anything, opposed to the foreign and barbarous, or archaic and obsolete γλώττα. The word derives its special meaning from the original signification of κύριος, 'carrying authority', 'authoritative'; whence 'authorised, established, fixed (by authority), settled', as κύριος νόμος, δόγμα, κυρία ἡμέρα, ἐκκλησία, opposed to the irregular ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος, convoked at uncertain times on special occasions: and hence applied to the established, settled, regular name of a thing. See further on κύριον ὄνομα in note 2, Introd. pp. 282, 3. [On κύριος, compare notes on 2. 4. and 3. 4.]

οἰκεῖον ὄνομα expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor. It is something 'of one's own', appropriate, peculiar, characteristic, special. This is the Latin 'nomen proprium', of which Cicero says, de Or. III 37, 149, quae propria sunt, et certa ('define') quasi vocabula rerum, paene una cum rebus ipsis (naturally belonging to them). From these are distinguished quae transferuntur (all metaphorical words)

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1 Schrader quotes Cic. Orator, c. 24 § 81, *Translationes frequentissime scribo omnis utilius, non modo urbanorum, sed etiam rusticorum, signidem est corum gemmam vitæ, sitire agros, lactas esse sestas, luxuriosa frumenta.*

2 'If the orator confines himself to these, his style may be novel and ornamental, yet without forcing itself unduly upon the attention, and perspicuous.' Paraphr. in Introd.
et quasi aliena in loco collocantur: aut ipsis quae novamus et facimus ipsi (all foreign innovations on the ordinary language, aliena, Cicero, ἀλλὰ, διὰ ὧν ὁμοίωσις εἰς ὑμῶν, &c.). Cicero and the Latins do not distinguish κύρια and οἰκεῖα. Yet, as Victorius has pointed out, he uses terms exactly corresponding to those of Aristotle: de Or. III 39, 159, quod omnes translati et alienis magis quam propriis et suis. For even if we understand here suis of their own language (as I suppose we should), this is immediately followed by nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum proprium non habet; and in pro Caecina, c. 18 § 51, we have, res ut omnes suis certis ac propriis vocabulis nominentur. οἰκεῖος stands for κύριος, Metaph. Δ 29, 1024 a 32, of Antisthenes, εὕθες ἦσον μηδέν ἄξιοι λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἑῷ ἐνος.

§ 7. This is a parenthetical note: it has little to do with Rhetoric except so far as it occupies common ground with poetry, in the use of synonyms. 'Of names (words) homonyms (ambiguous words, with more than one meaning) are useful to the Sophist' (the fallacious reasoner; see II 24.2, the topic of ὑμωνυμία, and the note)—'for those are the (principal) instruments of his (logical) frauds or cheats; to the poet, synonymy'. The homonym and the synonym are defined at the commencement of the Categories. The former is a word of more than one signification, of which the several definitions do not agree; so that the name being the same, the one signification can be employed fallaciously for the other: synonyms are words which can be variously applied, in which the name and the definition (or meaning) do agree; as animal, can be said with truth of man and ox. Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 42, p. 116, on synonyms. Of homonyms Quintilian says, Inst. Or. VII 9. 2, singula afferunt errorem, quia pluribus rebus aut hominiibus eadem appellatio est, (ὄνομα δικτύρ) ut Gallus; avem enim, an gentem, an nomen, fierunt corporis significet incertum est: et Aiex Telaemonis an Oilei filius. Verba quoque quaedam diversos intellectus habent, ut cerno: (with the application of it in suits of law). Of this logical application of κακούργεων, see the examples quoted in note on I 1. 10.

'By proper and synonymous I mean such words as πορενήσεως and βαδίζεως: these are both of them proper and identical in meaning'. According to Trendelenburg, u. s., πορενήσεως is the genus and βαδίζεως the species, both predicable of animals in the same sense: "Aristoteles enim constantem vocabulum (ὑμωνυμία) ita frequentavit, ut vel eiusdem generis formas vel genus et species, quatenus communi nomine comprehenduntur, synonyma diceret." The use of these to the poet lies
'Now what each of these things is'—i.e. the things already enumerated, nomina propria, translatia, συνώνιμα &c. (Victorius)—'and the number of the kinds of metaphors, and that this, metaphor, is most effective both in poetry and prose, has been already stated, as we said (§ 2, τῶν δ’ ὄνοματων καὶ ῥημάτων—τάλλα ὄνομα ὤσα εἰρήνη ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς), in our work on poetry'. Max Schmidt, in his tract On the date of the Rhetoric, Halle, 1837 (frequently referred to in the Introd.), and before him Victorius, notices here, that the synonyms alone of all the words here referred to do not appear in the Poetics; from which each of them infers a lacuna in that work: more especially as Simplicius had left on record that Aristotle had treated of them in his book on poetry. There is another loss in that work indicated by a reference in Rhet. i 11. 29 [and III 18. 7] to the Poetics for an account of τὸ γελοῖον, which is now no longer to be found there.

§ 8. 'And they require all the more diligent attention (φιλοποιεῖν 'labour con amore;' fond, affectionate, loving, care and pains), to be bestowed upon them in prose, in proportion as the sources from which prose draws its aids or supplies are fewer than those of verse': see ante § 3. I have translated τοσοῦτοι which seems much more likely than τοσοῦτα. If the latter be retained, it can only mean 'so much as I have described', but where? or when? I have no doubt that τοσοῦτοι is the right reading. ['τοσοῦτο A (quod Bekkerum fugit) Q, unde iamVictorius τοσοῦτορ restituit,' Spengel.]

'And perspicuity' (perhaps rather, 'clearness' in the sense of vivid, graphic, representation1), 'and pleasure, and the foreign air, are conveyed by metaphor more than in any other way', (more than by any other kind of word which can be used to give an extraneous interest to language). ἢτι δὲ μέγα μὲν τὸ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰρημένων πρεπόντως χρῆσθαι, καὶ διπλῶς ὄνυμασι καὶ γλώστασι, πολὺ δὲ μεγίστω τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. Poet. XXII. 16. The pleasure derived from metaphors is that we learn something from them; they bring into view hitherto unnoticed resemblances between things the most apparently dissimilar. τὸ εὐτεμαφβείειν τὸ τοῦ ῥημαίος θεωρεῖν, Poet. XXII 17. Top. Z 2, 140 a 9. This is the fourth kind of metaphor, that from analogy, and by far the commonest and most attractive. On the pleasure of learning, see I 11. 21 and 23, III 10. 2.

'And it can't be derived (acquired) from anyone else'. This does not of course mean that one writer or speaker cannot borrow a metaphor

1 Demetrius, however, περὶ 'Ερμηνειας § 81, (Spengel, Rhode Gr. II 281), says, ἦνα μενοι σαφέτερον ἐν ταῖς μεταφοράς λέγεται καὶ κυριώτερον ἤπερ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κυρίοις, ὡς τὸ ἐφρίζειν δὲ μάχη (II. N 339), κ.τ.λ. but this is by the vividness of the description.
from another; but that the invention of metaphors is a mark of original genius, and therefore cannot be taught, derived from another in the way of instruction. Not that metaphors in general are confined to men of genius, πάντες γὰρ μεταφοράς διαλέγονται, § 6; but they all show originality more or less, and are marks of natural (not acquired) ability, or genius, each in proportion to its merit. μόνον γὰρ τούτο (τὸ μεταφορικὸν) οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου ἐστὶ λαβεῖν, εὐφυίας τε σημεῖον ἐστίν’ τὸ γὰρ εὗ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὀμοῦν θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. Poet. XXI 17. And therefore, the more remote the resemblance between the two objects brought together by the metaphor, the more ingenuity and natural ability is required for detecting it.

Harris, Philol. Inq., Part II, ch. 10, takes this view of the meaning; "that metaphor is an effort of genius and cannot be taught is here again (in the present passage) asserted in the words, καὶ λαβεῖν...παρ’ ἄλλου." Whately, on the other hand, denies that this means, "as some interpreters suppose, that this power is entirely a gift of nature, and in no degree to be learnt: on the contrary he expressly affirms that the 'perception of resemblances' on which it depends is the fruit of 'philosophy': but he means that metaphors are not to be, like other words and phrases, selected from common use and transferred from one composition to another, but must be formed for the occasion" [Rhetoric, chap. III p. 277 ult.]. Whatever Aristotle may have said elsewhere, it is certain that what he says in the Poetics, and therefore in this passage which is repeated from it, is what Harris has described: the close connexion of παρ’ ἄλλου λαβεῖν with the following εὐφυία shows this unmistakably. Besides this, a remark about borrowing metaphors from other people's speeches or writings is not only trivial in itself, but here altogether out of place: and if it were not, why should metaphors be singled out from all other forms of speech as things that should not be borrowed? Is not purloining your neighbour's thoughts or expressions or bons mots equally reprehensible in all cases? or may γλῶτται and πεποιημένα and the rest, all of them be 'borrowed', and metaphors alone excepted? Victorius, according to Schraeder, renders it, "non licet semper sumere ipsam ab alio auctore," which he approves, and interprets, that you musn't be always begging or borrowing your metaphors from others, when you can and ought to invent them yourself. In my copy of Vettori's Commentary [Petri Victorii Commentarri in Opera Aristotelis, 5 vols.folio, published at Florence, 1548—1553], these words do not occur: the passage is there explained, as it should be, of 'acquiring metaphors' from any one but oneself: they being due to a natural ingenuity. Victorius also says that this remark, upon the inventive power which they presuppose, is introduced as an additional recommendation of metaphors: and refers to one of the topics of Top. III., the degrees of good, καὶ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ παρ’ ἄλλου πορίσαις η ὃ ἐστὶ παρ’ ἄλλου, what can't be procured from another, any native excellence or advantage, is superior to anything that can. Also c. 1, 116 b 10, τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ
§ 9. ‘Epithets’ (including not only single adjectives, but any ornamental or descriptive addition to a plain άναλόγον, as a sauce to a joint; see Introd. p.280) and metaphors must be made appropriate (in the former, to the subjects to which they are applied, in the latter to those to which we transfer them from something else): this appropriateness will proceed from the proportion (between the epithet or metaphor and the thing it is applied to in either case: “si ex proportione duxerimus, observaverimusque ut ipsa sibi mutuo respondeant, similemque rationem inter se habent.” Victorius): ‘otherwise (εἰ μὴ εἰσιν άρμοττούσαι) the impropriety will be apparent, glistening, (by the juxtaposition), because the opposition of two contraries becomes most apparent when they are placed side by side of one another. But (on the contrary) we must consider, as a scarlet coat is suitable to a youth, so also (what is suitable) to an old man: for the same dress is not becoming to both’.

φανεται, φαίνεσθαι is used in the emphatic sense, equivalent to φανερών είναι—which occurs in the parallel passage, Π 23. 30—is illustrated in note on Π 2. 1, and 1 7. 31 [p. 141]. The observation that παράλληλα τά ένποτα μάλλον φανεται is a favourite one with Aristotle. The parallels from the Rhetoric are quoted in note on Π 23. 27. Add Dem. de F. L. § 192, παρ’ άλληλα γάρ έσται φανερώτερα.

An inappropriate epithet may be illustrated by the substitution of amabile and formosum for horrendum and informe in Virgil’s line, Monstrum horrendum informe ingenae cui lumen ademptum: a metaphor is inappropriate when you bring some incongruous notion into juxta-position with the object which you ‘invest’ with your metaphor, like an old man with the incongruous dress of a scarlet coat;—although viridis is not inappropriate to senectus, though greenness and old age might seem incongruous, because in this application of the metaphor the proportion or ratio is observed between the freshness implied in the green vegetation and the freshness and vigour of old age, and the two are thus brought under a common genus. When old age is called the evening of life the metaphor is appropriate, because there is a true proportion or analogy; evening: the day: old age: man’s life; evening and old age are under a common genus, viz. the close of a period, εν τῷ αὐτῷ γένεσιν, infirma; comp. Pet. xxi 10, τάμειν, ἀράνθανε ἄμφω γάρ ἂθελεῖν τί ἐστίν. But when Shakespeare [Hamlet, iii i. 59] speaks of taking arms against a sea of troubles there is neither proportion nor congruity: and in such cases, when the two notions are placed side by side, and so brought directly into contrast, the incongruity becomes at once apparent. This kind of solecism is usually called ‘confusion of metaphor’.
§ 10. 'And if you want to set off anything (if praise is your object), you must take your metaphor from the superior (better, more honourable or valuable) things that fall under the same genus; if blame, from the inferior. As an instance of my meaning; since contraries are (the extremes of the species) under the same genus, to say that one that prays, begs and one that begs, prays, is to do this; because both of them are kinds of petition'. These are the two extremes of the genus petition, or solicitation; praying the highest form, begging the lowest; 'as also (besides others, ka) Iphicrates (called) Callias (whom he wished to depreciate) μητραγύρης instead of δαδουχος ['a mendicant priest', instead of 'bearer of the mystic torch']. The other (Callias) replied, that he (his opponent) never could have been initiated (or he would have been incapable of such a mistake), else he would not have called him μητραγύρης but δαδουχος—for it is true (adds Aristotle, by way of explanation) that they are both attached to the service of a goddess (both come under the common genus 'servants of a goddess'), but the one is a term of honour, the other of dishonour'. It is much like calling the Precentor of a Cathedral a ballad-singer.

τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει] This is the definition of 'contrary', ἐναντίον: τὰ πλειστὸν ἄλληλον διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὡριζόντα, Categ. c. 6, ὃ ἄ 17.

Καλλίας is the third of that name, the son of the third Hipponicus, of that noble and wealthy Athenian family, of which the heads received these names alternately during several generations, Arist. Ran. 283, Ἰππόνικος Καλλίας καὶ Ιππονίκου Καλλίας. The title of δαδουχος, hereditary in his family, is especially assigned to him by Xenophon, Hellen. vi 3 3, Καλλίας ο δαδουχος. His pride in this distinction would of course have rendered him much more susceptible to the slight conveyed by Iphicrates' ignorant, or malicious, mistake. The substitution of the one word for the other, though evidently interpreted by Callias (from his reply) as a mistake made in ignorance of the distinction between the two—perhaps wilfully, to save his dignity—is much more likely to have been intentional and malicious. Callias was a vain foolish man—see Xenophon. l. c. § 3, ult. and Callias' speech §§ 4, 5, 6,—and Iphicrates, the self-made man, who had risen to distinction by his own merits, εἰς οἶνον ἐλεύθερον, would doubtless have enjoyed a joke at the expense of the pompous and empty 'descendant of Triptolemus' (Xen. l. c.) and hereditary δαδουχος of the Great Mysteries. Xenophon mentions him as one of the ambassadors to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in virtue of his here-


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ΡΙΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 2 § 10.

ἀμύητον αὐτὸν ἐίναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δαδοῦχον· ἀμφω γὰρ περὶ θεῶν, ἀλλὰ
ditary προϊσία of that state. There is a good account of this Callias by Mr Elder in Smith's Biogr. Dict. He is the entertainer of the Sophists in the Protagoras, and the host of Xenophon's 'Banquet'. On Callias and his family, its wealth and splendour, see Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. IV c. 3, pp. 42, 3 (Lewis' Transl.), and Heindorf's learned note on Protag. 311.

The δαδοῦχος was, as we have seen, an office of great distinction. The δαδοῦχος led the procession of the μύσται from Athens to Eleusis on the fifth day of the great Eleusinia, the torch-day, ἕ τῶν λαμπάδων ἡμέρα. See Dict. Antiq. Art. 'Eleusinia,' p. 373 b. Rich, Dict. Gr. and Rom. Ant. s. v. p. 232.

μητραγύρτης, on the contrary, implies everything that is vile and contemptible: it is the designation of a class of profligate beggars, chiefly women, who attached themselves to the worship of some particular deity—usually Cybele, the Magna Mater, from which μητραγύρτης is taken—at whose festivals they attended to ply their profession, that of ἀγείρειν, collecting alms, stipec cogere, and then practised every kind of imposture and indulged in every variety of licentiousness. They seem also to have gone their rounds through the great houses in cities, Plat. Rep. II 364 B—C, fortune-telling, and with charms and spells (as to draw down the gods from heaven) and other nostrums for sale. They carried about with them an image of the goddess in whose name they asked alms. Lobeck, Aglaophonius, p. 629, compares them to mendicant friars or Βηγνίνες, and designates them viles Metragyrtas. Menander wrote two or three plays upon them, the Θεοφοροευήν and Μητραγύρτης (or Μηναγύρτης, so Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. Menander, IV 163, on which see Lobeck, ibid. 645, note), and the Ιέρεια, which, from the lines εἰ γὰρ ἐλκεῖ τὸν Θεόν τοῖς κυμβαλίοις ἀνθρωπος εἰς ὅ Βουλήτεα, Lobeck supposes (apparently with little reason) to have been directed against the Μητραγύρται. Meineke, ib. Menand. IV 140. Compare on their character, Antiphanes, Fragm. Μισσοποθήρον, Meineke, Ib. III 86, αὐτός δὲ ἑπερ-βάλλοιτε μετά γι νῆ Δία τοῦς μητραγυρτοῦντας γε' πολὺ γὰρ αὐ γένος μαραῶταν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ. On incantations and the like, see Ruhnken ad ἐπαγωγαί, p. 114. To this extremity Dionysius the younger, once tyrant of Syracuse, was finally reduced, αὐτὸς δὲ Διωνύσιος τελος μητραγυρτῶν καὶ τυμπανοφορούμενοι οἰκτρῶς τῶν Βιον κατέστρεψε: Clearchus ap. Athen. 541 σ (Victorius). The μητραγύρται, male and female, did not confine themselves to a single goddess, though Cybele was their favourite, but also attached themselves to the service of Isis; and apparently to that of Demeter and Cora (from the present passage); of Opis and Arge, Hdt. IV 33; and in general, of those whose worship was of an orgiastic character, see by all means Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 10, s. v. ἀγείρειν. Here there are two goddesses implied, Demeter in δαδοῦχος, and Cybele in μητραγύρτης. There is a short article in Dict. Antiq. on the subject under ἀγείρησις.

ἀγείρειν is used to signify collecting alms, or begging, several times by Herodotus; twice, for instance, in IV 35. By Homer, ἀγείρεσθαι and ἀγείρ-
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 2 § 10.

τὸ μὲν τίμων τὸ δὲ ἄτιμων. καὶ ὁ μὲν διόνυσοκολακας, αὐτοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν τάντα δ’


The next is a case of the same kind; of two possible designations of actors one takes the lowest and most contemptuous, the other the opposite and highest and most complimentary. Διόνυσοκολάκες represents them as parasites or flatterers, not worthy to be companions or friends of the god; the lowest and most degraded form of service, of Dionysus the patron deity of the stage and its belongings (Aristophanes passini) τεχνίται as 'artists', or 'artistes'—as the lower kind of professional performers, singers, dancers, posture-makers, are fond of calling themselves nowadays by way of dignifying their profession: the term is actually applied to them by Dem. de F. L. § 212, of Philip who collected at a festival πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας; on which Ulpian (quoted by Shilleto ad loc.) τοὺς υποκρίτας οὕτο καλεί κομικοῦ τε καὶ τραγικοῦ. Shilleto adds, ut aitnunt in Graeciss artificibus, Cic. pro Murena 13 (29). [Ar. Problems 30. 10, 936 b 11, διά τί οἱ Διονυσιακοί τεχνίται ὡς ἔπι τὸ πολὺ ποιητοὶ εἶσιν; referred to by Aulus Gallius, XX 4. Comp. Alciphrion, III 48, (Ἀκυμίων τῶν τραγῳδών) ὃν ἕγω τῆς ἀχαριστίου φωνῆς ἑνεκα αὐτοκροφόν καλεῖσθαι πρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν Διονυσοκολάκων ἐκμενα (Otto Lüders, die Dionysischen Künstler, 1873, pp. 58—63.)

The common genus or notion which unites Διονυσοκολάκες and τεχνίται as 'contraries' is that of service to a deity: the τεχνίται as well as the κολάκες being assumed as actors, to be devoted to his especial service. The distinction is that between true art, and low buffoonery. This, as far as I can see, is the whole meaning of the passage.

Victorius however, and Schweighäuser on Athen. vi 249 F, drag in here, wholly as I can conceive beside the point, another sense of Διονυσοκολάκης in which it was applied to the flatterers of Dionysius of Syracuse—of whose filthy and disgusting practices Theophrastus (quoted in Wytenbach on Plut. p. 53, F) gives some revolting examples—in a double sense, of Dionysus and Dionysius: see their notes for the explanation of this. (It is supposed by them and Mr Shilleto u.s. to be a joke; if so, it is of a very frigid description.) Wytenbach says (note ad Plut. I. c.) "Actores scenici honesto nomine dicebantur οἱ περί Διόνυσον τεχνίται, per contemptum Διονυσοκολάκες": which is no doubt all that is meant here, though he refers to Victorius' note, who makes a great deal more out of it. This special sense of τεχνίται is fully confirmed by another passage of Athen. v 198 B describing a magnificent procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus (cc. 25—30), μεθ’ ὧν ἐπορεῦτο Φιλίσκος ὁ ποιητής, ἵππεως ὧν Διονύσου, καὶ πάντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνίται. It
occurs also in Diog. Laert. x 4. 8, Epicurus called τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα (Plato’s followers) Διονυσοκόλακας, καὶ αὐτὸν Πλάτωνα χρυσόν (which is translated ‘Dionysii assentatores’ in Cobet’s corrected version, though Dionysius can surely have nothing to do with the matter, any more than here). Here also the word is a term of reproach; and seems by this time to have become proverbial for gross and low flattery: “tanquam assentatores eos, non sodales, insimulans.” Victorius. Victorius understands the term, as here used, to express the lowest order of attendants on the stage (parasites of Bacchus), such as the scene-shifters, candle-snuffers, and such like menials of a modern theatre, but another passage of Athen. xi 538 F,—καὶ ἐκτοτε οἱ πρότερον καλούμενοι Διονυσοκόλακες Ἀλέξανδροκόλακες ἐλήφθησαν, διὰ τὰς τῶν διώρων ὑπερβολὰς ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ ἥσθη ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος. This occurs in a list of the entertainments which were exhibited in a great marriage-feast given by Alexander after the capture of Darius, taken from a work of Chares, ‘the histories of Alexander’. Now whether ἐφ’ οἷς ἥσθη refers to Alexander’s delight at their gifts (neut.) or at themselves (masc.), that is, their acting, in either case their employment could not have been of the mean and degrading character attributed to it by Victorius—in the one case they were too rich, in the other, if they amused him, they must have been actors, or at all events above the degree of menials, though their acting may have been mere grimace and buffoonery.

‘And one (to vex and lower them) calls them’ (whether this means any ‘one’ in particular, we do not know) ‘parasites of Dionysus (low buffoons), whereas they themselves style themselves artists: and each of these is a metaphor (artist as applied to them is a metaphor, I suppose, because the proper object of art is production—τέχνη μετὰ λόγον ποιητική, ταύτων ἐν εἰς τέχνη καὶ ἔξεις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοὺς ποιητικοὶ: and ποιητικοὶ being distinguished from πράξεις, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσως ἀλ’ οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. Eth. Nic. vi 4, 1140 a 7 seq.—and these men produce nothing; their profession is practical, ends in πράξεις, or action), ‘the one for the purpose of (lit. belonging to) blackening (soiling, defaming), the other the contrary’.


‘And pirates nowadays call themselves purveyors’. So Pistol, in Merry Wives of Windsor, i 3. 49, “Convey the wise it call: Steal, foh! a fico for the phrase!”

νῦν] referring to the early times spoken of by Thucyd., i 5, when the Greeks ἐπὶ ἀκούοντα πρὸς ληστείαν...οὐκ ἐξοντός πω αἰσχρῶς τούτον τοῦ ἦτον.
The text is presented in Greek and Latin, discussing the use of certain words and phrases in Greek literature. It references specific works and authors, such as Homer and Sophocles. There is a focus on the use of the word "φίλος" and its implications in speech and thought. The text also mentions the importance of the correct use of prepositions and the avoidance of errors in speech, linking to the concept of "προσαμηνεύω" (to use correctly). A passage from Euripides' Telephus is cited, with a discussion on the use of "σφαγη" (slaughter). There is also a reference to the art of rhetoric and the importance of careful and respectful speech. The text concludes with a discussion on the nature of screeching sounds in ancient Greek literature.
with which it is connected, expresses the harsh voices of certain animals as the 'croak' of the raven and the frog, and the 'bawling' of a man, all suggestive of disagreeable associations. The 'badness of the metaphor' seems to reside in this. ἀσημός φωνή is, it is true, nothing but a non-significant voice or sound,' applied, Poet. xx §§ 5, 6, 7, to sounds like syllables, and conjunctions, which signify nothing by themselves, but only in combination with other sounds or words; and opposed to σημαντικά, sounds which do signify something each by itself, as noun and verb §§ 8, 9. But these non-significant sounds, which represent discordant and unmeaning cries, are here to be interpreted as expressing also the associations which they suggest, and so κρανύῃ, which suggests all these disagreeable cries and screams, is particularly ill applied as a metaphor to the sweetest of all voices, such as that of a Muse.

'Dionysius the Brazen', so called from having first suggested the use of bronze money at Athens, Athen. xv 669 d, was a poet and rhetorician, ibid., whose floruit is to be referred to the earlier part of the fifth cent. B.C., judging from a remark in Plut. Nic. c. 5, 526 B, where we are told that there was in Nicias' household a man called Hiero, who claimed to be the son of Dionysius the Brazen. A further account of him is to be found in Smith's Biographical Dictionary, Dionysius no. 16; and a collection of the fragments of his elegies, amounting to seven, in Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. p. 432 [p. 468, 2nd ed.]. In fragm. 5 there is a still worse specimen of his metaphors preserved, which beats even the κώπης ἀνάστη, and in the same kind of fault. καὶ τίνες οἰνον ἄγοτες ἐν εἴρεσι Διονύσου, συμποσίον ναῦται καὶ κυκλῶν ἑρέται.

[On the Bronze coinage of Athens, see Beule's Monnaies d'Athènes, pp. 73—77. It seems impossible to say with certainty, either when it first came in, or what is the date of the oldest bronze money extant. Leake supposes it probable that it came in soon after the first unsuccessful attempt to introduce it, while Beule thinks that the early extant bronzes are of the age of Alexander. It is certain they were in circulation in the time of Philemon, the Comic poet. See Leake's Numismata Hellenica (European Greece), p. 22. These details are due to Professor Churchill Babington.]

On harshness of sound in composition, see Hermog. περὶ ἱδεῶν Τομ. α' c. 7, περὶ τραγάνητος, Spengel Rhel. Gr. ii 299. Of the second class, the ἰδῆς ἐναπών σκληρὰ, the harshness arising 'out of themselves' from the disagreeable combination of the letters, ἄταρπός, έμαρπεν, ἐγκαμφέ, and such like, are given as examples. In the same treatise Τομ. β' c. 4, (11 359), there are some remarks upon the connexion of sounds with pleasant associations, which make the sounds themselves pleasant.

§ 12. 'Further, they must not be far-fetched, but from things kindred (cognate) and of like form must be transferred notions (in the form of words) hitherto nameless in the fashion of names (so as to become new names), any one of which as soon as spoken will be clearly perceived
to be near of kin, as in the popular (famous) aenigma, 'I saw man gluing upon man bronze with fire'; for the process was nameless, but both of them are a kind of application (the common genus); and accordingly he (the author of verses) gave the name of 'gluing' to the application of the cupping glass.'

pòrróthēn] infra c. 3. 4, ὀδοφέις δὲ ἐν πόρροθεν. Demetrius, peri ἔρμηνειας, 78, μὴ ἤπειρον πόρροθεν μετεπηργμέναι (μεταφοράς. χρηστέων), ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὄμοιον. Cíc. de Or. III 41. 163, Deinde videndum est ne longe simile sit ductum. Syrtem patrimonii, scopulum liberti dixerim; Charybdim bonorum, voraginem potius. Facilis enim ad ea quae visa, quam quae audita, mentis osculi feruntur. 1b. II 63. 255, of jokes, in quo, ut ea quae sint frigidiora vitemus—etemiam caudenum est ne accessitum dicitum putetur... Quint. VIII Proem. 23, sunt optima minime accessita. Similarly of arguments supra, I 2. 12, II 22. 3. Top. A 105 a 8.

ἀνώνυμα ὄνομασμένας] Cíc. de Or. III 38. 155, tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem incunditas delectatioque celebravit. In fact, to say nothing of others, words which stand for moral and intellectual notions, abstractions, conceptions, are and must be ultimately derived by metaphor from objects of sense: see Locke, who gives a list of them, Essay, Bk. III ch. 1. 5, Berkeley, Three Dialogues, Dial. III Vol. I p. 202 (4to. ed.), "most part of the mental operations" (this is saying far too little) "being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms, comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c." Whewell, Nov. Org. Renov. Bk. IV I, p. 260. Renan, Orig. du Langage, p. 128, seq. Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais sur l'entend. hum. III 1. 5 (quoted by Renan), Max Müller, Lect. on science of Lang. 1st series, Vol. I p. 377 seq.

The second line of this aenigma, which completes it, is found in Athen. x 452 c, the only author, says Victorius, who gives it entire, οὗτο συγκάλος ὥσπερ σύναμα ποιεῖν. τούτο δὲ σημαίνει τῆς σικς προφθο-λης. It is inserted amongst the aivigmata, No. VIII in the Anthology, Vol. IV p. 288, Jacobs' ed., and preceded by another on the same subject in four lines. The first line is also quoted, Poet. XXII 5, Demetr. peri ἔρμηνειας § 102, (Demetrius recommends that aenigmatical expressions of this kind should be avoided), and Plut. Symp. Sept. Sap. 154 B (Victorius). Harris, Philol. Inq. Pt. II ch. 10, on aenigmas. [On the cupping-instrument referred to in the riddle, compare Juvenal xiv 58 (with Mayor's note), iam pridem caput hoc ventosa curvulta quærit.
Bronze specimens about four inches high, found by Pompeii, may be seen in the Museum at Naples."

'And in general, from all ingenious, well-constructed, aenigmas good metaphors may be derived: for all metaphors convey (imply) an aenigma, plainly therefore a metaphor (so borrowed from a good aenigma) must be itself well converted (i.e. a well-selected metaphor). Cicero thought less highly of aenigmas as a source of metaphors; at all events metaphors, accumulated till they become aenigmas, are reprehensible. De Or. III 42. 167, est hoc (translatio) magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obs. uritas fugienda est: etenim hoc genere fiunt ea quae dicuntur aenigmat.a. eó metenýnektai] is rendered by Cicero (according to Victorius) ratiene translata, and quae sumpta ratione est, de Or. III 40. 160. tó ἐπιεικές μεταφόραμαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄγαθον, Eth. N. v. 14, sub init.

§ 13. 'And (metaphors should be taken) from things fair and noble (subaudit deí λαβείν μεταφοράς): but the beauty of a word (especially a noun, which can represent some visible or audible object), as Licymnios says, resides either in the sound or the sense (the thing signified), and the ugliness in like manner'.

When Aristotle wrote tó μὲν, he seems to have intended to introduce tó de to correspond as the second member of the division, which was afterwards carelessly changed into ἤ. It is surprising however that he never corrected such palpable blunders as these, for which he must have had frequent opportunities. Did he think that they were of no consequence in writing, of which the object was instruction only? He says at any rate, III 1. 6, that no one pays much attention to style in teaching geometry.

ἀπὸ καλῶν] Cic. de Or. III 41. 163, seq. Et quoniam haec vel summum lans est in verbis transferendis ut sensum feriat id quod translatum sit, fugienda omnis turpitudo carum rerum ad quas corruptum quis audient trahet similitudo. Nolò dici morte Africani castratam esse rem publicam; nolò stercus curiae dici Glaucliam: quaevis sit similis, tamen est in utrique deiformis cogitatio similitudinis. Quint., VIII 6. 14—17, quotes the line of Furius Bibaculus (Hor. Sat. II 5. 41), Iuppiter hibernas cana nive conspirit Alpes.

κάλλος δὲ υνώματος] Theophrastus, according to Demetrius περὶ ἐρμηνείας, §§ 173—5 (Rhet. Gr. III 300, ed. Spengel), recognised three sources of beauty in words, (1) the appeal to the sight, the direct suggestion of beautiful objects by the words which are associated with them; (2) to the car, by the sound of the words themselves; and thirdly διάνως, by the 'meaning' or 'sense', Licymnios' ἐναγομένου, and Aristotle's δυνάμεις τῶν, virtue, force, i.e. significance, its power of suggestion. These are illustrated by Demetrius, l.c., the first by ῥοδόχροον, ἀνθοφόρον χρῶς: the second by Καλλιστρατος, Ἀγασίων, (the λλ and υυ seem
to have pleased his ear); and the third by ἄρχαιος as compared with παλαῖος, the former being suggestive of higher and nobler associations: ό γάρ ἄρχαιοι ἄνδρες εντιμότεροι. It seems from this that the distinction between the first and third of these sources of beauty in a word is that the first is the direct suggestion, by word-painting, of a beautiful object of sight, as a rosy cheek or skin: the third is the remoter suggestion of beauty, by inference from association, as ἄρχαιος suggests worth and respect; this form of suggestion has an intellectual character, and is therefore represented by Theophrastus as διάνοια. To the direct suggestions of sight in the first class, Aristotle afterwards adds all the other senses—as music to the ear, a well-remembered flavour to the palate, smell to the nose, soft and warm things to the touch. The second of the three, is the actual sound of the word, suggesting nothing else; Licymnius’ ψόφος, and Theophrastus’ and Demetrius’ πρὸς ἀκοήν.

do ψόφου] There are [as already remarked supra p. 12, on 1 § 9, διάλεκτος], three degrees of sound in an ascending scale. The first and lowest is ψόφος ‘noise’, such as even inanimate things are capable of when struck. The second is voice, φωνή or φθόγγος, (as distinguished from speech,) which is shared by all animals that have a throat. The third is distinctive of the human race, διάλεκτος (sometimes called λογός), discourse, articulate speech. ψόφος as distinguished from φωνή will include all sounds which, though human, do not proceed from the voice and organs of speech: such as sneezing, coughing, hissing, whistling (ποππυρισμός) and so on. These particulars are taken from two passages, Ar. Hist. Anim. iv 9, 535 a 27—b 3, and Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 14 (p. 72, Reiske). Of sound, ψόφος, in its most general sense, as the object of hearing, see de Anima II 8. De Sens. c. 3, init. Ib. c. 1, 437 a 10. Hist. An. I 1. 29, 488 a 31, seq., of the distinctions of animals, in respect of the sounds they make.


‘And again thirdly (a thing ...uation upon metaphors), which solves (furnishes an answer to, serves to refute) the sophistical argument (theory or position); for it is not true, as Bryson said, that no one ever uses (there is that no such thing as) foul or indecent language, if (if—as the case really is, i.e. since or because) the same thing is signified by saying this or that (by using the broad word or disguising it by a veil of ύποκορισμός), for this is false: for one term is more properly applied to an object than another (represents it more literally and directly), and is more assimilated to it, and more nearly akin to it, by setting the
Of Bryson, I have collected what is known in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. V Vol. 11 pp. 143—6. In this dogma of the impossibility of indecent language he seems to have anticipated the Stoics—see Cicero’s famous letter to Paetus on this Stoic libertas logendi, u.s. p. 144 note. *Suo quamque ren nomine appellare* was their statement of this ‘liberty’, to call everything its right and proper name without shame or disguise, to call a spade a spade, to use the language of a Swift or Aristophanes. Aristotle answers Bryson by a simple denial of the fact. It is not true that there is no difference in the use of words in respect of their moral effect upon us; the broad and literal expression presents the abomination much more vividly and impressively to the mind, naked as it were, than the same notion when half hidden from the view by a decent veil which conceals a great deal of its deformity. On this subject of plain speaking, besides Cicero’s letter to Paetus (ad Div. IX 22), already referred to, see Cic. de Off. 1 35. 128 where the Stoics are again introduced. Cicero takes the moral and delicate side of the question. *Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 23*, *ίδοι δ’ αὐν τίς καὶ ἐκ τῶν κυριωτέρων τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν τοῖς μεν ἡν γελοῦν ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια* (the covert insinuation: this is the difference between coarse and refined indelicacy). Ar.’s opinion upon the subject is given much more strongly and decidedly, Pol. IV (vii) 17, 1336 b 3, *ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πολέμου, εἰπέρ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν ἐκ τοῦ γάρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὑπονοοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς*. Perhaps one of the wisest observations the author ever made. Comp. Quint. VI 3. 29.

‘And besides, it is not under the same conditions and circumstances that it signifies this or that, so that on this ground again we must assume that one (mode of expression) is fairer or fouler than another: for though both of them do express (or signify) beauty and deformity, yet not qua beautiful and deformed (in so far as they are beautiful and the reverse, and in no other respect): or, if the latter also, at all events in different degrees’. These two different effects of αἰσχρολογία seem to be thus distinguishable. We are first told that the use of the broad word is offensive because it suggests directly and immediately, paints on the mind a vivid picture of the ugly, foul or impure object: nothing is said of any further, indirect, associations connected with it, and the bad effect arises solely from the *strength* or vividness of the impure or ugly impression. But in the second case the effect of the plain speaking and its associations is contrasted with those that may be produced by softening the term, or employing one which signifies the
same thing, but suggests an entirely different and innocent set of associations. As in the instances given by Cic. in de Off. I 33. 128 liberis dare operam. Here all the associations which would be at once suggested by the broad, obscene word, are diverted, and another set introduced, connected solely with children, as the result of the intercourse, and perfectly free from all impurity. In the one case it is the mere comparison of strength and intensity that makes the difference, in the other there is a difference of kind. 'The fair term and the foul term it is true mean the same thing, point to the same object, but not in respect of beauty and deformity alone simply and solely (ἡ), but besides that, there are associations suggested by which the one may be invested with a moral and the other with an immoral character, either altogether, or at all events in different degrees': ἄμφω γάρ...μάλλον καὶ ἠπτων. An example of these words suggestive of unpleasant associations which are willingly avoided by the well-bred and refined under the name of αἰσχρολογία, is to be found in Plat. Gorg. 494 C, where Socrates is made to apologise to Callicles for shocking him by the use of terms such as ψωρᾶς, κυνηγάμα.

'These are the sources from which metaphors may be taken; from things beautiful either by the voice (the sound of the word itself when uttered), or by the force or meaning' (what it indirectly suggests: as δύνασθαι, to have the power, force, virtue, when applied to words, denotes their 'value', in the sense of meaning or signification, see note on I 9.36; so δύναμις the subst. may of course be similarly employed), 'or by (i.e. conveyed by) the sight or any other sense'. These terms have been already explained. ὅπει ἡ ἀληθῶς τοις αἰσθήσεις is illustrated by Victorius from Cic. de Or. III 40.161, Nam ut odor urbanilatis, et mollitudo humanilatis, et murmur maris, et dulcedo orationis, sunt duxa a ceteris sensibus; illa vero ocularum multo aciora, quae ponunt paene in conspectu animi quae cerebre et videre non possimus.

'But it is preferable (διαφέρει here, to surpass, excel) to say rose-fingered dawn, rather than purple-fingered, or, still worse, red-fingered.' The latter suggests cooks' hands, or other vulgar associations. 'The rose on the contrary reminds one of what is agreeable to the sight, and the smell. Add to this from Campbell, Phil. of Rhet., Bk. III ch. I § 1, (Vol. II p. 142, 2nd ed.), that the last of the three epithets compared is the vaguest and most general, and therefore the worst: the second better, because more special; and the first best of all, because the most particular, the red (purple Campbell says) of the rose. He also mentions the gratification of the two senses.

§ 14. 'In the epithets also, the application of them may be made (they
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 2 §§ 14, 15.

μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, ὅσον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἐστὶ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίωνος, ὅν ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ καὶ ὁ Συμωνίδης, ὦτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὅλιγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀφέσιν, οὐκ ἦθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραῖνες εἰς ἡμόνως ποιεῖν, ἐπεί δ' ἰκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησεν

χαίρετ' ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων·
καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θύγατέρες ἦσαν. ἐτί τὸ αὐτὸ
15 ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἐστὶ δ' ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς ὡς ἐλαττον
ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ὡςπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀρι-

may be derived, for application) from what is mean and low (morally bad in this sense), or foul and ugly, or disgraceful (another kind of badness), for instance "matricide," or from what is (nobler and) better, as "a father's avenger." The one represents the fair side of Orestes' act, the other its bad aspect. "Locus ex Eur. Oreste 1587, ὁ μητροφόντης, ἐπὶ φίλων πράτσων φίλον inquit Menelaus, Orestem criminans: cui se defendens respondet Orestes, ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ ὃν προδόθηκας χαίρειν."

On επίθετα, see Introd. on c. 3. p. 289. Ernesti's Lex. Technologiae Gr. 'And Simonides, when the victor in the mule-race offered him only a small fee, refused to write (the ode on this occasion) on the plea of being offended (shocked) at the notion of "composing an ode on half-asses," but when the other gave him as much as he wanted (as satisfied him), he wrote at once, "All hail, daughters of storm-footed mares" ["Hurrah, for the brood of the storm-footed coursers!"], and yet they were daughters of the asses as well.' Dion., de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (Vol. v 201, ed. Reiske), quotes a pentameter verse, without the author's name, which contains an analogous epithet, κοῦρα ἄλαφροστόδων ἵνα' ἀειμέναι. On Simonides' greed of gain and miserably habits, see Aristoph. Pax 697—9. Ar. Eth. N. IV 2. ult. (ὁ λευθέρος) Συμωνίδη οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος, which has the air of a proverbial expression for a miser. Comp. his dictum in πι 16.2, on the comparative advantages of money over wisdom. The case of Simonides is referred to by Whately, Rhet. c. III (p. 277, Encycl. Metrop. Enc. of mental philosophy), in illustration of the "employment of metaphors (epithets, not metaphors) either to elevate or degrade a subject," of which he says in the note "a happier instance cannot be found" than this.

§ 15. 'Further the same thing may be effected (as by epithets in the way of elevation or depreciation) by diminutives', lit. 'diminutives are, or amount to, much the same thing as epithets'. As epithets, so diminutives, may be applied to diminish the good or bad of a thing, according as a favourable or unfavourable view is to be taken of it. Οἱ ὑποκορίζεσθαι, ὑποκορισμός, see note on 19.29. Add Gräfenhan, Geschichte der Klass. Philologie, i p. 459. It will be seen by the examples quoted in the note referred to, that the term includes much more than mere diminu-
tives, and is extended to the expression of all coaxing, flattering, soothing, endearing phrases; and does not (properly) include expressions of contempt, which is however conveyed by many diminutives. The two terms are therefore by no means co-extensive: Aristotle, who has merely illustrated this form of language by examples of diminutives, has taken them alone as the most distinctive class of words which convey by the termination endearment and contempt. The form of endearment used in extenuation diminishes the bad, the contemptuous employment of them diminishes the good.

There are no less than thirteen varieties of Greek diminutive terminations, which may be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 103. Donaldson, Gr. Gr. § 361, 3. f. aa, p. 320, gives only ten. Both of them have omitted a form ἀττικίων, which occurs in Arist. Pax 214, where the Schol. has κατα-φρονήσεως ἐνέκα. It is to be noted that some of these diminutives in -δον have the i long, though by the ordinary rule it is short. τοκίδων, Ar. Nub. 93. ὠσίδων, Nicom. Inc. Fr. ap. Meineke, iv. 587. σηπίδων, Arist. Fragn. et ooti. ap. Comic. Fragn. ἀργυρίδων, Av. 1622. ἵμαιδων, Lysistr. 470. δικαστηρίδων, Vesp. 803, and others, ap. Fritzsche ad Arist. Ran. 1301. πορφίδων has the i long and short, Arist. Ran. 1301, and Nub. 997. The long i arises from a contraction, so that πορφίδων must be, derived from πορφιδων, and is a diminutive of a diminutive. [Kühner Gr. Gr. § 330.]

On Latin diminutives, Madvig, Lat. Gr. § 182. "By means of lus, la or lum, and culus, cola or culum, are formed diminutives (nomina diminutiva) which denote littleness, and are often used by way of endearment, commiseration, or to ridicule something insignificant, e.g. hortulus, a little garden, matercula, a (poor) mother, ingeniolum, a little bit of talent."

On English diminutives see a paper by Sir G. C. Lewis, Phil. Mus. 1697 seq. in Marsh's Lect. on the Eng. Lang., Smith's ed. p. 218; and Latham's Eng. Lang. c. xv § 337; also a paper by J. C. Hare in (Hare and Thirlwall's) Phil. Mus. Vol. 1. p. 679. These are in kin, ling, and et, let (from the Norman, French and Italian (f. M. c.), Marsh. Lect. u. s. Lect. xiv. § 6). To which Latham adds ie (Scottish), (lassie, doggie), eu (chicken, kitten), et and let, trumpet, lancet, pocket, owl, brooklet, streamlet; ock (Grimm), bullock, hillock: paddock, buttock, hummock (Lewis). "The Greek word μειωτής means diminution; ὑποκόρισμα means an endearing expression. Hence we get names for the two kinds of diminutives; viz. the term meiotic for the true diminutives, and the term hypocoristic for the dim. of endearment." Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, 111 664 (ap. Latham). The contemptuous diminutive in English is ling; lordling, fantling, foundling, underling, hireling.

'By diminutive I mean that which diminishes the evil and the good (which belongs to the proper meaning of a word; by the addition of a
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 3 § I.

1 ὑψρά ἐν τέτταρι γίγνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἐν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οἷον Δυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου γῆς
termination), of which Aristophanes' sarcasm in the Babylonians is a
specimen, where he substitutes χρυσιδάρων for χρυσίον (this again is
diminutive of diminutive), ἰματιδάρων for ἰμάτιον, λαυδορμάτων for λαυδορία,
and νοσημάτων (Fritzsche, ap. Meineke l.c., by a very probable conj., reads
νοθμάτων, which is certainly much more germane to the matter). 'We
must, however, be very careful (in the use of this figure), and be on our
guard against exaggeration in both' (in the employment of ἐπιθετα and
ὑποκορισμός).

On these diminutives of Aristophanes, Meineke, Fragm.
Babyl. XXX. Fr. Comic. Gr. II. 982, observes: "Usurpasse autem videtur
poeta istas verborum formas, ut Gorgiam et qui eius in dicendo artem
sectarentur rideter, quemadmodum etiam in Acharnensibus saepissime
ista ornamenta orationis vituperat." This explains σκόπτει.

παρατρείν] 'to lie in wait for', see on II 6.20. In the word here
there is no 'evil purpose' implied. It is rather 'to wait upon', watch for
an opportunity.

CHAP. III.

From the graces and excellences of style we now pass on to some of
its defects. These are comprehended under the term ψυχρά, 'faults of
taste', expressions stale and cold, flat, lifeless, opposed to πρόσφατα
'fresh'. The import and origin of this word, as applied to style, are
illustrated in Introd. pp. 286, 7. The faults lie mostly in some kind of
exaggeration, or turgid and bombastic phraseology, the error of excess.
Add to the examples there given, Dem. de Cor. § 256, de F. L. § 207,
tο ψυχρόν τοῦ ὀνόμα (the name of ἐνεργήτης applied to Philip).

Demetrius, περὶ ἐφερέσσας § 116, refers (in his chapter περὶ ψυχροῦ τοῦ
ἀντικειμένου τῷ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ) to this division with the author's name. All
the details are omitted, and only one of the examples, the ἐγρόν ἰδρῶτα in
§ 3, is given. There is no doubt a lácuna.

§ 1. 'Faults of taste are shewn (are made to appear; arise, grow) in
four points of style or language; first in compound words, instances of
which are Lycophron's 'many-visaged heaven', his 'vast-topped earth',
and his 'narrow-passaged shore'.

On διπλά ὀνόματα, see Introd. p. 287. All the compound words men-
tioned are compounded of two significant elements, ὀνόματα ση-
μαίνωτα, Poet. XXI. 1, 2, i.e. of words which have an independent sense
of their own; opposed to such as are only significant in combination with
others, as prepositions, conjunctions, particles.

πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν] "quod plurimam variamque faciem habet ob
sidera ipsa, nisi fallor." Victorius. Compare Plato's famous epigram:
ἀστέρας εἰσαθρείσι ἀστέρι ἐμὸς 'εἰς γενοῦν οὐρανόν, ὡς πολλοίς ὄμμασιν εἰς

μεγαλοκορύφου] κορφή is a mountain-top. To one who lived in
Greece and knew nothing beyond it, the Earth might well seem to be
covered with vast summits.
καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενοπόρον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὁνόμαξε, πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, ἐπιρρήσαντας καὶ κατευροκή-
σαντας. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας "μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν Π. 1406.

ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον] also belongs to the mountainous character of
Greece. The cliffs come down precipitously to the very edge of the sea
(in which there are no tides), leaving but a narrow passage for horseman
or foot-passenger. The word is used appropriately enough by the poet
Aeschylus, P. V. 729, and Eur. Iph. Aul. 1497; also by Herod. vii 211.
[Blass, in his brief notice of Lycoiphron, die Attische Beredsamkeit,
II p. 235, while conjecturing that several of the phrases here quoted
must have come from a panegyric in glorification of Athens and her heroes,
and of Theseus in particular, is led by the Sophist's application of πελώρων
ἀνθρα to Xerxes in § 2, to refer ἀκτὴν στενοπόρον to the Hellespont. It
would be more reasonable, however, to take the hint supplied by his allu-
sion to Sciron in the same section, and explain it of the narrow path
which runs like a cornice along the precipitous sides of the cliffs of Sciron
on the coast of Megara (Eur. Hippol. 1208, Σκείρωνος ἀκής, Strabo IX
p. 391, αἱ Σκειρωνίδες πέτραι πάροδον οὐκ ἀπολείπονται πρὸς θαλάττῃ ὑπὲρ
αὐτῶν δ' ἐστιν ἡ ὄδος ἡ ἐπὶ Μεγάρων, and Pausanias I 44 § 6 (Bekker), τὴν
ὑπομαζομένην ἀπὸ Σκείρωνος (ὁδὸν) Σκίρων πρῶτος ἑπίσημος ἀνδράσιν ὅδευσεν
εὐχώσου. Hadrian (as Pausanias adds) made this narrow ledge εὐρύφορη, but
the cliff and its pathway have since once more become an ἀκτὴ
στενοπόρας, which is described by Leake (Northern Greece, II 414) as
'only practicable by foot-passengers'.]

On Lycoiphron the Sophist, see Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred
Phil. No. v, Vol. II p. 141 seq. Not to be confounded with Lycoiphron
the tragic poet, the author of Cassandra, who lived at Alexandria in the
reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, towards the middle of the third cent. B.C.
'And the name given by Gorgias, "beggar-witted or pauper-witted
flatterer"', πτωχόμουσος κόλαξ, as Victorius understands it, inops ingenium.
Or perhaps rather one who prostitutes his literature and intellectual ac-
complishments to flattery and sycophancy to make a living by them,
'making his Muse a beggar.' ["This can hardly mean 'arm an dichter-
ischer Begabung', as Rost and Palm explain. Liddell and Scott give with
greater probability "living (or rather starving) by his wits." It might
also mean, "one whom poverty inspires" (cui ingenii largitor Venter).
Wit and poverty are the hackneyed attributes of the Greek parasite,
and in a comic poet the epithet would probably have been thought happy.
A similar compound, πτωχαλάξων, is quoted from Phrynichus com.
(Meinecke, C. G. II p. 582)." Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179 note.]
ἐπιρρήσαντας καὶ κατευροκήσαντας] 'forsworn, and oath-observing'.
The objection here is to κατευροκήσαντας, in which the κατά is super-
fluous. All that Gorgias meant might have been equally well ex-
pressed by the simple εὐροκεῖν 'to keep one's oath'; or rather the simple
opposition of false and true, which he has exaggerated into two long
words. εὐροκεῖν, though itself a compound, seems to be regarded here as
a single word. The Schol. has on this, καὶ τὸ κατευροκήσαμα λέγεται ἐπὶ
ἀληθὸς ὁμόσαντος οὐχ ἀμοζέει δὲ ἡ λέξις αὐτὴ ρηθήναι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς
πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δε την ὅψιν γυνομένην,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον φήθη την προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενεισθαι,” καὶ “τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθω τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν,” καὶ “κυανόχρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἐδαφος” πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιητικά διὰ τὴν διπλωσίν φαίνεται. μιὰ μὲν ὅν τοῦ αὐτή αἰτία, μιὰ δὲ τὸ χρήσθαι γλῶτταις, οἶον Δυκόφρων Ἐξέρξην πέλωρον ἀνδρα,

εἰπόντος τὸ ἄλθις, οἶον ὅτι ὑπέρ γῆς ὅντος τοῦ ἡλίου ἡμέρα ἑστίν, ἰ. ἡς. this is like expounding ‘it is day’ into the more pompous phrase ‘the sun is above the earth.’

μένος μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πληρουμένην πυρίχρων δε τὴν ὅψιν γυνομένην ‘And Alcidamas’ phrases, “His soul saturated with wrath, and his face growing the colour of fire” (fire-coloured)’. This, as I have noted in the account of his in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. III, p. 266, is an exemplification of three of the new figures which Gorgias, his master, had recently introduced into Rhetoric, ἀντίδεοι, παρισσωτος or ἰδόκολος, and ὄμοστελον, on which see Ib. No. VII, 111 69—72. The ψυχρῶν objected to is of course the διπλών ὅνωμα, πυρίχρων (*‘flame-flushed’*).

‘And “end-fulfilling deemed he would be their zeal”, and “end-fulfilling established he the persuasion of his words”, and “dark-blue-coloured the sea’s foundation”. (κωνδος is indigo blue, also dark in general)—for all these have a poetical character arising from (due to) the doubling’. τελεσφόρος may be translated by Shakespeare’s “thought-exacting” fires; but that is poetry [King Lear III. 2. 4.—τελεσφόρος became commoner in later Greek prose, as remarked by Lobeck, Phrynichus, p. 673 (referred to by Vahlen, der Rheto Alkidamas, p. 491 infra). An account of Alcidamas will be found in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. III, pp. 263—8 (omit pp. 264, 5, where the proof of a paradox is unnecessarily undertaken). [See also Vahlen, der Rheto Alkidamas, pp. 491—528 of Transactions of Vienna Academy, XI.112 1, 1863; and Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, II pp. 317—335]’

§ 2. On the second defect of rhetorical style, γλῶτται, see Intro. p. 283.

‘Now this is one cause (of ψυχρότης); another is the employment of obscure and unintelligible words. As Lycophron calls Xerxes a “hugeous” man, and Sciron’ (the famous robber who gave name to the Scironian rocks; put to death by Theseus, after Hercules the greatest eradicator of nuisances from the land of Attica) ‘a “bale” of a man’. γλῶτται] Whether those which have never been much in use, unusual; or those which have gone out of use, obsolete or archaic; or those which belong to a foreign language or dialect. Comp. Julius Caesar’s rule, tantum scopulum fugere inauditum atque insolens verbum (Aulus Gellius 11.10).

πέλωρον] This word frequent in Hom. and Hes. under the forms πέλωρ, πέλωρος (subst.), πέλωρος and πελώριος (adj.); πελώριος twice in Aesch.
καὶ Σκίρων σίννεις ἀνήρ, καὶ 'Αλκιδάμας ἄθυμα τῇ
ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτω
3 τῆς διανοίας ὀργῆ τεθηγμένον. τρίτον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπί-
and once in Eurip. Iph. T., had it seems become obsolete in Arist.'s time. Comp. infra 7 § 11.

σίννες ἀνήρ.] If σίννες stands for the actual robber, ὁ Πιτυκόματης, rival and
contemporary of Procrustes, and Sciron, all of whom Theseus dis-
posed of, he may be translated a "Turpin-man:" but the word is also
used to represent the "incarnation of all mischief and destructive agency"
—see Monk on Eur. Hippol. 981, and the authors cited; comp. the old
poetical words σίνεσια, σίνεσις, (σίνης of the great robber and ravager, the
mischievous, destructive lion, Hom. II. XX 165;) and σίνεσις. Both σίνεσιν
and σίνεσις occur in Aeschylus in the abstract sense of mischief or destruction,
and if σίνεσις is to be so understood here, as I rather think it should, bale,
an old English word of similar import, may serve to express it. [Suidas
s. v. Σίνεσις' ὀνομα ληστοῦ βλαστηκοῦ.]

ἀθυμα τῇ ποιήσει] ' And Alcidasmos "toys to poetry". The rest of
the phrase is supplied below § 4, "to apply to or introduce toys in poetry".
ἀθυμα is a childish amusement, ἀθυρεῖν to sport like a child, of a child's
sport or pastime. So employed by Homer, Pindar, Apoll. Rhod., Anthol.
(γυνικίες), Euripides (in his Auge, Fragm. viii Wagner, vi Dindorf) νη-
πίοις ἄθυμασιν, and by Plato in the solemn semi-poetical Leges, vii 796 B.
See Donaldson on Pind. Nem. iii 44, παῖς ἐνώ ἄθυμε, also Meineke ad Fragm.
Crat. 'Οδυσσηίς, xvi; Suidas ἄθυμα, παίγνιον. It seems from this that 'toy'
is the corresponding English word; which is actually used by Spenser in
the same more general sense of 'a childish sport or amusement,' and in
this sense is with us obsolete. Faery Queen, Bk. i. Cant. 6, 28 "To dally
thus with death is no fit toy, Go, find some other play-fellows, mine
own sweet boy." 'Gawd' is another word now obsolete that might repre-
sent it.

τήν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν] and 'the outrecuidance of his nature'.
ἀτασθαλία, ἀτάσθαλος, ἀτασθάλλω, a poetical word denoting 'mad,
presumptuous arrogance', found in Homer and Herod., and also in an
epitaph of Archedice quoted by Thucyd. vi 59, οἵκ ἤρηθη νοῦν ἐπ' ἀτα-
σθαλίν. ['Retchlessness,' for recklessness, is similarly an unfamiliar
word with ourselves, and may serve as an illustration, if not a rendering
of this use of ἀτασθαλία.]

καὶ ἀκράτω—τεθηγμένον] and 'whetted with the unadulterated' (hot and
heady, like pure unmixed wine) 'wrath of his mind'. The γλῶττα
here is τεθηγμένον, a not very rare, but usually poetical, metaphor for
exasperated, excited, provoked, irritated; sharpened like a knife or tool,
or an animal's teeth. Examples from the tragic poets are supplied by
Vallck. on Eur. Hippol. 689, ὀργῆ συντεθηγμένης φρένα: it is opposed to
ἄθυμαναι as Aesch. Theb. 721, τεθηγμένον τοι μ' οἷς ἀπαμβλυνεῖς λόγως,
Trag. Dind., Eur. Cycl. 240, Electr. 836. Xenophon however has em-
ployed it several times; Cyrop. 1 2. 10, 6. 19, 6. 41, 11 1. 4, 5, 7, Mem.
iii 3. 7. Lat. acuere. [Vahlen, der Rhetor Alcidamas p. 492, notes that
§ 3. 'The third vice of style lies in the misuse of "epithets", that is, in introducing them either too long, or out of season (out of place, we say), or too frequent (numerous); for in poetry it is suitable enough to say "white milk" (a Homeric epithet of course; as red wine, fair women, &c. in ballad poetry), but in prose it is not only less appropriate, but also, if they be employed to satisety (excess), they convict (detect, expose, the art of the composition) and make it plain that it is poetry: for, to be sure, it must be used; for it varies the customary style and gives a foreign air to the language'.

On ἐπίθετα see Introd. p. 289. The over-long 'epithets' are illustrated by those of Aeschylus in Tragedy, and Aristophanes in Comedy—who sometimes strings together an entire line of epithets, as ἀρχαιολειστιδομήωνφωνομήσων, of Phrynichus' μέλη [Vesp. 220]. Such epithets are of course most inappropriate to prose. The excessive length may also be shewn in the 'descriptive additions' to a substantive, which often takes the place of a regular epithet.

δει γε κρησθαι αὐτῇ] i.e. to a limited extent; taking care at the same time that the poetical character of the language be not marked and apparent (reading αὐτῇ the vulgata lectio retained by Bekker). Spengel with Ἀε αὐτῷ: Victorius and Vater αὐτοῖς; but the variation of the customary language is far more applicable to poetical usages than to epithets: in fact I doubt whether ἐξαλλάττει could be applied to ἐπίθετα with any satisfactory meaning).

ἐξαλλάττει supra c. 2 § 2, note, and § 5. ἐξεκινὴν τὴν λέξιν] supra c. 2 § 3.

'But the mean should always be our aim, for (the reverse of moderation, excess) does more mischief than careless, random, speaking, (over-doing it), exaggeration, is worse than entire carelessness, taking no pains at all): for the one no doubt wants the good, but the other (has) the bad (the defect in the one case is negative, the mere absence of special excellence, in the other it is positive). And this is why Alcīdamas' (epithets) appear tasteless; because he employs them, not as the mere seasoning but as the actual meat (pièce de résistance, the substance, not the mere adjunct or appendage); so frequent, and unduly long (μείζον τοῦ διόντος, too long) and conspicuous are they'. Victorius is doubtless right in his opinion that these three words are a repetition in slightly altered terms of the three views of epithets at the commencement of the section; unseasonableness, the importunity with which they engross the attention, is now represented by the conspicuousness of
undue prominence which produces the same effect. A fair specimen of this pompous inflated writing, in epithet and metaphor, is given in Auctor. ad Heren. IV 10.15, nam qui perduellionibus venditat patriam non satis supplicii dederit si praeceps in Neptunias depulserit eit lacunas. Pvenitiat igitur istum qui montes belli fabricatis est, campos sustulit pacis.

[epidôleis, 'obtrusive', 'glaring'. Bernays proposes ëpi dêlos, apparently without due cause, though Vahlen quotes it with approval.]

[The little that is left of Alcidamas seems to justify Aristotle's strictures on his want of taste in the use of epithets: e.g. περὶ σοφιστῶν, § 6, ἀντίτυπο καὶ προσώπης ή τῶν χαλεπωτέρων ἐπιμελεία, § 7, ὁ ποδώκης δρομεύς, § 16, εὐλύτω τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγχορία χρώμενον ὑγρῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως μεταχειρίζεσθαι τοὺς λόγους, § 17, ἡ γραφὴ...ἀπορον καὶ δεσμῶτη τὴν ψυχήν καθιστη καὶ τῆς εἰς τοὺς αὐτουχειατικοὺς εὐροῖας ἀπάσης ἐπίπροσθεν γίνεται, (where for εὐροῖας we should surely read εὐπορίας which is a suitable contrast to ἀπορον and is supported by § 29, τοῖς αὐτοῦτοι εὐπορήμασι εἴμπωον ἐστιν, and by the fact that εὐπορία, εὐπορος, ἀπορία and ἀπορος occur at least ten times in the thirty-five sections of the rhetorician's diatirbe, e.g. § 34, which is also an instance of the superabundance of epithets here criticised; τὴν γνώμην ἐκθεῖν καὶ τὴν μνήμην εὐπορον καὶ τὴν ἐρήμην ἀδήλων). See also Vahlen, Alkidamas, u.s. pp. 508—510, and Blass (who has edited Alcidamas, Gorgias, and Antisthenes in the same volume as Antiphon), die Attische Beredsamkeit II 328.]

'For instance, (he says) not 'sweat', but "the moist sweat"; and not 'to the Isthmian games', but "to the general assembly (great convocation) of the Isthmian games"; and not 'laws', but "laws the kings of cities"; and not 'running', but "with the impulse of his soul at speed"; and not merely 'a Museum, or haunt of the Muses', but "a Museum of all Nature that he had received"; and "sullen-visaged (or sullen-looking, with sullen aspect) the care (solicitude, anxiety) of his soul"; and "artificer" not of 'favour', but "of universal public favour"; and "steward (administrator, dispenser) of the pleasure of the hearers"; and "concealed", not 'with boughs', but "with the boughs of the wood"; and "he clothed", not 'his body', but "his body's shame"; and "counter-imitative (responsive-answering) the desire of his soul"; and "so extravagant (inordinate, [abnormal]) the excess of the wickedness"."
πόλεων βασιλείς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαίῳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμῇ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ παιδήμον χάριτος δημιουργός, καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκούστων ἱδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὑλῆς κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψε, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παραμπίσχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τοῦτο δ' ἀμα καὶ διπλῶν καὶ ἐπίθετον,

πόλεων βασιλείς νόμους) Fragm. Pind. quoted by Plat. Gorg. 484 B, νόμοι ὁ πάντων βασιλείς θειάδος τε καὶ αδήμων, and Sympos. 196 C, οἱ πόλεως βασιλῆς νόμοι. [Also by Herod. III 38, καὶ ὁρθῶς μοι δικείτω Πίνδαρος ποίησαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλεία φήσας εἶναι, quoted by Thompson on Gorg. u.s.]

τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον I have above translated this quite literally, and own that I do not fully understand it: παραλαβὼν seems suspicious: Α' has περιλαβὼν, which does not much mend the matter. Perhaps all the meaning lies on the surface, and there is none underneath. Victorius says that μουσεῖον is locus a musis bonique artibus frequenter: and translates, cum musea museum acceptisset: adding, appellat igitur hic quoque τῆς φύσεως epitheon, cum adhominat illi nominet ad naturam eius exemplandam. [Vahlen discusses the phrase in his article on Alcidamas, u.s., pp. 494—6, and suggests that the passage originally stood as follows: δρομαίῳ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμῇ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον, which he translates “mit der Seele Sturmesdrang der Wissenschaft der Naturwissens sehe,” μουσεῖον occurs in a well-known passage of the Phaedrus, 267 B, τὰ δὲ Πόλων πώς φράσωμεν αὐτό μουσεία λόγων, ὁς διπλασιολογία καὶ γνωμολογία καὶ εἰκονολογία, and an interesting account of the word may be found in Thompson’s note. Vahlen, who holds that μουσεῖα λόγων there means Redeschulen, in denen man dies diplasios und dies διέκόνων, δια γραμμών λέγει, lernen konnte, suggests that by τὸ τῆς φύσεως μουσεῖον Alcidamas here intends to express what in ordinary language would have been expressed by some such phrase as ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία. In illustration of this view, he quotes a fragment of Diogenes Laertius, VIII 2. 56, where 'Αλκιδάμασ εν τῷ Φυσικῷ εἰπε τοὺς Εμπεδοκλῆς, Ἀναβασιλέα διακοσία καὶ Πεθαγόρον καὶ τοῦ μὲν τὴν συμπότητα ἐξήλωσαι τοῦ τε βίον καὶ τοῦ σχήματος, τοῦ δὲ τῆς φυσιολογίαν.—In Stobaeus, 120. 3, the quotation of two lines of Theognis εκ τοῦ 'Αλκιδάματος Μουσείου shows that as a title of a book (whatever its exact meaning may be) the term is not so modern as might be supposed. (Compare Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit II 322, note.)]

From the passage of Aristoph. it seems that this word, like ἀντίστροφος, should have after it a dative of the object to which it answers; what that object was in Alcidamas' declamation Aristotle has not informed us.

'And this is at the same time a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes quite a poem (a mere bit of poetry: plain prose is turned by this inflated style into poetry).

ἐξέδρος, from the analogy of ἐκτόπος, ἐκτόπιος, and the actual use of the word—as ἐξέδρον χάριν ἐχειν, of birds of omen in an unlucky quarter of the heavens, Arist. Av. 275; ἐξέδροι φρενών λόγοι 'words beside the seat of the wits', Eur. Hippol. 985, οὐκ ἐξέδρος, ἀλλ' ἐκτόπος ἀνήρ, Soph. Phil. 212—must mean 'out of its proper seat or place', 'abroad'; and hence as an exaggeration of excess, 'extravagant', as translated.

On these extracts from Alcidamas Victorius remarks, "Cum autem haec omnia a mediis quibusdam orationibus sumpersit, ut vitiosae tantum locutionis exemplum sint, non est quod miremur aut plenam sententiam in nonnullis non esse; aut desiderari, ut in hac, verbum unde casus nominum regantur."

'And so this poetical diction by its unsuitableness introduces absurdity and tastelessness into their composition, and obscurity which is due to the verbiage: for whenever (a speaker or writer) accumulates words (throws a heap of them) upon one already informed (already acquainted with his meaning), he destroys (breaks up, dissolves, effaces) all perspicuity (distinctness) by the cloud (or darkness, obscurity) in which he involves his meaning' (lit. which he brings over it; ἐπισκοπεῖν τῷ κρίσει, 1 1.7, see note: to over-cloud, over-shadow, obscure).


'And people in general, use their compound words (τοῖς, those that they do use) when it (what they want to express) is nameless (those that have no single word to represent it) and the word is easily put together (the combination is easily made), as χρωνοτριβεῖν: but if this be carried too far
oi δ' ανθρωποί τοῖς διπλοῖς χρώνται, ὅταν ἀνώνυμον ἦν καὶ ὁ λόγος εὐσύνθετος, οἶον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν· ἀλλ' ἀν πολὺ, πάντως ποιητικόν. διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλὴ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοῦσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ψοφώ- 
δεις· αἱ δὲ γλώτται τοῖς ὑποποίοις· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ

(overdone), it (the result) becomes absolutely poetical. And this is why compound words are most serviceable to the dithyrambic poets—τῶν δ' ὄνομάτων τὰ μὲν διπλὰ μάλιστα ἄρματε τοῖς διθυράμβοις, Poet. XXII 18—for these are “full of sound and fury”; full of pompous, high-sounding phrases' (on ψόφος see III 2.13); 'and obsolete or unusual, to Epic poets, for language of this kind has a stately (majestic, dignified, proud, solemn, and scornful or disdainful) air; and metaphor to writers in iambics, for these they (i.e. the tragic poets) now-a-days—since they have quitted the tetrameter—employ, as has been already stated. III 1.9 comp. infra. 8.4, and Poet. IV 18. The reason, conveyed by γὰρ, is this: I say iambics, not tetrameters, because now-a-days, &c.

[χρονοτριβεῖν. Compare our 'pastime,' which is also a λόγος εὐσύνθετος. So in Daniel's Ulysses and Sirin, "Delicious nymph! I suppose there were No honour or report, Yet manliness would scorn to wear The time in idle sport." I soc. Paneg. § 41, θοίστας diatriβάς.]

On compound words, as connected with dithyrambic poetry, Demetrius, περὶ ἔρμηνειας § 91, says, ληπτέων δὲ καὶ σύνθετα ὄνοματα, οὐ τὰ διθυραμβικῶς συγκείμενα, οἷον θεοτράτους πλάνας, οὐδὲ ἀστράκυν όροπυρον στρατῶν, ἀλλ' εὐκότα τοῖς ἕπῳ τῆς συπνήθεας συγκείμενος (such as νομαθέα, ἀρχιτεκ-

The dithyramb at Athens became at and after the end of the fifth cent. the wildest, and (in point of style) most licentious and most extravagant of all the kinds of poetry. See note in Intro. on III 9, pp. 307, 8, and the ref. to Aristoph. there given; Bode, Gesch. der Hell. dichtk. Vol. II. Pt. II. p. 111 seq. and 290 seq.; and Müller, H. G. L. s. XXX. To use words suited to a dithyrambic poet is therefore an exaggeration of the ordinary defect of the introduction into prose of poetical language.

Plat. Phaedr. 238 D, οὐκείτι πάρμφ διθυράμβους φθέγγομαι, Ibid. 241 E, ἤδη ἦτοι φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκείτι διθυράμβους. Cratyl. 409 C, (σελανία) διθυ-

ραμβικῶς γε τοῦτο τούτομα. Dionys. Dinarch. Iud. c. 8, of the imitators of Plato, διθυράμβιδοι ὄνοματα καὶ φορτικὰ εἰσφέροντες, Lys. Iud. c. 3, Γοργίας 

...οὐ πάρμφ διθυράμβους ἐνας φθέγγομενος, de adn. vi. dic. in Dem. c. 29, Ep. ad Pomp. c. 2 (of Socrates' poetical outburst, Phaedr. 237 A), ψόφοι ταῖ' ἐστι καὶ διθυράμβους (p. 763 K) and (764) where the words of Phaedr. 238 D (u. s.) are quoted. Hor. Od. IV 2.10, of Pindar, per audaces nova dithyrambos verba devolvit, Donaldson, Theatre of Gks. p. 37, note 31 and the references. διθυραμβεῖν is a step beyond τραγωδεῖν in pomp and exaggeration of language.

σεμνὸν γὰρ] σεμνὸς, contracted from σεβόμενος, lit. an object of worship: applied again to the heroic measure or rhythm, III 8.4.

On these passive forms in Greek and Latin, see Donaldson, New
3 §§ 3, 4.

αὐθάδες· ἢ μεταφορὰ δὲ τοῖς ιαμβείοις· τούτοις γάρ
4 νῦν χρώνται, ἀσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ ἐτὶ τέταρτον τὸ
ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίγνεται· εἰσὶ γάρ καὶ
μεταφοράς ἀπρεπεῖς, αἵ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρώνται
γάρ καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοποιοί μεταφοραῖ), αἳ δὲ διὰ τὸ
σεμνὸν ἀγαν καὶ τραγικον· ἀσαφεῖς δὲ, ἀν πόρρωθεν.

Crat. § 410, Varro, p. 406 (ed. II), 97. Add to the Greek examples
given σεμνὸς and ἕρωμα to the Latin, somnis (sopio).

καὶ αὐθάδες] This means that the unusual γλῶται affect an air of
independence and hauteur; they, like the αὐθάδες, the self-pleaser, self-
willed, stubborn, haughty, independent man, will not conform to ordinary
usage, and scornfully affect singularity. Comp. Poet. xxiv 9, τὸ γάρ
ἵρωικόν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὑγκωδεστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν, διὸ καὶ γλῶττας
καὶ μεταφοράς δέχεσται μάλιστα.

§ 4. 'And further, the fourth vice of style is shewn in metaphors;
for metaphors also are inappropiate, some because they are laughable—
for the comic poets also employ metaphors—others from their exaggera-
tion of the stately (solemn) and tragic (pompous) style: if far-fetched,
they are obscure'. πόρρωθεν, see on III 2.12. 'As Gorgias, "things (πρά-
ματα, actions, occurrences, events, business) all fresh and raw"'. This
certainly is a good exemplification of what it is designed to illustrate: it
is obscure. It seems, however, to mean nothing more than 'recent
events', events fresh, and with the blood in them: the metaphor from a
beast just killed. It therefore corresponds to πρόσφατος, 'fresh', which also
stands for 'recent'. πρόσφατος is specially applied to 'fresh meat'. See
Lobeck On Phrynichus, p. 375, note: examples of πρόσφατος are there
given, p. 374. "And these things thou hast sown in disgrace, and
reaped in misery". For it smells too much of poetry'. [Both the
extracts probably belong to the same context, and may perhaps be com-
bined by rendering them thus: 'all was green and unripe (fresh and
flushed with sap), and this was the crop that you sowed in shame to reap
in ruin'. χλώρα καὶ ἐναμα possibly refer to the green and unripe stalks
of corn, with the sap still fresh in them. This assumes that αἷμα can be
used metaphorically of 'sap', both coming under the generic notion of
'vital juice'. If so, the metaphor is a sufficiently bold one. Thompson
(ed. of the Gorgias, p. 179) notes that ἐναμα (which is the reading of
Q, Vb and Z) is 'well supported, and cannot but be right,' and remarks
that while the metaphor of sowing and reaping is a mere commonplace,
"pallid and bloodless affairs" would need apology even from a modern.]

A metaphor, nearly resembling the first of these two, occurs in
Demetrius περὶ ἐμπρειας, § 116, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν μεταφορὰ τὸ ψυχρὸν,
τρέμοντα καὶ ὡχρὰ τὰ πράγματα. Longinus περὶ ἕνους 3.2, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ
τοῦ Λεοντίου Γοργίου γελάσαι γράφοντο, "Σέρβης ὁ τῶν Περσῶν Ζεύς," καὶ
"γυνὲς ἐμπρακτοὶ τάφοι" [comp. supra I § 9, on the poetical style of Gorgias].

Hermogenes also, περὶ ἰδεῶν Τομ. α', περὶ σεμνότητος 226 (p. 292,
Spengel, Rhetores Gracii, vol. II) gives some examples of exaggerated
metaphors, ἀκυκλομιμένοι, καὶ τὸ πεπρακὼς ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τὸ λωποδυτῶν

RHETORIKHΣ Γ 3 §§ 3, 4.
οιον Γοργίας "χλωρά καὶ έναμα τὰ πράγματα· σύ
dὲ ταῦτα αἰσχρῶς μὲν ἐσπειρᾶς κακὸς δὲ ἐθέρισας;"
ποιητικός γὰρ ἀγαν. καὶ ὡς 'Αλκιδάμας τὴν φιλο-
σοφίαν ἐπιτείχίσμα τῶν νόμων, καὶ τὴν 'Οδύσσειαν
καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ "οὐδὲν τοι-
ούτον ἀθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων." ἀπαντά γὰρ

τὴν 'Ελλάδα: and a few lines below, τάφον ἐμψύχους τοὺς γύπας,
but without the author's name. The objection to some of these meta-
phors, as the 'sowing and reaping', the 'selling oneself', and above all,
Alcidamas' 'mirror of human life', seems to shew a change of taste from
ancient to modern criticism. 'We certainly should object to none of
these; and the 'mirror' in particular has become one of the commonest
metaphors in our language. The 'sowing and reaping' appears in Plato,
Phaedr. 260 c (see Thompson's note), and Aesch. Pers. 821. In Cic. de
Orat. ii 65, 261 (without comment), ut sementem feceris ita metes. 1 Ep.
ad Cor. x. 42—4. Ep. ad Gal. vi. 7 (and Lightfoot ad loc.). "They
that sow in tears shall reap in joy: he that now goeth forth weeping,
and beareth forth good seed, shall doubtless come again with joy,
and bring his sheaves with him," Psalm cxvi. 6, 7. Possibly the antithesis,
one of Gorgias' new inventions, may have helped to offend Aristotle's
tastes, and it is the effect of the whole phrase, and not of the harmless
metaphor alone, that has unconsciously provoked his disapprobation: yet
the same occurs in the simple psalm.

[kαλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον. Alcidamas elsewhere uses this
metaphor from a mirror, in the form of a simile, περὶ σοφίστων, § 32, εἰς
dὲ τὰ γεγραμμένα κατιδώτας ὠσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ διορθάζει τὰς τῆς ὑψηλῆς
eπίδεισες μακρὸν ἑστὶν. The present passage and those already quoted
in § 3 τοῖς τῆς ᾨδῆς κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψεν κ.τ.λ. (Odyssey. vi 128) and κανόνων
τὸ τῆς ἑθικῆς ἔδαφος, probably belong to a declamation on Odysseus
(or on the Odyssey); while τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθό τῶν λόγων κατεστήσεν
(§ 1), and πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργῆς καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων
ηδονῆς (§ 3), point with equal probability to a pamphlet on Rhetoric.]

And as Alcidamas (follower of Gorgias), (called) philosophy a
"fortress to threaten" (a standing menace to), the laws; and the
Odyssey a "fair mirror of human life"; and "introducing no such
toys, or gawds, in his poetry"—for all such things are subversive of
credibility, for the reasons already stated'. These are, that forced
metaphors, and all such-like artificial graces and ornaments, make the
art and the labour of composition apparent; make the speech appear
studied and affected, and therefore premeditated and unreal, and without
serious purpose: οἰκ ἐν κλέπτεσθαι: the language of genuine emotion, of
earnest and real conviction, which are required for persuasion, being
always simple and natural. Probably the most perfect example of art
thus disguised by art is to be found in Mark Antony's speeches over
Caesar's body in Julius Caesar; and the first thing he does is to impress
upon his audience the entire artlessness and unstudied simplicity of
his address: I am no orator as Brutus is, but, as you know me all, a plain, blunt man that love my friend, &c [III 2.221].

ἐπιτείχισμα] in the first extract from Alcidamas, is interpreted in this passage in the Lexicons of Rost and Palm, and Liddell and Scott—in Stephens' Thesaurus it is quoted but not explained—'a bulwark or defence of the laws'. But ἐπιτείχισμα in its proper literal sense seems to be invariably used of an offensive, not defensive, fortification, to command and annoy an enemy's country, like Decelia, which, τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπορχεῖτο, Thuc. VII 27. 3 (Bekker, in Thuc. VIII 95, reads τείχισμα for ἐπιτείχισμα, on this account) as indeed is required by the ἐπι with which it is compounded; and philosophy may be used in the attack, as well as the defence, of established laws and institutions, whether it be understood as speculation or scientific research.

'And Gorgias' address to the swallow, when she discharged her excrement' [rather, 'dropped her leavings'] upon him as she flew over, is in the best style of tragic diction, (τὸ δὲ Γ. ἀριστα, sc. εἰρηνα,) "For shame, Philomel", said he. For to a bird it was no disgrace to have done it, but to a young (unmarried) lady it was. And therefore he was right in his reproach to describe (speak of) her as she was, and not as she is'. The simplicity of all this is delightful. I could fancy Aristotle winking to his imaginary reader as he wrote the explanation, ὃρθῳ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., a bird, you know, &c. [The anecdote illustrates the habit of irony ascribed to Gorgias in 7 § 11, ἵστατι, μετ' ἐφωνείς ὑπερ Γοργιας ἐποίει, as noticed in Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 180.]

περίττωμα] in medicine and natural history is 'a secretion'. It occurs constantly all through Ar.'s writings on Nat. Hist. Plut. Symp. p. 727 D (Victorius), in telling the same story, uses the broad Aristophanic word: Γοργιας δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς χελιδώνος ἀφείης ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀπόστατον, ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὴν, οὐ καλὰ ταύτ', ἐπεν, ὁ Φιλομῆλα.

The transformation of Proce and Philomela authorities differ. Thucidides, II 29, referring to the story, seems to adopt Gorgias' view, and make Proce the nightingale. Ovid seems to leave the point unsettled, Metaph. VI 667 seq. But tradition in general, and English poetry in particular, have always associated Philomela with the nightingale; e.g. 'Less Philomel will deign a song. Milton's Pнесенο, 56.

Victorius notices on this passage that Aristotle includes under the designation of metaphor more than is now recognised as belonging to it. The case here, he says, is a mere hypallage or change of name. Comp. Cic. Orator c. xxvii 93, 94. Ηανε ὑπάλλαγη ῥητορεσ, quia quasi sum-mutantur verba pro verbis, μετωνοματο grammatici vocant, quod nomina
From metaphors (c. 2), and the abuse of them (c. 3), we pass on in this chapter to the simile, eikôν; which differs from the metaphor only in this, that the latter concentrates, or fuses into one, the two things or notions brought into comparison. The former separates them by the particle of comparison ὡς. Thus the simile may be regarded, as an expanded metaphor. See further on this in Introd. p. 290, and the references to other authorities.

§ 1. 'The simile too is a metaphor, the difference between them being slight: for when he (Homer) says of (his, or the great) Achilles "and as a lion he rushed on", it is a simile, but when, "he rushed on, a (very) lion", a metaphor: for (in the latter) because they are both brave, he transferred to Achilles the appellation of lion'.

§ 2. 'The simile is useful also in prose, but seldom (to be employed), since it has a poetical character. They must be used like metaphors (the same rules must be observed in the use of them as of metaphors); in fact they are metaphors, only with the difference already stated'.

οὐστῆα[ν] φέρεων for λέγεων or χρῆσθαι is commonly applied in Arist.

1 The words here assigned to Homer do not occur in our present text: but the substance of them is found at the beginning of the famous simile of the lion, II. xx 164, Πηλείδης δ’ ἐτέραθεν ἐναντίον ὄμητο λεον ὡς, κ.τ.λ. followed by a long description of this animal. On the quotations from Homer in Aristotle, see Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Arist., die homerischen Fragen, p. 258, seq.: and Paley's note, with the extract from Wolf's Proleg. § 11, Introd. (to the ed. of the Iliad) p. xxxvi. The former of course includes this amongst the quotations which differ from Homer's text, but draws from this the inference that the text used by Aristotle (who himself revised it) was here different to our own. I think that nothing more can fairly be inferred from cases like this than that Aristotle has misquoted the words of our present version: all the substance is there. As we have already so many times had occasion to notice, Ar. has here quoted from memory; and like all other men of very extensive reading and very retentive memory, Bacon for example, and Walter Scott, has trusted too much to his memory, not referred to his author, and consequently misquoted. And I think that is all that can reasonably be said about it.
to any topic, example, argument, or anything else that is to be 'brought forward'. *Supra* c. 2, 10, 13,*infra* c. 6, 7, also *ii* 22, 16, 17. *Top. Θ* 1, 153 a 14, et passim. Isocr. *Areopag. § 6.*

§ 3. 'An example of the simile is' (*lit. Similes are a thing like that simile which*), 'that which Androton (directed, discharged) against Idrieus, that he was like the curs when they are let loose (untied); for *they* fly at you and bite, and so Idrieus was vicious (or savage) when *he* was freed from his chains'.

Androton was an Athenian orator, whose name occurs coupled with many opprobrious epithets not only in the speech delivered against him (Or. 22), but also in that against Timocrates in which he is very frequently mentioned. He was sent on an embassy with Melanopus and Glauetes, *Dem. c. Timocr. §§ 12, 13, alibi*, to Mausolus prince of Caria 377–351 b.c. Idrieus was his brother, and Androton may have met him at his court, and there had the encounter with him which ended in the discharge of his simile. The Scholiast on Isocr. p. 4 b 27 (ap. Saupppe, *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Alt.*) tells us that he was a pupil of *Isocrates*, and the writer of the 'Atthis', "a work on the history of Attica", *Biographical Dictionary*—which settles the question raised in that Dictionary about the identity of the orator and author—and the Scholiast adds that he was also the defendant in *Demosthenes' speech contra Androtonem*.

Idrieus was a prince of Caria who succeeded to the throne on the death of his brother Mausolus in 351 b.c. See Mr Bunbury's *Art. in Biogr. Dict.* He is mentioned by *Isocrates*. Philippus *§ 103*, *as εὐτρόπωταν τῶν νῦν περὶ τῶν ἡπειρών*. This speech was published in 346 b.c. (Clinton), and therefore subsequent to his accession. It may be presumed that the imprisonment with which Androton taunts him was due to his brother, and of course prior to his accession to the throne. He is referred to again without his name by *Demosthenes*. In the speech de Pace, *§ 25,— this was also delivered in 346 b.c. (Clinton *F. H.* ii 360)—as 'the Carian', who had been permitted to take possession of the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* i 351, 440.]

'And Theodamas' comparison of Archidamus to Euxenus—minus his geometry, by proportion: for Euxenus also will be Archidamus plus geometry!' (a geometrical Archidamus). Nothing is known of the three persons here mentioned. Theodamas compares Archidamus to Euxenus without his geometry; and so—by the rule of proportion, i.e. in the same proportion—will Euxenus be to Archidamus with geometry: i.e. equal, both being alike rascals. The *proportion* is that of equality. With *ἐν τῷ δἀνάλογον supply λόγος, 'in the ratio, or relation, of proportion'.

AR. III.
In this we are referred to the ‘proportional metaphor’, the last and most approved of the four kinds described in Poet. xxi 7—16. Comp. Rhet. iii 10. 7, where the proportional met. is illustrated at length. Victorius, who agrees in this explanation, supplies a parallel case from Diogenes Laertius, Polcemo, iv 3. 7, ἢλεγεν ὅν τὸν μὲν ὁμορν ἐπικόν εἶναι Σωφροκλῆς, τὸν δὲ Σιφροκλῆς ὁμορν τραγικόν. Theodamas has taken this common mode of comparison and applied it to the equal worthlessness of Archidamus and Euxenus. It was probably a standing joke at Athens. The case may have been something of this kind:—Two contemptible fellows, one of them priding himself upon a little knowledge of geometry, are comparing or disputing their respective merits: “you needn’t say any more about the matter,” says Theodamas, a bystander, who was listening much amused to the discussion, “you are both equal, Arcades ambo, a pair of fools, only Euxenus is a geometrical Archidamus, Archidamus an ungeometrical Euxenus.”

‘And that in Plato’s Republic (v 469 d), that “the spoilers of the dead are like curs (κυνίδων, contemptuous, diminutive: an improvement on Plato, who merely says κυνῶν), which bite the stones (thrown at them) without attacking, setting upon, the thrower”. Aristote, like Bacon, quoting from memory, and assuming a knowledge of the original in his readers, has left out the explanatory part of the illustration which is supplied by Plato. Victorius cites Pacuvius, ap. Nonium, in Armorum Judicio, Nam canis, quando est percussa lapide, non tam illum appellat, qui seicit, quam illum eum lapidem, qui ipsa icta est, petet.

καὶ ἡ εἰς τῶν δημοσιῶν This, which originally stood in MSS Q, Y, Z, and the early editions, καὶ οὖς ὁ Δημοσθένης εἰς τῶν δημοσιῶν, was first corrected by Victorius from MSS A.

‘And that (simile, understand εἰκόν, (directed) against democracy, that it is like a ship-owner (or ship’s captain) strong but slightly deaf’. This again is a mere allusion to or reminder of, ‘what every one must surely remember’, Plato’s celebrated illustration (Rep. vi 488 a) of the evils of democracy by the comparison of it to the undisciplined, untrained, turbulent, anarchical, crew of a ship; each of them, though utterly without qualification for the charge, ready to dispute with the captain the direction and control of the vessel. The passage is referred to by Cicero, de Off. i 25. The words quoted by Ar., few as they are, are not correct: he makes the ναύκληρος the representative of the δῆμος, the whole state; in Plato the ναύκληρος—the ship-owner, who in this case is captain, and steers his own vessel—is the governor, or governors, of the unruly mob of citizens.

‘And that (sc. εἰκόν, as before) applied to the poet’s measures, that they are like the bloom of youth without beauty (actual beauty of features):
for they, when their bloom has faded (worn off, when they have lost it), and the other (the poet’s measures) when they are broken up, seem utterly unlike (their former selves). This also comes from Rep. x 601 B, eiouse (tâ tôn poieïan) tôi tôn òrhoîn prooìkous, kalwôn òe ùh, òia ginetai ideîn òtan avtà tâ anwbos prôlipse. All poetry is imitation of natural objects, which are invested with certain ‘colours’ by the poetical art, in which the entire interest and beauty of poetry lie. These colours resemble the bloom on a youthful face, which is merely superficial, when there is nothing corresponding underneath, no beauty of feature or solid attraction. The imitation of the objects themselves may be bad and incorrect, as the face itself may be plain; so that when the bloom, the poetical colours, the graces and ornaments, and especially the numbers, are removed, there remains only a substratum, which may be worthless, of the direct imitation. Horace, Sat. i 4. 60, has pronounced, as is well-known, a directly contrary opinion, at least in respect of the better kind of poetry. After applying to Lucilius’ verses much the same criticism as Plato does to poetry in general, he adds, Non, ut si solvas postquam discordia tetra Belli ferratos postes portasque refregit, Inventias etiam disiecti membra postes: from Ennius. Compare Isocr. Evag. § 11, ἢν γὴρ τις τῶν παιμάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντων τὰ μὲν ὅνωμα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανερῶς πολὺ καταδείξατε τῆς δύνας ἢ νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. Also Rhet. III 1. 9.

With the expression comp. Eth. N. x 4, 1174 b ult. ὅνων τοῖς ἀκραίοις ἡ ὀρα, pleasure is like the bloom on the ἐνέργεια, the realized, active energy: illustrated by Zell’s note ad loc., from Valerius Paterculus [II 29, 2], of Pompeius, forma excellens, non ea qua flos commendatur aetatis, sed ex dignitate constanti. Youthful bloom, distinct from, and independent of, personal beauty.

And that of Pericles against the Samians, that they are like babies (pαιδιοὶ, ‘little children’) which cry whilst they take the morsel (or sop) offered them. ψῶμοι recurs, under the form ψ´όμισµα, in the third simile following, where it is explained. The comparison made here by Pericles of the Samians to babies, which take their food, but cry while they take it, refers to their conduct after the final reduction of the island by Pericles in 430 B.C., Thuc. i 115—117, after an eight months’ contest, ἐξεπόλεονθεὶσαν ἐντὸς μῆνι. The sop, i.e. the nourishment, benefits, favours, they had received—from the Athenian point of view—consisted, thinks Schra- der, in their freedom, and liberation from the yoke of the Persians and the oligarchs. They nevertheless, though they accepted them, most ungratefully and unreasonably grumbled. Buhle refers to Diodor. XII 27.

And (of Pericles again) against the Boeotians; that they are like their
own holm-oaks: for as these are cut down (knocked about or down) by themselves' (dashed one against another by the wind; so Victorius; or 'cut down', split by wedges and mallets made of their own wood, like the "struck eagle" of Aeschylus, Waller, and Byron), 'so are the Boeotians, by their civil (or domestic) contentions'.

And Demosthenes compared the people' (of the Athenian, or some other, democracy: understand εἰκάσειν, which is expressed in the next example) 'to the sea-sick passengers in the vessels at sea'. Their squeamishness, fastidiousness, nausea with the existing state of things, constant desire of change, is produced by the perpetual agitation, fluctuation of their political condition and circumstances, the tumultuous waves of the stormy sea of civil commotion: they are sick of the present, and long for change. The Demosthenes here mentioned is, by general consent, net the Orator; more probably the Athenian general of the Peloponnesian war in Thucydides [sine causa, says Spengel].

The very remarkable fact that the name of the great Orator is in all probability only once mentioned by Aristotle—II 24. 8, where Demades' condemnation of his policy is quoted—though the pair were living together for many years in the same city—is parallel to a similar silence of Bacon as to his great contemporary Shakespeare; but still more remarkable in the former case, from the constant occasion offered to the writer on Rhetoric of illustrating his rules and topics from the practice of the first of speakers. It has been already noticed in the Introduction, pp. 45, 46, and notes, where the cases of supposed mention of or allusion to Demosthenes are collected and examined. And this omission will appear still more remarkable when it is contrasted with the nine closely printed columns of references and citations in Spengel's Index Auctorum ad Rhetores Graecos III 312, seq.

And Democrats' comparison of the "orators" to the nurses who themselves swallow the morsel (which they have previously chewed and softened for the baby), and smear (or slobber over) the babies with the spittle (that they have used in the process). This is the case of the lawyer and the oyster in the caricature; the legal practitioner swallows the savoury contents, and presents the rival claimants with a shell apiece; so the public speakers swallow the substantial profit themselves, and besmear the audience with their unctuous flattery. Comp. Ar. Eq. 715, (Κλέων) ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ αὐτόν (τὸν δήμον, represented as a toothless old man that must be fed like a baby) οἷς φωμίζεται' (Ἀλλαντοπόλης) καθ' ὀπέρ αἱ τῖτβαι γε στιγέις κακῶς, μασώμενος γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅλιγον ἐστίθης, αὐτὸς δ'
σθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἰκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος ἐυφραίνει. πάσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ
eκείνου τριπλάσιον κατέσπακας. Democrats, the author of this saying, seems, from a passage of Plutarch (in Vict.), Pol. Praec. 803 D, to have been notorious for biting and offensive sayings, το λυπών ἀκαίρως τούς ἀκούστας: two of them are quoted. Two persons of this name are mentioned by the Orators. One, son of Sophilus, of the deme of Phyla, in a list of the ambassadors sent to Philip in 347 B.C., after the fall of Olynthus (in the spurious ψήφισμα, Demosth. de Cor. § 29, see Dissen), and again in another questionable ψήφισμα, Dem. de Cor. § 187, purporting to be Demothenes' decree for the appointment of ambassadors to Thebes and the other Greek states, to negotiate an alliance, and arrest the progress of Philip, June, B.C. 338, Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, sub anno. The other, of Aphidna, Isaeus, περὶ τοῦ Φιλοκτηνοῦς κλήρου, § 22, and Aesch. de F. L. § 17. Nothing more seems to be known of either of them. The two are confirmed in the article of Smith's Biographical Dictionary, Democrats No. 1; and the saying here quoted is styled "a fragment of one of his orations."

'And Antisthenes' comparison of Cephisodotus the thin (slight, lean) to frankincense, because he gives pleasure by wasting away'. ὁ λεπτὸς seems to have been a sobriquet of Cephisodotus; and may also indicate a second point of resemblance between him and frankincense, namely his slight, vaporous, unsubstantial nature. Buhle quotes in illustration the German proverb, die Juden nehmen sich nirgend besser aus als am Galgen. "Οτι ἀπολλύμενον εὐφραίνων means that that was the only enjoyment that was to be got out of him: all the rest of him, his properties, qualities, character, was anything but enjoyable, bad and vicious. On λεπτὸς contrasted with παχύς, and men distinguished by this personal peculiarity, Athenaeus has three chapters, xii 75—77, p. 551, seq.

Antisthenes is most likely the Cynic philosopher, who outlived the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, sub anno 365, and was therefore contemporary with Cephisodotus. He, like his successor, Diogenes, had a habit of bitter sarcasm, of which the saying here quoted is a fair specimen. It is truly a bitter jest. See the account of him in Cotton's art. in Smith's Biogr. Dict. Vol. I, p. 208 a. A long list of his sayings is given by Diog. Laer. in his life, vi 1, some of which are caustic enough. Mr. Grote, in his account of Antisthenes, Plato, iii, p. 504, seq., has not specified this cynical feature in his character. [Blass, die Alltische Beredsamkeit, ii 304—316.]

Cephisodotus, ἐκ Κεραμίου. Distinguished by Sauppe (Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. i, p. 77) from the general of that name, mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. §§ 153, 156, 163, 167, as sent (about 359 B.C.) to cooperate with Charidemus in the Hellespont and Chersonese, and elsewhere; by Aesch. c. Ctes. § 51, seq.; by Suidas and Harpocrates. Cephis. ἐκ Κεραμίων, the orator, is informed to be Dem. c. Lept. § 146, together with Leodamas, Aristophon, and Deinias, as one of the best speakers of the time; and again, § 150, οὗτος ἔστι λογος ἀπὸ τῶν λεγόντων δεινος εἰπεν. The Cephisodotus who was sent (with Callias, see note on iii 2. 10) to the congress at Sparta in B.C. 371, Xen. Hellen. vi 3. 2, vii 1. 12, seems more
likely to have been the orator than the general; and so Schneider pronounces, ad Xen. l. c. Three more bons mots of the same are quoted, insfra III 10. 7. In Mr Elder's art. Cephasidotus No. 2, Biog. Dict., the two are identified. [Arnold Schaefer distinguishes them, Dem. u. s. Zeit III 2. 155—6.]

For all these may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors: and therefore, plainly, all those that are popular when expressed as metaphors, will be also (if required) similes, and similes metaphors without the descriptive details (the detailed explanation). "A simile is a metaphor writ large, with the details filled in; this is λόγος." Introd. p. 290.

§ 4. 'The proportional metaphor should always be reciprocally transferable, and to either of the two congeners; for instance, if the goblet is Dionysius' shield, then also the shield may be appropriately called Ares' goblet. Such then are the elements of which the speech (or discourse in general, or prose) is composed'. This section, and its concluding observation, are fully explained in the Introd. pp. 290—292, to which the reader is referred.

Anaxandrides (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. III. 201, Anax. Fr. Inc. xxxi.) as well as Antiphanes (Kaweis, Meineke, Fragm. III. 58) quote this metaphor of Timotheus in ridicule. From Athenaeus, XI. 502 b, we learn that the goblets which Anaxandrides calls φιάλας "Δρεος are τὸς καρπωτός, 'walnut-shaped'. This tends to confirm Twining's remark, on Poet. xxi. 12, note 185, that there was a resemblance in shape between this kind of cup and a shield, which helped to suggest and justify the metaphor. He refers, as also Buhle ad loc. Poet.—see also Gräfenhan, ad Poet. p. 157—to Hom. II. xxiii 270, on the shape of the φιάλη, πείμπτω δ' ἀμφίθετον φιάλην ἀπίρωτον ἔθηκε and the notes.

I have followed Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, in his recent ed. [1867], who agree in excluding from the text the superfluous καὶ επί, before τῶν ὀμογειών,—apparently a mere repetition of the preceding καὶ επί before βάτερα.

CHAP. V.

Here commences the second division of λέξεις, the treatment of style as it appears in the combination of words in sentences, and the connexion of the latter in harmonious periods. The ἀρχή, the beginning, basis or
§§ 1, 2.

Purity of language, ἡ Ἑλληνίζεως τὸ Ἐλληνίζεως, pure and correct Greek, in idiom and choice of words, opposed to barbarism, solecism, and all impropriety in general. The subject of Purity has been already treated in the Introduction, under the head of 'General observations on Style,' p. 279, note 3.

The divisions of the chapter, the five heads to which Purity may be reduced—to which are added in the last section two supplementary topics which belong rather to perspicuity, punctuation and metaξυλογία, or parenthesis—are explained and illustrated by references to the works of other rhetoricians, in the analysis, Introd. pp. 292—5.

The classification is, as we shall see, extremely imperfect and deficient; and, moreover, the distinction of purity and perspicuity is not carefully observed. Most probably Aristotle did not recognise it at all. Nearly all the precepts given in this chapter are referrible to perspicuity rather than purity.

§ 1. ἡ Ἑλληνίζεως] Cic. Brut. LXXIV. 258, Solum quidem, et quasi fundamentum oratoris...locutionem emendatum et Latinam.

.mag στέρνει] 'Ελληνισμός, φράσις αδιάπτωτος (Diogenes Laertius, Zeno, vii. 59). τὸ Ἑλληνίζεως οικτοῦ ἢ τὸ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν συνήθειαν διασώζειν τών ὄρομάτων ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ τὸ ἀκριβοῦς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνήν, καὶ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ ἢ τῶν γραμματικῶν ἢ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν προσήκουσαν τῶν πράγμασιν ἢ τοὺς ἕρμασι τοὺς πράγμασιν ἢ τὸν φιλόσοφον (Schol. ad Plat. p. 70 ap. Gaisford). This takes quite a different view of the meaning of the word to that of Aristotle; in the one case the 'purity of the Greek' is shewn in the choice of words, in the other in the connexion of sentences by observance of the idiom of the language. But in fact both of these belong to 'pure Greek': and purity is a negative quality of style, consisting in the avoidance of error (φράσις αδιάπτωτος, emendata locutio,) in the shape of (1) solecism (Aristotle's view, idiomatic, grammatical, blunders), (2) barbarism; the latter, the use especially of foreign words (whence the name), or any similar impropriety. Atque, ut Latine loquamur, non solum videndum est ut et verba efferamus ea quae nemo iure reprehendat, et ea sic et casibus et temporibus et genere et numero conservemus, &c. Cic. de Orat. iii. 11.40. In the next section he includes pronunciation. The examples of σολοκισμός, the opposite to Ἑλληνισμός, given in de Soph. El. 32, 182 a 13 and 34, are both of them grammatical errors: one who is guilty of either, οὐκ ἀρχὸν Ἑλληνίζειν. In the same, c. 3, 165 b 20, σολοκίζειν is defined, τῇ λέξης βαρβαρίζειν. [Dem. Or. 45 (κατὰ Στραφᾶνον α') § 30, ύστερ δ' ἵσως αὐτῶν ὑπειληφατε, ὅτι σολοκίζει τῇ φωνῇ, βαρβαρον καὶ εὐκαταβρόντου εἶναι.]

'Pure, correct' Greek is the foundation of style: this falls under five heads or divisions'.

§ 2. 'The first of these is (the proper use of) connective particles, that is, when they are made to correspond, in such a natural position (relation) of priority or posteriority to one another in the sentence, as some of them
§ 2.

λῆλων, οίνον ἐνοι ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὡσπερ ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν ὁ δὲ. δέι δὲ ἔως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἄλληλοις, καὶ μήτε μακρὰν ἀπαρτάν μήτε συνδέσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς require; as μὲν and ἐγὼ μὲν require δὲ and ὁ δὲ (as correlates)¹. That is to say, the connective μὲν (ὁ ‘μὲν’ συνδέσμος) requires an answering δὲ in the apodosis, the one particle necessarily implying the other; and the same with ἐγὼ μὲν, and ὁ δὲ; μὲν with ἐγὼ necessarily implies a second, or other person, some one else, (see note on I 6. 22, and Donaldson, New Cratylus, § 154, there cited,) correlative and subsequent or posterior: and therefore in the construction of the sentence μὲν is placed before (προτέρων), δὲ after (διότερων).

On συνδέσμος as a ‘part of speech’, see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. III c. 2, p. 371 seq.; and on its various senses in general, ib. Appendix D, p. 392; and again p. 437, in the analysis c. 25 (26) of the Rhet. ad Alex. The rule here given for the treatment of connectives is derived originally from Isocrates’ τέχνη. Ibid. pp. 437, 8. The Rhet. ad Alex. also has it, c. 25 (26), 1, μετὰ δὲ συνδέσμων οὐς ἤν προείπης ἀποδίδου τοῖς ἀκολουθοῦντας; which is then exemplified by μὲν and δὲ, καὶ, καί.

ἀποδιδόναι] to render, or ‘assign, to its proper place’, see note on I 1. 7. ἀντ-ἀποδιδόναι (in the following clause) is to do this so that there is a ‘reciprocal correspondence’ between the two, ἀντ-ἄλληλοις. ‘But this reciprocal correspondence between them should be introduced (by the speaker, δέι τῶν λέγωντα) before the audience has had time to forget (ἔως μέμνηται, sc. ὁ ἄκροατής, while he still retains in his recollection) the first of the two connectives, with its accompanying clause; and the two should neither be too widely separated, nor should (another) conjunction be introduced before that which is absolutely required; for (such a construction) is seldom appropriate. “But I, as soon as he told me—for Cleon came entreating and requiring (claiming, demanding)—set out with them in my company.” For in examples like this, several clauses with conjunctions are prematurely inserted before that which is to correspond as the correlative’.

The example of this faulty construction here given is one of the very few which Aristotle has manufactured, contrary to his usual rule of citing examples from the sayings or writings of others supplied by memory. This has been noticed as one of the characteristic differences which distinguish Aristotle’s Rhetoric from the Rhet. ad Alex.—see Introd. p. 414¹—the author of the latter, almost invariably, illustrating his precepts by examples of his own. The example itself, as appears from the πολλοί σύνδεσμοι of the ensuing clause, is to be regarded, not as an actual exemplification of the fault, but only as a suggestion of what might be. In itself it is clear enough: but if these parenthetical clauses be multiplied—as in fact is very often done in Aristotle’s own writings—between protasis and apodosis, the hearer, or reader, is very apt to

¹ Where “the single exception, of III 16” requires modification: but the exceptions are extremely rare.
γιαγκαίον· ὀλιγαχόν γὰρ ἀρμόττει. "ἐγὼ δ', ἐπεὶ μοι ἐπεν (ἥ λε τε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενος τε καὶ ἀξιών), ἐπορευόμην παραλαζῆν αὐτοὺς." ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολ- λοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβε- βληται σύνδεσμοι. έαν δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταξὺ γένηται 3 τοῦ ἐπορευόμην, ἀσαφές. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὑνόμαις λέγειν 4 καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν. τρίτον μὴ ἀμφιβόλους.

forget if the commencement of the sentence, and the argument becomes
confused.

'But if the clauses that intervene (before) ἐπορευόμην (between the
πρότασις and it) be numerous, it becomes obscure'. μεταξὺ is not
unfrequently used with only one of the two extremes, between which
the intermediate lies, expressed: examples are, Arist. Ach. 432, Τηλέφων
ῥυκώματα, κεῖται δ' ἀναβεν τῶν θυστείων μακών, μετάξυ τῶν ἱνοῦ. Aesch.
Choeph. 55, τὰ δ' ἐν μεταίχμιῳ σκότου, for σκότου καὶ φῶν. Others
in Shilleto's note on Dem. de F. L. § 181, who compares with the last
instance, our own twilight, i.e. 'betwixt (darkness and) light'. Add
Hec. 437. [Isocr. Paneg. § 70, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῆς χώρας, Dem. de Corona
§ 32, τῶν μεταξὺ χρόνων τῶν ὅρκων.]

A violation of this rule is pointed out by Arnold, on Thuc. I 32. 1.
Comp. Quint. VIII 2. 14, 15. The parenthesis, τὸ μεταξὺ, is there called
interiectio. Interiectio, qua et oratores et historici frequenter utuntur,
ut medio sermone aliquem inscrant sensum, impediri solet intellectus,
nisi quod interponitur breve est; Virg. Georg. III 79—83 being adduced
as an example. This is properly referred by Quint. to perspicuitas.

§ 3. 'So one point (or head, of merit in style) appears, resides,
in the due construction of connectives (conjunctions); a second is to
call things by their own proper (special) names, and not by terms that are
general (comprehensive; i. e. names of classes, abstract terms)'.

τὰ περιέχοντα is explained by Victorius and Schrader, 'periphrases,
circumlocutions', such as the general definition for the particular object
under it, the λόγος for the ὅμωμα; or a description in several words substi-
tuted for the single ὕδων ὕδωρ, as Ibericas herbas for spartum, duratos
muria pisces for salsamenta, Quint. VIII 2. 2, 3, and others, quoted by
Schrader from Cic. de Div. II 64. This is περιφράσις, a roundabout,
not direct, expression of your meaning, circumlocutio, circuitus elocuendi,
Quint. VIII 6. 59—61.

I have followed this explanation myself in the paraphrase, Introd.
p. 293; but I now see that the word cannot bear this meaning, and
adopt the explanation of Schweighäuser on Athen. VII 309 A (q. v.), who
understands by it the γίνον, the genus or class name, which, being an
abstract, general term, is of course less perspicuous than the direct
expression of one of the particulars, (ἡμα, of which the class is composed,)
by the name of the concrete individual; as animal or man than John
and Thomas. The genus may be said περιέχειν ‘to comprehend, embrace, include’, the species, and individuals of which it is made up; and conversely περιέχεσθαι of the included object, τὸ ὑπόκειμενον, Anal. Pr. 1 27, 43 b 23, 29. Comp. Met. Δ 2, 1013 b 34, τὰ περιέχοντα ὑπὸ ὅν τῶν καθ ἐκαστὰ. Πτ. Θ 2, 1046 b 24, μὰ γὰρ ἀρχὴ περιέχεται, τὸ λόγῳ. Moreover ὀνόμασι, which must be carried on to περιέχουσιν, can hardly stand for ‘descriptions’ consisting of many words.

§ 4. ‘Thirdly, to avoid ambiguous terms; but that, (viz. to avoid them,) only if the purpose be not the contrary’: the contrary, viz. to perspicuity, that is obscurity. If your object is to be obscure, you should then not avoid, but make use of, these equivocal terms, to hide your meaning and mystify your audience.

ἄμφιβολοι is one of the fallacies of language, παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, ‘ambiguity’ in words connected in a sentence, ‘in the proposition’; distinguished from ὁμωμορία, ambiguity in single words, de Soph. El. c. 4. It is exemplified, l. c. 166 a 6 seq. See above, in preliminary observations to Π 24. These two last precepts are most probably taken, like the preceding on σύνθεσις, from Isocrates’ τέχνη; and appear also in Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) 1, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὀνόμαζε τοῖς οἰκείοις ὀνόμασιν ὅτι ἀν λέγεις, διαφεύγων τὸ ἄμφιβολον. See in the analysis of this treatise, ch. 25, Intro. p. 437. The qualification, ἀν μὴ τάναντα προαιρήται, seems to be Aristotle’s own. On the various kinds of ἄμφιβολα, ambiguitas, in Rhetoric sunt innumerabiles (Quint. vii 9). They may be referred to two general heads; in singulis verbis (ὁμωμορία), and continuas (Aristotle’s ἄμφιβολοι).

‘As is done (ambiguous terms employed, by speakers and writers) whenever, having in fact nothing to say, they make a pretence (affect) of saying something; for such (those who pretend to a meaning when there is none) express this no-meaning in verse (comp. III 1 9, οἱ ποιταί λέγοντες εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ.), Empedocles, for instance: for this (roundabout, circuitous, phrasology) circumlocution cheats (deludes) by the multitude (accumulation) of words, and the listeners are affected (i.e. imposed upon) in the same way as the vulgar in the presence of diviners; that is, when (the latter) pronounce their ambiguous utterance, they express their approval by a nod of assent, “Croesus, if he pass the Halys, shall destroy a mighty realm”.

The oracle leaves it doubtful whether the power or dominion to be destroyed is his own, or some other. Herod. 1 53, 91. Oracles are proverbially ambiguous and enigmatical. [Macbeth, v 8. 19, Be these juggling fiends no more believed. That palef with us in a double sense; That keep the word of promise to our ear; And break it to our hope.] Cicero, de Divin. 11 56, 116 (to Pyrrhus), Aio te Aetecida Romanos vincere posse.

Perhaps the following two verses of Empedocles’ collected fragments,
καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὁ περ οἱ πολλοὶ πυρὰ
toïς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμ-
παρανεύουσιν.

Κροῖσσος Ἄλων διαβάς μεγάλην ἀρχήν καταλύσει.

Karsten, p. 100, lines 106—7, may in some degree illustrate Aristotle's allu-
sion to this writer, and his sound without sense;

Νείκις τ' ουλομένου δίχα τών, ἀτιλιατόν ἀπάντη,
καὶ Φιλότης μετὰ τοίσιν ἵνα μὴκός τε πλάτος τε.

Karsten's remarks on Empedocles' style, de Emp. vita et studiis p. 60,
(prefixed to the Fragm. and Comment.) well illustrate this passage, to
which he refers. He notices the obscurity of his diction, which appears
especially in the symbolical terms, such as Ἔγης, by which he some-
times designates the elements—see for instance the four lines, Fragm.
211—214—and in the ambiguities ascribed to him here by Aristotle,
"Nonnunquam vero ad oraculorum gravitatem adsurgit, quales sunt ver-
sus illi, ἐστιν 'Διάγερ κρήμα κτ.λ. Fragm. init. ἄλλα το μὲν πάντων νύμπ
μων κτ.λ. ν. 404. Quamobrem minime miramur quod afirmat Theodo-
retus, seriores fatidicos ex Empedoclis potissimum versibus oracula sua
compilasse."

Aristotle says of him, Poet. 1 11, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν ἐστὶν 'Ὀμηρὸ καὶ 'Εμπε-
δοκλῆς πλῆν τὸ μέτρον' διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλέων, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον
μάλλον ἡ ποιήτην. It is curious to contrast this contemptuous judgment
of his poetry and the general character and value of his writings, as it
may be gathered from the two passages of the Rhet. and Poet., with the
glowing eulogium of Lucretius, de rerum nat. 1 716—733. After describ-
ing the wonders and good things of Sicily, his birthplace, he concludes,
Nil tamen hoc habuisse vīro praecelarius in se, nec sanctum magis ei
mirum carumque videtur. Carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius voci-
ferantur et expoundt praeclera reperta, ut vix humana videatur stirpe
creatus. And still more remarkable is Aristotle's contradiction of him-
self, if Diogenes Laertius' quotation, VIII 57, is to be depended upon, ἐν
δὲ τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν φήσιν ὅτι καὶ 'Ομηρικὸς ὁ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δευνός περὶ τὴν
φράσιν, κτ.λ.—comp. the passage of the Poetics:—the possible explana-
tion, that what he said in the one refers to the style, and in the other to
the contents, of Empedocles' poem, is excluded by the contemptuous
remark upon his style in the Rhetoric. On the passage of Lucretius, see
 Munro's note, 1 733.

Of the vagabond impostors who hawked about spurious oracles and
predictions under the names of μάντεις and χρησμολόγοι, prophets or
diviners and soothsayers, Aristophanes has given us specimens, Hiero-
cles in the 'Peace,' 1252, foll., and the nameless χρησμολόγος in the
 'Birds,' 959, foll.

'And by reason of the less liability to mistake in general (by follow-
ing this course) diviners are accustomed to deliver their predictions in
(through the channel, or medium of) general terms of the fact (which is
prophesied), fraus latet in generalibus; for a man is much more likely to
make a hit in playing "odd and even" by saying "even" or "odd", than
§§ 4, 5

καὶ διὰ τὸ ὑλὸς ἐλαττὼν εἶναι ἀμαρτημα, διὰ τῶν R.
γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσι οἱ μάντεις τύχοι γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτισμῳὶς ἀρτια ἡ περισσα ἐἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἡ πόσα ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ότι ἐσται ἡ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζον τὰ πότε ἀπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὁμοία: ὅστ' ἂν μὴ τουτούτον τινὸς 5 ἕνεκα, φευκτέων. τέταρτον, ὡς Πρωταγόρας ὑγ ἀρνή
τῶν ὅνουμάτων διήρει, ἀρρένα καὶ θηλεα καὶ σκεὺς δει

any particular number that he has in his hand; or “that (the event
predicted) will be” than “when” (it will be); and this is why the soothsayers
never add (to their prediction) the precise time (lit. the definition of the
when’). All these then (circumlocutions, ambiguities, and the like) are
alike (in being faults) and therefore, unless for some reason (as before
suggested), to be avoided.

Of ἀρτισμοῦ “odd and even”, (a child’s game, played with ἀστράγαλοι,
or knuckle-bones, Plato, Lysis 206 E, ἄρτια οὖν ἀστραγάλως παρπάλλοις,) an
account is given in Becker’s Charicles, on the games’, p. 354; and of the
Corresponding Latin game par impar in Gallus, p. 504. Ludere par im-
par, Hor. Sat. II 3. 248 (Heindorf’s note), Ovid, Nux Eleg. line 79, estetiam,
par sit numerus, qui dicat, an impar. The game might be played with
any kind of counters, beans, acorns, coins—in Carion’s house, after he had
grown rich, Arist. Plut. 816, “the servants played at odd and even with
golden staters.” It is usually described as played by two persons, one of
whom held in his closed hand a number of counters, and the other had
to guess whether it was odd or even. This was no doubt one way of
playing it, but there was also another not quite so simple, as appears
from this passage of the Rhetoric, and also from the Schol. on Plut. 1057,
in which the guess was made at the number, πόσα. In the Plutus, I. c.,
the game is played with ‘walnuts’, κάρπω, and the Scholiast’s comment is,
“one grasps a handful of walnuts, and with his hand stretched out asks,
how many? and if the other guesses right, he receives all the contents of
his hand; if wrong, he pays the number found in the other’s hand when
opened.”

οὶ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζονται τὸ πότε] On this intentional indefi-
niteness and obscurity of would-be prophets, Victorius refers to Æschel-
nes c. Ctes. § 99, who contrasts Demosthenes with other ἅλαζοιν, ὃς
ταν τι θεῦσμαι, ἀφάτω καὶ ἀσφῆ πειρώνται λέγειν, φοροῦμεν τῶν ἔλεγ-
χων: and, to the same effect, of a supposed citation from the Sibylline
verses, Cic. de Divin. II 54. 110, Callide enim qui illa composuit perfect
ui, quidcumque accidisset, praedictum videtur, hominum et temporum
definitione sublata.

§ 5. ‘Fourthly, to observe Protagoras’ division of the classes (class-
ification) of nouns, into male, female, and inanimate (prop. implements): for these also must be correctly assigned, each to its proper place’. This
is illustrated by an example of two participles in the feminine following ἥ.
γὰρ ἀποδιδόμαι καὶ ταύτα ὀρθῶς "ἡ δὲ ἐλθοῦσα καὶ ὁ διαλεξθεῖσα ὄχετο.", πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὠλίγα καὶ ἐν ὀρθῶς ὄνομάζειν. "οὐ δὲ ἐλθόντες ἐτυπ-
τόν με.

όλος δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὐφραστὸν. ἐστι δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὁ περ οἱ πολλοὶ

On the import of this, the earliest attempt at Greek grammar, and other similar essays of Protagoras in the same line, see Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. VII. Vol. III. p. 48 seq. in the article on Protagoras. I have there, and subsequently in a note, Introd. p. 293, endeavoured by comparison of various passages on the subject to determine its meaning, and I need not here repeat what is there said. At all events it is not

the now recognised grammatical classification of 'genders of nouns', masculine, feminine and neuter. γένη is not here 'genders', though the later grammar adopted this name to express it; but simply 'classes'. This is a genuine precept of Ἑλλησσμός, 'purity of language', as is also

the next.

§ 6. 'Fifthly, in the correct expression (by change of termination) of many, few, and one', followed by an example of a plural participle and verb. This is of course the due expression of the number of nouns, and the observation of the concord, or agreement of adj. with subst. or pronoun, or verb with nom. case, in number. Victorius thinks that ὀλίγα stands for what was afterwards distinguished as the dual number. Comp. Cic. de Orat. III 11. 40.

'And, as a general rule, every written composition must be easy to read, or—which is the same thing—to speak, or deliver'. Comp. Quint. viii 2. 17. Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας, § 193 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 304), γραφικὴ δὲ λέξις (written composition) ἡ εὐανὰγνωστος. αὐτὴ δὲ στίν ἡ συνη-

τημένη καὶ οἶον ἡ σφυλακισμένη τοῖς συνδέσμοις, i.e. written composition must be carefully and well constructed, with due regard to the conjunctions, and the connexion of sentences, or syntax in general. This is opposed to declamatory speaking, ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις, ἡ διαλεξμένη, in which the want of exact connexion—particularly asyndeton, the omission of καὶ—often aids the effect: comp. § 194.

'This is wanting (in compositions in which) conjunctions and other connecting particles are numerous, and such as are not easy to punctuate, like those of Heraclitus'. This does not contradict what was said before about the necessity of conjunctions, &c., to ensure perspicuity, it only condemns the excessive use of them; a long string of connected clauses is apt to lead to obscurity: the due mean is to be observed, here as elsewhere. With what follows compare Demetrius, u. s. § 192, τὸ δὲ ἀσυνέδετον καὶ διαλεξμένον δλον ἀσαφῆς τῶν ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστου κόλου ἄρχη διὰ τὴν λόγον, ὀσπέρ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ γὰρ ταύτα σκοτεινα ποιεὶ τὸ πλεῖον ἡ λόγος, and Theon, Progymn. peri διηγήματος § 187 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. II 82), παρὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν (ambiguity arising from punctuation) τὰ Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίβλια σκοτεινά γέγονε κατακόρως αὐτὴ χρησιμέ-

νον, ἴτοι ἐπίτρησε ἦ καὶ δὲ ἀγνοιαν (the fault had been previously illustrated)
σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ' ἀ μη ῥάδειον διαστιζειν, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἦρακλείτου. τὸ γὰρ Ἦρακλείτου δια-ρ. στίζει τίργων διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται,

Quintilian, vii. 9. 7, classes this as one of the varieties of amphibolia (ambiguity), viz. per collectionem, ubi dubium est quid quo referri aportaret, exemplifying it from Virgil, Aen. i. 477 lora tenens tamen. § 8, unde controversia illa, Testamento quidam insit poni statuum auream hastam tenentem. Quaeritur, statua hastam tenens aera esse debeat, an haste esse aera in statua alterius materiæ? —σκοτεινά, in the above passages of Demetrius and Theon, is, of course an allusion to Heraclitus' well-known sobriquet, ὁ σκοτεινός; his 'obscurity' was proverbial. This want of punctuation is not by any means the only, or indeed the principal, source of the obscurity of the mystic enigmatical sayings of the 'dark' philosopher. The remains of these have been collected by Schleiermacher, Bernays [and Lyttelton] in their respective tracts, and several of the most remarkable quoted by Thompson in his note on Butler's Lect. on Anc. Phil. i. 313, note 10; see also Diog. Laert. ix. 1, vita Heracliti.

διαστιζειν] δια στίζειν, ('to prick'), is 'to distinguish or duly distribute by pointing or punctuation'. Two examples similar to this are given in de Soph. El. c. 4, 166 a 36, in illustration of the fallacy of διαφέρειν.

'For to punctuate Heraclitus' writing is a hard matter (a difficult ἥθος, a business), owing to the uncertainty as to which of the two (words), the preceding or following, (any particular word) is attached; as for instance, at the commencement of his (αὐτοῦ, masc.) composition, where he says, "Of this reason constant (being) ever (reading τοῦδ' ἐόντος ἄει) men come into being devoid of understanding"; for this leaves it uncertain to which of the two (ἐόντος or ἐξίνετοι γίγνονται) the word ever should be attached by the punctuation'. Bekker, who in his first edition reads τοῦ δέοντος, has in the third altered it to τοῦδ' ἐόντος. Spengel retains the former— which is the reading of ὁς A (or A). τοῦδ' ἐόντος, which had been already proposed by Victorius from a passage of Sext. Empir., is undoubtedly right. The words are quoted also by Clemens Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 716, by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xiii, and by Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. vii. 132, who extracts several lines, reading τοῦδε ἐόντος, and omitting ἄει, which are cited and commented on by Schleiermacher in his tract on the fragments of Heraclitus, No. 47, p. 482. Clemens and Eusebius have τοῦ δέοντος (Schleierm.). The λόγος, according to Sextus—and this is confirmed by Heraclitus' context, which he quotes—is the universal reason, ὁ θειός λόγος, of which men are unconscious, depending rather upon sense, though it is the true κριτήριον. τοῦτον δὴ τῶν κοινῶν λόγον καὶ θείον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μετοχήν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησίν ὃ Ἦρακλείτου. This interpretation of course requires ἐόντος. An additional argument in its favour is suggested by Schleiermacher, that if δέοντος had been the reading in Aristotle's copy of Heraclitus, he would have found no difficulty in the reference of ἄει. The title of his σύγγραμμα—which is omitted by Diogenes in his life, ix. 1, though the σύγγραμμα itself is twice mentioned, §§ 6, 7, and some of its contents quoted in the 7th and follow-
ΠΙΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 5 §§ 6, 7. 63

τῷ ὑστερον ἢ τῷ πρῶτον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ὦρχῇ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγράμματος. φησὶ γὰρ "τὸν λόγον τοῦ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἐξύνετοι ἀνθρωποὶ γέγυνονται" ἀδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί, πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ διαστίζει. ἔτι δὲ ποιεῖ συλλογικίζει τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόμα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιζευγνυθῇ ἀμφοῖν ὁ ἐν γίνεται sections—seems to have been περὶ φύσεως; the ordinary title of works upon similar subjects by the earlier cosmical speculators, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, &c.

ἐργον] of something hard, difficult of execution, laborious—in the same sense as ἐργαθία, ὀπεροῦσι, which is derived from it—occurs occasionally in various Greek writers, though it is exemplified by only one instance in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. It is used sometimes with, sometimes without, χαλεπών. Arist. Ran. 1100, χαλεπόν οὐν ἐργον διαρέων. A number of instances of ἐργον in this sense and ἐργαθία are to be found in the fragments of the Comic poets, Menander, Diphilus, Posidippus, Apollodorus; for instance, ἐργον—ἀναν ημέρα μεταστήγα αὐτ' ἐργον ἐτὶ μακράν συνήθανα—ἄναα ἐργον ἕκ λόγου πιστῶν λαβέων, κ.τ.λ. See the Ind. to Meineke's Fragn. Comic. Gr. s. v. Xen. Mem. IV 7, 9, ἐργον εἶναι εὐρέων ἅστρων κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 187 E, μέγα ἐργον...καλὸς χρήσθαι, Ib. Tim. 28 c, τὸν ποιητὴν...εὑρετεῖ ἐργόν καὶ εὑρώσα, κ.τ.λ. Demosth. de Rhod. Lib. § 34, ἀλλ' ἀν' ἐποίησαν λόγου—τοῦτ' ἐργον εὐρέων. It occurs more frequently in Aristotle, and is, I think, almost confined to the later of the classical Greek writers. Arist. Pol. II 7, 1266 b 13, ἐργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοῖ εἶναι τοὺς τουποὺς. III 15, 1286 a 35, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐργον ἁμα πάντας ὄργανθαν καί ἀμαρτέων. Eth. Nic. v 13, 1137 a 13, τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἐργον (a harder task) ἢ τὰ ὑμεῖα εἴδειν. Ib. c. 3, 1130 a 8. Topic. E c. 4, 133 b 16, c. 5, 134 a 19, Θ 3, 159 a 5, c. 11, 161 b 32, πλέονος ἐργον δειμέων. Hist. Anim. II 6, ὡς ἐργον εἶναι ἑιδεῖ. Ib. VI 20, 7, 30, 2, 1X 40, 29, ἐργον δ' ἐστὶ λαδείν. ἐργαθία occurs, Eth. N. I 13, 1102 a 25, 1X 2, sub finem, c. 7, 1168 a 24, 1, 10, 1171 a 5, and Top. Z. 1, 13 b 9, ἐργοδέστερον. In Latin we have negotium similarly employed, and nullio negotio; and Virgil has opus; Hoc opus, hic labor est, Aen. vi 129.

ὁποτέρῳ διαστίζει. Bekker in margin of 4to. edition "αν δει στιξαν?" He (and Spengel) has now returned to the vulgata lectio διαστίζει, subaudii δει. Gaisford conjectured δει διαστίζει.

§ 7. 'And further a solecism is made if, in combining (two words) in one phrase (and grammatically connected with a third; as two subs. with one verb, or two verbs with a subst.), you fail to assign one which is equally appropriate to them both (lit. and again, a solecism is made, by not assigning, that is, if you don't unite in construction with them, i.e. with the two verbs or nouns, which are not expressed, one which is appropriate to them both; in other words, if you do assign to them a third word which is appropriate only to one of them). For instance, to see is not common to sound and colour (won't combine with, is not appropriate to, both) but to perceive is'.

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 5 § 7—6 § 1.

αρμόττει, οἶνον ἡ ψόφον ἡ χρώμα: τὸ μὲν ἰδῶν οὐ κοινὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήμενος κοινόν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ ἀν μὴ προθεὶς εἰτῆς, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οἶνον "ἐμελλὼν γὰρ διαλέχεις ἐκεῖνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ἠδὲ πορεύεσθαι," ἄλλα μὴ "ἐμελλὼν γὰρ διαλέχεις πορεύεσθαι, εἶτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ἠδὲ ἐγένετο."

I οὖν δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ σχῆμα ἐπιζυγώνα, which occurs again c. 6 § 5, and c. 9 § 7, seems to be technical in this grammatical application, of 'uniting' as in 'under a vinculum or bracket'; the ἤκο in the Greek fulfilling a similar function in uniting two animals, as a bracket, in arithmetic or algebra, unites two or more symbols that are placed under it. So that ἐπιζυγώνα is to place the ὄψιν πρὸν the two words, and so bring them together in one construction. This soleism, as Ar. rightly calls it, usually passes under the respectable name of a figure, grammatical or rhetorical. It is the figure εὐγμα or σύλληψις, the office of which has been already explained. It is illustrated at length in the note on 1 4.6.

ψόφον and χρώμα are 'governed' by ἰδῶν following. Why Aristotle should have chosen to write ἡ the alternative, instead of καὶ the cōpula, which he clearly means, no one I suppose can guess. I have taken for granted, as Victorius has also done, that he does mean and, and not or, and have so translated it. A bad instance of εὐγμα is given in note 1, Introd. p. 295, from the immaculate Isocrates, Paneg. § 80 (καὶ σωτῆρες ἀλλὰ μὴ λυγμένες ἀποκαλλεῖσθαι).

'It tends to obscurity too (is an offence against, violation of, perspicuity) if you intend to introduce a number (of words or details) in the middle of a sentence, not to complete the sense first (πρὶ, before you proceed, lit. not to put first, that which will remove what would else be the obscurity). For instance, "I intended, after having talked to him about this and that and so and so"—here the details are to be introduced; but these are so long, that before the speaker has come to the end of his sentence the hearers have forgotten the beginning—"to start:" instead of, "I was about to start after my conversation with him, and then (when) this and that and so and so happened." This is μεταξυλογία, interiectio (Quint.), or Parenthesis. See Introd. p. 295.

CHAP. VI.

Of ὤγκος (swelling), pomp, grandeur, dignity (Auct. ad Heren. IV 13.18, dignitas), of style; most appropriate to Epic poetry: Poet. xxiv. 9, τὸ γὰρ ἡρωίκων στασιμώτατον καὶ ὠγκώδεστατον τῶν μέτρων ἑστίν. Ib. § 6, ἀ τῶν ποιήματος ὤγκος. See Gräfenhan’s note ad loc. So Dion. Hal. de Dinarch. l. 7 (Vol. v. 643, Reiske), τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς τὸ μὴ τραγῳδὸν μοδὲ ὠγκόδες ἔχη. This is near akin to σεμνότης, on which Hermogenes has a chapter, περὶ ἱδέων, to. a'. (Spengele, Rhet. Gr. II. 287), and περὶ σεμνων λόγων, περὶ εὐρισκεῖσ, to. b. 9. (Ib. p. 255), and again περὶ μ.-γένεσις, in the preceding chap. 10, p. 286. So Demetrius writes περὶ
In the language of Rhetoric we see that ὁγκος implies excellence and is a virtue of style. In the vulgar usage of common life, when it and its derivatives are applied metaphorically, as they often are, it may bear either a favourable or an unfavourable interpretation. In the latter case the ‘pomp’ of style becomes ‘pomposity’, and the ‘swelling phrases’ turgid and inflated amplulae. And in a moral sense the same notion of fastus is attached to it, and it comes to denote vanity, ostentation, arrogance, as Plat. Meno 90 A, where it is personal, and opposed to κόμιος. In Soph. Oed. Col. 1162, βραχὺν μύθων οὐκ ὁγκὸς πλεῶν is a short conversation without ‘bulk’, not unnaturally and unreasonably swelled out or lengthened. ὁγκοθεὶς χαλιὴ in the same author (Fragm. Inc. ap. Stobaeum, No. 679, Dind.) has the same sense in a moral application. And so ὁγκὸν ἄρεων, Soph. Aj. 129. τὸ ὁγκηρὸν, Ar. Eth. N. iv. 13, sub finem, is again ‘inflated’, of mere bulk without solidity, show without substance; i.e. morally, ‘ostentation’, a pretentious air and exterior, assumption. See Ernesti, Lex. Tech. Gr. s. νν. ὁγκηρόν, ὁγκος, ὁγκοῦν, ὁγκοθεῖς.

§ 1. ‘To dignity, amplification of style, the following things contribute; first, the substitution of definition (or detailed description) for the (direct, proper) name (of the object); to say for example not circle, but “a plane figure which is in all points equidistant from the centre”. One would have supposed that this was an exemplification rather of the unfavourable sense of ὁγκος: it also seems to be opposed to what was said c. 5. 3, τοῖς ἱδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν: and in fact dignity ought not to interfere with perspicuity. The two precepts, however, do not in reality contradict one another. The use of abstract, general terms, instead of the plain and direct individual names, is a source of obscurity: there is no obscurity, but rather the contrary, in setting forth the definition of it at length. ‘For (the purpose of) brevity the contrary is the rule, the proper name, and not the definition’. Both of these precepts appear in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 22 (23) §§ 3 and 5. They are probably taken, like the others mentioned in Introd. pp. 437, 438, from Isocrates’ τέχνη.

§ 2. ‘And if (you have to express) anything ugly or foul’ (to the eye or to the mind and moral sense), ‘or unbecoming, if the foulness or indecency is in the (conception, explanation, description, i.e.) meaning and associations, use the word, if in the word itself, the description’. See on αἰσχρολογία, note on c. 2. 13, and the distinction there laid down.

AR. III.
§ 3. 'And setting forth (representing) things by metaphors and the descriptive and ornamental epithets (epithets proper, and any descriptive addition to a noun), guarding at the same time against giving them a too poetical character'. One of the characteristics of Thucydides is τὸ ποιητικὸν τῶν ὄνομάτων, according to Dionysius, de Thuc. Iud. 24.; as likewise of Gorgias and his school, who exaggerated this defect so that their prose made a near approach to dithyrambs.

§ 4. 'And to make one many (to put plural for singular) after the manner of the poets: they say, though all the while there is only one harbour, "to Achaean harbours". [Victorius refers to the treatise περὶ ὕψους, 23 § 2 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. I 274), ἐσθ' ὅποι προσπίπτει τὰ πληθυντικὰ μεγαλορημονέστερα, καὶ αὐτὸ δοξοκομούντα τῷ ὄχλῳ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, which the writer illustrates by quoting Soph. Oed. Rex 1403—7, ὃ γάμοι γάμωι κ.τ.λ.] λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαίκοις] There are five instances of λιμένες for a single harbour in Euripides, and one in Sophocles, but none of them is 'Achaean harbours'. Victorius says that he has not been able to find the passage.

'And again, "Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablets"', the letter, namely, which Iphigenia was proposing to send by one of the two strangers to Orestes at Argos. Iph. Taur. 727. πολύθυροι restored (for πολύθρηροι) from πολύθρηροι found in one MS, describes the many leaves of the tablets: this, which was less usual than the simpler form, with only two leaves, shows that it was a long letter.

On δέλτος, comp. Becker's Charicles, p. 162 note [Vol. I. p. 285, of unabridged German ed.], Rich's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. s.v. cera p. 144. The leaves of the tablets, which were thin slabs or plates of wood coated with wax, were sometimes shaped like doors (a very natural form to give them), whence the name δῆρα. Pollux IV 18. (ap. Herm. ad Iph. T. 715), οἴ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ γραμματεῖον δῖθυρον καὶ δῆρας τὰς πτύχας, ἄχρι δύο εἶτα πτύχας, καὶ τρίπτυχον καὶ παλύπτυχον. Hesychius, θυρίδας Ἀττικοῖ τὰς τῶν γραμμάτων πτύχας, καὶ δῖθυρον λέγοντιν, οὐ τρίθυρον, ἀλλὰ τρίπτυχον [τρίπτυχον?]. Paley, ad loc., well compares the δέλτος with its wooden leaves to 'the modern ivory memorandum-book'. Becker, u.s., observes that these wax tablets were only used for letters, and matters of no permanent moment. They could be fastened with a string and sealed, Paley on Iph. Aul. 37.

διαπτυχαί is interpreted by the Lexicon as equivalent to πτυχαί, and meaning 'folds'—not of course, though the difference is not stated, folded like a modern letter, of paper, which this explanation sug-
gests, but in another sense of πτυχή or πτύξ, 'a leaf, layer, slab, or plate'. It is repeated in line 793, γραμμάτων διαπτυχάς. The Commentators, who are totally silent on the subject, appear to take the same view. As it seems necessary to assign some meaning to the διά, we may suppose that it expresses the division of the leaves, whether two or more; but in the latter case, derived from the primary division into two. Hermann and Paley have both noticed, what is sufficiently apparent, that Aristotle here has mistaken Euripides' meaning. It is quite plain from the epithet πολλῷ που, that the plural is to be understood literally of the several leaves of the tablets. If Euripides had written ἄλτοι he would have used the licence ascribed to him by Aristotle.

§ 5. 'And not to combine (two cases with one article, Victorius: τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός), but to assign or attach (ἀποδοῦναι or προστίθεναι, understand ἀπό κοινοῦ, or by χένυμα, from ἑπιζευγνύων) each to either (an article in either instance to either case) τῆς γυναικός τῆς ἡμετέρας, 'that wife of ours'" But if conciseness be the object (if you would express yourself concisely), the contrary, τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός, 'our wife.'

§ 6. 'And to use (as a rule) in speaking (and writing) conjunctions and other connectives; or, for conciseness, to write without connectives, but not without connexion: as either πορευθεῖς καὶ διαλεξθεῖς, or πορευθεῖς διαλέξθην'. It is impossible to translate this into English, so as to shew the difference in the two Greek phrases, because the approved translation of the second is to convert the participle, which we seldom use in this connexion, into a finite verb connected by a copula with the verb succeeding: so that in our language the two expressions become identical.

άνυδετος λόγος is composition in which the conjunctions and other connecting particles, especially the copula, are omitted; and therefore more or less loose, unconnected, incoherent. Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. p. 45. It is to be observed that as connecting particles occur much more frequently in Greek than in our own language, the want of them, which constitutes asyndeton, would be much more disagreeable to the Greeks than to us, and would give the composition the appearance of being both naked and disjointed. Consequently the general rule (which is stated here) is to avoid it: but in special cases, where the aim is to give emphasis and vigour, rapidity and conciseness to a narrative, it may often be used with advantage, as the examples will shew. Demetrius peri ἐρωμείας, § 192, το δὲ ανυδετον καὶ διαλεξμένον ὅλον ἄσαφες πάν.

άνυδετον is defined alike in several of the later Greek rhetoricians, Hermogenes, peri μεθόδου δεινότητος, 11, Phoebammon, Tiberius, Herodian, Zoneus and others, as the 'omission of συνδεσμον'; and all alike exemplify it by the omission of καί, which is no doubt the most frequent
7 διελέχθην. καὶ τὸ 'Αντιμάχου χρύσιμον, ἕξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει λέγειν, δ’ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τὸν Τευμησσοῦν, ἔστι τις ηὐμέοιες ὀλύγοι λόφοι'

case. Comp. Cic. Orat. xxxix 135, who speaks of it as one of the orationis lumina et quoddammodo insignia, quem demptis coniunctionibus dissolute plura dicuntur. Quint. IX 3. 59, figuram, quae quia coniunctionibus caret dissolutio vocatur; apha quum quid instantius dicimus; nam et singula inculcantur et quasi plura sunt, seq. Confer omnino Dem. Phil. I 118, § 27, Ibid. p. 130 § 130, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ’Ελληνας συγγαλεῖν συνάγειν διδάσκειν νοουτεῖν. The speeches of Lysias against Eratosthenes and Andocides both conclude with an asyndeton of this kind. The former ends thus: παύσαμε κατηγορῶν. ἀκρόατε, ἑφράκατε, πεπώβατε’ ἔχετε, διάκειτε: which Aristotle quotes Rhet. III 19. 6, at the end of the work; and of course wrongly. See also III 12. 2 and 4, where a similar example is given; not to omit Cicero’s, abit excèsit, evasit, erupit [in Catilinam II § 1]. Demetrius περὶ ἐρωμεῖας, § 194 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 304), δι’ ὅ τι ὑποκριτικῶν ἡ λύως παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθω τὸ δέ’ ἐδεξάμην, ἔτητον, ἔτρεφον, φίλη, κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of § 6 is this. If you wish to add pomp and dignity to your style, as in an ordinary narrative, employ conjunctions—Victorius refers this to the so-called figure ὡς δὲ δνως, hendiadys, pateris libamus et auro, in brevia et Syrtes, molequence et montes insuper altos imposuit, from Virgil’s Georg. and Aen.—Or, if you do not employ conjunctions, at any rate do not break the connexion between the parts of the sentence; if on the other hand (as he implies elsewhere) you want to be concise or give vigour and animation to your language, asyndeton will often do it.

§ 7. ‘And the (practice) of Antimachus is useful (for this purpose), to draw the materials of a description from the attributes, (qualities, virtues, excellences,) which (the thing described) has not, as he does in the case of Teumessus, “There is a windy low hill”; for in that way the amplification may be carried to infinity’. This is a quotation from Antimachus’ Thebais, the expedition of Adrastus and his six Argive companions against Thebes, the ἐπιτά ἐπὶ Θῆβας. In this he had occasion to mention Teumessus, “a village of Boeotia in the plain of Thebes, standing upon a low rocky hill of the same name”. Launching out, as his manner was, into an episodical encomium of this little hill, he expended many verses upon it διὰ πολλῶν ἑποίων, “enumerating all the virtues that did not belong to it”. Strabo, IX 2, Boeotia, p. 409. Strabo, like Aristotle, only quotes these five words, adding, as a reason for breaking off there, γνώριμα δ’ ἔτι ἐπη. This same poem is referred to by Horace, A. P. 146, Νέκ reditum Diomedis ab interitu Meleagri; a narrative of Diomedes’ fortune and return seems to have been interwoven with the main subject of the poem. Düntzer, Epic. Gr. Fragm. p. 99. (The fragments of Antimachus are collected by Düntzer in this volume, p. 99 seq. and Nachtrag pp. 38–43.)

The Scholiast Porphyrian, on the verse of Horace, says, Antimachus fuit cyclicus poeta: hic adgressus est materiam, quam sic extendit ut
vigiint quattuor volumina (i.e. books) impleverit antequam septem ducès usque ad Thebas perduceret. On the connexion of the two stories, see Welcker Ep. Cyclys, p. 163; also quoted by Orelli ad loc. Anti-
machus was an elder contemporary of Plato. The occasion of their meeting is related by Plutarch, Lysand. 18, and differently by Cicero, Brutus 51 § 191, Antimachum, Clarium poetam, ...qui quem convocatis auditoribus legeret eis magnum illud quod novitiss volumem suum (the Thebaeis), et eum legentem omnes praeter Platonem reliquissent, Legam, inquit, nihilominus: Plato enim mihi unus instar est omnium millium. (Welcker pronounces both forms of the story unworthy of credit.) In magnum Cicero no doubt refers not to the merit or celebrity, but to the bulk of the poem. His style is spoken of by Dionysius de Comp. 
Verb. c. 22 (v. 150, ed. Reiske), together with that of Empedocles, Pindar, Aeschylus, Thucydidæ and Antiphon, as belonging to the autét̄ā 
λεί̄s; already described. To class him with these authors may seem to imply approbation. Quintilian, x 1. 53, in a comparison of the Epic 
poets, places him next to—though far below—Homer. Contra in Anti-
macho vis et gravitas et minime vulgare eloquenti genus (this agrees with Dionysius) habet laudem. Sed quanvis ei secundas fere grammati-
corum (of Alexandria) consensus deseret; et affectibus et incunditate et 
dispositione et omnino arte deficitur; ut plane manifesto appareat quanto 
sit alius proximum esse, alius secundum: (so Horace of Jupiter, nec 
viget quicquam simile aut secundum; proximos illi tamen occupavit 
Pallas honores). He is called by some authors Clarian, by others Colo-
phonian. Claros was a small town near Colophon, a colony and de-
pendency of it. Most probably Claros was his birthplace, for which the more important and neighbouring mother-city was substituted. See 
further on Antimachus in Schrader and Buhlè’s notes; and on Teu-
nessus, Valken. ad Phoen. 1107.

[εῑς οῡ μη̄ ε̄χε̄ῑ. This device of description by a series of negations may be 
emphazized by Homer’s Odys. vi 43, (Olympus) οῡ ανέμοις τινάσσε-
tαι οῡτε πορ̄ δρ̄βρ̄ω δε̄βε̄ται οῡτε χῑω̄ν επῑπλῑναται (and Lucr. iii. 18). 
There are some striking instances in an expanded Anglo-Saxon para-
phrase by Cynewulf of Lactantius’ poem de Phoeneis, And there nor rain 
nor snow, nor breath of frost, Nor blast of fire, nor rush of rattling hail, 
Nor fall of rime nor scorching heat of sun, Nor lasting cold nor drought 
nor winter-shower... (This translation is due to the Rev. W. W. Skeat.)]

‘This mode of treatment, that the things are not there, (or that the 
object of praise or censure has them not,) may be applied to things 
either good or bad (to bad things in a panegyric, to good as virtues, 
accomplishments, merits of all kinds, in a censure or invective), in which-
ever of the two ways it may be serviceable (or, whichever of the two the 
occasion may require). Hence (from the absence of a certain quality or 
attribute) the poets also derive their epithets (δρομα here stands for an 
adjective: see Introd. Appendix A to Bk. iii. on ὀνόματα and ὑματα)
such as a stringless or lyreless music"—music, but without the ordinary accompaniment or instrument, the strings of the lyre, or the lyre itself: applied to the sound of the wind-instrument, the trumpet—"for they apply privative epithets; this being popular when expressed in the metaphors of proportion, as when the (sound or music of the) trumpet is called a lyreless music".

ἐκ τῶν στερησεων...ἐπιφέρουσιν] lit. they attach epithets borrowed or derived from privations: στερήσις and ἐéis being one of the four forms of opposition: Categ. c. 10, 11 b 17 and 12 a 26 seq.

metaforaioi...tōi anválogon] anválogon in this combination seems to be used adverbially; comp. supra c. 4 §§ 3, 4, τῆν metaforaion τῆν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, infra c. 7 § 10, ὁ τοῦ ἀνάλογον. On the proportional metaphor, the best of all the four kinds, I have already referred (on III 4.4) to the Introd. pp. 290—292. See also Appendix B Bk. III on Metaphor, where this is fully explained.

Comp. with this section Poet. XXI 15, 16 ἐστι δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦτο τῆς metaforaioi (the proportional, to wit) χρήσαται καὶ ἄλλως, προσαγορεύσατα τὸ ἀλλότριον ἀποφθέγμα τῶν οἰκειῶν τι, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀπόφαι ἐπικοφθέγμα μὴ Ἀρεως ἄλλος ᾿ἀνων (Victorius' enendatio palmaria for the vulgata lectio ἄλλος ὀνων).

I transcribe Twining's excellent note on this passage, which well illustrates our present subject. Note 189, p. 446. "Metaphors from their nature are in danger of being obscure or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. If the simple substitution of the improper for the proper term would be obscure or harsh, the metaphor may be converted into an image or comparison (referring to Demetrius, peri ἐρμηνειας § 80); it may be used analogically, and we may say φίλη Ἀρεως ἢ φιλή αὐνος; or if that be not sufficient for perspicuity—that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner or circumstances in which the expression is introduced—we may join these (φιλή Ἀρεως ἢνως), or even add to either of them the proper word itself. There is a fine instance of this negative mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah li. 21, 'Thou drunken, but not with wine.' The same end is often answered by an epithet affirming of the thing expressed some quality of the thing signified; thus ships are floating bulwarks [Mason's Ode to the Naval Officers], and the lyre a chorded shell, where Dryden [Song for St Cecilia's Day, line 17, Σφυβαλ struck the chorded shell,] has made the same use of the affirmative epithet chorded that Theognis did of the negative ἀχορδος in his metaphorical expression for a bow, φόρμικες ἀχορδος (comp. Rhet. III 11.11, and Demetr. peri ἐρμηνειαις § 85, quoted in Introd. p. 297). Sometimes the explanatory epithet is itself a metaphor; as in the πτερωτοις ἄμωσι (1ph. Aul. 251) of Euripides, 'winged chariots'. Here we have a double metaphor: chariot for ship, and wing for sail."
He then concludes with four examples of these private explanatory epithets from the Greek Tragedians, which I have already quoted with some others in the Introduction p. 297, in the note on this passage of the Rhetoric. Add to these Cephasodotus' 'parti-coloured millstones', μύλωνας ποικίλους, III 10. 7, by which he meant to represent the 'crushing' properties of the Athenian 'triremes' in devastating the coasts and islands and exacting tribute. These differ from millstones in having their sides gaily painted in various colours. ἀπτερός φάτες, Aesch. Agam. 267 (contrasted with ἑπτα πτεροειδή), ἀπτερός ὁρνίς, Eur. Iph. Taur. 1095. [Eur. Phoen. 791 ("Ἀρης") κόμον ἀναιλότατον προχρεόεις, 808 Σφιγγὸς ἀμυνοστάτασι σὺν φίδας, Herc. Fur. 879, 891, 892. Similarly the Italian poet, Guarini, called birds 'winged lyres'.]

It remains to notice the proportion of the metaphor, which, according to Victorius, is Trumpet: sound of trumpet (anonymous) :: lyre: μέλος, the music of the lyre (properly so called). To qualify the harshness, throw light on the obscurity, of this improper application of the word μέλος, the epithet ἄλωρον "not that of the lyre" is added.

One more remark on private epithet, which has not been pointed out. They have two uses, the one to qualify, the other to contradict, the substantive they are joined with. In the latter case they are not metaphors at all. This is what is called the figure oxymoron, which combines in one expression two contradictory notions of which the one denies the other: ἔχθρων ἄδωρα δώρα (Aj. 655), an enemy's gifts are no gifts at all; χάρις ἄχρις "graceless grace", or "thankless favour"; μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ, Soph. El. 1154; γάμος ἄγαμος, Oed. T. 1214; άδειον εἰσιτέραι, Phil. 534; ὁπνεος ἀπνεος Ib. 848; Βίος ἄδιωτος or ἄδιωτος (Eur. Hipp. 821, 867), insaniens sapientia, strenua inertia.

CHAP. VII.

On the general subject, and the connexion of the several parts of this Chapter on Propriety, see the Introduction, pp. 297—303, where they are treated in full.

The passages of Cicero and Quintilian in which the same subject is dealt with are referred to in p. 298: and p. 299 has a note (1), with various references on ὅς and πᾶς in style.

§ 1. 'Style will have propriety, if it be made to express feeling (the various emotions) and character, and be proportionate to the subject-matter.' The perverse transition from the feminine to the abstract neuter ανάλογον (sc. πράγμα, as in triste lupus stabulis et sim.) is characteristic of Aristotle's carelessness in writing. Perhaps, however, it may be used adverbially as in c. 6 § 7 (see note).

§ 2. 'This proportion consists in a style of composition (λέγηται of speaking and writing) such as is neither off-hand (i.e. careless and slovenly, αὐτοκαβδαλός is 'extemporaneous') on a dignified, nor stately on a slight and mean (lit. cheap), subject, and has no ornamental epithets (ἐπιθεία refers to εἰκήτα) attached to mean words; otherwise, it (the composition) has the appearance of mere comedy (i.e. laughable; its subject
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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 7 § 2.

δ' ἀνάλογον ἐστιν ἕαυ μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαί-
is τὸ γελῶν: Poet. v. 1, 2), like Cleophon's poetry (tragic poetry: he was a tragedian): for some things he wrote (said) were like saying (like as though one were to say), "Lady fig", or "august fig".

On propriety in this sense, the adaptation of language to the subject or matter of the speech, spoken or written, comp. Hor. Ars Poet. 86 seq., Cic. de Or. III 55. 212, ut figuram orationis...ad id quod agemus accommodatum deligamus, seq. Orator XXI 70, seq. Quam enim indicorum est de stiliicidis quin apud unum iudicem dicas, amplissimis verbis et locis uti communibus, de maiestate populi Romani summisse et subtiliter! § 72. Quint. VIII 3. 11, Illud observatione dignius, quod hic ipsa honestus ornatus pro materiae genere decet variatus, et seq. Clariss illa atque sublinia plerumque materiae modo cernenda. Quod alibi magnificum, tumidum alibi. Et quae humilia circa res magnas, apta circa minores videntur. § 18.

εὐόγκων] here refers to the ὅγκος or dignity of style, as applied in c. 6. 1. Elsewhere, as Meteor. iv 2. 6, it is to be interpreted literally of bulk or size, "of a good or fair bulk": εὐογκότερον καὶ παχύτερον are there equivalent to a preceding παχύτερα. Similarly Eur. Syles, Fragm. 2 sq. (Dind.), πρόσχημα σεμνὸς καὶ ταπεινός, οὐδ' ἀγαν εὐόγκος (bulky): this is said of Hercules, whom Mercury is selling to Syles, and like an auctioneer, setting forth all his excellences: several more examples are to be found in Rost and Palm's Lex. The ordinary meaning of the word seems to be 'of fair, or reasonable, size'.

αὐτοκαβδάλως] extempro, recurs as an adj. αὐτοκαβδαλα III 14. 11 sub fin. cap. It is said to be derived from κῆβος (ill-kneaded meal or dough, (Hebr. Keb, translated κῆβος in LXX; Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v. κῆβος). The αὐτὸ is 'self', as in αὐτοποιήτως, αὐτόματος, αὐτογνώμων, αὐθαδής, et sim. Comp. αὐτοσχεδιαστικὸς το ἐστεμποροῦμεν, αὐτοσχεδιασμὸ 'an impromptu', Poet. iv 7, αὐτοσχεδιαστικοῖ, of tragedy and comedy in their infancy, whilst still 'extemporaneous', ib. § 14. αὐτοκαβδαλα—Semonus of Delos, ap. Athen. XIV 16, 622 b—inimprovisatoris. Rost and Palm's Lex. interprets this eine art posienreisser aus dem stegreif, und Liddell and Scott sim. buffoons, buf-roactors. But Athenaeus says of them σχεδῆν ἐπιραμων ρήσεις, which is exactly equivalent to αὐτοσχεδιαζον. So σχεδία is 'a raft', a vessel extemporised, constructed on the spur of the moment to meet a sudden occasion. And the whole family of these words seems to derive the notion of hasty, off-hand, unpremeditated, unartistic, action or composition, which distinguishes them, from ἔχειν (ἔχον, σχεν) or rather ἔχεσθαι, in the sense of seizing or grasping the first materials that come to hand for a sudden and unforeseen emergency.

αὐτοκαβδάλοι in Lucian, Lexiph. § 10 (ed. Hemsterh. II 336), is interpreted, qui farinam ipsi sibi subignit: with the note, αὐτοκαβδάλον ἀλευρον, τὸ ὡς ἔτυχε φυραθεῖν. Spengel reads αὐτοκαβδάλον (apparently a γενικὴ— at all events a ἀπόκ λεγόμενον, and without meaning here) from ms Λκ (A). "Victorius primus αὐτοκαβδάλως scripsit." Spengel}
vetai, oînov poiei Kleophôn ómòiws gáp éina élege
kai ei eîpœiein [âv]1 "pótnia svkî."


\[2, 3.\]

\[1\] òv sine uncinis.

Kósmos] This is mentioned as one of the kinds (eîdh) of poetical and
ornamental words, with glóttâ and metâforâ, Poet. XXII 7, and again
§ 19, as an òmòma, ôstî de tà toûga toû kýrôn kai metâforâ kai kósmos. It
is therefore a poetical or ornamental word. Òpán de òmôma èstw ò kýrôn
ò glóttâ ò metâforâ ò kósmos ò peiômèn ò k.t.l., eight in all. Poet. XXI
4. All these are defined seriatim except kósmos. Twining, in his note on
§ 17, argues from this that Aristotle could not have intentionally omitted
this alone, and that the explanation of kósmos is one of the many lacunae
which had to be supplied in Aristotle's MSS, one of the diâbômata—the
moth- and worm-eaten passages, as Strabo calls them in his celebrated
account of the transmission of Aristotle's manuscripts (XIII. 1). In the
Paris MS, indeed, there is a mark of omission which Buhle and Hermann
have indicated in their editions. He understands kósmos to signify
"such an epithet as embellishes or elevates the thing to which it is
applied." Though he quotes this passage of the Rhetoric, he does not
notice that ñhn here applied to it proves that the kind of ornament
intended by kósmos is an ornamental épithet. See also Grâfenhan, on
Poet. XXI 17, p. 159 and on XXIV 9, p. 189, where tôis ëpîbêtois kósmos is
quoted from Dionysius de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene c. 1,
(vi 955. 12, ed. Reiske) and again, de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, p. 864. 2.

Kleophôn] 'Athetaîos drâgikos. tôn drâmâtôn aítou 'Aktaiôn, 'Ampyâraos,
'Arilleûs, Bâkiai, De Xeûmenos, 'Herugô, Òuvêstis, Leûkîpos, Peîos, Tîleûpos,
Suidas. He is omitted in Wagner's collection, Frâgm. Trag. Gr. vol. III.
We learn from Poet. II 5, that his subjects and characters were neither
above nor below the level of ordinary, every-day, life and character.
To the same effect it is stated in Poet. XXII 1, that his style was low
or humble, tapêwî, and devoid of all poetical ornament. Grâfenhan,
ad loc. II 5. Id. ad Poet. XXII 1, "qui humili dictione imitabatur vulgares
mores."

To Sûïdas' list of 10 tragedies must be added the Manôdôbolos, de
Soph. El. 15, 174 b 27, oînov o Kleophôn poiei en toû Manôdôboulôs, where it
is quoted in illustration of a mode of argument.

eî eîpœiein ñv] That ñv, which Bekker puts in brackets, may be retained
and justified with eî and the optative, will be seen by referring to the Ap-
pendix (D) on eî ðûwâr' ñv II 20. 5 [Vol. II p. 336].

pótnia] the feminine of pósis and ðe-s-pó-û-ûs, is a female title of
honour, equivalent to ðéspônia, implying reverence and high station,
'august'. It is best rendered by 'Lady'. It has two forms, pótnia and
pótna—ðóia, pótna ðéwâ, Eur. Bacch. 370—and in both the ñ is short, and
can therefore be elided. There is a good article on the word in Liddell
and Scott's Lex. which will supply further information.

\[3\] 'Emotion is expressed, if insult (wanton outrage) (be what you
are describing), by the language of one in anger; if impiety or anything foul or base, by that of indignation and reluctance (hesitat' on) even to name (or mention) it; what is praiseworthy, by that of admiration; what is pitiable, in a low tone and language, and so on for the rest in like manner'. With ἀγαμένως and ταπεινῶς supply λέγοντος. [For ἀσβη and αἰσχρὰ κ.τ.λ., compare Dem. Or. § 54 (κατὰ Κόσμων) § 9, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ βλασφημίαν ἔχει τινὰ, καὶ ὑπομάζειν ὁχνήσαιμ' ἀν ἐν ὑμῖν ἄνα.]

ἀγαμένως] as in Plat. Phaedo 89 A, 'approvingly, admiringly, with admiration', ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τῶν λόγων ἀπεδέξατο. The word is rare, and the meaning here has been doubted. Victorius, cum lactilio, 'with delight or exultation'. Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 9, omnibus perpensis, inclines to the opinion that in Aristotle (that is, here: in Plato, it has the other meaning,) it signifies admirabiliter, magnifice, 'admirably, so as to be admired'; which seems to me the least likely of the three.

tαπεινῶς] seems to combine Horace's dolet sermone pedestri (A. P. 95) of the language, with Cicero's summisae voce [Orator § 56] of the tone of voice: a low tone in expressing pity is appropriate to both.

§ 4. 'This appropriate language (proper or peculiar to the emotion to be represented) also gives a plausible air to the facts (or statements under consideration): for the mind draws a false inference to the truth of the speaker (the reality of his emotion, and hence to the truth of his statements), because every one under similar circumstances feels the same—so that they (the audience) are led to think, even though the fact is really not so, that the things (the facts of the case, the things under consideration) are as the speaker represents them (αὐτὰ ἔχειν φησι, Buhle), and (besides this) the listener always has a fellow-feeling with one who speaks with emotion, even though what he says is naught (worthless; proves nothing)'.

οἰκεία] comp. infra § 7, ὄνοματα οἰκεία τῇ ἔξει.

παραλογιζεται κ.τ.λ.] The fallacy is this. A speaker puts himself into a passion in describing some atrocity imputed to his opponent, assuming the tone of anger or virtuous indignation, which would naturally be provoked by the act as described. People always sympathize with the expression of emotion, and the audience, knowing what it is to be angry themselves, and perceiving by reference to their own experience the 'appropriateness' of the language, tone, and gestures, to the true expression of the passion, draw from this the fallacious inference that the speaker must be in earnest, as they were when they were similarly affected, and therefore that the facts that he states must be true: arguing from the truth of the delineation to the truth of the fact stated.

The logic of the fallacy is explained in de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1 seq. It proceeds from the false assumption, in antecedent and consequent, that they are reciprocally convertible: that if a consequent always follows an antecedent the converse is likewise true, and that the consequent in-
§§ 4—6. 

Firstly, the language &c. used is the ordinary sign of the emotion represented, as they themselves know from their own experience; and does usually arise in men as a consequence of such facts as those alleged; the antecedent is then falsely inferred 'reciprocally' from the ordinary, but not necessary or universal, consequent. This may be otherwise represented as a confusion between the ἁμείων, the usual and ordinary, and the τεκμήρια, the universal and necessary, accomplishment of something thereby signified. Comp. Poet. XXIV 18, ἐστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογισμός, ὁμοίως γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, οὗτοι δὲ ἤτοι τοίς ὦ νυνικῶν γίνεται, εἰ τὸ ύπερτέρων ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐναι ἡ γνωσθαι τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ πεύδος. And with the language of our text, ἱνθεῖ παραλογίζεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή. Twining in his note on the passage of the Poet., at the end of n. 222, p. 488 [II p. 352, ed. 2], has quoted and translated this sentence of the Rhetoric, § 5. 'And this is the reason why many (speakers) try to stun (overwhelm, confound) their hearers with the clamour that they raise'. The speaker carries, that is, his δείκνυσι or exaggeration even to the excess of more empty noise and clamour, thinking thereby to produce a deeper impression upon the audience, who will suppose that the depth and sincerity of his feeling are in proportion to the noise he makes. The διὰ is, because the listener always sympathizes with the language and raised tone of passion; the more violent the expression of it, the more he is likely to be affected. Thuc. VII 42 has κατάπληξις to describe the 'consternation', abattement de cœur, of the Syracusans at the arrival of Demothenes and Eurymedon.

§ 6. 'And this mode of proof arising out of (external) signs (exhibited in language, tone, and action) may be invested also with an ethical character, in that (in so far as) that which is appropriate (i.e. the appropriate language, &c.) to each class and moral state (i.e. character, ἡθος; the sum of the moral states and habits which characterizes the individual) is attendant upon each of them'. The datives γένει and ἐξεί seem to belong equally to ἀκολουθεῖ and ἀρμόττουσα. Compare, with what is said here of ἐξεί and ἡθος, III 16. 9.

In the Introduction, p. 108 foll., on ἡθος, I have endeavoured to shew (against Spengel) that there are three kinds of ἡθη distinguished by Aristotle in the Rhetoric; (1) the ἡθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, the personal character exhibited by the speaker himself, serving as a kind of proof of his sincerity, competency, and good will; (2) the characters of certain
PHTORIKHS Γ 7 §§ 6, 7.

d' εγένος μὲν καθ' ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνήρ ἢ γέρων, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ ἀνήρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἐξεῖς δὲ, καθ' ἂς ποιός τις τῷ βίῳ. οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἄπασαν ἐξιν οἱ βίοι 7 ποιοὶ τίνες. ἕαν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγη τῇ ἐξει, ποιοίς τὸ ἱθος; οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οὐδ' ὅσαυτως

ages and classes, with which the speaker must be previously acquainted, in order to accommodate his general tone, and the opinions he expresses, to the tastes and dispositions of his audience, their political sentiments and such like: as for instance an audience of rich and poor, young and old, aristocratic and democratical, must be addressed each in a different tone and with different language, suitable to their several opinions and prejudices; and (3) what I have called the dramatic characters, which are treated only in the third book as belonging to style, and are still more important, and occupy a larger share of attention in poetry (especially dramatic poetry)—and therefore in the Poetics xv—than in the prose of Rhetoric. These consist in the accurate representation of personal character, as described by Horace, A. P. 114 seq. See also the instances given in the parallel passage, III 16.9, above referred to. This is what is now called 'keeping', and seems to me to be totally distinct from the second, which refers to classes; although the two have some points in common. The principal differences between them are that the latter describes personal peculiarities, and is an ingredient of propriety of style: and the two are therefore treated in different parts of the work. The dramatic ἱθος, morata oratio, does however in some inferior degree assist the argument, as Aristotle has just told us, and is a kind of δείκτη; it conveys a favourable impression of the accuracy of the speaker, and the truth of his description.

By class I mean (according to age, different ages) the various ages of life, youth, manhood, old age; and (sexes) woman or man, and (natives of different countries) Lacedaemonian or Thessalian; and by states (moral states) those by which the character (or quality) of a man's life is determined: for it is not every kind of state that determines the character of men’s lives. Ἐξεῖς, an acquired, developed, permanent, habit, is a general term (opposed to διάθεσις an incomplete and progressive state, Categ.) and applicable to various states in men and things, physical as well as intellectual and moral. It is only the last two that determine the ἱθος.

§ 7. ‘If therefore (the speaker) use the words (language) also appropriate (οἰκεῖοι, domestic: hence properly belonging to, things of one’s own: hence special, appropriate, &c) to the (given) state, he will produce this character (i. e. convey it to his speech): for the clown (rustic, boor: ἄροικος, country-bred, opposed to ἄρτειος, city-bred, polished, as urbanus to rusticus) ‘would not use the same language nor in the same way (sc. the same tone, pronunciation, action), as the educated gentle- man’. These are the two ἐξεῖς of εὐτραπελα ‘easy, well-bred pleasanty’ and its opposite ἄροικία, ‘rusticity, boorishness’; the contrasted ‘conversational virtue and vice’, of Eth. Nic. II 7, and IV 14. Comp. Poet.
PHILOLOGIKHΣ Γ 7 §§ 7—9.

αγροίκος ἀν καὶ πεπαίδευμένος εἰπτειν. πάσχουσι δὲ τι οἱ ἀκροταῖ καὶ ὁ κατακόρως χρώνται οἱ λογογρά-φοι, “τις δ’ οὐκ οἴδεν;” “ἀπαντες ἱσασιν” ὀμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων αἰσχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ οὐ περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

8 τὸ δ’ εὐκαίριος ἡ μὴ εὐκαίριος χρήσθαι κοινὸν ἀπάν—P. 1408 b.
9 τῶν τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶν. ἄκος δ’ ἐπὶ πάση ὑπερβολὴ τὸ θυρυλούμενον· δεὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ προσεπιπλήττειν· p. 122.

1 προσεπιπλήττειν

ΧV 4, δεύτερον δε τὰ ἀρμότοντα· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀνδρείον μὲν τὸ ἥδος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀρμότον γυναίκι τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἡ δεινή εἶναι.

What follows is a note suggested by the preceding remarks upon the παθητικὲς λέξεις, and not very closely connected with the immediate subject of propriety.

‘The hearers are affected also in some degree (some impression is also made upon the audience) by what (a trick which) the speech-writers employ to a nauseous excess; (the introduction viz. of such phrases as) “Who doesn’t know?” “Everybody knows.” For the listener is shamed into an admission (of the fact) that he may be supposed to share (what is assumed to be) the feeling of “everybody else’.

On λογογράφου, the paid writers of speeches for the use of plaintiff or defendant in the law-courts, a much-despised class, see note on P. 11. 7. Victorius supposes, in accordance with his preconceived opinion of a still continued hostility between Aristotle and Isocrates, that the latter is here alluded to; quoting four instances of it from Isocrates and two from Demosth. de Cor. This is hardly enough to sustain the charge. On this subject, see Introd. p. 41, foll.

§ 8. Of propriety in the use of every τόπος and every ornament of style. ‘The seasonable and unseasonable’, fitness in regard to time, place, occasion, ‘is common alike to all the kinds’. This observation is thought by Victorius to be suggested by the ‘nauseous excess’ of the preceding section.

§ 9. ‘A remedy for every excess (exaggeration in style) is the notorious practice of speakers: a speaker, that is, should pronounce censure on himself beforehand (in anticipation of the possible disapprobation of the audience): for (then, the exaggeration) is thought to be sound and right since the speaker himself is quite aware of what he is doing’.

τὸ θυρυλούμενον] See note on P. 21. 11.

The reading of all MSS is προσεπιπλήττει, which the staunch Bekker and Spengel, the consistent adherent of A or A3, both retain. Nevertheless, the emendation προσεπιπλήττει makes excellent sense, and its rival is decidedly inferior; and a passage of Quintilian, VIII 3. 37, which seems to have been copied from this of Aristotle and repeats his words, has (in the Greek words) προσεπιπλήσεως τῇ ὑπερβολῇ, and a little above, πρακτικέον, which also seems to be a reminiscence of προσεπιπλήττειν; Spalding (ad loc. Quint.) and Gesner approve, and Casaubon had
already suggested this emendation, and Stephens introduced it in his Lexicon. Supported by this evidence, and the common-sense view of the case, I venture to read προσεπλήθεν. The passage of Quintilian above referred to runs thus:—*Et si quid periculosius finxitisse videbimur, quibusdam remediis praecumundium est, ut ita dicam; si licet dicere; quodam modo; permittite mihi sic uti. Quod idem etiam in iis quae licentius translatata erunt proderit, quae non tuto dici possunt. In quo non falli iudicium nostrum sollicitudine ipsa manifestum est. Qua de re Graecum illud elegantissimum est, quo praeciptur, προσεπλήθεσιν* (sic) τῇ ύπερβολῇ. And again § 50, sed hoc quoque quinum a prudentibus fit (ἐπεί οὐ λανθάνει γε ὁ ποιεῖ), of another doubtful use of μείωσις. If we keep προσεπλήθεν, it is “to add something in the way of reprehenison of oneself”—so Vater;—which certainly gives a fair sense.


§ 10. The greatest care and pains are always requisite to give the speech an artless, natural, and unstudied character: the rule *ars est celare artem* is of the utmost importance in effecting the end and object of a speech, persuasion or conviction. See, for instance, III 2. 4, 5; 8. 1. This applies equally to proportion, as an element of propriety. It has been laid down that a certain proportion (or resemblance) of style, tone, and manner to the subject is always to be observed: but this, if carried too far, will defeat its own object; the study will appear, and the suspicions of the hearers will be aroused. For instance, there is a proportion in the tone of voice and manner of delivery, in the expression of features and the action, to the subject of the words delivered: these however should not be all employed at once: if the words have a harsh sound—σκληρά ὀνόματα are exemplified by Hermogenes περὶ ἰδεῶν, α’, περὶ τραχύτητος, p. 236, II 300 (Rhet. Gr. Spengel), by ἀπαρησίας, ἐμαρπτεν, ἐγναμψε, &c., and again, Ib. β’, (II 359), by a line from Homer in which ἀγκῶς ἐμαρπτε, both of them objectionable on this ground, occur together. “The voice and the features and the rest should not be made to assume a harsh expression, else the study becomes apparent—it will give the composition a stiff and studied appearance, make it look affected and overdone: whereas, if one or two of them are made to correspond, and the rest not, the same effect is produced, whilst the artifice escapes detection”. *Introductio*. pp. 301, 2. Compare on this subject, Cic. de Or. III 57. 216.

1 Further, not to employ all these proportions (or correspondences) together; for by the observance of this precept (following this rule) the listener is deluded (i.e. the art is disguised). I mean, to take an instance if the words used are harsh (in sound?), not to (extend the harshness) to
the tone of voice and the features and the other appropriate (correspondences or proportions)\textsuperscript{1}: (we must supply here either χρήσθαι from χρήσται preceding; or, ad sensum, from σκληρά, σκληρότητα prosférein, or something else similar). ‘Otherwise the true character of each of them (their studied and artificial character, πέπλασθαι supra 2.4) becomes manifest’.

Vahlen, in his observations on the Rhetoric, Trans. Vienn. Acad. p. 144 (already referred to), says, that nothing else can be implied in τοῖς ἀρμόττονοις than the adaptation of voice and feature to subject, already specified; and therefore proposes to strike out καὶ before τοῖς ἀρμόττονοις so that τοῖς ἀρμόττονοις may be connected with, not distinguished from, the two preceding. This seems to me quite unnecessary. Besides the two proportions specified by Aristotle, there is at all events ὑπόκρισις, appropriate action or gesticulation, that may be brought into correspondence; and also the mode of delivery may be distinguished—at all events for the nonce—from the other three. And he adds a similar objection to another perfectly innocent καὶ, in 1 15. 28, καὶ ὃς οὗτος κ.τ.λ., the sense (as I have explained it in the paraphrase of the Introduction) being at least equally good with, as without, the conjunction.

In the succeeding clause—which guards against a possible misapprehension of the foregoing, as though it were meant that all this kind of adaptation should be avoided, and intimates that the mean is to be observed here as everywhere else; that we do not rush into the opposite extreme, like those who dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt—the connexion of thought might seem to require that ἐάν δὲ and ἐάν οὖν should change places. If the two clauses, ἐάν δὲ, ἐάν οὖν, are to be connected in sense, we require some kind of opposition, expressed by a restrictive or adversative particle such as μενοι, δὲ, or ἀλλα, to establish this, and not one that conveys an inference or consequence, which does not follow from the foregoing.

‘But if (the speaker introduce) one and omit the other (make the adaptation in some cases, in others not), he does the same thing (really has recourse to study and art) and yet escapes detection. So then’, (it results in a general way from all this,) or, ‘well then—as I say—if things soft and mild (for instance, the expression of compassion) be represented by a harsh tone and language, or harsh things in soft tone and language (so Victorius), it (the expression or things expressed) loses all its plausibility (or power of persuasion)\textsuperscript{1}. If οὖν be retained, it must be understood (I think) as I have rendered it. There will be no connexion between the clause which it introduces and that which immediately precedes it, and οὖν will be a mere continuative, as in the narrative use of μὲν οὖν—the inferential, as with our then, having degenerated into a temporal sense, denoting mere continuation or succession. The clause will then be a sort
II ταί. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλεῖον καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς: συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργίζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμηκες

of general conclusion from all that has been said in this section on the adaptation of delivery to subject-matter. ἄπιθανον, see III 3.4.

§ II. ‘Compound words, epithets’ (including descriptive additions of more than one word) ‘more than one (several), and strange (foreign, unusual) words, are most appropriate to the language of emotion: an angry man may be forgiven (excused) for saying a wrong heaven-high, or for calling it colossal’. I have translated κακῶν ‘wrong’, on the supposition that the speaker is a complainant in a court of justice, and that the ‘evil’ at which he is so indignant is some injustice or wrong done to him by the defendant, against whom he is inveighing.

οὐρανόμηκες] is an example of a διπλῶν ὄνομα, πελώρων of a ξένων. Comp. III 3.2, where πέλαρας (the alternative form) is cited as an instance of a γλώττα, an antiquated or barbarous term that requires explanation. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 134, has used the former word quite in cold blood, τὸ δὲ κατορθωθεῖν οὐρανόμηκες ποιήσουσιν, ‘your success they will exalt as high as heaven’. Aristophanes has it as an epithet of φονῆ, Nub. 357, and again of κλέος, 459, in a chorus. Herod., II. 138, of excessively tall trees, and so Hom., Od. v. 239, of a pine. Aesch., Agam. 92, of the beacon-light, in the πάροδος of the chorus.

With ὀργίζομένῳ κ.τ.λ. comp. III 11.16, where ὑπερβολαῖ, the figure hyperbole, or any excess or extravagance, is said to be most used by men in anger, and is illustrated by two quotations from Homer. Also Hermog., περὶ ἰδεῶν α. (Rhet. Gr. Spengel, II 302.3) περὶ σφοδρότητος (vehemence), quotes a number of instances of this exaggerated language and long compound words from Demosthenes when he was affecting indignation, ἱματιοφάγος, de Cor. § 139, γραμματοκύψων, Iib. 209. “Nearly the whole of the speech against Aristogeiton,” he says, “is a specimen of this vehement language”: and then proceeds to illustrate it from his other writings: [the speeches against Aristogeiton are, however, undoubtedly spurious.]

‘And also (this kind of language may be used) when (the speaker) has fairly’ (lit. already, by this time, then and not till then: on this use of ἄδη, οὔπω, οὐκέτι, see note on I 1.7) ‘overmastered (got into his power) his audience, and worked them up into a fit (raised them to the height) of enthusiasm, either by praise or blame or indignation, or love (which he has assumed towards them); as Isocrates also (as well as others, καὶ) does in his Panegyric, at the end: φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη.’

This is, as usual, a misquotation; Isocrates wrote, Paneg. § 186, φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην (Aristotle ought not to have forgotten this, for it is a striking case of ὀμοστελέντων, or rhyming termination, one of the new figures introduced into Rhetoric by Gorgias and his school): φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσην τῶν χρή νομίζειν ἡ ἴωται ἢ ἡ τελευτήσασ τας καταλέψεις τους ἐν τοιούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαστας; It is in fact a finely written sentence.

‘And again, οἱ τίνες ἐγήσαν κ.τ.λ. (Paneg. § 96, another striking sen-
ΠΗΣΙΚΗΣ Γ 7 § 11.

η πελώριον είπειν. καὶ ὅταν ἔχη ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσίασαι ἢ ἐπαίνοις ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὄργῃ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἶον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, "φήμη δὲ καὶ γνώμη" καὶ "οἱ τίνες ἐτλησαν" φθέγγονται τε γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιαζοντές: for men (in general) give utterance to such language in their enthusiasm (the language of inspiration), and therefore (the audience) also being themselves in a similar state of feeling (having been brought thereto by the orator) are plainly ready to accept and approve of it.

[It is worth noticing that ἐτλησαν, 'in that they brooked to &c.', is characteristic of poetic usage, and is rare in Attic prose: though found in Xenophon, Cyrop. III 1. 2, οὐκέτ' ἐπη εἰς χείρας ἐθείνει. The corresponding form is ἐτλησαν, which indeed is the manuscript reading in Isocrates l.c. and is corrected by the editors from the present passage and Dionysius Halic. de adm. vi dicendi in Dem. c. 40.]

ἐχθὺςComp. Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s.v. "τοὺς ἀκροατάς, auditores occupatos tenere, obseedesse oratone. Ar. Rhet. III 7, ubi permutat cum τῷ ἐνθουσίασας, extra se rapere." [Cicero, Orator § 210, id autem (numerosa oratio) tum valet cum is qui audit ab oratore iam obsessus est ac tenetur; and (for ὅταν ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσίασα) compare ib., § 99, si is non praeparatit auribus inflammare rerem coepit; furere apud sanos et quasi inter sobrios bacchari vinolentus videtur.]

The careless introduction of the superfluous τε after φθέγγονται, repeated ἐνθα c. 11. 7, τὸ τὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., is abundantly illustrated by Shilleto, Dem. de F. L., critical note on § 176, τὸν τὲ γὰρ εἰρήνην κ.τ.λ., including this passage amongst his instances. [See Bonitz, Zeit.rift f. Oest. Gymn. 1867, pp. 672—682, quoted in Index Aristotelicus s.v. τε, ad fin., where, amongst other passages, a reference is given to Pol. VII 14 § 6, 1333 a 1, τὸν τὲ γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἀρχεῖν ἀρχηγοῖς φασὶ δειν πρῶτον.]

'This also accounts for the fitness of this kind of language for poetry, because poetry is inspired. It must therefore (be used) either in the way above described, or with irony, as Gorgias did, and (in) the passages of Plato's Phaedrus. The 'passages' referred to are 231 D, ἓν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος...γένομαι, μὴ θαμώσῃς τὰ τῶν γὰρ οὐκέτι πώρῳ διευράμβων φθέγγομαι, alluding to the exaggerated and enthusiastic expressions with which Socrates had been inspired by the local influence; in particular to the rhapsody at the conclusion of his speech, εἰρωμένοις ῥωμάθεια νυκτίσσαι ἀγώγη κ.τ.λ., and 241 B, οὐκ ἦσθον... ὅτι ἤδη ἐπὶ φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι διευράμβως, καὶ ταῦτα ζέγνων; ἓν δ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἐτερόν ἀρξωμαι, τί με οἰεὶ ποιήσων; ἄρ' οὐσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν... σαφῶς ἐνθουσίασα;]

A specimen of Gorgias' irony is found in Ar. Pol. III 2, 1275 ὁ 26, Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἅπαν ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωμένους, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἄλογος εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Δαρμασίων τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημητριωγῶν πεποιημένους' εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρισσαποιοῦσας, so read, with Schneider, for λαρισσαποιοῦσι ταῖς retained by Bekker. "Aristotle

AR. III. 6
res, ὡστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δήλων ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἠρμοσεν ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις. ἡ δὴ οὐτω δεῖ, ἢ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὁ περ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ.

I τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς Λέξεως δεῖ μῆτε ἐμμετρον εἶναι μῆτε ἀρρυθμον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι

refers to an ingenious evasion of an awkward question. Whilst Gorgias was in Thessaly, where he seems to have spent a considerable time at Larissa, some Thessalian, who had no doubt heard his boast that he was able and ready to answer any question upon any subject, took him at his word, and asked him what constituted a citizen.—This is the constitutional question which gives occasion to Aristotle’s quotation.—Partly in jest, and partly because he was really at a loss, he replied, that citizens were made by citizen-manufacturers: as the vessels made by mortarmanufacturers were mortars, so those made by the Larissaean-manufacturers were Larissaeans: for there were such people as Λαρίσσασαι. Λάρισσα, besides the Thessalian city, denotes also some kind of kettle or other cooking-utensil. The reply is much the same as if some one being asked, What makes a citizen of the town of Sandwich? were to answer, ‘a cook, for he is a sandwich-maker’; and is no bad specimen of the way in which Gorgias most likely fulfilled his promise of solving any problem whatsoever that was proposed to him. It may be doubted whether, as Schneider supposes, there is also an ambiguity in δημοουργῶν: the word bears also the sense of a magistrate, as the grammarians tell us, especially in Doric states. Larissa was not a Doric state: but we learn from K. O. Müller, Dor. Bk. III ch. 8. 5; from Thuc. v 17, ἐν Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημοουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλή...ἐν Ἥλλην ὁ δῆμος οἱ ἰδί. καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, and from a (doubtful) letter of Philip, Dem. de Cor. § 157, Πελοποννησίων τοῖς δημ.; that the use of the term was not confined to these, and Aristotle applies it to ‘magistrates’ in general, Pol. vi (iv), 4, 1291 a 34. See further on this subject, Müller’s Dorians, u. s.” From a note in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. III No. vii p. 80, with additions [see also p. 180 of Thompson’s edition of the Gorgias].

CHAP. VIII.

On rhythm in Prose.

In the paraphrase of the Introduction I have already given an outline of the contents of this chapter and its connexion, with references and some details, pp. 303–306. And on rhythm in general, and its application to prose, there is an Appendix (C), pp. 379–392; in which is a full account of its original and derived significations in the first part, and of its distinction from μέτρων in the second. The commentary on this chapter will therefore deal principally with the details of the language, allusions, and such particulars as require explanation, which are omitted in the paraphrase.

In the fragments of Isocrates’ τέχνη, collected by Benseler in the Teubner series, Vol. II p. 276, we have the following, fragm. 4—cited from
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 8 § 1.

γὰρ δοκεῖ) καὶ ἃμα καὶ ἐξίστησιν· προσέχειν γὰρ

Maximus Planudes ad Hermog. and Joannes Sicelites—ἀλος δὲ ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω· ἡρὸν γὰρ μηδὲ ἐμμετροῖ· καταφανὲς γὰρ ἀλλὰ μεμίχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ, μάλιστα ἰαμβικὸ ὁ τροχαίῳ. The first of these precepts is in entire agreement with Aristotle, § 1; the disagreement of the second with the statements of § 4 is equally striking. It seems from what is said of Thrasymachus and the paean in § 4, that the subject of prosaic rhythm was not included in the τέγμα of himself and the succeeding writers on Rhetoric. It does not appear even in the Rhet. ad Alex. Cicero, de Or. III 44. 173, attributes to Isocrates the first introduction of ‘numbers’ into prose composition.

Dionysius de Comp. Verb. c. 25 (p. 197 R.) refers to this chapter of Aristotle in support of his observations on rhythm in prose. His own opinions on the subject are given, pp. 195, 6.

References are made by Cicero to this chapter (§ 4 et seq.), de Or. i 47. 182, 183, in the course of his dissertation on rhythm, from § 171 foll. The same subject is treated, Orat. c. LXIII 212 seq. The various rhythms heroic, iambic, trochaic, &c. are discussed in c. LXIV, where Aristotle’s opinions, as expressed in this chapter, are twice referred to, §§ 215, 218. In § 214 we have, temeritas ex tribus brevisbus et longa est, quern (sc. paeanem) Aristotelis ut optimum probat, a quo dissentio. Cicero is referring to this chapter, from which the other references are taken: and as this is not found there, he must be either quoting inexactely, from memory, or perhaps confounding Aristotle’s opinion on the point with that of one of the other rhetoricians whom he mentions, § 218. There is likewise an incorrectness in the opinion which he there attributes to Aristotle, that the paean is, aptissimus orationi vel oricii vel mediae: Aristotle says nothing of the ‘middle’ of the sentence.

Compare also, Demetrius peri ἐρμηνείας, peri μεγαλοπρεποῦς, § 38 seq. (Rhet. Gr. Spengel, III 270—273) who also refers thrice to this chapter of the Rhetoric. Quint. ix 4. 45 seq. There are references to this ch. in §§ 87, 88.

On the abuse of rhythm, which degrades and is incompatible with the sublime, there is a short chapter in Dionysius peri Ὑψους, c. 41.

§ 1. ‘The structure (figure, fashion) of the language (i.e. prose composition) should be neither metrical (run into verse)¹ nor entirely without measure or rhythm: for the one has no power of persuasion, because it is thought to be artificial (superfl. c. 2. 4, πεπλασμικός), and of the same time

¹ A remarkable instance of this defect in composition is quoted by Twining on Poet., note 36, p. 209, from Dr Smith’s System of Optics—where, as he truly says, one would least expect to find such a thing—the beginning of Buk. 1 c. 2 § 47, Where parallel rays Come contrary ways And fall upon opposite sides. This is decidedly more metrical than a parallel instance in one of Dr Whewell’s treatises on Mechanics, hence no force however great, Can stretch a cord however fine, Into an horizontal line, Which is accurately straight [Whewell’s Mechanics i p. 44, ed. 1819, Facetiae Cantabrigienses p. 162]. Quintilian is particularly indignant at this introduction of a verse into prose writing: versum in oratione fieri multo fodissimum est, totum; sed etiam in parte deformè, ix 4. 72. [For iambic verses in the prose of Isocrates, see Paneg. § 170, ἕρην γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰπερ ἰςαν ἄξιοι and Spengel’s Artium Scriptores, pp. 152—4.]

6—2
ποιεῖ τῷ ὤμοιῳ, πότε πάλιν ἥξει, ὅπερ ὁὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνοντι τὰ παιδία τοῦ "τίνα αἱρεῖται ἡ ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθεροῦμενος; Κλέωνα." τοῦ δὲ ἀρ- ρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεὶ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μὲν, μὴ μέτρῳ also diverts (the hearers' attention, from the main subject or the proof of the fact): for it makes him attend to the recurrence of the similar cadence. And so (the audience anticipate the answering or recurring cadence) just as the children anticipate the answer to the herald's summons, "Whom does the freedman choose for his attorney? and the answer is, Cleon"!

ἐπίτροπος one who is charged or entrusted with the management of his case, or of any business as deputy for another; procurator, ἐπιτρόπος Καλσάρος, Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. c. 17, 813 E, ὃς αὐτός μὲν ἐκ ἑπεμεληθῇ τούτῳ, ὁ δ' ἐπίτροπος Μιλύας, 'his man of business, deputy, agent'.

On Cleon's self-assumed functions of public prosecutor and poor man's advocate, see Grote, Hist. Gr. ch. li, Vol. VI. p. 667 seq. An example in Arist. Ran. 569, (one of the tavern-keepers says,) ἦθε δὴ κάλεσον τὸν προστάτην Κλέωνα μοι, (and the other) σὺ δὲ ἐμοῦ, ἐάντερ ἐπιτύχης, ὑπέρβαλον, ὃν αὐτόν ἐπιτίφῳμεν : from which Mr Grote draws his inferences as to the real nature of Cleon's misrepresented policy. The children, in the illustration, are so accustomed to the invariable reply to the herald's proclamation, for an attorney or deputy to plead some freedman's cause—who by law was not allowed to speak for himself in court—that they have learned to say 'Cleon' whenever the question is asked. It has not been noticed that this story is told in the present tense, as if the children were in the habit of doing this in Aristotle's own time. Can it be meant that the custom had been handed down from generation to generation for a century or so after Cleon's death? If so, it is a very remarkable fact.

With the opening words of the chapter, comp. Cic. Orat. 1. 172, Is (Aristotelic) igitur versum in oratione vetat esse, numerum inbet. Ib. § 189, of verses unintentionally introduced by the orator in his speech, Inculcamus per imprudentiam...versus; vitiosum genus, et longa animi provisione fugiendum. With ἀπίθανον κ.τ.λ., comp. Ib. 1. 209, Si enim semper utare (these studied arts and tricks of rhetoric), quum satietatem adsert tum quale sit etiam ab imperitis agnoscitur. Detrahit praecox actionis dolorem, adsert humanum sensum actoris, tollit funditus veritatem et fidem... LXV 220, Multum interest utrum numerosa sit, id est, similis numerorum um plane et numeri constet oratio. Alterum si fit, intolerabile vitium est; alterum nisi fit, dissipata et inculta et fluens est oratio.

§ 2. 'That (composition) which is (entirely) devoid of rhythm (has no measure) is indefinite (or, unlimited), but it ought to be limited, only not by metre (like verse): for the infinite (indefinite, unlimited) is displeasing and (i.e. because it) cannot be known. But everything is defined (or limited) by number; and the number (numerus in both its senses) of the structure of the language (prose composition) is rhythm, of which metres are so many sections'. Here we pass for a moment into Platonic metaphysics. The doctrine of the formless, vague, indefinite,
perainetai \\

unlimited, infinite of more or less, of degree; into which to metron order, harmony, measure, symmetry, law—the mean—are introduced by the limiting πέρας, the definite principle; coming originally from the Pythagoreans, is adopted and expounded by Plato in the Philebus, 23 E et seq. The principle is applied to the numbers or measures of music and composition, verse and prose, 26 λ. ἐν de οἴκει καὶ βαρεῖ (the tones of music) καὶ ταξεὶ καὶ βρασθεῖ, ἀπείροις οὐσίων, ἀρ' oῡ ταύτα ἑγγυγόμενα ταύτα (to πέρας καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον) ἀμα πέρας τε ἀπειράσατο καὶ μουσικὴν συμπάσαν τελεώ- 

tata ἑξυπνητήσατο; From him Aristotle undoubtedly borrowed his conception of rhythm, as he did likewise his grand division of ὀνή, the informis materia, the potential, unenergized matter, the material cause of all things; and λόγος, the formal cause, which gives form and substance to the brute material, energizes or realizes it into complete existence, and is the original design, or conception in the mind of the Creator, the 'what it was to be', τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: and also his doctrine of the 'mean'. With ἀγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον, compare Anal. Post. A 24, [86 a 5.] ἐστι δ᾽ ἢ μὲν ἀπειρά οὐκ ἑπιτυχτά, ἢ δὲ πεπέρασαι ἑπιτυχτά. Metaph. B 4, 999 a 27, τῶν ἄπειρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἑπιτυχήμαν: κ.τ.λ.

On τὸ ἄρντωον ἀπεραντον, compare Cic. Orator, LXVIII 228, Hanc igitur, sive compositionem sive perfectionem sive numerum vocari placet, adhibere necesse est, si ornate velis discere, non solum, quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infirme feratur ut flumen oratio, seq. On ῥυθμός, μέτρον, 'measure of time', Ib. § 227, sonantium omnium quae metiri auribus possimur.

περαίνεται...ἀρντωφ πάντα] This axiom is doubtless derived ultimately from the Pythagoreans, who traced the laws of the universe in numbers and mathematical symbols. Καὶ πάντα γα μᾶν τὰ γεγυγνωσκόμενα ἄρντων ἕχουσι, ού γὰρ οἶνον τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθὲν οὔτε γνωσθὲν ἕνεκ τούτου, ἀρ. Stobaeum, Böckh, Philolaos, p. 58. "The finite in number is the calculable, that which the mind can grasp, and handle; the infinite is the in-calculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable." Grant, Essay on Ar. Ethics, p. 202 (1st ed. [p. 252, 3rd ed.]). Prob. XIX 38, ῥυθμός ὑπὲρ καὶ στατικόν ἄρντων ἕχειν, καὶ καλώς τηταγμένος' οἰκειοτέρα γὰρ ἢ τηταγμένη κίνησις φύσει τῆς ἄτακτον, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν κάλλος. This illustrates ἄρνδε...τὸ ἄπειρον. With ῥυθμός...οὐ τὰ μέτρα τριμή, comp. Poet. IV 7, τὰ γὰρ μέτρα ὅτι μόρια τῶν ῥυθμῶν ἐστι, φανερὸν i.e. metres, verses or systems of verses, are definite lengths or sections, into which the indefinite matter of rhythm is as it were cut. Similarly it is said, III 9.3, that the period and all metres are measured by number.

§ 3. ‘From this it may be inferred that the speech (i.e. prose composition) should have rhythm, but not metre; otherwise it will be a poem
4 'έαν μέχρι τοῦ ἴ. τῶν δὲ ῥυθμόν ὁ μὲν ἴφιός σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἵλμβος αὐτὴ (verse-composition). Its rhythm however should not be exactly and nicely finished': (i.e. with exact and systematic accuracy so as to be continuous, and pervade the whole structure of the writing. The description of prose rhythm by Hermogenes, πέρι ἴδεων α', Introd. p. 391, Appendix on ῥυθμός, will serve as a commentary on this and μέχρι τοῦ): 'and this will be effected if it be only carried up to a certain point (and there stop short; left incomplete and irregular; not finished and systematic, like verse)'.

§ 4. 'Of (the three) rhythms, the heroic (hexameter, epic) is (too) stately (or solemn), and deficient in conversational harmony'. By using the word 'harmony', I have left it open whether we are to understand by ἀρμονία 'harmony' in its ordinary musical sense—in which case the meaning will be 'that particular kind of harmony which is adapted to ordinary conversation', the language of common life, and inferior to that of the heroic rhythm—a somewhat non-natural interpretation; or in the primary, more general sense of the word, 'an adaptation or fitting of parts into an organized whole', which with λεκτικῆς will signify 'deficient in conversational structure', in an adaptation of parts fitted for conversation (Dionysius uses ἀρμονία as equivalent to λέξις, for style of composition); the iambic is the very language of the vulgar, and therefore of all measures the iambic is most frequently uttered in common speech (or conversation); but it wants (the acquisition of, γενεισθα) solemnity and dignity and the power (or faculty) of striking. The trochaic is too farcical (has too much of the comic dance about it; reminds one of its indecency and buffoonery: is totally devoid of all dignity and sobriety, too light and lively): this is shown by the trochaic tetrameters, for the tetrameter is a tripping (running, rolling) measure.

ὁ...ἵριως] The 'heroic' measure, also called 'dactylic', 'hexameter', 'epic', including the spondaic and anapaesthetic, is one of the three kinds of rhythm, its basis, basis—corresponding to the 'feet' in metre—expressing the ratio of equality 1:1. See further on the doctrine and ratios of rhythm, in the Appendix on that subject, Introd. p. 387; foll. where the statements of the following sections are illustrated. The epithet σεμνὸς has been already applied to it in ίΙΙ 3.3; Dionysius, de Isocr. Iud. c. 11 (p. 557, 3, Reiske), designates it by the similar epithet μεγαλοπρεπῆς. Comp. Poet. XXII 9, τὸ ἱραῖκὸν στασιμῶτατον καὶ ἄγκω-διάτατον τῶν μέτρων.

σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὸς καὶ ἀρμονίας δεόμενος is the vulgata lectio. But to say that the heroic or hexameter measure—Homer's verses for instance—are deficient in harmony is absurd in itself, and contradictory to the evidence of our own ears, and all ancient authority: at all events Dionysius was not

1 This may possibly be included in the meaning of the word here: but if so, it is quite subordinate. In the references from other authors it is predominant.

2 τροχερὸς ῥυθμὸς. There are some bars in the overture to Auber's Bronze Horse, which, to those who are acquainted with it, will perfectly represent the measure of trochaic tetrameter, and illustrate the epithet here used, implying a light, tripping, metre.
of that opinion, who says, de Comp. Verb. c. 18 (p. 109, Reiske), the exact opposite; δακτυλικός πάντων ἡμισεμίον καὶ εἰς κάλλος ἀρμονίας ἄξιολογώτατος. Victorius, from Demetrius, peri ἐρμηνείας § 42, read ὥς μὲν ἄριστον σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικός, which leaves ἀρμονίας δεύμενος to explain itself as it best may. I have adopted with Tywhitt on Poet. IV 19, ἐξάμετρα ὅλγακε (λέγομεν) καὶ ἐκτινούτα τῷ λεκτικῷ ἀρμονίας, the reading suggested by that passage, which had been already proposed by Vincentius Madius, ad loc., and since approved by Spalding ad Quint. IX 4. 76, and finally adopted by Bekker and Spengel, each in his latest ed.

Ταμβού... ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν This has been already noticed, III 1. 9, and twice in Poet. XXII. 19. The Latin rhetoricians make the same remark upon their own language. Cic. de Or. III 47. 182, Orat. LVI 189, magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio, LVI 192. Quint. IX 4. 76, Illi (trimetri) minus sunt notables, quia hoc genus sermoni proxiunm est.

ἐκστήσας] is used here in a much milder sense than its ordinary one, to strike, excite, mettre hors de soi, to displace or remove a man out of his ordinary state of feeling, to a higher one of excitement: whereas in this metaphorical application, it usually implies a much more violent emotion than mere admiration or amusement, as Demosth. c. Mid. 537 ult., ταῦτα κεῖνε, ταῦτα ἐξιστητον ανθρώπος αὐτών, 'drives men besides themselves, drives them mad'. Eur. Bacch. 850, πρώτα δ' ἐκστήσαν φρενῶν ἐνες ἐλαφρῶν λύσσαν, equivalent to ἔξω δ' ἑλαφρῶν τοῦ φρενῶν, in line 853.

τροχαίον κορδακκίωτερος] Cic. Orat. LVI 193, Trochaecum autem, qui est eodem spatio quo choresum, cordacem appellat (Aristotelis), quia contractio et brevitatis dignitatem non habeat. Quint. IX 4. 88, herous, qui est idem dactylus, Aristotelis amplior, iambus humanior (too like the language of vulgar humanity) videatur: trochaecum ut nimirum currentem (τροχέρων) damnet, eique cordacis nomen imponat. Harpocr..κορδακισμός' ο κόρδας κυρικῆς ὀρχήσεως εἴδος ἐστιν, καθάπερ φησίν 'Αριστόδενος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς τραγικῆς ὀρχήσεως. Suidas κορδάκις' αἰχμάρα ὀρχήσεως (the rest as Harpocr.). The characteristics of the κόρδας, a kind of Comic dance, may be gathered from notices in Theophr. Char. 6, peri ἀπονοιας, 'desperate recklessness', where it is a mark of this character to dance the cordax sober and without a mask: in Aristophanes, who takes credit to himself, Nub. 540, for never introducing it into his comedies: in Athenaeus, XIV 28, ult. 630 E, who calls it παγμωδῆς, 'sportive'. Dem. Olynth. Π 8 (of Philip's mode of life), εἶ δὲ τις σώφρων ἢ δίκαιος άλλος, τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν άκρασίαν τοῦ βίου καὶ μέθην καὶ κορδακισμός οὐ διάμεσος φέρειν κ.τ.λ. It seems therefore to have been accompanied by the grossest indecencies, so that no respectable person could allow himself even to look on the performance of it. See further in Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. XXVII 7.

This however is not the point of the reference here. But the κόρδας
was accompanied by verses in the trochaic tetrastich, and these are identified; and all that is implied here by the term is the lightness, the want of gravity and dignity, and the *dancing* tripping measure, afterwards expressed by τροχερός; as we see also in the passages of Cic. and Quint. This character always belonged to the tetrastich; and hence we are told that the dithyrambs, from which Tragedy took its rise, were originally written in this measure, which was afterwards exchanged for the iambic, the metre nearest to the language of ordinary conversation, when the *dialogue* had been introduced, and Tragedy assumed a regular form. Τὸ τε μέτρον (of Tragedy) ἐκ τετράμετρον ἱμμελείου ἐγένετο: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἔχρωντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ἀρχαγησικῆτα εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὑρέθη μᾶλλον γὰρ λεκτικῶν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱμμελεῖον ἐστίν (Poe. IV 19). Comp. Rhet. III 1.9.

These rhythms being set aside, they are in fact reducible to two, the proportions 1:1, and 2:1, iambus and trochee, and—respectively—the third 'the paean remains, the use of which began with Thrasymachus, though he and his followers couldn't tell what it was (did not know how to define it). The paean¹ is the third (of the rhythms) and closely connected with the preceding: for it has the ratio of three to two (½:1, three short, and one long syllable equal to two short), whilst the others have that of one to one (dactyl, spondee, anapaest), and two to one (iambus and trochee), severally. And one and a half (⅔:1, the ratio of the paean) is connected with these (two) ratios ['next to' both ratios, i.e. the mean between the two extremes, 1:1 and 2:1], and that is the paean'. On this see Introd. Appendix on ῥυθμός, pp. 387, 8. The paconic ratio includes also the bacchius and cretic. These three ratios are the βάσεις of the three measures.

§ 5. 'Now all the rest (of the ῥυθμοῖ) are to be discarded, not only for the reasons already mentioned, but also because they are metrical (too suggestive of the cadence of regular verse): but the paean is to be adopted: for it is the only one of the rhythms named which cannot be made into a regular verse, and therefore (the use of it) is most likely to escape detection. ἀπὸ μένον γὰρ κτ.λ., that is, it is an element of rhythm, not metre. Hermann, Elem. doctr. metr. II 19, de vers. Cret. (near the beginning of the chapter), has a criticism of this passage which

¹ Aristotle writes παεῖν: Cicero, paean in the Orator, and pans in the de Oratore: Quintilian, paean.
he quotes, attributing to the author a misconception of the nature of the paemonic measure, which has caused him to fall into the error of denying it to be a metre1. See Cic. Orator, § 194, paean autem minime est aptus ad versum; and the whole section. Also § 218, numerus a qui-busdam (Aristotle, no doubt), non pes habetur. 'At present the one (form of) paean is employed (at the end) as well as at the beginning (of the sentence), but the end ought to be different to the beginning'. Vater proposed to supply τελευτῶτες before καὶ ἀρχόμενοι: but in a writer like Aristotle the supplement or opposite may be very well supposed to be implied in the καὶ.

§ 6. 'There are two kinds of paean opposed to one another, of which the one is suitable at the beginning (of the sentence or period), as in fact it is employed: and this is the one which begins with the long (syllable), and ends with three short. Δαλογενές εἶτε Λυκίαν, "O Delos-born, or if perchance Lycia" (were thy birthplace). The poet, whose alternative is cut short by the inexorable brevity of the quotation, was doubtless going on, as the manner of the ancient poets is, to offer the deity whom he was addressing the choice of the various titles under which he was known and worshipped, expressive of place of birth, special character or office: which was done to avoid the possibility of giving offence by omitting any title of honour of which he might be specially proud. The following specimens of a very frequent custom will suffice to illustrate it. Hor. Carm. Sec. line 14, Lenis Ilithya... sive tu Lucina probas vocari seu Gentilis. Sat. II 6. 20, Matutine pater, seu Iane libentius audis. [We may also compare Horace's enumeration of the favourite haunts of Apollo, qui rorė purō Castaliae lavit crines solutos, qui Lyciae tect dumeta natalemque silvam Delius et Patareus Apollo. Od. III 4. 61.] Zeüs, ὅσις ποτ' ἔστω, εἴ τοῦ αὐτῷ φίλων κκλημένῳ, τοῦτο τὸν προσευνέξω. Agam. 147. The author of the paean was apparently about to add after Λυκίαν, νέιμων or some such word, offering the god the alternative birthplace of Lycia, if he happened to prefer it. The Homeric epithet Ἀκηγενής, II. Δ 101, 119, is usually supposed to denote his Lycian birthplace, Patara, though Müller, Dor. II 6. 8, would "rather understand" it 'born of light'. On the epithet Ἀκηγενής, frequently applied to Apollo by the Tragedians, as Aesch. Suppl. 668 (with Paley's note), Sept. c. Theb. 133, Agam. 1228, Soph. Oed. R. 203 (Schneidewin), Electr. 6, &c. &c., see Müller's Dorians, II 6. 8, where the various significations of Apollo's titles are discussed at length; and Donaldson's New Cratylus § 269, on the connexion of λύκος with

1 Though I cannot see much force in Hermann's argument against Aristotle, yet it must be owned that it is odd to deny that to be metrical, which derived its very name from the hymns to Apollo which were principally written in that measure, as may be seen from the two specimens here quoted.
Victorius has noted this and the following quotation are both commencementes of paecans to Apollo, from which the name of the metre is derived: and each of them exemplifies the 'paean at the beginning'.

"Golden-haired Archer son of Zeus". The other, the opposite to this, in which three short syllables form the beginning, and the long one comes at the end. "After earth and its waters, night obscured (blotted out) ocean". In the Greek line there are four pure paecans, all of this construction "—": but Ar. appears to quote it as an exemplification only of this form of paecan in the last place of the verse, or rhythm.

\[\text{ές έναυτίας}=\text{έναυτίος, or έναυτίων, ex opporto.}\]

Polit. VIII (V) 11, 1314 a 31, ὁ δ' ἐτερος σχεδον εξ έναυτίας ἐχει τοις εἰρήμενοις τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. Herod. VII 225, οἱ μὲν έναυτίης εἰσπόμενοι. Thucyd. IV 33, εξ έναυτίας οὐτοὶ καθεστήκεσαν, 'opposite', opposed to εκ πλαγίων. Ep. ad Titum i. 8, δ' εξ έναυτίας. έξ έναυτίων is the more usual form. The ellipse to be supplied is according to Bos, Ellips. p. 325 (562, ed. Schäfer), χώρασ, corrected to ἀρχής by Schäfer ad loc., q. v., where several instances of the omission of that word are produced. But the ellipse of ὀδός, in one or other of its cases, is very much more common than that of χώρα or ἀρχή, in the formation of adverbs and quasi-adverbs in the feminine, genitive, dative and accusative; such as η τῇ ταυτή τῇ δε ἐκεῖνη άλλη et sim.—a large number of instances of these three varieties of the ellipse of ὀδός is collected under that head in the work referred to, pp. 188—192; and at p. 192 init. εν' έναυτίας φέρεσθαι is rightly inserted among them by Leisner (one of the earlier editors).

'And this makes a (true and proper) end: for' (γάρ: the reason of this, that the long syllable is required for the end, may be inferred from the consideration that follows of the incompleteness, &c. of the short syllable) 'the short syllable by reason of its incompleteness makes (the rhythm appear) mutilated (cut prematurely short)'. Cic. Orator, §§ 214, 215, 218, u. s.
RHTORIKHΣ Γ 8 §§ 6, 7; 9 § 1.

ἀτελὴς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβὸν. ἄλλα δὲι τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ δῆλην εἶναι τῇν τελευτήν, μὴ διά τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφήν, ἄλλα διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὐρυθμόν δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἀρρυθμόν, καὶ τίνες εὐρυθμον ποιοῦσι ῥυθμοί καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εὑρηται τῇν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἡ εἰρο-

κολοβὸν] trunci, de Soph. El. 17, 176 a 40, ὃσα μὴ σαφῶς ἄλλα κολο-
βὸς ἐφωτάται, παρὰ τὸντο συμβαίνει ὁ ἔλεγχος. Poste, ‘elliptical.’ For other examples see the Lexicons.

‘But the (sentence or period) should be broken off (brought abruptly to a close) and the end marked by the long syllable—not (however) by the scribe (or copyist), nor by a marginal annotation (marking the end of the sentence), but by the measure itself’. διὰ with the accusative, which indicates the cause or motive, (not the medium, channel or means, which is διὰ with genitive,) here implies that the indication of the end of the sentence should not be due to the scribe or his marks, stops, or what not, but solely to the rhythm: that the end should appear by the abrupt close of that.

παραγραφή, a by-writing, or marginal annotation. That these were occasionally stops appears from our use of the word ‘paragraph’: just as the words that we use for stops, comma, colon, period, originally repre-

sent members of the period or the whole period itself. Victorius aptly quotes, Cic. Orat. c. LVIII § 228 (already referred to), quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio, quae non aut spiritu pronunciantis aut interductu librarium, sed numero coacta debet insister.

And to the same effect de Orat. III 44. 173, where the librariorum notae are again mentioned. Victorius also cites Isocr. Antid. § 59—to the clerk of the supposed court—ἀρχάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς παραγραφῆς ἀναγγέλθη κ.π.λ. Ernesti Lex. Tech. Gr. s. v. [In the papyrus of the Funeral Oration of Hyperides, preserved in the British Museum, and edited in fac-simile by Professor Churchill Babington, the approach of the end of a sentence is indicated by a short interlinear dash below the first word of the line in which the sentence is about to close.]

§ 7. ‘So this subject, that the composition should be rhythmical, and not altogether without rhythm, and what rhythms, and how con-

structed, make style rhythmical, is finished and done with’.

CHAP. IX.

We now come to another kind of ἄρμονία, the adaptation of the several parts of the sentence to one another in order to its fit composi-
tion (sæptæ compositio, Cic. [de Orat. III 52. 200]), shewn in the arrangement of its words and subordinate clauses. The subject of the chapter is accordingly the period and its construction; and some of its leading figures—those originally introduced by Gorgias and his school—are illustrated by several examples from Isocrates’ Panegyricus.
The style must be either loose and concatenated (the sentences loosely strung together, connected solely by connecting particles, as δέ, καί, like onions on a string) and one only by the connecting particle, like the preludes in the dithyrambs, or close and compact (i.e. periodic) and resembling the (regular) antistrophes of the old lyric poets, Pindar Arion, Stesichorus, and the like. The last of the three is said to have owed his new name of Stesichorus—his original name was Tisias—to his having been the first to bring the chorus to a stand, make it stationary, for a time at least; and give it order, regularity, symmetry, and dignity. This is also attributed to Arion.

Now the loose style is the ancient (original) one. "This is the setting forth of the researches of Herodotus of Thurii." This style which was formerly universal is now confined to a few. By loose I mean which that has no end in itself except the completion of the subject under discussion. And it is displeasing by reason of its endlessness (or indefinite length or character, supra c. 8. 2); for every one desires to have the end distinctly in view'. Quintilian, VIII 5. 27, thus describes the εἰρήμενη λέξις, soluta fere oratio, et e singulis non membris sed frustis collata, structura caret. Cicero, Or. LV 186, notices the want of 'numbers' in Herodotus and his predecessors: which may possibly include the periodic structure of sentences; as Aristotle does, infra § 3, ἀρίθμου ἔχει ἡ ἐν περισσοτερον λέξις.

'Ἡροδότον Θουρίου] This appears to be the reading of all MSS, except that Aε has θυρίου. Herodotus did actually join the colony established at Thurium in 443 (Clint, F. H. sub anno 443, col. 3), and was thence sometimes called a Thurian from this his second birthplace. So Strabo, XIV c. 2, (Caria,) p. 657, of Halicarnassus; ἄνδρες δὲ γεγόνασιν εξ αὐτῆς Ἡροδότος τοῦ συγγραφέως, ἐν ὑστερον Θουρίον ἐκίλεσαν, διὰ τὸ κοινωνήσα τῆς εἰς Θουρίους ἀποκινέω."
terou μὲν ἀπαντεῖς, νῦν δὲ οὗ πολλοὶ χρώνται. Λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἣ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὐτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πράγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀνδρὸς διὰ τὸ ἀπείρον. τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθόραν. διὸ περ ἐπὶ τοὺς καμπτὴριον ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται:

exilio, c. 13, τὸ δὲ, "Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσέως ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις ἢδὲ," πολλοὶ μεταγράφουσι, "Ἡροδότοι Θουρίων." μετάφησε γὰρ εἰς Θουρίων, καὶ τῆς ἀποκίας ἑκάσες μέτεχε. Id. de Herodoti malignitate c. 35, καὶ ταῦτα, Θουρίων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων νομίζομεν, αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀλικαρνασσέως περιεχόμενον. The second of these passages may be interpreted to mean, that the reading in Plutarch’s time was often found altered in the copies of Herodotus' history, from Ἀλικαρνασσέως to Θουρίων; and if so, no doubt Aristotle's copy may have had that reading, which he transferred to his Rhetoric. But on the other hand, Demetrius, περὶ ἐρμηνείας, § 17 (περὶ περιόδου), in quoting the same passage, follows the reading of all our MSS Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσήσις ἱστορίης ἀπόδειξις ἢδὲ. Which, together with two other inaccuracies of quotation (in the Rhet.), the transposition of ἢδὲ, and the writing ἀπόδειξις for ἀπόδειξις—Demetr. preserves the correct form—leads me rather to conclude that the variation from our text is due here, as we have already seen in so many other instances, to our author's carelessness in quoting from memory, without referring to the original. Aristotle was a book-collector, and no doubt possessed a copy of Herodotus. Victorius thinks that the reading here is sufficiently justified by the fact that Herodotus did actually become a citizen of Thurii, and was so called. But the point here to be decided is not whether he was ever so called by others, or even by himself at odd times; but whether he did, or did not, write himself a Thurian at the commencement of his own history: which I deny, and attribute the implied assertion of that fact as a mere misquotation to our author himself.

'And this is why it is only at the goal that (the runners) pant (or gasp) and become faint, because whilst they are looking forward to the limit of the race they don't flag before that (i.e. before they have reached the goal). This, as I have said in Introd. p. 311, note, seems the explanation of the illustration which is required by the application of it and by the context. The sight of the goal before them, the term of their labour, keeps up the racers' spirits and stimulates their exertions, so that they neither faint nor fail till they reach it: ἅτιν' ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται, they breathe hard, and their exertions being over, their sinews are relaxed, they slacken and grow languid. This interpretation, which is opposed to that of Victorius (see note u.s.), makes the καμπτήρ, which is properly the turning-point of the διάλος—whence its name—here the goal of the στάδιον or single race, in a straight line: the καμπτήρ of the διάλος being in fact the πέρας of the στάδιον. If the καμπτήρ were intended here for the turning-point, the statement made of it could not be true, for in that case the runners would not come in sight of the goal until they had passed the καμπτήρ. So in Eth. N. v. 1. 2, 1093 b 1, an illustration is borrowed from the single foot-race: the στάδιον; ὅσπερ ἐν τῷ
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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ § 3.

3 προορώντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον. ἦ
σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικωτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἦ ἀνάπαλιν (to illustrate the
Platonic ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς). And similarly the Tragic poets
express reaching the term or end of life by κάμψεων, which seems to imply
the necessity of this explanation. Soph. Oed. Col. 91, ἔνταθα κάμψεων τὸν
Electr. 956, πρὶν ἂν τέλος γραμμῆς ἵκησαι καὶ πέρας κάμψη βίου. Hippol. 87.
tέλος δὲ κάμψαις ὁσπερ ἠρώμην βίον. This single course is also called
dρόμος ἀκαμπτος, οὐ ἀπλοῦς, οὐ εὐθύς, Pollux et Hesychius ap. Stallbaum
ad Phaedo 72 B. The καμπτήρ, or στήλη, with the inscription κάμψων,
was called τέρπμα, βατήρ, τέλος and νίκαι. Comp. Krause Gymn. u. Agon.
der Hell. 1 140.

ἐκλύνεται[ Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 150, πρὸς τὸν πολεμὸν ἐκλευμένον
(slack, remiss). Ib. ἀντίδ. § 59, ἐν ὃν μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκλυθο (be exhausted)
pολλῶν ἐπὶ μι κεκτέων ὑπνοι. Ar. Pol. VII (v) 6, πλοία ἐκλευμένα, of
crazy vessels. Ib. Hist. Anim. IX 1.32, ἢ ἄν ἐκλύσασθων (of taming
elephants). Xen. de Ven. 5.5, dogs lose their keen smell in the
summer διὰ τὸ ἐκλυθυνθα τὰ σώματα. Ar. Probl. XXX I, 6, λίαν πολὺς
(οἶνος) ἐκλύει, de Gen. Anim. 18,51, ἐκλύθης, relaxation, weakness.
Ib. VII 7, 21, ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ κινώσα τὴν φωνήν ἐκλύνεται.

§ 3. ‘Such then is the loose (‘jointed’ Mure, H.G.L.) kind of style; the
compact, condensed, concentrated, kind is the periodic, that which is
constructed in periods: by period I mean a sentence (lit. kind of style or com-
position) having a beginning and end in itself, and a magnitude such as
can be readily taken in at one view’. The other style is ἀπειρος, περηπτεια,
definite, continuous, running on without end, and without proper divi-
sions; and therefore can’t be comprehended in one view. εὐσύνοπτος,
comp. Pol. IV (VII) 4, ult. ἡ μεγίστῃ ὑπερβαλλη πλήθους...εὐσύνοπτος, (for
purposes of supervision). So of a tragedy, Poet. VII 10,74, ἢ ἔχει μὲν
μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι. On the construction ἡ εἰρωμένη τῆς
λέξεως, for ἡ εἰρωμένη λέξις, see the examples in Matthiae’s Gr. Gr. 442. 2.
Add this, and Isocr. Paneg. § 132, τῆς χώρας τίν πλειότης αὐτῆς,
Arist. Pol. VIII (v) 10, 1312 b 20, πολλαὶ τῶν καταλύσεων.

‘A style of this kind is agreeable, and easy to be learnt’ (εὐμάθης,
passive; see Aesch. Eum. 442, Soph. Aj. 15, Trach. 611, where ‘easy
to be learnt’ means ‘readily intelligible’); ‘agreeable, because it is the
contrary of the endless, indefinite, and also because the listener
is constantly thinking by reason of this constant definite conclusion
(or limitation of each sentence) that he has got hold of something
(got something in his grasp—in the way of a conclusion) for himself (αὐτῷ,
retained by Bekker and Spengel; ἑαυτῷ αὐτῷ?); whereas, to have
nothing to look forward to (no conclusion to anticipate) either to be,
or to be finished (ἀνέψεσθαι, ὡστε τώα ἀνέψει), either fact, or effect,
is disagreeable’. It occurred to me that εἶναι, which seems superfluous,
might have arisen from a repetition of the εἶν in προορών. The
translation will then be, ‘nothing to look forward to nor to finish (get
done, effect)’: ἀνέψει identifying the hearer with the speaker, as if he
himself had to come to the conclusion. Comp. § 6, ὁμοῦ ἐπι τὸ πόλις
καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει εν λαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντιωπεύειν πανταμένου.
And easy to be learnt because easily recollected: and this because the periodic style can be numbered, and number is of all things the most easily recollected'. The proportions, or relations of the several parts or members of the period to the whole, and to one another—its symmetrical structure—can be expressed in numbers, like the numerical relations of rhythm, c. 8. This gives the periodic structure a hold upon the memory, by its definite proportions, which is entirely wanting to the continuous and indefinite succession of the other.

'And this is why every one recollects metres (verses) better than (disorderly) irregular prose; because it has number which serves to measure it'.

τῶν χύδην is the soluta oratio (Cic. Orat. § 228, alibi), the διαλευκμήνι or διερμηνεύμενα λέξεις (Demetrius): the incoherent style, words poured out at random, in confused mass, one after another, without order or discrimination. Thus, in distinguishing the symmetrical structure of verse from the comparative confusion and disorder of prose, Plato, Legg. vii 811 d, writes λόγων, οὐς ἐν ποιήσαν ἡ χύδην οὕτως εἰρήμενα (where οὕτως is, Platonice, 'just as they are', 'just as it happens', 'indiscriminately', 'without order or regularity'; or 'without consideration', 'just as it may be'. Heindorf Gorg. § 127 and Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v.); Phaedr. 264 B, ὁδι χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλησθαί τά τοῦ λόγου (helter-skelter, like rubbish shot out of a cart; Thompson). Rep. vii 537 C, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα...γενόμενα (taught promiscuously). Isocr. Panath. § 24, ἄμωσι ἂν εἶναι δόξαμα τοῖς εἰκή καὶ φωτικοῖς καὶ χύδην ὅτι ἂν ἐπέλθῃ λέγονσιν (who utter at random, promiscuously anything that comes into their head). Arist. Pol. iv (vii) 2, 1324 b 5, τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὅς εἰπεῖν κειμένων (shot out in a heap, indiscriminately, at random, without order or system), de part. An. iv 5. 27, ὅδι διεσπαρμένα χύδην. The passage of Plato, Legg. u.s., is referred to by Dionysius, Ars Rhet. x 6 (v 381 ed. Reiske), οὐ χύδην, ὡς ἔτυχον βεβλησθαί τά ενθυμημάτα.

§ 4. 'The period must also be completed (or brought to a conclusion)
by the sense (καί, as well as by the structure and rhythm) and not broken off abruptly (without completing the sense: διακόπτειν ‘to cut in two’), like Sophocles’ iambics, “Calydon is this land of the Pelopion soil—”: for the contrary supposition (to this real fact) arises from (lit. is caused by; dativus instrumenti) this (wrong) division (in general), as also in the instance given, that Calydon belongs to the Peloponnesus’.

We learn from the Anonymous Scholiast on this passage (see Brandis’ tract [Philologus IV i] pp. 46, 7), and more precisely from the Schol. on Ar. Ran. 1269, that this verse comes not from Sophocles, but from Eur, Meleager, of which it is the commencement. See Wagner, Fragm. Eur. Mel. 1 (Fr. Tr. Gr. 11 270). The second verse, which completes the author’s meaning, is supplied by Lucian, Conv. c. 25 (Hemsterh. III. 436), and Demetr. peri ἐρωτεῖας § 58 (Rhet. Gr. Spengel III 275), εν ἀντιπάρθενοι πέδι ἐχοντο εὐνάμων: and the three following by Wagner, u.s. This makes it clear that this misstatement was not due to Euripides. As to the substitution of Sophocles for Euripides as the author, I have no doubt, from the abundant evidence we have already had, that it is due solely to a lapse of memory on Ar.’s part, and that no alteration of the text, as suggested by Vater and Buhle, is required.

The stop, or pause, which the speaker or reader makes, when introduced in the wrong place, may make a complete alteration in the meaning: as here, if the verse be read as an entire sentence with the pause at χθονός, it conveys the meaning that Calydon is situated in the Peloponnesus, which is contrary to the fact: but if it be read continuously without a pause with the ensuing line, the true sense becomes clear. διαιρείσθαι here is equivalent to διαστίζων 5 6, comp. Anon. ap. Brandis, p. 47, οὔ είσι κατὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν, καὶ εὐταύθα μὲν διαστιζώμεν δύλην διάνοιαν ἀπαρτίσομεν, εὐταύθα δὲ διαστίζομεν ἄλλην. This is in fact the ‘fallacy of division’, de Soph. El. 4, 166 a 33, παρά τὴν διαίρεσιν, where two verses are quoted in illustration.

Demetrius u.s. quotes the two verses in illustration of a different kind of fault; the interpolation of a σύνδεσμος—in which he includes interjections—by actors, as an ἐξετάζων: Οὐ δὲ πρὶς ὤθεν ἀναπληρώσατε, φησί, τὸν σύνδεσμον ἔκασα τοὺς ὑποκριταὶ τοὺς τὸ καὶ τὸ πρὶς ὤθεν ἐπος λέγοντας, οὐσ εἰ τις ὤθεν λέγω, Καλυδῶν μὲν ἤδε γαία Πελοπείας χθόνος, φεῦ, ἐν ἀντιπάρθενοι πέδι ἐχοντο εὐνάμων, αὐτ. ὁς γὰρ παρέλκει τὸ αὐτ αὐτ καὶ τὸ φεῦ εὐθάνα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πανταχῶς μᾶτην ἐμβαλλόμενοι σύνδεσμοι.

The MSS. with the exception of A', have Πελοπείας, which is found also in Demetrius and retained by Bekker and Spengel; MS A', Lucian, the Schol. on Aristophanes, Dindorf (Eur. Fragm. Mel. 2), and Wagner, read the more usual form Πελοπίας. The text of Euripides, who alone of the
5 περιόδος δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν κῶλοις ἡ δ' ἀφελής. ἔστι δ' ἐν κῶλοις μὲν λέγεις ἡ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διηρμενή καὶ εὐανάπτυνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαμέσει ὦσπερ ἡ εἰρημένη περίοδος, ἀλλ' ὀλίγῳ κῶλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἑτερον three Tragedians uses the word, has Πελώπιος in five places, including the line of the Meleager (Beck's Index).

§ 5. 'A period may be either divided into clauses, or simple (confined to one)'. Ar. himself defines what he means here by ἀφελής, viz. μονικαλος, a sentence consisting of a single member, without the complication, or elaborate construction of the period. ἀφελής properly denotes smooth and level, without inequalities or irregularities, as Arist. Eq. 527, διὰ τῶν ἀφελῶν πέδων ἐρμεῖ. It is therefore 'plain' as opposed to 'mountainous', literally and metaphorically, level, easy to be traversed, simple, plain; whereas the mountain is suggestive of difficulty. It is applied by Dionysius, de admirabili vi dicendi in Demosthene [c. 2], to Lysias' style, which is said to be ἄτη καὶ ἀφελής, 'smooth and plain or simple'. Lysias' style is in fact a medium between the εἰρημένη λέγεις of Hecataeus and Herodotus, and the complex periods of Isocrates and Demosthenes: and a comparison of the sentences of Lysias with those of Demosthenes will clearly shew the difference between the ἀφελής and ἡ ἐν κῶλοις περίοδος. Quint. IX 4.124, 12. 5. Genera eius (periodi) duo sunt: alterum simplex, quum sensus unus longiore ambitu circumducitur; alterum, quod constat membriis (ἐν κῶλοισ) et incisis, quae plures sensus habent. Habet periodos membra minimum duo: medius numerus videntur quattuor (so Cic. Orat. § 221), sed recipit frequenter et plura.

'The period in clauses or divisions must be complete in itself, duly divided (its members distinct and definite), and such as can be easily delivered without stopping to draw breath' (lit. easily breathed, well adapted to the limits of the breath).

ἐυανάπτυνευστος] Cic. de Or. III 44. 175; Rudis orator incondite fundit... spiritu non arte determinat. Orat. § 228, Non spiritu pronunciantis... debet insister.

'Not however (μη, if, provided, it be not) by the mere (arbitrary) division (as if the speaker might pause for breath, wherever he pleases), as (in) the period already cited (Καλύπτων μὲν ἤδε...), but as a whole. A member or clause is one of the two parts of this. By simple I mean a period of a single member'. It appears from this that a period, according to Ar., is a sentence that includes a complete sense, and is thereby distinguished from a κῶλον or member of it: which is a member or part of a whole, and therefore incomplete until the whole has been expressed. The period therefore is twofold, simple, μονόκαλος, and compound, ἐν κῶλοισ. The phrase τὸ ἑτερον μόριον divides the compound period primarily or essentially into two parts, which stands for, and may be extended to, division in general. Cicero, as Vater

1 So Hierog. peri euréseus tov. δ', peri periódou (II 2.41 Rh. Gr. Spengel), of the κῶλον. The period may consist of one, two, three or four, colons. κῶλον δὲ ἐστὶν ἀποτιμεμένη διάνοια, a complete sense. Aristotle admits this only of the μονόκαλος περίοδος.
§§ 5, 6.

6 μόριον ταύτης. ἀφελὴ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κώλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μονόρους εἶναι observes, acknowledges the compound alone to be a true period. Τὸ δὲ κάλον Ἀριστοτῆς οὕτως ὁρίζεται, "καλὸν ἔστι τὸ ἔτερον μέρος περιόδου". εἶτα ἐπιφέρει, "οὐτὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπλὴ περίοδος" οὕτως ὁρισάμενος "τὸ ἔτερον μέρος" δικάλον ἐξουλετο εἶναι τὴν περίοδον δηλοῦτι. ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδωμος συλλαβά-βον τὸν ὄρον τοῦ Ἀρ., καὶ τὸ ἐπιφέρομενον τὸ ὄρος σαφέστερον καὶ τελεότερον οὕτως ὁρίσατο, "καλὸν ἔστιν ήτοι ἀπλὴ περίοδος, η δὲ συνθέσι περιόδου μέρος" [Demetrius p. ἐρμηνείας, § 34]. Ον κόλα and κόμματα in general, see Introd. pp. 312, 3; note I.

This word is variously written μυ- and μει-ουρος, and so here the MSS. The Lexicons, including Stephens', regard them as two different words: Stephens only distinguishing the sense, μει-ουρος, καλβουρος, bob-tailed, with a stunted tail; μονορος, sharp-tailed, like a mouse; while Liddell and Scott, and Rost and Palm, deriving μονορος from a mouse's tail, set the facts of the case at defiance by defining it nevertheless 'curtailed', 'abgestutzt oder abgestumpft'. This at all events is no doubt the meaning of it. It seems to me rather that the word is the same, and the variety only in the spelling. The meaning of it is always the same; bob-tailed, curtailed, originally; and thence blunted, truncated, docked, maimed, cut short where you would naturally expect a prolongation. Comp. Poet. c. XXVI 13, εἶν μὲν ἕνα τῶν μῦθων ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη ἡ βραχέα δεικνύμενο μῦνορον φαύνεσθαι, unnaturally, unduly, curtailed. See Twining's note, p. 557. He refers to Hephæstos. μει-ουρος στιχος, ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος ἐλλεῖπον χρόνον, opposed to δολιχουρος, 'long-tailed', ὁ κατὰ τὸ τέλος πλεονάζον συλλογῆς. Comp. de part. Anim. III 1. 13, of blunt-nosed, as opposed to sharp-nosed, fishes: οὐ σαρκοφάγοι, fishes of prey, like the shark, are sharp-nosed, οὐ δὲ μή σαρκο- κόφαγοι μονορος (a bulldog's nose is particularly μονορος). And again IV 13. 22, the same remark is repeated. Pausanias, x 16. 1, describing one of Croesus' offerings at Delphi, σχῆμα δὲ τοῦ ὑποθήματος κατὰ πῦργῳ μίλιστα ἐς μουρόν ἀνίστα ἀπὸ εἰρυτέρου τοῦ κάτω, of a truncated cone or pyramid. Athenæus (xiv 632 D, E, Æ), of three kinds of defective verses; οὐκεφαλος, at the beginning, as a verse beginning with ἐπειδή; λαγαρί, prop. spider-shaped, contracted or weak in the flanks; hence of verses, faulty in the middle (claudicant in medio Schweighäuser ad loc.), where a short syllable occurs for a long one in the middle of the verse: illustrated by II.B [11] 731, and another hexameter which Schweighäuser can't find, and to him is inexplicable; and thirdly μει-ουρος, οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκβολῆς, at the end of the verse; of which three specimens are given, II. M [xii] 208, another which
μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίειν πολ- λάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατήν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, όταν ἔτι ὦμων ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὀρόν, ἀντισπασθῆ πανσαμένου, οἰον προσπταίειν γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντικροσίαν. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολεί- ρεθαὶ ποιεῖ, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τὸν τέρματος· ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὔτω τοὺς συμπερι-

is misquoted from II. θ [viii] 305, and a third from Od. i [ix] 212. This passage of Athenaeus is quoted at length by Hermann, El. doctr. metr. II 26.20. Athenaeus writes μείουρος. Ernesti Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. μείουρος.

'For that (sc. the κόλων) which is too short often makes the listener stumble (balks him by bringing him up short and abruptly); because if, whilst he is still hurrying (eager) to get on (forward), and to the (end or completion of the) measure (rhythm), of which he has already a definition (i.e. a definite and preconceived notion) in himself, he be suddenly pulled up (checked, lit. pulled against) by a pause (a premature cessation on the part of the speaker), there must necessarily follow (arise γίγνεσθαι) a sort of stumble by reason of the check'.

προσπταίεω] must be regarded as a subst. in the accusative before γίγ- νεσθαι, equivalent to τὸ προσπταίειν. The metaphor is from driving: a sudden and unexpected check, or pulling against him, will often cause a horse to stumble, or bring him on his knees. The abrupt cessation of the onward motion, in the listener's mind, as in the horse's career, produces analogous effects—whence the metaphor—in the two cases.

'Those again which are too long produce a feeling of being left behind, like those who (in a measured walk, as in the colonnade of a gymnasium) turn back only after passing (not till they have passed) the limit; for they too—like the speaker that uses too long periods—leave behind their companions in the walk'.

The notion is that of a party walking backwards and forwards in the portico of a gymnasium, the walk, like the period, being properly limited, though the limit is capable of being passed. If one of the party—suppose Aristotle himself in his daily περίπατοι in the Lyceum—chanced to have thus outstripped his companions, the latter would be left in the lurch, and be no longer able to hear him. Similarly the speaker who makes his periods of undue length, leaves his hearers in the lurch: they stop short, as it were, and lose the thread of his discourse. ἀποκάμπτειν is here not in its usual sense, but 'to turn away' in the sense of 'turning back', as ἀποδιώκω, ἀπονέμω, ἀπαίτειν.

On this subject comp. Cic. Orat. LIII 178, itaque et longiora et breviora idicul et perfecta ac moderata semper expectat; mutilia sentit quaedam et quasi decurtata, quibus tanguam debito fraudetur offenditur, productiora alia et quasi immoderatus excurrentia, quae magis eiam aspernantur aures, et seq.
πατοῦντας. ὦμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακρὰς οὖσαι λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολὴ ὦμοιων. ὥστε γίνεται ὁ ἐσκωψε Δημόκριτος ὁ Χίος εἰς Μελανιππίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς,

οἱ τ᾽ αὐτῷ κακὰ τεῦχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεῦχων,

η δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολὴ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη

ἀρμόττει γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκώλους

'And in like manner also the periods that are too long become so many speeches, and like a dithyrambic prelude; that is, rambling and incoherent, without unity or system.

αἱ περίοδοι...λόγος γίνεται] verb attracted from the plural to the singular, as the nearer of the two: so ἵνα, αἱ τε λεῖν βραχύκωλοι οἱ περίοδοι γίνεται. For ὦμοιον cf. triste lupus stabilis, et sim. On ἀναβολή, see note 1, Introd. p. 307.

'And therefore what Democritus of Chios quoted to taunt Melanippides for writing (long, rambling) dithyrambic preludes instead of the (compact and regular) stanzas, is realized (in these overgrown periods). "A man works mischief to himself in working mischief to another, and the long dithyrambic prelude is most mischievous to its composer" (substituted for ἥ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη, of the original, Hesiod. Op. et D. 263): for a taunt of the same kind may also be appropriately applied to the long-membered gentry, (the dealers in long-membered periods)". The makers of the periods are themselves called here μακρόκωλοι. To scan the second verse of the quotation μακράναβολη must be read as a crisis. "Democritus Chius Musicus, Abderitae aequalis teste Diogene Laertio, ix 49 (γεγώναι δὲ Δημόκριτοι ἔπος αὐτὸς αὐτό, δεύτερος Χίος μουσικὸς κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν χρόνον). Meminerunt eius Suidas s. v. χιαζεῖν, Pollux, iv 9. 4, Arist. Rhet. III 9. De hoc omnium optime egit Coraes ἐν Ἱακῆς Ἀρχαιολογίας Υλη Ἀτακτ. III p. 192, seq." Müllach, ad Democ. Fragm. p. 91.

In the note on ἀναβολή, Introd. p. 307, already referred to, may be found some account of the two kinds of dithyramb here alluded to; the earlier antistrophic form of that of Arion, Stesichorus, Pindar, and the novel, relaxed, often incoherent, extravagances, of Melanippides and his followers. Nevertheless, Melanippides is selected by Aristodemus, in answer to Socrates' question, Xen. Mem. I 4. 3, as the most distinguished representative of dithyrambic poetry, as Homer of epic. Sophocles of tragedy, Polycletus of sculpture, and Zeuxis of painting. This represents the popular judgment, as opposed to that of the critics. On this subject, I have referred to Bode, Gesch. der Hell. Dichtk. Vol. II Pt. II p. 211 seq. and 293 seq. and to Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XXX. See also Arist. Probl. xix 15. Of Melanippides of Melos, there is a life in Smith's Biogr. Dict. [E. Curtius, Greek Hist. Vol. iv p. 102 of Ward's tr.]

'Those which have their members too short make no period at all: and so it (i.e. the period made up of these short κόλα) drags the reader with it headlong'. The audience is carried away by them, as by a
horse, at a headlong, break-neck, pace. Specimens of this style are
given in Introd. p. 314, note 1.

§ 7. 'The periodic style has two divisions, of which the one has its
clauses (simply) divided, the other opposed to one another; an instance
of simple division is, "I have often wondered that those who first
assembled these universal gatherings and established the athletic con-
tests..." διηρημένη λέξις, "in qua membra periodi copula a se invicem
distinguuntur." Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. διαρέων. This is the opening
of Isocrates' Panegyric Speech, supposed or intended to be delivered
at the 'General Assembly' of the great Olympic games—whence the
name. It is remarkable, and shews that Ar. could not have looked
at the passage he was quoting, that the very next words to those at
which his quotation stops, long before the end of the sentence, contain
a regular antithesis or opposition of members, and the 'simple division'
is absolutely confined to the words cited. I should suppose that he
could not have been aware of this.

'(An instance) of the antithetic period, wherein in each of the two clauses
contrary by contrary are brought together, or (the same word is imposed
as a yoke, i.e. bracket, or vinculum, on both contraries) the two con-
trasies are coupled together by one and the same word, is "Both they
served, them that remained, and them that followed; for the one they
acquired more land than they had at home in addition, and to the
others they left behind sufficient in what they had at home." ὑπομονή,
(staying behind) is contrary to ἀκολούθησις (following), ἵκανον το πλείον'.

It is unnecessary to say that the passage is quoted wrong: it runs
in the original, Paneg. § 35, 6, ἀμφ. δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀκολ. καὶ τῶν ὑπομ.
ἐσωσαν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἵκανον τῆς ὀικίας χώραν κατέλιπων, τοῖς δὲ πλείον τῆς
ὑπαρχούσης ἐπώρισαν. The first clause is an exemplification of ἐπίευξις,
on which see note supra c. 5 § 7; the second, of the antithesis of con-
traries in two clauses balanced and opposed to one another.

In the quotation that follows, Paneg. § 41, the original is, ὡςτε καὶ τοῖς
χρηματών δεομένους καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσαι βουλομένους" ἀπόλαυσις κτῆσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι "συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀφρονας κατορθοῦν." "εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἑξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ύστερον τὴν ἁρχὴν τῆς βαλάττης ἐλαβοῦν." "πλεῦσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἥπειρος, πεζεύσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς βαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἐλλήσποντον ἑυβαστὶ, τὸν δὴ "Ἀθω διορύγας." "καὶ φύσει πολίταις ὄντις νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι." "οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρηματῶν δεομένους καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαύσαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐπιθυμουσι ἀμφότεροι ἀρμότερως. Ar. in his alteration has adorned Isocrates' text with an additional rhetorical figure, the ὁμοτελετὸν or rhyming terminations of δεομένους and βουλομένους. 'ἀπόλαυσις, (sensual) enjoyment, is opposed to κτήσει, acquisition', as the text has it. As these two can hardly be considered antithetical, and nothing corresponding to κτήσει occurs in Isocr., are we to suppose that Ar., meaning to write ἐπείδα, carelessly substituted κτήσει? or rather, that κτήσει is a mistake of a copyist for δείσει, which occurs twice in the sense of 'want.' II 7, 3 and 4: and also, in the same sense, Pseudo-Plato, Eryxias, 405 E bis.

Then follows a string of quotations from the same speech of Isocrates, illustrative of antithesis; § 48 (wrong), § 72 (right), § 89 (right again), § 105 (wrong), § 149 (right), § 181 (wrong), § 186 (wrong, ἑξείν for ἑξεῖν).

The passage τὸν μὲν Ἐλλήσποντον κ.τ.λ. occurs likewise in the funeral oration attributed to Lysias, § 29. This speech is marked as spurious by Baiter and Suppe in their ed. of the Or. Alt. If this be so, the figure is probably due to Isocrates, which is all the more likely as Lysias' style, λίπῃ καὶ ἀφέλης, is usually free from these rhetorical artifices. Victorius refers to an imitation of this, Cis. de Fin. II 34. 112, Ut si Xerxes... Hellesponto iuncto, Athone perfosso, maria ambitaviisset terramque navigasset. And Lucr. III 1042 (1029, Munro), ille quoque ipse (Xerxes) viam qui quondam per mare magnum stravit, et seq.

'And what one some (one advocate, in accusation, whose name Ar. either had never heard, or didn't recollect) said against Peitholaus and Lycophron in the law-court (at some trial: quaec, theirs?), "And these fellows (οὗτοι, apparently 'the accused' or 'opponents' as usual) who used to sell you when they were at home, now that they have come to you here, have bought you"'. Peitholaus and Lycophron were brothers of Thebe, the wife of Alexander of Phereac. At her instigation they murdered their brother-in-law and succeeded him in the dynasty. They maintained themselves long against the attacks of Philip by the aid of Onomarchus the Phocian commander, but at last were defeated, 353—352 B.C., and Onomarchus slain; upon which they "retired with their mercenaries, 2000 in number, into Phokis." Grote, Hist. Gr. from Diodorus, Vol. XI ch. LXXVII pp. 366, 408, 9, 11, where Lycophron alone is mentioned as 'the despot of Phereac': in p. 412,
Peitholaus and Lycophon are named together for the first time as joint commanders.

As the time, place, and circumstances, as well as the speaker, of what is here related, are alike utterly unknown, any attempt at interpreting it must be a mere guess. My conjecture is, (1) that the scene is a court of justice—where, no one can say; I will assume at Athens—(2) that οὖτοι are Peitholaus and Lycophon, as accused or defendants—this is suggested by ἐις Π. τις ἔστε and the use of οὖτοι—and if so, this must have been after their downfall: and (3) that, to give the remark a point, ἐώνυμα must have a double sense. ‘These fellows, says some one to the judges, used when they were at home, at Pherae, to sell you (as slaves)—ὦμας maliciously identifies the Athenian judges with their fellow-countrymen, captives in Thessaly—now that they are come to you, the tables are turned, and they have to buy you’ (i.e. to bribe the judges). Victorius, but utterly without point, Videtur contumeliosa vox in eos iacta, qui pecunia, quam comparassent in suis civibus hostibus emancipandis, cadem postea uterentur in illis ab iisdem emendis, atque in servitudinem sibi adiudicandis.

‘For all these (passages) do what has been mentioned’, i.e. give an antithetical structure to the several sentences.

§ 8. ‘This kind of style is agreeable because contraries are best known (in themselves and by reason of their opposition), and still better when placed side by side (in juxtaposition, for the purpose of contrast and comparison); and also because it resembles a syllogism; for the ἐλεγχός (the refutative syllogism) is a bringing together (for the same purpose) of the two opposites (the two contradictory conclusions)’. This opposition of contraries in the antithesis, also reminds us of the ἐλεγχός, the conclusion of opposites, refutation by an opposite conclusion; this resemblance makes the former look like a proof, which is a source of pleasure.

Aristotle is constantly telling us—see Bonitz ad Metaph. B 2, 996 a 18—that contraries, which are the two extremes of things under the same genus, are also subject to the same science, τῶν ἐνστάσεων, or ἡ αὐτή, ἐπιστήμη. And accordingly, inferences may be drawn from one contrary to another, Eth. N. v 1, 1129 a 14 seq. This appears to be the foundation of what is here said, that contraries are best known to us; they can be studied together, and one throws light upon the other. Comp. III 11. 9,
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PHTORIHKHΣ Γ 9 §§ 8, 9.

"ὅτι τάναντια γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον π. γνώριμα, καὶ ὁτί ἐσοκ συλλογισμός: ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγχὸς συναγωγῆ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἑστίν.

9 ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑστίν, παρίσωσις δ’ ἐὰν ἵσα τὰ κῶλα, παραμοίωσις δ’ ἐὰν ὁμοια τὰ ἑσχατα ἐχὴ ἑκάτερον τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀρχὴ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆ ἑχειν, καὶ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ ὅσα ἀν...ἀντικειμένως λεξῆ τοιοῦτο εὐθομέμει μᾶλλον. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸν ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικείσθαι μᾶλλον...γίνεται. Π 23. 30 and Μ 17. 13, on ἐλεγχος, and the conclusion (implying learning) from opposites. In Probl. XIX 5, ὥδ’ τὸ μαθήματες is assigned, as an acknowledged truth, in explanation of a musical fact. 'Best known' seems to mean that contraries, being under the same genus, are better known than any other things that have no such relation, or no relation at all, to one another.

On the pleasure derived from learning, which is here assumed to be the explanation of the agreeableness of this periodic style, see the notes on Π Π. 21, 23; particularly the latter, in which it is fully illustrated from Aristotle's writings. I will repeat here that the Metaphysics opens with a statement that all men have a natural longing for (strive after) knowledge, πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει: and this of course implies pleasure in learning, which is the satisfaction of this natural appetite. The natural love of imitation or copying, which gives rise to all the imitative arts, is based in the same way upon the desire and pleasure of learning. And contrariwise therefore (this is additional), as we saw in c. 8. 2, ἀρέσκει καὶ ἀγρυπνοῖ τὸ ἀπέριον, the infinite, or indefinite, is displeasing to us because it is unknowable. Comp. ἰνθησα c. Π. 2. τὸ γὰρ μαθήματες ῥᾶσις ὥδ’ φύσει πάριν ἑστι: the words that convey the most instruction to us are the most pleasing; hence the pleasure derived from metaphors, which is explained: ἀλλάτται on the contrary, which teach us nothing, are therefore disagreeable.

παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα] juxtaposition makes things more intelligible is a fact already more than once appealed to, as Π 23. 30; compare the parallel passage, Μ 17. 13; Π 2. 9; and again Μ 11. 9.

On the ἐλεγχος and its opposite conclusions, συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως see Introd. on Π 22, and note 1, p. 262, and again, on Π 25, p. 268.

§ 9. 'Such then is antithesis; the equality of the members (or clauses) is παρισώσις; παραμοίωσις is when each of the two members (the supposition that the period consists of only two clauses is still carried on) has its extremities similar (i.e. in the letters, so that the terminations rhyme to one another). (The clauses) must have this either at the beginning or at the end. And when they (the similar sounding letters) are at the beginning (the figure is) always (expressed in) whole words (iii. the words, entire words, always a beginning), but at the end (it admits of) either the (similarity of the) last syllables, or the same word with a changed termination (declension, adverbial, adjectival, termination, &c), or the same word. Similar sound (παραμοίωσις) at the com-
ονόματα, ἡ δὲ τελευτὴ τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβάς ἧ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος πτώσεις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα “ἀγρὸν γάρ ἐλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ,”

δωρητὸι τ’ ἐπέλουντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἑπέεσσιν.

ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ “φήδησαν αὐτὸν παιδίων τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἷτιον γεγονέναι,” “ἐν πλείστασι δὲ φρον-τίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίστασι ἐλπίσιν.” πτώσις δὲ ταῦτο “ἀξιος δὲ σταθήναι χαλκοὺς, οὐκ ἀξιος ὃν χαλκοῦ.”

ταῦτο δ’ ὄνομα “σὺ δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ζώντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.” ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δὲ “τὶ ἂν

mencement (may be illustrated by) such examples as this; ἀγρὸν γάρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν (fallow, uncultivated) παρ’ αὐτοῦ’. Victorius quotes a parallel example from Xen. Cyrop. VIII 3. 15, οὐ δυνάμενος τρίφειν ἀργὸν εἰς ἀγρὸν ἀπαγαγὸν ἐκέλευσεν ἐργαζόμεναι. The ὑραμ at the beginning’ of clauses is properly called ὁμοιόμετρον; at the end ὁμοιότιλον and, δωρητοῖ τ’ ἐπέλουντο παράρρητοί τ’ ἑπέεσσιν. II. I [IX] 526. ‘At the end, φήδησαν αὐτῶν παιδίων τετοκέναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ αἷτιον γεγονέναι (in this there appears to be neither rhyme nor reason [the assonance, or correspondence of vowel sounds, is however clearly marked in the two clauses]; it is most likely corrupt, says Buhle.). ἐν πλείστασι δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίστασι ἐλπίσιν’.

‘And an inflexion (declension, change of termination from a root: see note on I 7. 27) of the same word (i.e. root) ἀξιος δὲ σταθήναι χαλκοὺς, οὐκ ἀξιος ὃν χαλκοῦ, “worthy to be set up in brass (have a bronze statue erected in his honour), Dem. de F. L. § 296, Φιλίππων θανάμουσα καὶ χαλκοῦσι εἰστάσαι... 1b. § 378, ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐμεῖς... χαλκοῦσι στήσαι ἀν ἐν ἀγορᾷ; as a public benefactor), not being worth a brass farthing”. (Supposed to deserve a brass statue—bronz in reality—when he doesn’t deserve a brass farthing. This is in fact more in the nature of a παρονομασία, or play upon words, than of an ὁμοιότιλον. Ar. however seems to class both under his παρομοίωσις).

‘And the same word (repeated) ἔλεγες κακῶς... γράφεις κακῶς’. Demetrius, who repeats all this, following Arist. very closely, and sometimes borrowing his examples, supplies in his version a word which is wanting in our text, both to the sense and to the due balance of the sentence: σὺ δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ζώντα ἔλεγες κακῶς, καὶ νῦν βανώντα γράφεις κακῶς. Demetr. peri ἐρμηνείας § 26. Compare the three chapters, π. περιόδου, π. παρομοίων κώλων, π. ὁμοιότιλου, Rhet. Gr. 111 262—268, ed. Spengel. This sentence was applied by some rival orator to one who, after slandering some one all his life, after his death wrote a panegyric on him—which, the speaker says, was just as bad as his slander1.

1 This reminds us of Lord Lyndhurst’s saying of Campbell’s Lives of the
éπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἀνδρ' εἶδες ἄργον;" ἦστι δὲ ἀμα

'And (a rhyming termination arising) from a single syllable: δειν-όν... ἄργ-όν. And the same clause may have all three at once, and the antithesis and balance of clauses, and similar termination may be the same' (included or exemplified in one or the same clause). An instance of this is given by Victorius from a saying of Gorgias preserved by Plutarch, Cimon. c. 10, τὸν Κίωνα τὰ χρήματα κτάσαι μὲν ὁς χρύσφωτο, χρύσφωτο δὲ ὁς τιμώτω. Gorg. Fragm. Sauppe, Or. Att. III. p. 131, Fr. Inc. 6. This is not only antithesis and the rest, but a false antithesis to boot. Demetr., u. s. § 23, has supplied a much more elaborate example from Isocr. Helen. § 17. τῷ (τοῦ Isocr.) μὲν εἶπονον καὶ φιλοκίνδυνον τὸν βιον κατέστησε (Dem. has ἐποίησε), τῆς δὲ περιθέστον καὶ περιμάχητον τὴν φύσιν ἐποίησεν (Dem. κατέστησεν). 'The commencements of periods (in this view of the artificial structure of the sentence) have been enumerated with tolerable (σχεδόν 'pretty nearly') completeness (ἐξ—'out', 'to the end or full') in the Theodecta. There are also false antitheses, as Epicharmus, besides others, (καὶ) wrote, τόκα μὲν κτ.λ.' This line of Epicharmus is also given by Demetr. u. s. § 24. He speaks of it as 'said in jest', πεπαιγμένον—τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐνατίνῳ—to make fun of the rhetoricians, ακόστων τῶν ῥήτορων, viz. Gorgias and his school, the inventors of antithesis and the rest of these rhetorical novelties.

For further details on the subject of these rhetorical figures introduced by Gorgias and his school, who carried them to a vicious excess, a style to which the term Γοργαῖες was afterwards applied; which was thought to have attained its highest perfection in the measured and laboured, empty and monotonous, periods of Isocrates;—see the paper on Gorgias, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil., No. vii, Vol. iii. p. 69 seq. where they are classified and arranged under three heads, representing parallelism in sense, structure, and sound, which is in fact Aristotle's division. Illustrative extracts from Gorgias' speeches are given at p. 67: and a collection of his fragments in Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. (appended to the Or. Att. Vol. iii) p. 129 seq. [Compare Blass, die Attische Bereedsamkeit, 1 pp. 60—62, and Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, Appendix, On the Fragments of Gorgias.]

Perhaps the most complete specimen of Isocrates' style in his Panegyric, from which I will select one or two illustrations, is § 76, οὗ γὰρ ὀλγιώρον τῶν κοινῶν, οὐδ' ἀπελάπαν μὲν ὡς ἰδίων, ἤμελουν δὲ ὡς ἀπλοτριών, ἀλλ' ἐκβουντο μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖων, ἀπείρου δ' ὁστερ χρη τῶν μηδέν προσχώντων καὶ σον, in the same measured strain. Of παρωμοίωσις, we have an example § 45, ἐστὶ δ' ἑγώνως ἵδειν μὴ μόνον τάξαν καὶ ῥώμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων καὶ γνώμης, κτ.λ. The rhyming terminations pervade §§ 185, 186, culminating in a sentence, in which for once the echo is really effective, φύμη δὲ καὶ μάμη καὶ δόξαι πόσαι τίνα χρη νούμεν τι ὑφαίνει εἰς ἡ τελευτήσαις καταλείψεις τους ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἀριστεύεις; (Aesch. c. Ctes. p. 65 § 78, at the close of a paragraph, οὗ γὰρ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τῶν τόπων μονὸν μετῆλλαξεν. Ennius, ap. Cic. Orat. xxvii 23, Arce et urbe orba sum.) No better illustration could be found of the importance of Chancellors: that the prospect of having his life written by him added a new terror to death.
πάντα ἔχειν ταῦτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ Π. 1410δ. πάρισον καὶ ὀμοιότελευτόν. αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιό-
δων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηται. εἰσὶ
δὲ καὶ ἵσυεΐς ἀντίθεσεις, οίον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,
τόκα μὲν ἐν τίνων ἐγών ἢν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τίνοις
ἐγών.

I ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τοῦτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ
ἀστεία καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν
ἐστὶ τοῦ εὐφροσύνη τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς

the precept so much insisted upon by Aristotle, that the art employed in
composition should be carefully concealed, than the striking difference
in point of interest between the studied, monotonous, wearisome periods
of Isocrates, and the animated, vigorous, natural, yet rhythmical peri-
ods of Demosthenes, on which though at least as much pains and
labour had been bestowed by the one as by the other—the critics said
‘they smelt of the lamp’—in the one the study entirely escapes notice, in
the other it is most painfully apparent.

On antithesis and the rest, there are also remarks in Introd. pp. 314, 5,
and the note: and on the divisions of the period, κόμμα and κώλον, of
which the last two are not distinguished by Ar., p. 312, note 1.

The meaning and authorship of the Theodectea has been already
discussed at length, p. 55, seq. The conclusion arrived at is, that the
work here referred to was an earlier treatise on Rhetoric by Aristotle, the
result of his rhetorical teaching, which confined itself to the subjects
dealt with in the extant third book. αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων, which is
confined by the expression to the ὀμοιόκατάρτης, may perhaps, as Vic-
torius supposed, be intended to include by inference all the other figures
described in this chapter.

CHAP. X.

This chapter offers a remarkable exception, at all events in the first six
sections, to Aristotle’s ordinary manner of writing; in that the thoughts
are in some degree written out and the meaning fairly represented by the
language: instead of being left, as usual, to the sagacity of the reader
to fill up and interpret as best he can.

§ 1. Having discussed and settled the preceding subject we have
next to describe the sources of lively, pointed, sprightly, witty, facetious,
clever, and popular (εὐδοκιμούντα) sayings. Now to make them is the
result either of natural ability (cleverness) or of long practice (exercise);
the exhibition (or explanation) of them is the province of this study (or
treatise). εὐφροσύνη, note on I 6.15. The Rhet. ad Alex. c. 22 (23) treats
of ἀστείον in style, apparently with much the same meaning as that of
Aristotle. See the analysis of the chap. in Introd. p. 434. Brevity is at all
events an element of τὸ ἀστείον. Aristotle’s τὸ ἀστείον seems to correspond
to Campbell’s ‘vivacity’ of style, which is treated in the first three chap-
ters of his third book.
§ 2. Let us then describe it by a complete (thorough or detailed) enumeration, and let this be our starting-point. Learning namely with ease (without trouble or labour) is naturally agreeable to every one, and names (nouns) are significant; and therefore all nouns or words from which we learn anything are most agreeable. On this see note on c. 9 § 8, add c. 11.9, and i 11. 21, 23.

Now words strange, foreign, archaic, are not known at all (and can therefore convey no information), and the proper, ordinary, names of things, we know already. It is the metaphor (the only remaining kind of single word) that does this in the highest degree: for when (the poet, Homer Od. § [XIV] 214) calls old age a (dry, withered) stalk or stubble, he conveys learning and knowledge through the medium of the genus, because both are withered, 'are fallen into the sere and yellow leaf'. dia tou γένους, because the metaphor brings remote members (species) of the same genus into a novel comparison, which teaches us something new of one or the other.

§ 3. Now the poets' similes produce the same effect (give point, vivacity, or liveliness, to the narrative of an epic poem, in which they usually appear): and therefore if the simile be well (selected or executed, or both), it gives an air of liveliness, point, vividness to the composition. For the simile, as has been said before (not literally what is said here, but the substance of it, III 4.1), 'is a metaphor, differing from it merely by the manner of setting forth (mode of statement): and therefore it is less agreeable because longer (μακροτέρος, λεγομένη or πεποιημένη, ill. written in a longer form, at greater length), and (because) it does not say directly that (of the two things compared) one is the other; and accordingly (as the speaker's tongue does not say this, so) neither does the (hearer's) mind look out for it—and so loses the opportunity of learning.

μακροτέρος] On this termination of the adv. comparative, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 141.3, Donaldson's Gr. Gr. § 282 b, [Kühner, Gr. Gr. § 158, 2]. Matthiae has omitted it.

The meaning of προθέσει, by which the simile is said here to differ from
the metaphor, may be inferred from the previous passage referred to, III 4.1, but is not there directly expressed. It means the 'mode of setting forth', of describing or stating the comparison which both of them make; just as in c. 13, 2, 3 (in Ar.'s division of the speech), and Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30) §§ 2, 21; 35 (36) § 1, πρόθεσις and προεκτίθεναι are put for 'the statement of the case' or exposition of the facts. There are two distinguishable points in which the simile differs from the metaphor; the length, and (consequent) dilution of the force of its impression. The metaphor is concise, generally expressed in a single word, which suggests the comparison, and identifies the two things compared, λέγει ός τότῳ ἐκεῖνο; so that the comparison is forced directly upon the hearer's mind, who thereby learns something: whereas the simile goes into detail, often to a considerable length, so that it loses the pointed brevity of the metaphor; and instead of identifying the two objects compared, like the other, by the introduction of the particle of comparison ὡς, so weakens its force that the hearer is apt to lose the lesson and the pleasure that should be derived from it.

§ 4. 'Accordingly in style and enthymemes, all those' (ταυτα, agreeing only with ἐνθυμήματα, stands for ταὐτην καὶ ταύτα; including the former of the two) 'are pointed and lively, which convey to us instruction rapidly'. Then follows a note on the preceding. 'And this is the reason why neither superficial enthymemes are popular—by superficial (γάρ, videlicet) I mean those that (lie on the surface, and) are (therefore) plain to everybody (so that he who runs may read) and require no research or investigation—nor those which when stated are unintelligible (to a popular audience); but all those of which the knowledge is acquired at the moment of delivery—even though it did not exist previously—or (in which) the understanding is only a little in the rear (of the speaker). For in the one case knowledge as it were is acquired; in the other, neither the one nor the other', i.e. in either of these two ways there is a sort of learning, either immediate or nearly so: in the other case, that of superficial and unintelligible enthymemes or style in general, neither immediate nor quasi-immediate knowledge is attainable. Compare with this the second clause of II 23, 30.
§ 5. 'Such is the approved (popular) kind of enthymemes in respect of the sense or meaning (in their intellectual aspect). In that of style or language, so far as regards the figure (i.e. the structure of the period and its clauses), the popularity is attained by the antithetical expression of them (the balance of opposite clauses or members), as in the example, (Isocr. Phil. § 73), καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὐτῶν ἴδιοις πόλεμον.'  

§ 6. 'and in the single words, by the metaphors they contain, and these neither foreign and strange; (compare ΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙ, where reference is made to this place; so that ἄπ' ὀίκειον may be regarded as an interpretation of μὴ ἄλλοτριάν here: and this coincides with ΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙ, metaphors should be 'appropriate', ἁρμοστυόσα, or ἐκ τοῦ ἀναλογον 'derived from a proportional or kindred subject': and ibid. § 12, metaphors should not be 'far-fetched', οὐ πόρμαθεν, ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὀμοιότων, 'for such it is difficult to take in at a glance; nor superficial, for these produce no impression. Further, (words are popular) if they vividly represent (things that they describe); for things should be seen (in the orator's description of them) as if they were actually being done (going on, transacted, before the hearer's eyes) rather than as future. This is in fact the 'historic present', applied to future, instead of past, events. On πρὸ ὀμμάτων, see note on ΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙ, see note on ΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙ,  

ἄλλοτριάν "alienam, ductam a rebus parum propinquis et affinis;" Victorius; who also, as a parallel case, refers to Cic. de Or. ΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙ, est autem haec huius generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores eius de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimantur, ut iis qui audiant tum geri illa fierique videantur.  

'These three things then are to be aimed at (in the attempt to give vivacity and pungency to style), metaphor, antithesis, and vivid representation'.  

The meaning of ἑνεργεία is clearly shown by a comparison with the statements of ΠΙΠΙΠΙΠΙ. It is there identified with πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, § 2, and is principally shewn in animation, literally and metaphorically, in a vivid, vivacious, style, and in animating, vivifying, inanimate objects; investing them with life, motion, and personality;
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 10 §§ 6, 7a.

πόλαιν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἐτὶ εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὅραν γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἀρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορὰς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργειῶς.

§§ 2, 3, 4. κυνομένα γὰρ καὶ ἴοντα ποιεῖ πάντα· ἢ δὲ ἵππη ἐνεργειὰ τις (Eth. N. x 4, 1175 a 12). This sense is borrowed from the metaphysical use of the term, to express 'realization,' as opposed to δύναμις, the mere capacity or potentiality of life and action. I may add that ἐνεργεία is used in two distinct senses, representing two different forms of development, which may be distinguished as the metaphysical and moral applications of it; as will appear from a comparison of the form it assumes in the Nicom. Ethics, and the biology of the de Anima. It is sometimes identifiable with ἐντελέχεια, expressing the actuality or actual realization of existence out of a mere undeveloped capacity of life: in the moral view, it is the realization of action, a realized activity, from the dormant capacity—implying existence—to the active exercise or energy of the bodily and mental functions. So happiness is an ἐνεργεία ψυχῆς, pleasure τελειῶ (completes and crowns) τὴν ἐνεργείαν, Eth. N. x 4, sub init. and again c. 4, ult. c. 5, sub init.; and the def. of pleasure in the seventh (Eudemian) book, ἐνεργεία ἀνεκπόθεν. Sometimes three stages are distinguished (as frequently in the de Anima), illustrated by three degrees of knowledge in man: (1) the latent capacity, (2) knowledge acquired but not exercised, and (3) the active exercise of thought and knowledge by θεωρία, philosophical contemplation and speculation.

Quintilian on ἐνεργεία, VIII 3, 89, ἐνεργεία coniun his (est enim ab agendo dicta) et cunius propria virtus, non esse quae dicuntur, otiosa. Lib. 6. 11, Præcipueque ex his oritur sublimitas quae audaci et præmiente periculum translatione tolluntur, quum rebus sensu carentibus actum quendam et animos damus; qualis est, pontem indignatus Araxes. From ἐνεργεία another quality of style is to be distinguished (in Quint) viz. ἐνεργεία, 'clear, lively, graphic, narration,' (evidentia,) though near akin to the other. It is mentioned IV 2, 63, and distinguished from perspicuitas, VIII 3, 61. ἐνεργεία, quae a Cicero illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere: et affectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur [id. vi 2, 32]. See Ern. Lœx. Tech. Gr. s. v. et ἐνεργεία.

§ 7. 'Of the four kinds of metaphors, the proportional are the most popular.' On metaphor in general, and the proportional metaphor in particular, see Appendix B to Bk. 111, Introd. p. 374.

Here follows a string of pointed, striking, sayings, exemplifying 1

At the conclusion of Mr Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil. p. 559, we find the following remark. "In Aristotle's case the assertion (of Sir W. H.) rests on a mistake of the meaning of the Aristotelian word ἐνεργεία, which did not signify energy, but fact as opposed to possibility, actus to potentia." Had Mr Mill turned to the first two sentences of Aristotle's Ethics, or to the chapters on Pleasure, x. 4, 5, he would have seen reason to alter this statement. By 'energy' I suppose active, vigorous, exercise to be intended.
μάλιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ώσπερ Περικλῆς ἐφι τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἡφαίστεαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ώσπερ εἰ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναιντοῦ ἐξέλοι. καὶ Δεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἔαν περιδεῖν τὴν Ἔλλαδα ἐτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδωτος σπουδάζοντος Χάριτος εὐθύνας
tō ἀστίοιν in style; all of them metaphors, and most of these conveyed in single words. They do really, I think, deserve the character attributed to them. The passage, τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν — πειράσθαι δοῦναι, is transcribed by Dionysius, Ep. 1 ad Amm. c. 8, in his enquiry into the date of the Rhetoric. The most important variation from the text of Ar. is the omission of the example from Leptines “by all the MSS” (Spengel's Tract on Rhet. Munich 1851 p. 47), though it has been supplied in the printed copies; he begins the quotation with κατὰ λέξιν οὕτω γράφων. The only other difference of any importance is ἰἀγάντα for ἵχοντα, and διδόναι οὕτως for δοῦναι.

'As Pericles said, that the youth that had perished in the war had vanished out of the city, as though one were to take the spring out of the year'. On this saying, and Pericles' claim to it, see note on I 7.34.

'And Leptines of the Lacedaemonians, (to the Athenian assembly,) that he would not let them look on whilst Greece became one-eyed (lost one of her eyes—the other being of course Athens; Athens, the eye of Greece, Milton, P. R. IV 240). Victorius has produced similar expressions from Cic. pro leg. Manil. c. 5 § 11, de Nat. Deor. III 38, Hi duas illos ovulos orae maritimae effoderunt. "Similiter Cimon Atheniensibus suscit, μήτε τὴν Ἔλλαδα γωλνή, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἐτερώνον ἁρπαγμένην, Plut. Cim. 489 C, ὃς ὁ εἶπον, μὴ ποιήσῃ ἐτεροφθαλμὸν τὴν Ἔλλαδα (Plut. Polit. Pracept. 803 Α.)," Victorius. The Leptines here mentioned is no doubt the proposer of the law peri τῆς ἀτελείας against which Demosthenes delivered the speech c. Leptin. in B.C. 355. He may possibly be the same as the Leptines mentioned by Demosth. c. Androt. § 60, ὁ ἐκ Κοίλης. Wolf, Proleg. ad Dem. Leptin. p. 45, note 12 (Schäfer, Appar. ad Dem. p. 8), supposes that the author of this saying and the opponent of Demosthenes are the same person. The occasion on which Leptines produced his metaphor was the embassy sent by the Lacedaemonians to Athens in their extremity, after the defeat of Leuctra (371 B.C.), during the invasion of their country by the Thæbans, B.C. 369; see Xen. Hellen. VI 5. 34, 35, Isocr. Archia § 64 seq. Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. X [ch. LXXVIII] p. 320 seq. Thirlw. Hist. Gr. ch. XXXIX (Vol. v. p. 106, 1st ed.). Isocrates, Arceop. § 69, alludes to the same event, ὡστε Δακεδαιμονίους, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλίγαρχίας ὀλίγους δεῖ καθ’ ἐκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν προστάτως ἤμιν (see the fragm. of Lysias, Or. 34, quoted in note on II 23.19, on this Lacedaemonian 'dictation', 404 B.C.) ἐδείχνει ἐπὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν (369 B.C.) ἵκετεϊσθαντα καὶ δημοσίους μὴ περιδεῖν αὐτοῦς ἀναστάτους γενομένους. [A. Schäfer’s Dem. u. s. Zeitl, I p. 75, note.]

'And the saying of Cephasidotus, in his indignation at Chares' enger-
do"nai peri tov 'OlymphiaiKov pòlémov, ∏γανάκτει, φάσκον εἰς πνύγμα τον δήμων ἕχοντα τὰς εὐθύνας περασθαι δο"nai. Kai parakaλῶν ποτὲ τοὺς 'Aθη-


naiouS eis E'ub0iaν επισιτισμένονS εφη δειν ἐξιέναι το

1 ἀγαγότα cum Dionysio. 2 δο"nai oútous cum Dionysio. 3 επισιτισμένονS ness for the scrutiny of the accounts (of his charge) in the conduct of the Olymphiai war, "that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his (pertinacity in the) attempt to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way." He wanted to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them in the attempt. I have followed Dionysius' version of this extract, which is plainly preferable to the text of Aristotle. ἀγεν εἰς πνύμα is Greek and sense; ἔχεν εἰς πνύμα neither one nor the other; and δο"nai oútous, at the end, has far more meaning than the simple δο"nai of our text. With the vulgar reading, ἔχοντα must be taken with τὰς εὐθύνας, "with his accounts in his hands"—which is so far graphic, as it indicates the eagerness with which he was trying to force them upon the people—but then δο"nai τὸν δήμων εἰς πνύμα, for 'to drive them into a choking-fit', is surely indefensible.

Cephisodotus, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων, has been already quoted; see III 4.3 note (near the end of the section [p. 53]), where some account is given. Two more of his pungent sayings are quoted further on. Chares, with his mercenaries, was sent to take the command in the Olymphiai war in 349 B.C. (Clinton, F. H.). Olymatus was taken by Philip, 347. This notice is cited by Max Schmidt in his tract On the date of Ar.'s Rhetoric, p. 15, as a piece of evidence on that question; but the limit of the period of publication can be brought much lower down. See Introd. On the date of the Rhetoric, p. 36 seq. πνύμα or πνύμαs, and its congeners, is a medical term, used by Hippocrates, expressive of choking, stifling, suffocation.

'And the same (Cephisodotus) once in an exhortation to the Athenians said that they must march out (at once) to Euboea (to the aid of the Euboeans), and there provide themselves with provisions' (read by all means επισιτισμένον, the future, with Spengel; Bekker retains the vulgata lectio επισιτισμένον, which spoils the point), 'like Miltiades' decree' (with all the unhesitating haste prescribed by Miltiades' decree at the time of the first Median invasion). They were therefore not to lose any time in making provision at home, but to get to Euboea with all speed and there provide themselves: the future is necessary: Victorius, though he reads the aorist, translates it as the future. This hurried expedition to Euboea occurred in 358 B.C., Clinton, F. H., sub anno, Dem. c. Androt. § 14, ἵσταται πρὸς Ἑπιλεκτὸν ἡμερῶν πρῶτον ἐξοπλίσατε κ.τ.λ. and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 85. It was made to assist the Euboeans against the Theban invaders; and in the archonship of Cephisodotus himself.

τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψφίσιαμ] is explained by the Scholiast, quoted by Vater, τὸ μῆ βουλευτισμῷ Μιλτιάδης μῆ βουλευτισμένος εξῆλθεν κατὰ τὸν Αἰείου; and more at length by Ulpian in Shilleto's note to Dem. de F. L. § 346, ἐπιστον τῶν Μήδων, ἐξαρχῆς καὶ ὁ Μιλτιάδης δραμεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τῶν Μαραθών ἐψφίσατο καὶ μῆ ἀναμένειν ἔως συλλεγόσιν οἱ συμμαχήσουσι. As to the grammatical construction of the accusative, it seems to be a substitution

ΔΡ. Η. III.
Miltiades ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἰφικράτης σπεισαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἑπιδαυρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἡγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρηρήσθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν πάραλον ῥόπαλον τοῦ

of τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα for the proper cognate accusative ἐξόδου, to make an expedition, such as, on the principle of, Miltiades' decree, with all haste, and without deliberation.

'And Iphicrates, indignant at the truce that the Athenians had made with Epidaurus and the neighbouring coasts, said of them that "they had stript themselves of their provisions (not 'for the way', but for the war". ἐφόδια are viaticia, provisions for a journey; which in the absence of ins the traveller had to carry with him: here, provisions for the support and maintenance of war and its expeditions. Hdt. writes ἐπόδα, Xen. ἐφόδιον (sing.). Arist., Pol. II 5, 1263 a 37, uses it of provisions for hunting expeditions in Lacedaemon.

The small independent state of Epidaurus, bounded by the territories of Corinth, Argolis, Trozen, and the Saronic gulf, was at this time in alliance with Sparta, to which it supplied troops, in the great contest with the confederate Greeks, allied for the reduction of the Lacedaemonian power, terminating in the battle of Corinth, 394 B.C., see Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. IX [ch. LXXIV] p. 422, 425; and Xenophon's description of the battle, Helen. IV 2.9—23. It appears from this passage that the Athenians had made a truce with Epidaurus. Cephasodotus' indignation was aroused at the folly of making a truce with people who had a sea-board, which the Athenians with their naval superiority could have plundered with impunity, and so have supported the war.

'And Peitholaus (called) the Paralian (trireme) "the people's cudgel", and Sestos "the corn-stall of the Piraeus". Whether this Peitholaus is the same as the one already mentioned III 9. 7, as associated with Lyco- phon in the government of Phereas, we have no means of precisely determining. The probability is that he is. For even Aristotle's carelessness could hardly have carried him so far as to neglect to mention the distinction between two persons named so nearly together, if there were any. This being so, it appears again, as from the former passage, that he lived at Athens after his downfall.

τὴν πάραλον] This vessel and its companion the Σαλαμινία were two picked vessels, fast sailers, and with carefully chosen and highly paid crews, kept in reserve at the Piraeus for state purposes; such as sacred embassies, βεωρίαι, to carry the admiral of the fleet in a naval expedition, for ordinary embassies, 'for the transport of money and persons' (Böckh, Publ. Econ., BK. II. c. 16, Lewis' Transl. p. 240), and for the pursuit and conveyance to Athens of state offenders who had made their escape: as Alcibiades after the mutilation of the Hermæ, Thuc. VI 53, 61 bis, of the Salaminia. As illustrating the use of the Paralus as a ῥόπαλον, Demosth. peri τῶν ἐν Χερσονήσῳ, § 29 is still more in point; ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκφθονον, οὔ τις ἐπὶ λαξείν ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων, καὶ στρατιώταις τρέφειν καὶ τρόφι- μες ἐκπέμπει καὶ χρήματα εἰσφέρειν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαίον ἔστων, ἐπὶ δ' ἦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ψήφισμα, εἰσαγγελία, Πάραλος, ταῦτα' ἔστιν, i.e. the special decree,
impeachment, and the Paralus, were the three principal instruments of punishment of offenders amongst the Athenian citizens. The Πάραλος therefore is here compared to a ῥόπαλον or cudgel, because it is the instrument with which the state deals her heaviest blows, not only upon those that have escaped her justice, but upon all those who offend her. Πάραλος: μια τῶν παρ’ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὰς δημοσίας χρείας διαπεμπτομένων τρήρων, Hærpscr. s. v. He adds that the crews of the two vessels received four obols a day, and stayed at home the greater part of the year. Photius has four articles on the word, one of them borrowed from Harpocr., almost in the same words. The first of the four identifies the Salaminian and Paralian. There is an article upon this in Smith’s Dict. of Ant. (s. v. Salaminia).

Sestos, on the Hellespont, seems from this passage to have been one of the emporia for the corn which was imported from the coasts of the Black Sea and the adjacent regions. It is mentioned with others by Isocr. antid. § 107, as an important and well-situated town. Strabo, in writing of Troas, makes no mention of the corn-stores of Sestos. [Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 421—430 (on the corn-trade between Greece and the Euxine). The present passage, which he does not quote, suggests a modification of his statement on p. 426 that Sestos and Abydos were less important emporia than Lampsacus.]

This corn-store or warehouse is compared to the ‘shopboard’ or ‘stall’ τηλία, the tray on which corn was exposed for sale in the shops. The word was used for a ‘stand’ or ‘stage’ of various kinds. A passage which illustrates the use of it referred to here (which does not appear in the Lexicons) is Arist. Hist. An. vi 24. 3, where there is an account of a wonderful mule, that lived to the age of 80; after it had been released from labour by reason of its age, it used to walk by the side of the teams which were dragging the stone for the building of the temple (doubtless the Parthenon), and not only urged them on to their work, but helped them itself to drag the load up the hill (how this was done by the animal is not explained); ὃστ’ ἐφηβίσκακαὶ μὴ ἀπελαύνειν αὐτῶν σπηνόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν τηλίων. This clearly explains the particular sense of τηλία in this passage. The τηλία is the tray or stand at the corn-dealer’s door, in which the corn is exposed for sale. In Aristoph. Plut. 1038, it means ‘a sieve’, κοσκίνου κύκλος σίνε περιφέρεια, Schol. ad loc., Etym., Suidas and Hesychius.

‘And Pericles bade (his countrymen) get Aegina out of the way (get rid of it, as a plague or obstacle to their enjoyment or happiness) “the eyesore of the Piraeus”’. This saying is quoted by Plutarch, Pol. Praec. 803 A, amongst the πολιτικὰ παραγγέλματα: and also μὴ ποιήσῃ ἑτεροφθαλμὸν τὴν Ἐλλάδα, without the author’s name. It is attributed to Demades by Athen. 111 99 D, Δημάδης ὁ γῆτορ ἔλεγε τὴν μὲν Λίγυναν λήμνην εἶναι τοῦ Πειραιῶς. Comp. Plut. Apophth. Reg. et Duc. 186 c, and Wyttenbach note β’ ad loc. It suggested to Casaubon an emendation of an apparently unmeaning word in Strabo 1x p. 395, of the islet of Psyttalea,
between Salamis and the mainland, νῆσιον ἔρημον πετρώδες (δύσορμος Aesch. Pers. 450) δ᾽ ἔνεις εἶπον λιμένα (λεγε λήμνη) τοῦ Πειραιῶς.

λήμνη and λήμαν seem (from the Lexx.) to be almost confined to Aristophanes amongst the earlier writers. Arist. Lysistr. 301, with a pun upon λήμναν πῶρ (on which see Schneidewin on Soph. Philoct. 799); Plut. 581, Κρονικαῖς λήμαις (old-fashioned prejudices, dimnesses of sight) ἢντως λημάτιον τὸς φρέινας ἀμφοτ. Nub. 327, λημαν κολοκύνται. (They occur however as medical terms in Hippocrates.) They are not found, where they were to be most expected, in the Fragments of the other Comic writers. No instance of either is to be found in the very complete Index to Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr.

'And Moerocles said that he was in no respect a greater knave than—one of the respectable (upper) classes that he named: for the other played the knave at the rate of 33 per cent., he (himself) only at ten.' The degree of knavery is compared to the rate of interest or profit which is made upon each: "a very respectable person indeed!" says Moerocles "and a very respectable interest he makes upon his respectability (or, rightly interpreted, roguery): why! I only get a third of that for mine." Of Moerocles an account is given in Smith's Biogr. Dict. s. v. Μοεροκλῆς, Σαλαμίνας τῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίοις οὖκ ἄσυλος πολιτευμάτων. Harpocr. He was a contemporary of Demosthenes, who mentions him four times, see Sauppe's Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. III 99, and an anti-Macedonian orator. He seems from the allusion, de F. L. § 293 (§ 335) to have been a greedy fellow, and inclined to exaction in money-matters. On the rates of interest at Athens, and the modes of computing it, see Böckh, Publ. Econ. Bk. I. c. 22, Lewis' Tr. p. 130.

'And Anaxandrides' iambic verse about (not 'on behalf of', of which there is no evidence in the text) the daughters' (so in the Scriptures, 'daughters of Jerusalem', &c) 'who were over long about marrying, "I find (μοι) the young ladies have passed the day for their marriage.”' ['My daughters' marriage-bonds have passed their date."

ὑπερήμερος, here metaphorically used by Anaxandrides, is properly a technical term of Attic law, signifying one who has failed to pay a fine, or to comply with any judgment or verdict imposed by the court on the day appointed: one who has passed the prescribed term or the day fixed. It takes the genit. here, as if it were ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡμέραν τῶν γάμων, like ἄχλακος ἀσπίδων, ἀπεστόλων φαριῶν, ἀφόριστος κωκυμάτων, &c. Anaxandrides was a poet of the Middle Comedy; Meineke, Fragm. Com. Att. Vol. I. p. 367 seq. The line here quoted is Fragm. Inc. XVII, Meineke III 200. Anaxandrides is quoted again, c. 11. 8, an equally uncertain fragment, No. XVIII, and probably again, 11.10, also 12.3, and Eth. N. VII 11.
καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικὸν τινα Σπεύσιππου, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποκυάν ἀγείν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τάς

'And that of Polyceuctus to one Speusippus who was paralysed, "that he could not keep still (was as restless as ever), though bound (fettered, confined) by fate (or accident) in a pillory- (or stocks-) complaint" ["bound in a perfect pillory of pain"]'.

Polyceuctus, probably of (the Ath. deme) Sphettus, an Attic orator, contemporary with Demosth. and of the same political party, viz. anti-Macedonian. See Plut. Vit. Demosth. 846 C, which connects him with Demosthenes. Also, Vit. Parallel. Demosth. c. 10, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς φιλόσοφος (Ariston of Chios) Πολυεύκτων ἵσταρε τὸν Σφήττου, ἑνα τῶν τότε πολιτειόμενων Ἀθηναίων, ἀποφαίωσαν μεγίστον μὲν εἰναὶ μήτορα Δημοσθένη κ.τ.λ. A short account of him is to be found in Smith's Biogr. Dict. s. v. No. 2, (the writer says that "the orations (!) of P." are here referred to).

There are six of the name mentioned in the Orators—Sauppe Index Nominiun (ad Or. Att.) III 117.—It is uncertain whether the P. who appears in Dem. c. Mid. § 139 is the same as he of Sphettus. Sauppe distinguishes them: Buttmann, ad loc. Mid. 560. 2, has this note: "Orator temporis illius, præclare hanc Midiae defensionem, cum Demosthene coniunctissimis, si credimus Ruhnkenio, qui eundem putat ac Sphetium. Augerus non item;" nor, apparently, Sauppe [nor Arnold Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zöllr, ii. p. 100, who elsewhere quotes Dem. Phil. iii. § 72, Πολυεύκτως ὁ βέλτιστος οὐσος (of the Sphettian)]. The speaker quoted by Ar. was doubtless the best known of them, the Sphettian. See the ref. in Westermann, Gesch. der Bereds. § 53. 5. 6.

ἀποπληκτικός, ἀπόπληκτος, one who has received a shock or stroke (as of palsy), which has driven him away from (ἀπό) himself and his normal condition, and so disabled, paralysed, him: of an ‘apoplectic stroke’, but not here; also, like ἐκπλήττεσθαι, to be startled out of one’s wits, or driven mad, attonitus. I have followed Victorius in the interpretation of the saying; that Speusippus, though his body was now paralysed, and motionless as if he had been fastened in the stocks or pillory—or worse, in an instrument that confined his head, hands, and feet—had his mind as restless and excitable as ever.

πεντεσυρίγγος is a transfer from a wooden instrument with five ‘pipes’ or holes, kept in the prison for the punishment of refractory prisoners, which confined at once the head, hands, and feet, to a disorder which paralyses and deprives of motion. Arist. Eq. 1049, δῶσαι σ’ ἐκλέειν πεντεσυρίγγος ἔξωλο. "πέντε ὅπας ἔχουσι, δε' ἄν οἱ τέθεισ καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ ὁ τράχηλος ἀνεβάλλετο." Schol. ad loc. πεντεσυρίγγος ἔξωλο, τῷ ποδοκάκῃ πάντε γὰρ ὅπας ἔχει, δε' ἄν... (as before) ἐμβάλλονται (Suidas). Comp. Ib. s. v. ποδοκάκη (a later form of ποδοκάκη), Δημοσθένης κατὰ Τιμοκράτους (in a law, § 105), τὸ ἔξωλο τὸ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ οὕτω ἐκαλείτο κ.τ.λ. To which Harpocr. s. v. ποδοκάκη, Λυκίας δ' ἐν τῷ κατὰ Θεομυστόν, εἶ γνήσιος, ἐξηγείται τούνομα 'φησι γὰρ ἡ ποδοκάκη αὐτὸ ἐστίν ὁ νῦν καλεῖται ἐν τῷ ἔξωλο δεδεσθαῖ (Lys. c. Theomn. a' § 16. q. v.). On this, and the various other punishments in use at Athens, see Becker's Charicles.
τριήρεις ἐκάλει μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύων δὲ τὰ κατηλεία τὰ Ἀττικὰ φείδιτα. Αἰσίων δὲ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ἑώστε βοήσαι τὴν Ἔλλαδα·"  

pp. 369, 370. He says "Suidas is wrong in taking this (π. §) to be synonymous with the ποδοκάκη;" but does not tell us why, or upon what authority (probably on account of the name, ποδοκάκη).

'And Cephasdotus called the triremes parti-coloured (gaily-painted) (mills i. e.) millstones' from their crushing and grinding (exactions and oppressions) the Athenian tributaries and others. Comp. on this expression III 6, 1, as an instance of a "private epithet", the note on that section, near the end. On ποικίλους, Victorius quotes Virg. Georg. IV 289, πίκτης φασελίς [cf. St John's Ἁθηναὶ III 302]. On Cephasdotus, ὁ λεπτός, ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων, see note on III 4. 4.

'And "the Dog" (Diogenes the Cynic) called the taverns (or wine-shops) "the Attic messes"'.

Of Diogenes, ὁ Κύων, see Grote's Plato III p. 507, seq. ch. 38. "Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under this title. Aristote (l. c.) cites from him a witty comparison under that designation," u. s. p. 509. He receives this name from the little boys or the bystanders in several of Diogenes' (Laert.) stories about him. A long list of his sayings, often witty, but usually bitter and sarcastic, is to be found in Diogenes Laertius' Life. This does not appear amongst them.

τὰ κατηλεία[ν] retail shops (κατηλείων), cook-shops, wine-shops and taverns. Comp. Isocr. Areop. § 49; speaking of the change of habits and manners in Athens in the author's time: εν κατηλείῳ δὲ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν υδέας ὅπερ ἀν ῥεχθη γέιτων ἐτολμήσει σεμνότερα χώρας ἐμπόλετων άλλ' οὐ βομβολοχένεσθαι. These scenes of riot, drunkenness, and licentiousness, says the satirical Diogenes, are what the Athenians call their συνόστια; this is their substitute for (or representative of) the sober and orderly Spartan φείδιτα. See the description in Grote, H. G. II 513 [chap. vi]. Müller, Dor. IV 3, on the meals of the Dorian. φείδιτα, or as it is usually written φείδητα, is the name given by the S, artans to what the Athenians and others called συνόστια, the public tables or messes at which all the citizens dined in common. Müller, u. s. § 3, 11 294 Lewis' Transl.), remarks, note 2, "It is very probable that this φείδητα,

1 One Aristogeiton, an Athenian orator, also received this nickname, ἐπεκαλείτο κύων διὰ τὴν ἀναίθειαν αὐτοῦ. Suidas.
2 This passage of Isocr. Areopag is cited by Athen. xii 21, 566 F, on tavern-haunting, ὃς ἐν τοῖς κατηλείοις καὶ τοῖς πανδοκείοις οὐ διαστάται, καθὸς Ἰσορόπως τοῦ ῥήττορος ἐν τῷ Ἀριστοτέλεικῷ εἰρηκότος—here follow the words quoted in this text. Athenaeus continues Ἱσορόπης δὲ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πατροκλόνως·τοῖς Ἀρεσπαγγίασθαι φρένι ἀρατησάμενα τω ἐν κατηλείῳ κυλῆσαν ἀνέμει ἔρειον πάγων. σὺ δὲ, ὃ σοφότα, ἐν τοῖς κατηλείοις συμπαθήρα ποθεὶ μεθ' ἑταίρων, ἄλλα μετά ἑταίρων κ.τ.λ. Plut. Vit. X Orat. Demosth. 847 F, Διογένης δὲ ὁ κύων θεατάμενος αὐτῶν (Demosth.) ποτε ἐν κατηλείῳ ιατροδέμενοι καὶ ἐποχοφόρουτοι, ἐπειδή, ὃς μᾶλλον ὑποχορεῖ τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον ἐν κατηλείῳ ἐστιν. These extracts descriptive of the character of these taverns will throw some light upon Diogenes' pleasantness.
καὶ τούτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὁμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευε μὴ πολλὰς τοιχὺσοι τὰς συνδρομὰς ἐκκλησίας. καὶ

(\textit{spare or scanty meals}) was a ludicrous distortion of an ancient Spartan name \textit{φιδίτια}, i.e. \textit{love-feasts}.” This is made still more probable by the fact that Ar. in his Politics always writes the word \textit{φιδίτια}—τὰ συνστίτα τὰ καλοῦμενα \textit{φιδίτια}, II 9, 1271 a 27, Ib. 10, 1272 a 2, c. 11, 1272 b 34—and the constant interchange of \textit{a} and \textit{l} (δάκρυ, lacrīma; \textit{Οδυσσεύς}, \textit{Ulysses}). They were originally called \textit{αὐδρία}, \textit{men’s meals}, both by Cretans and Spartans, the institution being common to both peoples, the Spartan being in this, as in other particulars, borrowed from the Cretan. Pol. II 10, 1272 a 2, καὶ συστίτα παρ’ ἀμφότεροὺς ἐστίν καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκέλον οἱ Δάκουν ὡς φιδίτια ἅλλ’ ἀνδρία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἀλῆθεν. And of the Carthaginian constitution, Ib. c. 11, 1272 b 34. ἔξει δὲ παραπλήσια τῷ Λάκ. πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συστίτα τῶν ἐπαρχῶν τοῖς \textit{φιδίτιοις} κ.τ.λ.

‘And Aesop, that (the Athenians) had emptied (or drained) their entire city into Sicily’. Meaning, that the Athenian forces sent over for the invasion of Sicily in 415—413 B.C. were so enormous in proportion to the population of Athens, that they might be said to have completely drained it. ‘For this is a metaphor, and sets the thing before our eyes’.

Aesop’s name occurs, but only as the father of Euctemon, in Demosth. Mid. § 165. Also in a citation from Hermippus, in Plut. Vit. Demosth. (Vit. Parall.) c. 11, in which he compares Demosthenes’ speeches, especially for \textit{reading}, advantageously with those of his predecessors. The only other notice of him that I have been able to find is Suidas s. v. \textit{Δημοσθένες} : which is merely that he (Dem.) \textit{συνεφιλολόγησε} Ἀλίσων τῷ Ἀθηναῖῳ; which implies community of studies. He was therefore an Athenian orator, contemporary with Demosthenes.

‘And’—Aesop again—“so that Greece cried aloud” : this again is in some sense a metaphor, and a vivid expression’. A metaphor no doubt (though Victorius says it is a mere \textit{hypallage}), since it \textit{transfers} the voice from an individual to a collective people, or country. It is πρὸ ὁμμάτων in that it animates an inanimate object, or abstraction; c. 11, 2, 3. Demosthenes has used this twice, de F. L. § 92, ἢ γὰρ ἄλλῃ καὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα αὐτὰ βοᾷ, and § 129, ταῦτ’ οὐχὶ βοᾷ καὶ λέγει ὃτι χρήματ’ εἰλήφεν Δησίνας; and a very near approach to it, Ólynth. a’ § 2, ὃ μὲν οὖν παρὰ καύρως καὶ μονὸν οὐχὶ λέγει φανῶν ἀφίεις ὃ κ.τ.λ. Aesch. Agam. 1106 (Dind.), πᾶσα γὰρ πόλις βοᾷ. Eur. Hippol. 877, βοᾷ βοᾷ δέλτος ἀλατα.

‘And as Cephasodotus bade (the Athenians) take care not to convert many of their mobs into assemblies’ (\textit{lit.} their mobs, in any numbers). Cephasodotus we have had three times already as the author of pointed sayings, III 4, 3, and 10, 6, \textit{bis}. The point of this saying seems to lie in the word \textit{συνδρομάς}, which is substituted for \textit{συγκλήτους ἐκκλησίας}. It implies that most of their ordinary assemblies are mere mobs, tumultuary gatherings, riotous and unruly, instead of \textit{σύγκλητους}, regularly convoked for special occasions in due form and order. It would certainly be
better without ἐκκλησίας, as Wolf proposes. It would then mean "not to hold their—mobs too frequently." Both Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgata lectio: the latter with a comma between συνδρομῆς and ἐκκλησίας.

1And Isocrates, "to those that flock together promiscuously (scramble, as it were) in the general festivals". This is an expression of precisely the same import as the preceding. It occurs in Isocr. Phil. § 12, and runs thus, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἔνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἄπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐθένα λέγειν ἑστὶν, κ.τ.λ.

1And the example in the Funeral Oration, that "Greece might well have her hair cut off (go into mourning) over the tomb of those that died at Salamis, for her freedom and their valour were buried in the same grave": for had he only said "that she might well weep for the virtue that lay buried with them", it would have been a metaphor and a graphic touch, but the (addition of) "freedom with the virtue" carries with it a kind of antithesis. This really affecting passage, which Aristotle has partially spoiled by omission and alteration, runs thus in the original—the funeral oration attributed to Lysias1, Or. 2, in Baiter and Sauppe's Or. Att. 1 68, § 60: "and therefore Greece might well that day cut off her hair over yonder tomb (the orator is on the spot, and points to it) and mourn for those that lie buried here, seeing that her own (the text has αὐτῶν, their own, the collective 'Ελλάς being resolved into its component members) freedom and their valour are laid together in one grave." Aristotle has very much marred the simple beauty of the sentence (which if it be not Lysias', is at all events quite worthy of him) by his alterations;

1 This speech is condemned as spurious by [Dobree and] Baiter and Sauppe [and also by Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, 1 p. 431, and Jebb, Attic Orators, 1 p. 208. It contains some close parallels to the Panegyric of Isocrates and would appear to have been written by one of the pupils of that rhetorician, from whom Ar. (it will be observed) takes the quotation just preceding the present passage]. Let us hear on the other side Mr Grote, Hist. Gr. vol. vi [chap. XLVIII] p. 191, note, "Of the (funeral orations) ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds (than that attributed to Demosth.)... but this harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen." In this judgment I entirely agree; and it seems to derive some authority from the citation of this extract here, as a specimen of pointed style, which shews that it was at all events well known to Aristotle and the Athenian public, and well remembered, though the author's name is not given; perhaps for this very reason, that the authorship of it was so well known.
especially the substitution of the frigid, explanatory, τὸ τῶν ἐν Ἑλληνὶς, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων, for the graphic τὸν ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς κυνικοῖς βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων. [The context of the original passage shows that the substitution is really a blunder, as the reference is not to the Athenians who fought at Salamis but to those who died at Aegospotami and elsewhere towards the close of the Peloponnesian war.]

The metaphor lies of course in the word κείρασθαι, by which Greece is personified and compared to a woman who, according to the national custom, cuts off her hair as a sign of mourning—on this custom see Becker's Charicles, p. 398; comp. Eur. Troad. 141, Orest. 458, Alc. 515, Suppl. 97, 974, Hel. 1060, πένθεις, πενθήμερος, κουρά, κουραί. Aesch. Choeph. 6 (Paley's note ad loc.), Hom. Π. 223, 142, &c. The last two passages shew that this custom was not absolutely confined to women, though it was especially characteristic of them. In Lysias the personification, which is most tastelessly interrupted by the plural ἀνδρῶν, is resumed in the next clause, ὡς δυστυχῆς μὲν ἡ Ἑλλᾶς τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν ὀρφανή γενομένη κ.τ.λ. Here Greece becomes a bereaved mother.

'And as Iphicrates said, "the course of my argument cuts right through the middle of Chares' acts": a proportional metaphor; and the "right through the middle" sets the thing vividly before our eyes'. This was said by Iphicrates in the same case as that which is noticed in Π. 23. 7 (see note), the prosecution, namely, of him and his colleagues Menestheus and Timotheus, together with Chares, who were all brought to trial by Aristophon the Azenian in 355 B.C. on the scrutiny of their accounts, for misconduct in their command during the Social war. Saupe u. s. p. 191, commenting on this passage, says "Iphicrates se et collegas accusatos defendens exponit quam male Chares rem gesserit. Hoc facturus dixit, iter orationes suae ferre per medias Charetis res gestas, quasi de ilinere per hostium fines faciundo diceret." The proportion of the metaphor is this: As a road is carried, or an army or expedition marched, right into the heart of an enemy's country, so Iphicrates in his defence carried hostility and destruction (exposure and censure) into Chares' conduct during their joint command.

'And the saying, "to invite dangers to the help (rescue, remedy) of dangers" is a vivid metaphor'. The author, and occasion, of this sentence are alike unknown. I have followed Schrader in the translation. To rid yourself of one danger another must often be invoked or invited, as a man saves himself from a shipwrecked vessel by throwing himself overboard and clinging to a plank. He also quotes Florus, i. 17, Fabius Maximus periculosissimum bellum bello explicavit. The metaphor lies in παρακαλεῖν and βοηθήσοντας, which are transferred from men to dangers, which are thereby 'animated'; τὸ ἁψιχοῦ becomes ἢψιχοῦ, becomes ἢψιχοῦ.
των μεταφορά. καὶ Δυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου "οὐδὲ τὴν ἱκετηρίαν αἰσχυνθέντες αὐτού, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν." μεταφορά γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἱκετεύει ἡ εἰκὼν, τὸ ἀψυχον δὴ ἐμψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα

1 fortasse δὲ

'And (what) Lycoleon (said) in his defence of Chabrias, “not even awed by that symbol of his supplication, the bronze image (yonder)”. Of Lycoleon nothing seems to be known, beyond what may be gathered from this passage, that he was an Athenian orator, and defended Chabrias in his trial B.C. 366.

The circumstances referred to are briefly these. In 366 B.C. Chabrias was brought to trial with Callistratus, the orator, on a charge of misconduct leading to the loss of Oropus. See ante, note ad 1 7. 13. Grote, Hist. Gr. x [chap. LXXIX] pp. 392, 3, and note 3. Chabrias had greatly distinguished himself on a former occasion, described in Grote, Hist. Gr. x [chap. LXXVII] pp. 172, 3, in an action near Thebes fought against Agesilaus and the Lacedaemonians, 378 B.C. Agesilaus “was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await his approach on a high and advantageous ground, without moving until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the knee, and their spears protruded” (Diodorus, xv. 33, Cornelius Nepos, Chabr. c. i, oinixo genu scuto). “The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue in his honour, he made choice of this attitude for the design.” Ib. 173, note i. This is also referred to, the details being passed over, in Dem. c. Lept., in a long enumeration of all Chabrias’ services to his country, §§ 75—78; πρὸς ἀπαντας Πελοπονησίους παρετάξατο εν Θῆβαις, § 76. See also Wolf, ad loc. p. 479-25 (Schäfer, Appar. ad Dem. iii 168). Lycoleon in his speech points to this statue which stood in the ἄγορα in sight of the court, and taking advantage of the posture of it, which he interprets as that of a suppliant, appeals from it to the feelings of the judges, at the same time reminding them of the merits of the original. The effect no doubt must have been very striking. The metaphor resides in ἱκετηρία, which is transferred from the suppliant’s olive-branch (ἔλαιον) to a suppliant attitude in general, implied in the posture of the kneeling figure. On the accusative of the object of awe with αἰσχύνθεντα, see note on II 2. 22.

'For it was a metaphor at the moment (whilst Lycoleon was speaking and Chabrias was in actual danger), but not for ever (i.e. so long, and no longer; not permanently), but yet perpetually (repeat ἀεὶ, Schrader) before the eyes (vivid and graphic): for it is only while he (Chabrias) is in danger that the image seems to supplicate, but the inanimate is ever animated—"the monument of his deeds for the city"'.

This very obscure sentence seems intended as an explanatory com-

1 Dieg. Laert., iii 3. 24, says that Plato also was engaged in the defence of Chabrias, no one else daring to undertake it. See Grote’s Plato, i 118, note i.
mentary on the preceding extract. It is truly obscurum per obscurius, a masterpiece of Aristotelian brevity, and a complete illustration of the Horatian brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. I follow Schrader and Victorius in the interpretation. First he says that there is a metaphor: this of course is in the word ἐκτρίβων, as above explained. But the metaphorical application of it only continues during the danger of the person represented; when that is over, and the suppliant out of danger, the statue loses indeed the suppliant character with which it was invested for the time by the application of Lycoleon, but retains the posture and its associations as “the memorial of his services to the state.” (I agree with Victorius in supposing that this is a continuation of the extract, and τὸ ὑπόμηνμα therefore in apposition with τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν. He ingeniously suggests an alternative, that it may be a second extract from the same speech, alibi in eadem causa, and another example of a pointed and graphic saying.) κυδωνεύοντος γὰρ...ἡ εἰκὼν is the explanation of ἀλλ’ ὅπερ...ἡ εἰκὼν of πρὸ ὁμοίων. Comp. c. 11, 2, 3, a vivid representation gives animation to inanimate objects. If this explanation be correct we must read δὲ for δὴ: by which the explanation of ἀλλ’ ὅπερ...ἡ εἰκὼν is contrasted with that of πρὸ ὁμοίων. δὴ is retained by all the Edd., but I cannot discover any sense in which it is here applicable. It seems also that ὑπέρ has dropped out in the phrase τὸ ὑπόμηνμα τῶν (ὑπέρ) τῆς πόλεως ἐργοῦν. ὑπόμηνμα occurs in the same sense, Isocr. Paneg. § 156, and de Pace § 124.

And, “in every way practising (or studying) meaneness of spirit”, for studying is a kind of increasing or promoting: μελετῶν being a ‘kind’, εἴδος, of αὐξεῖν, the metaphor is on ἄπειρον ἐίδους ἐπί γένος, Poet. XXI 7, one of the four kinds of metaphor. ‘To study’ therefore, which is one kind of the genus ‘promoting’, is here put metaphorically for the general term ‘to promote’. And the point of the metaphor lies in the unusual application of ‘study’: a man usually studies or takes pains to promote some worthy object, to cultivate some virtue: here the object is an unworthy one, a vice or defect. This is taken from Isocr. Paneg. § 151, in a note on which passage Coraes ingeniously proposed to read ἀπειρῶν for αὐξεῖν in Aristotel’s comment on μελετῶν.

And “that God kindled (lit up) reason as a light in the soul”: for both of them shew something (make things clear and visible). This is a proportional metaphor. As light to material, so reason to intellectual objects. Causus hactenus verba sunt nondum reperti, says Victorius, and no subsequent commentator has supplied the deficiency.

(The peace that we make are nugatory) for we do not put an end to
το τα’ συνθήκας φάναι τρόπαιον εἶναι πολύ κάλλιον
tῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων τὰ μὲν γὰρ ύπὲρ
μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὕτα δ’ ύπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ
πολέμου ἀμφό γὰρ νίκης σημεία. ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις
τῶν ψόγων τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύναις διδάσκων
ἡ γὰρ εὐθύνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

wars (do away with them altogether), but merely postpone them’. This
also comes from Isocr. Paneg. § 172. ‘For both of them look to the
future (to future results), both actual postponement (in its proper sense
and application) and a peace of that kind’. This therefore is a metaphor
from εἰδός to εἰδός, from one kind of postponement, to another, analog-
ous, kind.

‘And to say “that the treaty is a far fairer trophy than those which
are obtained in wars: for the one is for the sake of (to commemorate) a
trifling success and a single chance, but this for (on behalf of, marking
the issue of,) the entire war”: for both of them are signs of victory’.
Isocr. Paneg. § 180, quoted by Aristotle, as Mr Sandys says in his
note, memoriter. μιᾶς τύχης is explained by Isocr. Antid. § 128. ‘It is a
single stroke of fortune’, a mere lucky accident, as opposed to a series
of successes, which prove design, skill, and knowledge. (ὅτι, the mark of
quotation). ‘Again, “Cities pay a heavy reckon ing (render a terrible
account, for their misdeeds) to (or by?) the censure of mankind.” For
the “account” or “reckoning” is a legal damage or punishment’. The
explanation shews, first, (as Bernays also remarks, Dialog. des Arist.
p. 16,) that εὐθύνα here expresses not merely the account itself that is
rendered, but the penalty consequent upon it, if unsatisfactory: and
secondly, that the metaphor is a transfer from the legal and particular
scrutiny or account rendered by the officer on laying down his command,
and extended from this to an account or scrutiny in general, the penalty
paid by whole cities to the judgment and censure of mankind and pos-
terity: consequently it is a metaphor from εἰδός to γένος, from species to
genus. The passage referred to in Bernays’ treatise will furnish a com-
mentary on the use and signification of εὐθύνας and λόγον or λόγους διδο-
νας, pp. 15, 16.

εὐθύνα] This, according to some authorities, as Böckh and L. Din-
dorf, is the only true Attic form of the word, εὐθύνη belonging to the
later Greek. G. Dindorf writes εὐθύνας, Dem. Olynth. a’ 17. 15, and
Böckh, Publ. Econ. Bk. II. ch. 8, note 177, εὐθύνα, εὐθύνας (p. 190 Lewis’
leto on Dem. de F. L. § 19, not. crit., acknowledges both plurals, εὐθύνας
and εὐθύναις: “εὐθύνας, quod nihil est…” “The Zurich Editors have εὐθύνας.
In Lysias κατὰ Θεομίνατου β’ § 9, εὐθύναν is found without various read-
ing. The parallel form ἄμωνα, ἀλλίο, is cited by Phrynichus p. 23 (Lobeck)
as forbidden; also by Moeris and Thomas Magister. It is however
approved by Timacus (p. 26 Ruhnken). Ruhnken in his note indi-
gantly denies the use of the word in Plato, and refers it to the later
Greek.
PHILOPLKHΣ Γ 10 § 70; ΙΙ §§ 1, 2.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεία ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνά- λογον λέγεται καὶ τῶ ἑπό οὐμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται:

1 λεκτέον δὲ τὶ λέγομεν πρὸ οὐμάτων, καὶ τὶ ποιοῦσι

2 γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ οὐμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει. οἶον τὸν ἁγαθόν ἀνδρα φάναι εἶναι πετράγωνον μεταφορά, ἀμφω γὰρ τέλεια,

'And so we have despatched the subject of the pointed sayings that are derived from the proportional metaphor and by the vivid graphic language that sets things described before your eyes (presents them vividly to your mind's eye, as it were to the actual sense)'.

eἴρηται] is done, and over, and enough of it. Note on I II. 29.

CHAP. XI.

This chapter is in continuation of the subject of the preceding, ὅτῳ ἀστείον; first as it is exemplified in τὸ πρὸ οὐμάτων ποιεῖν, and next in jokes, puns, plays upon words, and verbal pleasantry of all kinds, metaphors and similies; and lastly hyperboles, which are also a kind of metaphor. All these may be employed in imparting 'vivacity' to style. Whately, Rhet. c. 3, on Style, following Aristotle, calls τὸ πρὸ οὐμάτων ποιεῖν, 'energy'. His remarks on this, partly from Aristotle, are worth comparing.

§ 1. 'We must now state what we mean by πρὸ οὐμάτων, and what must be done in order to give rise to this.'

§ 2. 'I mean then that things are set before our eyes by all expressions that indicate realized activity. For instance; to say that a good man is 'square' (i.e. complete) is a metaphor; for both are complete, but still don't signify a state of realized action (or activity). On the other hand, the phrase "with his vigour and prime in full bloom" (Isocr. Phil. § 10) does convey the notion of life and activity, as is also, "but thee, free to roam at large" (Ib. § 127); and again, in the verse, "so thereupon the Greeks (with a rush) darting forward with the spear" ( handleMessage text) (Eur. Iph. Aul. 88: I believe the otiose ποιεῖ to be a mere misquotation of Ar.), 'the word 'darting forward' is at once life-like and metaphorical'.

ἐνεργοῦντα...ἐνεργείαν] See ante, note on c. 10. 5. Comp. the explanation of πρὸ οὐμάτων there given, ὡσα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πραγμάτευμα μᾶλλον ἡ μελ- λοντα; the representation must be life-like, the action must seem to be actually carried on before us. Poet. XVII. 1. Cic. de Or. III 53. 202. Auct. ad Heren. IV 55. 68. Demonstratio, quum ita veris res expressitur ut geri negationem et res ante oculos esse videatur: with examples. Cic. de Inv. I 54. 104, 55. 107; II 26. 78. Quint. VIII 3. 81. ἐνεργεία, Ib. § 89. Infra § 3, ἐνεργεία εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα. φαίνεται, § 4, κινοῦμεν καὶ ζωντα ποιεῖ. See Whately's Rhetoric above referred to. This 'energy' includes Proso- poçia or Personification: illustrated in Whately's note §. Demetr. π. ἐνεργείας §§ 81, 82, quotes ἐφρίζεται ἐνα μάθη. Campbell, Phil. of Rhet., has a section, III 1. 4, on "Things animate for things lifeless."

τετράγωνος comes from Simonides—or rather from the Pythagoreans, who by a square number or figure symbolized (or, as Aristotle tells us, Met. A, actually identified it with) completeness, and perfect equality in
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ ΙΙ §§ 2, 3.

αλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν' ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἀνθοῦσαν ἐχοντος τὴν ἀκμήν" ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ "σὲ δ' ὤσπερ ἀφετον" ἐνέργεια, καὶ
tουντεθεὶν οὖν Ἔλληνες ἀξιόντες ποσίν

3 τὸ ἀξιόντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά. καὶ ὡς κέχρηται Ὁμήρος πολλαχῶν τῷ τὸ ἀψυχα ἐμψυχα λέγειν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πάσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐ-
δοκιμεῖ, οἶνον ἐν τοίσδε,

αὐτίς ἐπὶ ἀπεδόονθε κυλινδέτο λᾶς ἀναίδης,


The second extract quoted from Isocr. Phil. § 127 requires the con-
text to justify its selection as an example of animated style; with that, it becomes very striking. The orator is contrasting the entire freedom of view which Philip's commanding position allows him, as compared with the narrow patriotism enforced upon those who are 'fast bound' in the constitution and laws of their native cities; which he expresses by σε δ' ὀσπερ ἀφετον γεγενημένον ἄπασαν τὴν Ἕλλαδα πατρίδα νομίζειν κ.π.λ.—a flight quite beyond Isocrates' ordinary range of imagination. The meta-
phor is of course derived from the sacred cattle which were devoted to the worship of some god, and left free from the ordinary labours of the plough and cart, to roam and graze at large in the sacred precincts, the τέμενος of his temple. See Plat. Protag. 320 Α, Rep. VI 498 Α, and the notes of the Comm.: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 666, 684 (Paley) and the note there (also Blomfield's Glossary, 687), Eur. Ion 822, ὅ δ' ἐν θεοῦ δόμασιν ἀφετος, ὡς λίδοι, παιδευτα.

The difference between the mere metaphor τετράγωνονς, and the meta-
phor which also vivifies and animates, is this: in a square there is neither
life nor action; in 'blooming' we have the life of a plant, in ἀφετον of an
animal, in ἀξιόντες the vigour and impetuosity of living human beings.

§ 3. 'And Homer's frequent employment of the figure which invests
inanimate objects with life and motion by the medium of the metaphor.
But in all of them it is by representing (objects) as animated—setting
them as it were in action—that he distinguishes himself (acquires his
popularity, secures our approbation): in the following for instance:
"again (this belongs to the preceding sentence: ἀνθ' ἐπείται πέδονδε
cυλινδέτο λᾶς ἀναίδης is the reading of Homer, Od. XI 598): then to
the plain rolled the ruthless (remorseless) stone." ["Downward anon to the
valley the boulder remorselessly bounded"]). The animating metaphor
is of course in ἀναίδης, which attributes not only life, but also shameless-
ness, recklessness, remorselessness, want of mercy and proper feeling, to
the stone. Whately, u.s., ingeniously, but not correctly: 'provoking', mock-
ing Sisyphus' efforts, ἀναίδη, in the same sense, ruthless, pitiless, Soph.
καὶ ἐπτάτ' οὐστός,
καὶ ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεάνων,
καὶ ἐν γαίῃ ἱσταντο λιλαιόμενα χρόδος ἄσαι,
καὶ αἴχωμε δὲ στέρνοιο διέσυντο μαμιώωσα.
ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἐμυγχα εἶναι ἐνεργοῦντα
φαίνεται τὸ ἀναίσχυντειν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐνέργεια.
ταῦτα δὲ προσῆξε διὰ τῆς κατ’ ἀναλογιαν
μεταφοράς ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ρ. 130.

Oed. Col. 516. αἰδός, clementia, miserericordia, opposed to θρασύς, crudelis, Elmsl. ad Med. 461. This line has always been quoted as an example of “the sound an echo to the sense.”

And, “the arrow flew”—like a bird—Hom. II. N [XIII] 587.

And, “raging or yearning to fly to its mark”. II. A [IV] 125. This attributes human feelings and passions to the arrow, οὐστός. He might have added ἀλτὸ in line 125.

And, (sc. τὰ δύορα θρασειῶν ἀπὸ χειρῶν) “longing to taste blood” (more lit. ‘to take their fill of flesh’). II. A [XI] 574, Paley ad loc.

And “the spear-point panting, quivering in its cagerness, rushed through his breast”.

On these extracts, Whately, Rhet. u. s., note, well observes, “that there is a peculiar aptitude in some of these expressions: an arrow or dart from it flying with a spinning motion quivers violently when it is fixed; thus suggesting the idea of one quivering with cagerness”. This is particularly applicable to the two last extracts. In the third, ἵσταντο may help to convey this. The darts which fell short of their aim, struck, were fixed, in the ground, and there stood quivering. “And winged the shaft that quivered in his heart”. Byron (of Kirke White), in English Bards and Scotch Reviewers. Gaisford, in Variorum not. p. 426, adds Od. ε’ 175, νῆς, ἀγαλλόμενα (exulting) Δώς οὐρα. Eustath. ad loc. καὶ ὁρᾶ τὸ ἀγαλλόμενα, ὡς ἐπὶ ἐμψυχῶν τῶν νεών λέχθεν. Soph. Aj. 581, πρὸς τομῶντι πῆματε, and this Schol., τομῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅσπερ εἰ αὐθηναν εἰχέν. Plut. on Pyth. 398 Α. See also in Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Arist. pp. 278, 9, some passages from the Schol. to Homer, and that of Plutarch, on this peculiarity of Homer.

For in all these by reason of the living character (with which they are invested) they appear to be in action: for “shameless conduct”, and “quivering with cagerness” and the rest, all express forms of activity (implying life). But these he has applied to them through the medium of the proportional metaphor, for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless actor to him who is shamelessly treated'.
I am sorry to be obliged to differ from our author in the view he here takes of the meaning of ἀνασχυντόμενον. The notion of "reckless impudence", conveyed by his equivalent ἀνασχυντοῦρος, seems to me altogether alien from the Homeric conception of it. I can't think that "reckless impudence", ἀνασχυντία, is what Homer meant to attribute to the stone when he called it ἀναδίψεως, but "unmerciful treatment". At all events it is better than Pope's "huge round stone."

§ 4. 'In his most approved similes too (as well as metaphors) he deals thus (employs this treatment) with inanimate things (ἐπὶ 'in the case of' upon, applying to): "(Waves) arched, foam-crested, some in front, others (tumbling) after them"; for he draws (depicts) them all as living and moving, and living activity is a kind of motion'. II. N [XIII] 799, ['the waves of the bellowing ocean; Bending their heads foam-crested, they sweep on, billow on billow']. The following verse will shew where the ἑνεργεία lies: ὅσ Τρῶες πρὸ μὲν ἄλλου ἂμφροτες, αὐτάρ ἐπ' ἄλλοι, χιλικρ ἀμαξαίροντες ἀμφ' ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιον.

I have followed Bekker (Ed. 3) and Spengel in reading κίνησις for μάρτσις, from a conjecture of Bekker in his first ed. μάρτσις will however make good sense.

§ 5. 'Metaphors should be drawn, as has been stated before, (III 2.12, and 10.5, also 11.10; ἀκείμενον in the former, μή φανερῶν implied in the words μή ἐπιπολαῖον, in the latter,) from objects closely related, but not obvious to every one at first sight' (i.e. not so related, so clearly resembling one another, that no one can fail to see the resemblance at once: such metaphors do not pique the curiosity, and set people thinking; and from them you learn nothing, that you did not know before); 'just as in philosophy also, to observe the resemblances in widely distant things is characteristic of a sagacious penetrating intellect: like Archytas' saying, that arbitrator and altar were the same thing; because both are the refuge of the injured or wronged' (thing or person, animal or man, expressed by the neuter).

οἶνον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ Poet. ΧΧΙΙ 17, μίσον γὰρ τούτῳ οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἐστὶ λαβένει εὐφυίας τὲ σπείρας ἐστίν (this is equivalent to εὐφωτόχου, 'requires quick wit, penetration, natural sagacity') to γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὄμων θεορέων ἐστίν. Rhet. II 20.7, of fables, used as arguments, ποιήσατ' γὰρ δεῖ, ὡσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἐν τις δύνηται τὸ ὄμων ὃριν, ὡσπερ μόνον.
II § 5.

On the use of resemblances and differences in defining, distinguishing, and the formation of concepts, see Trendelenburg, ad Categ. § 59 p. 137, and Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. I p. 102, Lect. vi. This is the kind of 'philosophy' here referred to. Diotima's account, Pl. Symp. 211, of the formation of general conceptions or ideas will serve as an illustration.

On Archytas, the Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician of Tarentum, see Diog. Laert. viii 4. 79—83.

'Or if one were to say that an anchor and a hook were the same: for they are both the same kind of thing, but differ in position' (лат. 'the above and below').

κρεμάθρα is defined by the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 218, and by Suidas, as a basket for remnants, εἰς δὲ τὰ περιτεύνοντα ψά (the leavings of the dinner-table) εἰωθάμεν ἀποτίθεον. This was usually 'hung up', κρεμάθρα δὲ ἐγρήγορα διὰ τὸ ἄει κρεμαμένην μετέωρον εἶναι (Suidas). Hence the use of it for Socrates in the Clouds, u. s. But it is plain that that cannot be the meaning of it here, for it does not answer to the subsequent description of it, in respect either of the resemblance or the difference stated. Rost and Palm in their Lexicon translate it 'ankertau', the cable that holds the anchor; but this is open to precisely the same objection. It must be something in the nature of a hook, from which things may be suspended; and is literally 'a suspending instrument'. The resemblance to the anchor lies in its hooked form, and also in the intention or design of them both, which is to keep things where they are, preservation or security. The difference is that the anchor is applied to keep the vessel safe and steady at the bottom, the hook is above, and from it the thing suspended hangs. Liddell and Scott have κρεμάτρα (the reading of three inferior MSS) with this reference, and identify it with κρεμάθρα in the Nubes.

'And the re-equalisation of cities (in the respect of property, and powers, i. e. state offices, privileges, &c.) when the same principle is applied to (is the same for) things standing wide apart (very dissimilar), viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices, prerogatives &c.).' The widely dissimilar things which are here brought together for comparison, are the areas of properties, and the state offices and privileges, &c., which are to be alike equalised. The Scholiast quoted by Vater, explains the word and its application in the same way of the equalisation of the properties, fortunes or conditions, duties and rights of the citizens of a state. Victorius quotes Isocr. Phil. § 40, ὅλα γὰρ ἀπάσας ὁμαλισμένα ἔτο τῶν

AR. III.
§ 5, 6.

ταύτο, ἐν ἑπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει τὸ ᾗσον.

6 ἐστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλείστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατάν μᾶλλον γὰρ γίγνεται δήλον ὅτι ἐμαθέ παρὰ τὸ ἑναντίως ἐχεν, καὶ ἐν οἷς λέγειν ἢ συνεχοῦς ἢ ἐγὼ δ’ ἤμαρτον." καὶ συμφορῶν, all the Greek cities have been alike levelled to one condition by their misfortunes.

Vahlen has again applied his perverted ingenuity to the emendation of this passage. The passage wants none: it is clear in sense and construction, and the reading of the text is retained by Bekker and Spengel. In the first place, ἀν in the compound verb is not a privative with ὑ inserted, as ἀνώνυμος, ἀνώδυνος, &c., but ἀνα is ἀνείρια of breaking ὑπ (Ἀναλέγει, &c.) for redistribution, restoring to an original equality: so ἀναδιάδοχος = to distribute (ψηφίσεως), ἀναδιάδοχος = to redistribute. Thuc. v 4, ἀνάδιαδος, ἀναδιάδος, ἀναστὰς ex integro aequis partibus dividendo (Herod., Plat., see Ruhnken’s Timeaus p. 33), ἀναδιάδος, et sim. ἀνωμαλίσθης therefore does not denote inequality, but re-equalisiation. What the signification of the word is, appears from two passages of the Polit. II 7, 1266 b 3 and c. 12, 1274 b 9. In the first of these the word is ὑμαλισθῆναι, in the second, ἀνωμαλήσωσι, from verbs in ἀ-ἐσω and ἀ-έων respectively. They both refer to the same thing, viz. Phaleas of Chalcedon’s scheme for the equalisation or re-equalisation of properties, and plainly, except perhaps so far as the ἀνα is concerned, have precisely the same signification: and this is perfectly applicable here. Vahlen proposes καὶ ἀμαλισθῆναι τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολύ διέχουσι ταύτο. His objection to ἀμαλισθῆναι seems to me to be entirely unfounded, and I can see no reason whatever for altering the text. There is another slight alteration proposed, which is not worth mentioning.

ἔπιφανεία is a surface, here area; and in Euclid, a plane figure, which has only length and breadth, a superficies.

§ 6. This introduces a new topic of ἀστεῖα, things pointed and lively, in the sense of witticisms, things amusing and laughable, such as jokes παρ’ ὑπόνοιαν, or παρὰ προσδοκίαν, repartees, puns, plays upon words, and the like.

‘Though it is true in general that most of these ‘vivacities’ are conveyed by (διὰ) metaphor, yet they are also derived from (a temporary, momentary) delusion (leading to a pleasing surprise at the unexpected supplement): for it becomes clearer (to the listener) that he has learnt something from (the conclusion of the sentence) being contrary’ to his expectation—or, as Victorius, from his own contrary, i.e. changed, state of mind, which has arisen between the beginning and end of the sentence—‘and the soul seems to say to herself, “Really, so it is; and I missed it (never found it out till now)”. (This explanation of the pleasure derived from the unexpected surprise,—that the previous deception heightens the pleasure of the acquired knowledge—is due, I think, rather to the theory which had become habitual with Ar., that all intellectual pleasure is due to the natural desire of learning, than to
his sober judgment exercised upon this particular application of it.) Schrader has supplied two capital instances of this form of pleasantry: the first is from Cic. de Or. II 281, Quid huic abest—nisi res et virtus? Here the listener is misled by the opening of the sentence to expect a very good character of somebody, when unexpectedly, after a pause, two words are added as exceptions, which convert the expected eulogium into beggary and wordlessness: but is it the learning, the becoming acquainted with that fact, however unexpectedly, that constitutes the pleasure or amusement that the listener derives from his surprise? A still better from Quint. of a dandy advocate, illud Afri “homo in agendis causis optime—vestitus,” for the expected versatus 1, Quint. VI 3. 24 and 84. This topic he calls, decipiendi opinionem. He returns to it again in VIII 5. 15 under the name of ex inopinato: and gives two examples. Cic. de Or. II 63. 235; 70. 284, iocus praeter expectationem. I have quoted two or three English ones in the note to Introduct. p. 319, note 3.

1 And the apophthegms that have point and vivacity derive this character from the indirect statement of the meaning (from the speaker's not directly expressing the intended meaning), as that of Stesichorus “that their cicalas will have to sing to themselves from the ground” all the trees being cut down and the land devastation; which is the real, direct, meaning: and ευτοίοι, that there will be no one else to listen to them. On ἄποφθεγματα, see II 21. 8, where this is also quoted, Stesichorus' apophthegm also appears in Demetr. π. ἔρμ. § 99 where it is attributed to Dionysius (the tyrant; as a threat); and § 243, as an example of βραχυλογία in the chapter on δευτέρης. This is a riddle in the shape of an apophthegm: the next topic brings us to aenigmas proper. The pleasure derived from these is traced, as usual, to that of learning: and against that explanation in the present instance I have no objection to make.

1 And for the same reason, riddles well wrapped up give pleasure: for not only is this (viz. the solution of them) a kind of learning; but they are also expressed in metaphor. And what Theodorus calls "novel phrases, expressions." This is effected (this novelty, this surprise) when (the sequel) is unexpected, and not, to use his own words, "according to previous opinion or expectation"; but, as is the custom of humorous,
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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 11 § 6.

τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα. ὁπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκάμματα ἐξαπατᾶ γάρ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς μετροις οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ὁ ἄκούων ύπέλαβεν ἐστείχε δ’ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα. ὃ δ’ φέτο τέδιλα ἐρείν. τοῦτον δ’ ἀμα λεγομένου δεὶ δήλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐ χ’ ὁ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μεταστρέφει όνομα, οἶον τὸ Θεοδώρου jocular writers, who alter the letters of words to make jokes. I have given a free transl. of the last clause; with οἱ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις understand ἀντες ἀν διαριβζοντες; and with τὰ παραπεποιημεία, ποιοῦν, or the like. 

παραπεποιημένοι is, as I have pointed out in Introd. p. 320, the general name for all falsification (παρά) or (illicit) changes of the letters of words, for the purpose of a jest, παρονομασία, τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα, περιεργώσεις, μισαπλιθήσεως, of a word: all jokes that depend upon verbal or literal changes. Compare παράφοιμοι and its congener, in logic and grammar (Categ. init.), applied to πτώσεις or changes of termination. See further, Introd., u. s., note 1.

On Theodorus of Byzantium, see note on II 23, 28, ult. and the references there given.

Which is the effect also of literal jokes (founded upon the letters and the changes of them); for these also cheat (the expectation, and so far mislead). (This kind of joke is not confined to prose: it appears) also in verses. For (the conclusion) is not as the hearer (the listener to the recitation of a rhapsodist) supposed: “and he trod with his—chilblains under his feet” (statelicly stept he along, and under his feet were his—chilblains)—whereas the other thought he was going to say “sandals”. This παρὰ γραμμὰ σκόμμα, which must be taken from some burlesque hexameter poem—author unknown—has its counterpart in Arist. Vesp. 1167, κοκκαλάμον ἔγω· ὅτις γ’ ἐπὶ γῆρα χίμελον οὐδὲν λήψαμαι. The Schol. ad h. l. (in Gaisford’s Not. Var.) refers, as another instance, to Alcibiades’ τραυμισμός, Arist. Vesp. 45, ὅλας Θέωλος τὴν κεφαλὴν κύλακε ἐχεί. παρ’ ἐν γράμμα, ἧτοι παρὰ τὸ ὅ ἐστι τὸ σκόμμα. Hermogenes, περὶ μεθύδου δεινότητος, c. 34 (Rk. Gr. II 453, Spengel) in a chap. peri τοῦ κομικὸς λέγειν, has illustrated this topic, which he calls παράφοιμι, by the same verse of Aristoph.; and also this and τὸ παρὰ προσδοκιάν from Dem. de Cor.

Pleasantries arising from changes of letters (plays on words) are produced, not by a mere enunciation of a word in its direct meaning, but by something (a change) which gives a different turn to it, (converts or twists it into a different sense); as that of Theodorus (of Byzantium, the rhetorician: super, II 23, 28), against Nicon the harper, ὃματε: he pretends namely to say “it confounds you” (you are confounded), and cheats; for he means something else: and therefore it is amusing only after one has become acquainted with the meaning (or circumstances);

1 Δίδυμος φησὶ τὴν περὶ δοὺς σκιάς παραμείναν παραπεποιημένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥήτορος λέγοντος περὶ τῆς ἐν Δὲλφοις σκιάς...[Harpsocratio].
for if (the hearer) doesn’t know that he is a Thracian, he will see no point in it at all’. Victorius and Schrader have both missed the meaning of this pun. But in order to arrive at it, we must first remove from the text the first se after βράττει which has been introduced from the second (where it is required) and spoils the pun. Nicon, it appears from the explanation, is, or is supposed to be, of foreign extraction; and not only that, but a Thracian, the most barbarous of all nations. The Thracian women were habitually slaves, in Athenian families: Arist. Thesm. 279, 280, 284, 293, Pac. 1138, Vesp. 828. This person is addressed by Theodorus with the word βράττει, which means apparently, “You are confounded”; this appears from the interpretation that follows, (τι) βράττει se, which is of course convertible in meaning with the passive βράττει (and it follows also that the first se must be an error of the transcriber, for βράττει se would be no interpretation of βράττει se; nor in that form would there be any pun). It really means, however, Θράττει εί, “You are a Thracian maid-servant”, not only an out-and-out barbarian, but effeminate to boot, and a menial. Schrader’s explanation is “Θράττει (sic) se, hoc est, Thracia mulier te, intellige peperit:” at once impossible in respect of the Greek, and pointless. Victorius, to much the same effect.

The amusement derived from a pun is thus explained by Cicero, de Or. ii 62. 254, Ambiguum (double-entendre) per se ipsum probatur il quidem, ut ante dixi, vel maxime; ingeniosi enim videtur vim verbi in alium atque ceteri accipient posse ducere; sed admirationem magis quam risum movet, nisi si quando incidit in alium genus ridiculi.

βουλεί αυτόν πέρσαι] No satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given of this pun. The point of the joke has been always supposed to lie in πέρσαι. Francesco de Medici, a friend of Vettori, suggested to him a solution which he quotes at length, that the Persae a poem of Timotheus is referred to, and that we should read Πέρσαι. But as Buile justly remarks, “non video quidnam in hoc sit facitii.” Majoragius’ explanation, who supposes that there was a verb Πέρσαι, of the same meaning as Μηδίηω, Persis favere, is equally out of the question. I have looked (for once) into Spengel’s commentary, and find that he has suggested an analogy with Horace’s vin tu curtis Iudaetis offerere, Sat. i 9. 70. The same thought once occurred to me, but I abandoned it, in consideration of the form of the word, πέρσαι; which, though a possible aorist, is entirely without authority. πέρσαι is a dep. and has παρδηγομαι for its future, ἔπαρδων for the aorist. The solution I have finally arrived at is that the alteration of letters which makes the pun, resides in βουλεί. This would probably be pronounced nearly, if not quite, like βουλη, and the word could be rendered ‘will you?’ or ‘the Council’: in the
But both of them' (either the two last examples of παρὰ γράμμα; or that topic itself and the preceding, παρὰ προσδοκίαν; they all require the same precaution) must be properly pronounced (or delivered—attention must be called to the παρὰ προσδοκίαν, by a slight pause, and to the double-entendre by heightening the tone or some similar expedient). The following words, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, sadly want the end of the sentence to enable us to determine their meaning. Victorius understands it, "tannquann in σκόμμασιν et ioci amarialibus, ita in urbanis hisce sermonibus"; but Ar. makes no such distinction: all the jokes παρὰ γράμμα are alike ἀστεῖα. Vater fills it up thus; οὕτω δὲ καὶ (ταύτῳ δόναται ταύτα) τὰ ἀστεῖα (διὰ ὄμοινυμια): ταύτα being the before-mentioned ἀμφότερα; so that this is to be referred to the ὄμοινυμια which follows, and begins a new topic: a most unnatural interpretation as it seems to me. In default of any thing better I propose the following:—

And so likewise witticisms, pointed sayings in general (as distinguished from the two special varieties, or two particular instances preceding), (require the same attention to pronunciation), as to say that "to the Athenians the command of the sea was not the beginning (both expressed by the same word, ἄρχη) of their misfortunes"; for they derived benefit from it (it was the source not of evil, but of good). Or, as Isocrates puts it, that "the command was to the city the beginning (or source) of her calamities." This, or something like it, occurs three times in Isocrates. The two similar places, one a mere repetition of the other, Phil. § 61, and de Pace § 101, are probably what Ar. had (very imperfectly) in his recollection; the third is, Paneg. § 119, which differs more widely from the quotation.

For in both (these cases, or examples) that is said which one would not suppose likely to be said by any one, (lit. which one would not suppose that any one, τωά, would say) and (yet, at the same time) is recognised as true (sound, in accordance with facts, Victorius, see 111 7.9, infra § 10): for though it is true that there is nothing particularly clever in calling the command a beginning, (in calling ἄρχη ἄρχη, though in different senses), still he uses the term not in the same, but in different senses, (in the second example, Vahlen), and does not contradict (or deny) the use of ἄρχη (in the first example), only in a different sense. The second example, from Isocrates, may seem at first sight to
the object illustrated, and the analogous notion which throws a new light upon it, to suggest itself from the manifest correspondence to the hearer.

On the φαίλη "Άρεος, see note on III 4.4, and Introd. pp. 220—292, there referred to. This was due to Timotheus the dithyrambic poet. The φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος for τὸ έξων—point of resemblance which brings the two together seems to be the common twang of the bowstring and harp-string produced in each case by the vibration of the string. The bow may therefore be called a stringless harp, as wanting the many strings of the musical instrument, or, in other words, an unmusical harp. On these privative epithets with metaphors, comp. III 6.7. The author of this last bit of ἀστείως is a tragic poet named Theognis, mentioned with contempt and ridicule three times by Aristophanes, Acharn. 11, and 138, and Thesm. 168. He is said to have received the nickname of χίων from his excessive ψυχρότης. Of all his writings only this one phrase has survived, preserved by Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας, π. μεταφοράς, § 85. He gives the author's name, and cites this as a specimen of a κωνδυλόδες μεταφορά, ὡς ὁ Θέαγος παρατίθεται το (τόξον) φόρμιγξ ἄχορδον ἐπὶ τού τόξον βιδλουστὸν; ἡ μὲν γὰρ φόρμιγγς κωνδυλόδες ἐπὶ τού τόξου, τὸ δὲ ἀχύρῳ ἡσφαλίσταται. Out of this Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. III 100, and the writer of the article Theognis No. II in Biag. Dict., have made what they print as a verse, παρατίθεται τό έξων, φόρμιγγς ἄχορδων.

§ 12. 'The simile is made in this way, by comparing for instance a flute-player to an ape'—Simia quam similitur, turbpsima bestia nobis [Ennius, ap. Cic. de Nat. Deor. I § 97]: besides this general resemblance of the two natures, there is also a special resemblance between the two, thus described by Victorius, "quod tibicines quoque ut simiae contracto corpore, manibusque ad os appositis, cum tibias iniunt, ut bestia illa sedent." The resemblance is quite sufficient to justify the simile.

In the next example we must (with Bekker and Spengel) read, after MS Α', λύχνω [not λάκω], and omit εἰς.

'And a short-sighted man to a lamp with water dropping upon it'. The involuntary contraction, the convulsive winking, of the half-closed eyes of the short-sighted man is compared to the fizzing, spurring, and sputtering of the lamp when water is dropped on it: 'because both are contracted'. μέως (μέεως) is one that keeps his eyes half shut, Probl. XXXI 16, διὰ τί οἱ μεύεστε βλεφάρα συνάγοντες ὄρθων; Arist. makes the point of the comparison lie in the contraction of both, the eyelids and the flame. ὕσσα or ὕκας 'a drop'; ὕσσεως 'to drop, fall in drops', Ar. Nub. 580 of the clouds, ἦ ὕσσεον, 'we drizzle'; ὕσσειος (pass.) 'to be sprinkled with drops.' Xen. Symp. II 26, ἦν δὲ ἦμιν οἱ παιδείς μικραῖς κυλίζει πυκνά ἐπιφεκάζωσιν: opposed to ἄθροον πίνειν, to drink all at
SECTION II

In that: "the worthy man should marry the worthy woman"—but there is no point in that (this is superficial): but if they are both combined in the sentence (then only the sentence becomes pointed). "It is a worthy thing (or worth while) for a man to die when unworthy of death (when he has done nothing to deserve death)." Here we have the grave, sound, true doctrine, and the antithesis, which gives it point, and redeems it from superficiality. 'But the greater the proportion of these qualities, the more pointed and attractive it appears; if, for instance, the (individual) words also were to convey (εἰς) a metaphor, and a metaphor of a particular kind (the proportional met. for example), and antithesis, and balanced clauses, and to carry with them vividness and animation'. On ἐνέργεια, see above § 1.

§ 11. 'Similes too, as has been already said in the preceding (chapter, c. 4), are always in a certain sense popular metaphors. For they are always composed of (or, expressed in) two terms, just like the proportional metaphor; as for instance, the shield, we say, is Ares' goblet, (the shape of the φιάλη is in reality more like an elongated saucer, or shield—whence the comparison), and a bow a stringless harp. When thus expressed, the phrase is not single (or simple; it has both terms expressed, the two terms viz. that are brought into comparison; and is therefore a simile); whereas to call the bow a harp or the shield a goblet is single (and therefore only a metaphor). [αἰὲ εὐδοκιμοῦσα. `in aēi fortasse latet al."

Spengel.]

The meaning seems to be this. The difference between a simile and a metaphor is—besides the greater detail of the former, the simile being a metaphor writ large—that it always distinctly expresses the two terms that are compared, bringing them into apparent contrast: the metaphor on the other hand, substituting by transfer the one notion for the other of the two compared, identifies them as it were in one image, and expresses both in a single word, leaving the comparison between

1 This comes most likely from Anaxandrides again (note on § 8). The verse ran thus τὴν ἀξίων ἑεὶ γαμεῖν τὸν ἀξίων. Spengel, Artium Scriptores p. 20, adds ἑεὶ. Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. III 201.
antō kai tō 'Anaxandrīdō tō ἐπαινοῦμενον,
kalōn γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου ἄν ἄξιον.
ταυτὸν γὰρ ἑστὶ τῷ ἐπείγῃ ἄξιον γ' ἀποθανεῖν μή ὄντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν [ἡ ἄξιον γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανά-
το ἄξιον ὄντα] ἢ μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια.
τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰδὸς τὸ αὕτῳ τῆς λέξεως τοῦτων ἀλλ' ὄσῳ ἀν ἐλάττου καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεξῆς, τοσοῦτῳ εὐδο-
κιμεῖ μᾶλλον. τὸ δ' αὐτίου ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικείσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ θάττον
γίνεται. δεῖ δ' αἰεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὅν λέγεται ἢ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ μὴ ἐπιτολαίον.
ἐστὶ γὰρ ταύτα χωρὶς ἑχειν, οἴον 'ἀπο-
a different kind, or form', (foreign, alien, to the two others: ἀλλότριον
belonging to something or somebody else; opposed to ὅκειον).

'Of the same kind is also that so highly praised verse of Anaxand-
rides, "A noble thing it is to die ere doing aught worthy of death":
for this is the same as saying, "It is worthy to die when one is not
worthy to die", or "it is a worthy thing to die when one does not
deserve death", or "doing nothing worthy of death"'. Anaxandridies
is quoted III 10. 7 (see note) and infra 12. 3.

§ 9. ‘Now of all these the kind of expression (language) is the
same: but the more briefly (ἐλάττου, τῆς λέξεως) and antithetically’, (repeat
μᾶλλον from the compar. έλάττου: I have represented the similar ellipse
which our own language makes in the like case), 'so much the more are
they popular (approved, applauded). The reason of this is, that to the
antithesis is due the increase, and by the brevity (in a short time, χρόνῳ,
or space, compass, τόπῳ) the more rapid growth (or acquisition) of the
learning (that arises from them'). Comp. notes on I 11. 21, 23, and III
9. 8, also 10. 2.

§ 10. ‘(To make a phrase ἀποτεῖν) it should always have (attached
to it, προσεῖναι) some special personal application (τὸ τινὰ εἶναι πρὸς ὅν
λέγεται), or propriety in the expression if what is said (is to) be true and
not superficial’ (super c. 10.5).

ἀληθὲς] i.e. sound, solid, substantial, genuine, comp. III 7. 9, sententiam
gravem et honestiam, Victorius. Metri se quintique suo modulo ac pede
Orelli ad loc. These two, the ἀληθὲς and the μὴ ἐπιτολαίον, do not
always go together: when they are separated, the sentence loses its
point and attraction. This separation is illustrated by two examples:
the first, as a sentiment, has truth, weight, and solidity; the second is
well enough written, as far as the style goes; but neither of them is par-
ticularly attractive.

‘Because these two may be separated in a sentence: for instance,
a man should die free from all offence”—but there is no point
8 èn ἀπασὶ δὲ τοῦτοι, ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγχη ὀμωνυμίᾳ. ἦ μεταφορὰ, τότε τὸ εὖ. ὅτι
"Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἰνασχέτος," ὀμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν,
ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἄγδης. καὶ
οὐκ ἄν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἦ σε δεὶ ξένοις [ξένοις]¹.
ἡ οὖ μᾶλλον ἦ σε δεῖ, τὸ αὐτὸ. καὶ "οὐ δεὶ τὸν
ξένον ξένον ἂεὶ εἶναι" ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ
¹ ἦ [σε δεὶ] ξένος ξένος
contradict the first, what is affirmed in the one being denied in the
other. But if allowance be made for the double sense of ἀφησι, the
apparent discrepancy between the two statements will disappear.
§ 8. 'But in all these cases, the merit (τὸ εὖ) consists in the proper
application of the term (i.e. the appropriateness of it to the thing de-
scribed), whether by (expressed in) ambiguity (the play on words) or
metaphor'. ἐνέγχη, sc. ὀ λέγων: and comp. ΠΙ. 3. 2, εἰς τέκνοις καὶ μεταφορά.
'For instance "Intolerable Tolerable"—the contradiction lies only
in the ambiguity; but this is appropriate if the owner of the name is
a bore (or nuisance)². Read with Bekker and Spengel 'Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ
ἀνάσχετος [not ἰσχεῖς, with Bekker's Oxford ed. of 1837]. The first is
a proper name; as 'Tolerable' must be supposed to be in the English
version. ὀμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν 'the speaker contradicts the ambiguous word
only'; not the thing itself: the application, not the fact. These con-
tradictory, or private, epithets of proper names—comp. the private
epithets of metaphors, ΠΙ. 6. 7 and note—may be exemplified in our
own language by ruthless Ruth, helpless Helpš, fearless Phear, incon-
cstant Constance, unpleasant Pleasance, ignoble Noble, Hotspur cold-spur,
and the like. Significant Greek names are to be found in ΠΙ. 23. 29,
ΠΙ. 15. 8; Latin in Quint. VI. 3. 55. Others are "Ἀνακτέωs (which is pre-
cisely parallel to ἰνασχέτος in our text) and Νικηφόρος, Eustath. ad Hom.
ΠΙ. II. A p. 156—but in fact most Greek proper names are significant in
themselves, though they may have lost the appropriateness of their per-
sonal application.
'And, "never make thyself as a stranger, more of a stranger than
is required of thee" (not more than thou art bound to do); the same
thing (in different words)³. As the words are not different, but the same,
Vahlen¹ very reasonably proposes to omit σε δεὶ in the Iambic verse,
οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἦ ξένοις ξένος 'more strange than a stranger'; so that
οὐ μᾶλλον ἦ σε δεὶ is now differently expressed, and becomes what it is
said to be, an explanation; or the expression of the same thing in
different words. Victorius thinks that one of the two may mean
'hast' or 'guest'; but as ξένοις is not repeated in the alternative, Vahlen's
explanation seems more probable. 'And, (in a third way) "a stranger
must not be always a stranger" (or, strange): for that too is again of
¹ Vahlen, in Trans. Vien. Acad., u. s. pp. 146, 7. He also would connect the
sentence thus, which is a more doubtful improvement, ἦ οὐ μᾶλλον ἦ σε δεὶ. τὸ αὐτὸ
καὶ "οὐ δεὶ" κ. τ. λ.
once, in large measures. The other is to distribute your potations in 'drops', as it were, in very small glasses; and so to make up for what you lose in the magnitude of the draught by the frequent repetition of the little one.

§ 13. 'Excellence is attained in them when they contain (involve) metaphor (comp. c. io § 3); for the shield may be compared to "Ares' goblet", and a ruin to the "rag of a house"'; [conversely we have rags described as ἐφείπα χλανίδιον, Soph. Fragm. (Niobe) 400, comp. Eur. Troad. 1025.]

'And Niceratus may be said to be "a Niceratus stung by Pratys"—according to Thrasymachus' simile, when he saw Niceratus after his defeat by Pratys in the rhapsodical contest, and still all dishevelled and dirty (squalid); with the marks of the long and laborious struggle still fresh upon him; before he had had time to shave and dress. κορμὸν is here used in the unusual sense of long hair as a sign of neglect, incontinentis capillus, uncombed, unkempt: in the ordinary acceptation long hair is a sign of fabery, or the distinctive mark of a young man of fashion, Arist. Eq. 580, except at Sparta, Rhet. i 9. 26, where it was a national distinction, ἐν Λακεδαιμονι κορμὸν καλὸν: as it was likewise in the Homeric ages, when the Achaeans were καρποκόμωντες.

Of the many Niceratuses whose names appear in Sauppe's Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. p. 102, there are two better known to us than the rest, (1) the son of the distinguished Athenian general, who appears as one of the guests in Xenophon's banquet, in Lysias, &c., and was put to death by the Thirty tyrants. If the Thrasymachus who made the remark upon him be—as he doubtless is—the famous Sophist, this must be the Niceratus who is here meant. The second, mentioned in Dem. c. Mid. § 165, and afterwards in a list of witnesses with the name of his deme 'Ἀχέρ-δουσεσ, § 168, was probably the grandson of the other; for the names of Nicias and Niceratus seem to have alternated in successive generations in this family, as they did in that of Callias and Hipponicus. These two are habitually confounded by Taylor, Reiske (see his Ind. ad Dem.) and others; and the confusion still exists in Smith's Biographical Dictionary, although Buttmann proved their diversity (in Exc. viii ad Dem. c. Mid.). Sauppe likewise, in his Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. p. 102, distinguishes them. Several other Nicias and Niceratuses appear in Sauppe's Index, u. s.

Niceratus had engaged in a contest with one Pratys, a professional rhapsodist, and, being in all probability an amateur, had been defeated. In this state, and still bearing all the marks of it on his person, he is
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ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 11 § 13.

μάλιστα ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταῖ, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ, καὶ ἐὰν εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. Λέγω δ' ὅταν ἀποδιδόσων, ὥσπερ σέλινον οὐλὰ τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ, ὥσπερ Φιλάμμῳν ζύγομαχῶν τῷ καρύκῳ. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ' εἰκόνες εἰσίν. αἱ δ' εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοραί, ἐρημαὶ πολλάκις.

encountered by Thrasymachus, who thereupon compares him to “a Philoctetes bitten or stung by Praysia.” Schneider on Xen. Sympos. III 5 supposes that “the subject of the recitation in which Niceratus was beaten was the account in Lesches’ ‘little Iliad’ of the story of Philoctetes in which was related the calamity arising from the serpent’s bite; alluded to by Homer, II. Β 721”; and by Soph. Phil. 267, πληγεῖτ' ἐξίδησιν ἀγρίῳ χαράματι, and 632.

‘Wherein the poets are most condemned when they fail, and applauded when they succeed.’ ἐκπίπτειν is properly said of an actor who is hissed off the stage, and hence of condemnation, disapprobation, in general. Poet. XVIII 15, ἐπεὶ καὶ Αγάθῳν εἶπεν ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ, Dem. de Cor. § 265, εἴπειτε (Aeschines) ἐγὼ δ' εἴσωμιτον. Metaphorically, Plat. Gorg. 517 A, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴπειτον (ἐκπίπτει οmnino dicuntur ea quae reiciuntur et repudiantur; Stallbaum). explodi, exactus, Ter. Prod. (2) Hec. 4 et 7. The opposite of the agent is ἐκβάλλειν ‘to hiss off the stage’; Dem. de F. L. § 389 (of Aeschines again, as acting Thyestes), εἴπειτε αὐτὸν καὶ εἴπειτε τούτων δίκαιων.

‘I mean when they make (the two members) correspond (bring into comparison, note on ἀποδιδόμαι Ι 1.7). “He wears his legs as curly as parsley.” (οἶλος, Buttmann Lexil. No. 44 and 88). “Like Philammon, at close quarters with the sack”’. Philammon, a famous Athenian athlete, gained the prize at the Olympic games, Dem. de Cor. § 319.

Harpocr. Φ. τῶν Ἀθηναίων πύκτης. Eustath. ad Hom. II. ψ p. 1324, quoted in Dissen’s note on Dem. 1. c.

ζυγομαχεῖν of a close struggle, desperate encounter, prop. of two oxen under the yoke, or of any yoke-fellows. Ruhken ad Tim. s.v.

τῷ καρύκῳ] κάρυκος, θῦλακος. Suidas. θυλακον. ἔστι δὲ δερμάτων ἄγγειαν, ἁμοιον ἁσφ. Hesychius. ‘A sack filled with bran and olive husks for the young, and sand for the more robust, and then suspended at a certain height, and swung backwards and forwards by the players.’ Dict. Ant. art. ‘Baths,’ p. 144 b. It is evident that this describes only one use of it, namely for amusement or exercise at the baths: this game was called καρυκομαχία. The other purpose for which it was employed was plainly from this passage that of boxers, who practised upon it. [Compare Plautus, Rudens 722, follem pugilatorium faciam et pendentem incursabo pugnus, and see K. F. Hermann’s Privatalterthümer, § 37. 17.]

These two iambic lines, from unknown authors, are clearly selected not for the failure, but the success, of the poet or poets who composed them.

‘(These) and the like are all similes. That all similes are (a kind of, or involve) metaphors, has been stated already many times’.
§ 14. ‘Proverbs too are metaphors from species to species: as for instance, if a man has of his own accord invited the aid of (lit. called in to help him) another in the expectation of deriving benefit (from his assistance), and then incurs harm and loss instead, as the Carpathian says of the hare: for each of them is a case of the accident (or result) above mentioned.’

Carpathus, an island lying between Crete and Rhodes, from which the neighbouring sea took the name of Carpathian (Hor. Carm. i 35. 8): now called Skarpanto. The proverb is thus explained by Buhle. “Cum Carpathi incolae leporibus carerent, unus eorum par leporum intruduxit” (rabbits, doubtless), “unde tanta eorum multitudo propter facunditatem exorsa est, ut omnes fructus absumerentur.” Erasmus, Adag. Chil. II Cent. i 81, p. 1250.

A similar result follows from similar conduct in Stesichorus’ fable of the stag, the horse, and the man, II 20. 5. These are both species of the same genus of disappointed expectation, or disastrous result: and the proverb is a transfer, a tralatio of the one to the other. On the four kinds of metaphor, see Poet. XXI 7.

‘So the sources of witticisms and pointed, pungent, vivid things in general, and the reason why (they are such; their raison d’être), have been pretty well explained’. I have omitted τὸ ἀίτιον as a mere tautological repetition of διότι. On the three senses of διότι see note on I 1.11. Here the sense of “why” is proved by the explanatory τὸ ἀίτιον.

§ 15. ‘All approved hyperboles are also metaphors’, i.e. a mere hyperbola, without metaphor, will not be approved. On the hyperbole, Auct. ad Heren. IV 33. 44, superlatio est oratio superans veritatem ali causa, et seq. Cic. Topic. c. x § 45, aut aliquid quod fieri nullo modo possit angendae rei gratia dicatur, aut minuendae, quae hyperbole dicitur. Quint. VIII 6. 67—76, Hyperbolein audacioris ornatus summo loco posuit. Est hae decens veri superiectio. Virtus eius ex diverso par angendi atque minuendi. Then follow the description and illustration of its several varieties. In Ernesti, Lex. Techn. (both Greek and Latin), hyperbole is omitted. ὑπερβολή is in fact ‘exaggeration’. ‘For instance (what was said) to (or against, for the purpose of exaggeration, making the most of it) the man with the black eye, “you’d have taken him for a basket of mulberries”. For the black eye1 is something red’ (and so is the mulberry; the colour is similar; and

1 τὸ ὑπάτιον, which stands here for ‘a black eye’, is originally nothing but the seat of that, the part that is under the eye. It is thence transferred to the signification of the discoloured surface that results from a blow under the eye (ὑπανω-
There is a metaphor from one red thing—purple is nearer to the true colour—to another, έλθεν πρὸς έλθον; ‘but the hyperbole or exaggeration’ (σφόδρα, which distinguishes it from metaphor) ‘lies in the excessive quantity’, (i. e. in the absurdly exaggerated number of black spots represented by a whole basket of mulberries. Victorius). According to Theophrastus, de Caus. Plant. vi 6. 4, there are two kinds of mulberries, red and white, έρυθρόν καὶ λευκόν. This is an instance of Quintilian’s first variety of hyperbole; quinm plus facto dicimus, direct exaggeration; of which two examples are given. Victorius refers to the saying of an Athenian wag about Sulla, συκάμινον ἐσθ’ ὁ Σύλλας ἀλφίτος πεπαμένον, “Sulla (i. e. his face) is like a mulberry powdered with flour”, in Plutarch [Sulla, c. 2, p. 451 F].

‘And another (kind of phrase) like so and so’ (comp. τα καὶ τα, infra c. 17. 11; this seems to mean the two preceding examples, which are here repeated, and others like them) ‘is a hyperbole, differing from it merely by the form of the expression (it becomes a hyperbole by dropping the particle of comparison, ὅσπερ). Thus “like Philammon at close quarters with the sack”, (may be thrown into the form of a hyperbole, thus,) “you would have taken him for Philammon fighting the sack”.

Again, “to wear his legs curly like parsley”, becomes “you’d have thought his legs not legs, but parsley, so crooked are they”. This is Quintilian’s second variety of hyperbole, u. s. § 68, superiectio pr. similitudinem, aut per comparationem: illustrated by Crescis innare resulias Cyclades, Virg. Aen. viii. 691.

§ 16. ‘The hyperbole has a juvenile character, signifying vehemence: and therefore they are most used by people when they are angry; “No, not if he were to offer me gifts as the sand or dust for multitude” (or gifts in number like the sand or dust). “And the daughter of Agamemnon παρακληθο—to the special for the general—ὑπωταίου being to ‘strike, or inflict a blow under the eye’, and ὑπωτασιασμένον here ‘one so struck’, including the resulting discolouration. See for exemplifications of all three, Arist. Pax 541, Acharn. 551, Vesp. 1386. Fragm. Apollon. 1. Vol. ii 880, Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr., κόμην (a cupping-glass) τοῦ ὑπωτίου, Antiph. 13. 5, Vol. iii 130. Ἰβ., στάσων στάσει, ἐκχυ μάχειν ὑπωτίως ἐπὶ πάρτην (ἐξελαύνει). Eubul. Semele s. Dionysus. Fr. 1. 8, ἐκτός τε (κρατῆρ) κᾶμον, ἐξάσμος δ’ ὑπωτίων. Meineke u.s. 14. Vol. ii. 29.
PHITORIKHΣ Γ § 16; 12 § 1. 143

δηλοῦσιν. διὸ ὀργήκομενοι λέγουσι μᾶλιστα:
οὐδ’ εἰ μοι τόσα δοῖν ὅσα ψάμαθος τε κόνις τε.
κούρην δ’ οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρείδαο,
οὐδ’ εἰ χρυσεῖν Ἀφροδίτη κάλλος ἑρίζοι,
ἔργα δ’ Ἀθηναίη.

χρώνται δὲ μᾶλιστα τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ρήτορες. διὸ π. 1413δ
πρεσβυτέρω λέγειν ἀπρεπές.

1 ἔδει δὲ μὴ λεληθέναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστῳ γένει ἄρ-
μόττει λέξεις. οὐ γὰρ ἣ αὐτὴ γραφική καὶ ἄγω-
νυστική, οὐδὲ δημηγορική καὶ δικανική. ἀμφοὶ δὲ
son of Atreus will I not wed, no, not though she vied in beauty with golden Aphrodite, and in accomplishments [deftness of handiwork] with Athene", comp. III 7. 11. II I [IX] 385 (the angry Achilles indignantly refusing Agamemnon’s offered presents). μετακικώθεις is here meant to convey the fire, vigour, spirit, impetuosity, proneness to passion and excitement; or in general ‘vehemence’, as he tells us; which are characteristic of early youth. It is used by Plato [Rep. 466 b, and 498 b] in the sense of ‘puerile’. The latter usually represents this by νεανίκος, which he uses in two opposite senses, of the good and bad qualifications of youth; either gallant, spirited, generous, noble, splendid and such like, or rash, wanton, insolent: also νεανιας and νεανιΐςθα.

‘This figure is an especial favourite with the Attic orators’.

‘And this is why the use of it is unbecoming to an elderly man’—not because, as might be supposed from the arrangement of the sentences, it was such a favourite with the Attic orators but—because it is a juvenile trait of character, and as such must be inappropriate to the opposite.

[It may be doubted whether the awkward remark, χρώνται δὲ μᾶλιστα τούτῳ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ρήτορες, which is a parenthetical note immediately succeeding another parenthesis and breaking the connexion between the beginning and the end of the section, was really written by Aristotle at all. The phrase οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ρήτορες, which is not found elsewhere in Aristotle (though we have οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ρήτορες, infia 17 § 10), is peculiarly open to suspicion, and may perhaps be ascribed to the pen of some Alexandrine critic familiar with the canon of the Ten ‘Attic Orators’.]

CHAP. XII.

We now return for the last time to the subject of propriety of style, on which in this chapter we have some concluding observations. Rhetorical propriety must shew itself in the due adaptation of style to matter; and consequently the three branches of Rhetoric must be treated each in its appropriate style. We therefore distinguish two kinds of speeches, and two styles appropriate to them; (1) ‘debate’, speaking in the actual strife or contest of the assembly and the law-court, εγω-
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 12 § 1.

άνάγκη εἰδέναι τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασκοπᾶν, ἀν τι
νοστικὴ λέξις, and (2) γραφική, written compositions, which are confined
to the third or epideictic branch: and the first is again subdivided
into (a) public speaking, popular harangues addressed to the assembly, and
(b) forensic. This is only true in theory: in practice speeches were often
written by the orators, as Demosthenes and Isocrates, for the use of
those who were incompetent or unwilling to write and plead for them-
selves.

Under the head of γραφική λέξις are included all compositions
which are intended to be read, and consequently the whole range of literature,
with the exception of speeches which are intended to be delivered or
acted, deliberative and forensic, public and private orations—such as
those of Demosthenes. Thus the third branch of Rhetoric, the ἑπι-
δεικτική, is made to embrace all poetry, philosophy, history, and indeed
any writing on any subject whatsoever. The distinction coincides with
that of Hermogenes, περὶ θεών τομ. β'. περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου (see
Rhet. Gr. II. p. 401 seq. Spengel), who divides composition into λόγους
συμβολευτικοί, δικαιικοί, and πανηγυρικοί, the last including the works of
Homer and Plato, the most distinguished of poets and prose writers.

The declamations delivered at the Olympian Games and other great
public festivals or assemblies πανηγύρεις, whence the name πανηγυρικοὶ
λόγοι—such as Isocrates' Panegyric1 and Panathenaic orations, and
Lysias' celebrated 'Ολυμπιακός, of which a short fragment is preserved,
(Or. 33, Bailer et Sauppe, Or. Att. 1 146)—were intermediate between the
public or agonistic and the epideictic or graphic speeches, partaking of
the character of both: being declaimed in public and sometimes with a
political object (as Lysias' speech, and some of Isocrates'), but that object
was subordinate, the main consideration being always the display.
Isocrates is always anxious to impress his readers with the conviction that his
speeches are not mere empty declamations, ἑπιδείξεις, but genuine πολι-
tικοὶ λόγοι—are indeed a branch of Philosophy, which with him is pretty
nearly convertible with Rhetoric, see κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν §§ 1, 11, 21, and
Mr Sandys' note on Paneg. § 10. ['Isocrates means by "Philosophy" a
combination of the accomplishments of the ἄρητορ and the πολιτικός'.
Thompson's Phaedrus, p. 172.]

Isocrates, writing from his point of view, ἀντίδ. §§ 46—50, contrasts
himself and his own declamations, which he calls Ἐλληνικοῖς καὶ πολι-
tικοῖς καὶ πανηγυρικοῖς, with δικαιικοὶ λόγοι, forensic pleading and plead-
ers, whom, probably in consequence of his own failure in that branch
of Rhetoric, he attacks and vituperates upon intellectual, social, and
moral grounds. Writing before the establishment of Aristotle's three-
fold division of the art, he evidently recognises only two branches,
public or political speaking, in which national interests are concerned—
and at the head of these he places his own πανηγυρικοὶ λόγοι, the true
philosophy (§ 50)—and judicial or forensic, in which private interests

1 See on this, Mr Sandys' Introduction to Isocratis Panegyricus, p. xi. seq.
RHETORIKHΣ Γ 12 §§ 1, 2.

βούληται μεταδούναι τούς ἀλλοις, ὁ περ πάσχουσιν 2 οί μη ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφική

between man and man are debated and decided. In respect of style, he of course gives the preference to his own kind of composition, §§ 46, 7.

On this adaptation of style to the different kinds of oratory, see Quint. VIII 3. 11—14. The opening observation, at all events, looks like a reference to this chapter, though Spalding in his note is silent on the subject.

Whately also, in his Rhet. c. IV 'on Elocution', (Encycl. Metrop. p. 299 b, 300 a, 301 b,) has some good observations, partly derived from Aristotle, upon the contrast of the agonistic and graphic styles. On the contrast of the two, see by all means Isocr. Phil. §§ 25, 26: all the main points of interest in public and forensic, or agonistic, speeches are there enumerated, and the comparatively lifeless speeches to be read, forcibly contrasted with them. [Comp. also Alcidamas, περί τῶν τοὺς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφικῶν, (against Isocrates).]

§ 1. 'It must not be forgotten (lost sight of) that a different kind of language is appropriate to each different kind (of Rhetoric). For the same style is not suitable to written composition (that which is intended to be read) and that which is used in debate (in the contests, the actual struggle, of real life; nor again in (the two divisions of the latter) public and forensic speaking. The orator must be acquainted with both: for the one (debate) implies the knowledge and power of clear expression in pure Greek, and the other freedom from the necessity (lit. the not being obliged to) of suppressing in silence (κατά, keeping down) anything that one may want to communicate to the rest of the world; which is the case with those who have no knowledge (or skill) of writing (i.e. composition)'. Comp. III 1. 7. Cicero, de Or. II 82. 337, gives a brief description of the 'grand' and dignified style appropriate to the exalted subjects of public speaking.

The meaning of this seems to be—the orator must be acquainted with the written as well as the debating style; the latter implies and requires only the correct use of one's native language, so that one may be able to make oneself clearly intelligible: this (debate alone) does not require the minute accuracy of studied composition, which can be examined at leisure and criticized: but since one who can only speak, and not write, is incapable of communicating his opinions to the rest of the world (τοῖς ἄλλοις, all others besides the members of the assembly or law-court that he is actually addressing), it is necessary for a statesman to acquire the power of writing well, and therefore to study in some degree the art of exact composition. Victorius, who renders τὸ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι—τοῖς ἄλλοις of actual writing, that is of letters to absent friends, seems to narrow the meaning of 'writing' in such a way as to produce a somewhat ridiculous result. Surely any educated man, whether he be an orator and statesman or not, requires and possesses the knowledge of writing in that sense. On τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἐλθάντος ἐπιστάμενοι, Thuc. II 60, 5—6 may serve as a commentary; Pericles, in his defence, describing his qualifications for a statesman, says οὐδενὸς οἴμοι ἡσσων εἶναι γνώναι τε τὰ δεότα

AR. III.
"The written style is the most exact" (or finished: on ἀκριβεστάτη, ἁγωνιστική δὲ ἑ ὑποκριτικωτάτην. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἴδη: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἥδικη ὡς παθητική. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Βασταζονται καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα... τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ὦφ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐννοημήβη.

§ 2. The written style is the most exact (or finished: on ἀκριβεστά and its various senses, see Grant ad Eth. Nic. I 7. 18, and the references in Introd. ad h. l. p. 334, note 4), 'that of debate lends itself most to acting' (or delivery: is the 'most capable of being acted'). Comp. III 1. 4. The reason of this as far as declamation is concerned, viz. why the graphic style admits of more ornament and artificial arrangement than the other, is thus stated by Cicero, Orat. LXI 208. After the invention of the period, &c., he says, nemo qui aliquo esset in numero scripsit orationem generis eius, quod esset ad delectationem comparatum remotumque a judicis fore in quadrum numerumque sententias. Nam quum est auditor, qui non veracur ne compositionis insidiis sua fides attentatur, gratiam quoque habet oratoris volupitatis aurium servienti.

Of this (ἁγωνιστική) there are two kinds; one that (includes, conveys), represents character, the other emotion (in the speech). That is, not that ἁγωνιστική is a genus, containing two species under it, moral and emotional: for this is not the fact, and also any speech may have both: but that these two elements belong specially, not exclusively, to the two debating branches of Rhetoric, of which they are the very prominent ingredients: the reality of the interests at stake giving more room for the play of passion and the assumption of character than the cold unpassioned, deliberate written compositions. The ethical part is of two kinds, the ἡδος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, I 2. 4, II 1. 4, and the characters ἡδος of the several ages and conditions, II 12. 17. The emotional is of course that which is partially described I 2. 5, and treated at length in II 2. 16. Of these 'appeals to the feelings', δείνωσις and ἔλεος, the earlier rhetorical treatises were full, I 1. 3, of which Thrasymachus' ἔλεοι (III 1. 7) described by Plato, Phaedr. 267 c, was a well-known specimen. Quint. III 8. 12, (in concionibus deliberatio) affectus, ut quae maxima, positulat, seq. Valet autem in consiliiis auctoritas (this is principally due to ἡδος) plurimum, seq. See III 7. 1, 3, 6, where the two are described. The ἡδος is there confined to those of age, nation, station, &c. Compare with all this, Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας § 193, ἐναγώνιοι μὲν οὕτως μάλλον ἡ διαλειμμένη λέξις, αὕτη καὶ ὑποκριτικὴ καλεῖται καὶ ο杂物 γὰρ ύπόκρισιν ἡ λέξις. γραφική δὲ λέξεις ἢ εἰανάγωναστος. αὕτη δὲ ἐστιν ἡ συνηρτημένη καὶ άυτον ἡσυχασμένη τοῦς συνδέσμους. διὰ τούτο δὲ καὶ Μέναδρον ὑποκρίνονται λεξιμένον εἰς τοὺς πλείστους, Φιλίμωνα δὲ ἀναγνώσκουσι.

'And this is why actors also (as well as debaters) hunt after (διώκουσι) plays of this kind (that is, plays of which the subjects give scope for the exhibitions of passion and character), and the poets after persons (whether actors to represent the πάθη, or characters in the dramas to be represented with them) of the same kind. At the same time, the poets
that can be read (that write to be read as well as acted or rhapsodised) become pocket-companions, or favourites'.

*βαστάζεσθαι* is said of anything that is carried about in the hand or arms, fondled, cherished, fondly and familiarly treated, like a baby or pet lapdog; and hence when applied to a book naturally means one that people are fond of, and carry about with them in their pockets. There are several instances in Sophocles—see Ellenlet's Lex.—that illustrate this sense of *βαστάζεσθαι*, as Philoct. 655 of the favourite bow and 657, (Neopt.) ἐστιν ὁστε...καὶ βαστάζει με (be allowed to nurse it), προσκύνει β' ὁσπέρ θεόν; Aesch. Agam. 34, εὔφιλη χέρα ἄνακτος τῇδε βαστάσαι (to press and caress) χέρι (Blomfield's Glos. ad loc.). Quint. VIII 3. 12, of any striking sentiment or expression, intuentium (to be narrowly looked into) et paene pertraetàndum.

'Chaeremon for instance who is as exact (highly finished) as a professional speech-writer (such as Isocrates), and Lycymniius amongst the dithyrambic poets'. On Chaeremon, see note II 23. 29, ult. [The *ἀκρίβεια* of Chaeremon may be illustrated by his partiality for minute details, such as enumerating the flowers of a garland, e.g. Athenaeus xv p. 679 F, κάστορ τε ναρκίσσω φτερέλλα κύκλω στεφάνων ἐλεκτῶν.] On λογογράφος, see II 11. 7; Shilleto on Dem. de F. L. § 274. Lycymniius is mentioned above, III 2. 13, where reference is made to Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7, for an account of what is known of him; and again III 13. 5.

'And upon comparison the (speeches, λόγοι) of the writers when delivered in actual contests have a narrow, confined, contracted (i.e. poor, mean, paltry) appearance, whilst those of the orators (meaning particularly the public speakers, in the assembly), which by their skilful delivery succeed or pass muster' (none of this is expressed but 'well delivered'), 'when taken in the hands (to read) look like the work of mere bunglers or novices'. *στενὸς* is the Latin *tenuis*, and the English *slight* and *sleender*, in a contemptuous and depreciatory sense. In its primary sense of narrow it stands in opposition, in respect of style, to the wider range, and the broader, larger, freer, bolder, tone required by the loftier and more comprehensive subjects, and also by the larger audiences, of public speakers; the high finish and minute artifices of structure, as well as the subtler and finer shades of intonation and expression, are lost in a crowd and in the open air. So Whately, Rhet. ch. IV (Encycl. Metrop. p. 301 a), describes the *agonistic* style, as "a style somewhat more blunt (than the *graphic*) and homely, more simple and, apparently, unstudied in its structure, and at the same time more daringly energetic." *στενὸς* then

1 [So in Intro. p. 325, after Victorius and Majoragius, but compare Mr Cope's second thoughts as given in the note on the same page: "*ἐὸ* λεξιθέντες can mean nothing but 'well spoken of', ἤτορος being understood." ]
represents the comparative narrowness or confined character of the graphic style, with its studied artificial graces, careful composition, and other such 'paltrinesses', 'things mean and trifling'—a sense in which it occurs in a parallel passage of Pl. Gorg. 497 c, where σμικρά καὶ στενά are contemptuously applied by Callicles to Socrates' dialectics. This is actually said of Isocrates, in the passage of Dionysius, de Isocr. lud. c. 13, by Hieronymus, the philosopher of Rhodes ; ἁναγνώσα μεν ἂν τινα διψιθὴν τοις λόγοις αὐτοῦ (Isocr.) καλῶς, δημιουργὸς δὲ τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν τύχον ἐπάραστα, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ κατασκευῇ μετὰ τῆς ἁμοστούσης ὑποκρίσεως εἰπεῖν, οὐ παντελῶς.

ioni) such as have only the capacity (-kós) of unprofessional persons, or laymen in art, &c. as opposed to clerks, when all science and learning were in the hands of the clergy. ιδιωτής is opposed to δη-μιουργός, a practitioner of any art, science, profession, or pursuit: and especially to philosophy and its professors, as in the adage, ιδιωτὴς ἐν φιλοσοφοῖς, φιλοσοφός ἐν ιδιωταῖς.

Spengel follows MS A' (or A) in reading ἦ τῶν λεξιθέντων for εὖ λεξιθέντες. But I confess that I do not see who could be intended by τῶν λεξιθέντων besides the orators. Certainly not the preceding ἁναγνωστικόν.

ιδιωτικόν ἐν ταῖς χερσίων) This must have been the case with Cicero's rival, Hortensius. Quintilian [XI 3.8], after telling us that Hortensius was, during his lifetime, first thought to be chief of all orators, secondly Cicero's rival, and thirdly second to him alone, adds, ut appareat placuisse aliquid eo dicente quod legentes non inventinus (the same may be said of many sermons). Isocrates' Phil. §§ 25, 26, an excellent commentary on this, is unfortunately too long to quote.

'The reason is that their appropriate place is in an actual contest or debate' (with ἀρμότες supply, if you please, ταύτα as the nomin.—it means at all events the subject of the immediately preceding clause): 'and this also is why things (speeches) intended to be acted or delivered (lit. proper to be, or capable of being, -kós), when the delivery is withdrawn don't produce their own proper effect (or perform their special function, ἔργον), and so appear silly: for instance asyndeta, and the reiteration of the same word in the written, graphic style'—with which the agonistic divested of its acting or delivery is now (surreptitiously) associated—'are rightly disapproved; whereas in debating the orators do employ them, because they are proper for acting'. Aquila c. 30 (ap. Gaisford, Not. Var.), Ideoque et Aristotelis et iteratio ipsa verborum ac nominum et repetitio frequentior, et omnis huius modi motus actioni magis et certamini quam stilo videtur convenire.
§ 3. What follows is a note, a passing observation suggested by the subject, but not immediately connected with it. 'In this repetition of the same thing, some change must be made in the mode of expression of each member of it': (the repetition should be made in different words, to avoid monotony. See on the interpretation of this, and the figure μεταβολή, to which μεταβάλλειν points, a full explanation, Introd. p. 326, and note 1:) 'which paves the way as it were for the delivery' (on προδοτικοί, see note on 1. 2). "This is he that stole from you, this is he that cheated you, this is he that last of all attempted to betray you". (From an unknown rhetorician; most probably not the author's own.) 'And again, as another instance, what Philemon the actor (not to be confounded with the Comic poet) used to do in Anaxandrides' Old men's madness, where (lit. when, ὅτε) he says (uses the words in playing his part) "Rhadamantys and Palamedes," and also, in the prologue of the Devotees, the word ἐγὼ: for if such things (phrases, sentences, or words) as these be not (varied) in the delivery, they become like "the man that carries the beam," in the proverb (οὗτος), i.e. stiff and awkward, like one that has 'swallowed a poker', as our proverb has it.

Anaxandrides, quoted before, III 10.7. The first citation from his comedy, the γεγονόταμα, has the rest of the verse supplied in Athen. XIV 614 C, καί τοι πολύ γε παροίμεν. τὸν ἀσύμβολον εὕρε γελοία λέγειν Ῥάδαμανθὺς καὶ Παλαμῆδης. On the passage of Aristotle, which he quotes, Meineke, Fr. Comic. Gr. III 166, has the following remark: "Philemon autem quid fecerit in recitandis verbis P. καί Π., non satis apparat." I don't suppose the repetition to have been confined to these words; all that Aristotle means to say seems to be, when Philemon had come to that point, thereafter, the repetition took place. "Num forte eadem verba in pluribus deinceps versibus recitabantur et alio atque alio vocis flexu et sono ab histrione recitabantur? (This follows Victorius' interpretation of μεταβάλλειν.) Ita sane videtur, neque alia alterius loci fuerit ratio, in quo identidem repetebatur pronomen ἐγώ." At all events, these were two notorious and well-remembered points made by Philemon in this varied repetition in acting the character which he sustained in these two comedies. There is, or was, a similar tradition (which I heard from Dr Butler, the late Bp of Lichfield, and Master of Shrewsbury School) of the effect produced by Garrick's rendering of Pray you undo this button:—thank you, sir,—of Lear, choking in his agony, at the point of death [V. III. 309].

3 ὑποκριτικά. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας: ὁ περ ὡς προδοτικοὶ τῷ ὑποκρίνεσθαι. "οὔτὸς ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὔτὸς ἐστιν ὁ ἐξαπατήσας, οὔτος ὁ τὸ ἐσχάτον προδούναι ἐπιχειρήσας." οἴον καὶ Φίλημων ὁ ὑποκριτὴς ἔποιει ἐν τῇ Ἀναξαν-

드리δίῳ γεφορτομανίᾳ, ὅτε λέγει Ῥάδαμανθύς καὶ Πα-

λαμῆδης, καὶ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῶν εὐσεβῶν τὸ ἐγὼ:

ἐάν γάρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται ο

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§ 4. 'And of asyndeta the same may be said, “I came, I met, I implored”‘. I have translated this upon the supposition that there is no intention of distinguishing here the aorist and imperfect: ‘for (here again) delivery (i.e. intonation) must come into play, and it must not be spoken as if it were all one, with the same character and accent’. Of ἀσύνδετον or λίσσις, the disconnected style, in which σύνδεσμοι ‘connecting particles’ are absent, comp. Demetrius, π. ἐρμηνείας § 194, ὅτι δὲ ὑποκριτικὸν ἡ λίσσις παράδειγμα ἐγκείσθα τόδε, ἐξεδάμην, ἐτίκτον, ἐκτρέφω, φιλε (Menander, F.R. Inc. 230, Meineke, u.s. IV 284).’ οὕτως γὰρ λευγόνων ἀναγκάει καὶ τῶν μὴ βίλοντα ὑποκρίνεια διὰ τὴν λίσσιν: εἰ δὲ συνδέσμοι εἴποι, ἐξεδάμην καὶ ἐτίκτον καὶ ἐκτρέφω, πολλῇ ἀπάθειαν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐμβαθεῖς. Of asyndeton two examples are given from Demosthenes by Hermogenes π. μεθόδου διενώτητος, § 11, Rhct. Gr. II 435, Spengel.

A good example of asyndeton, illustrating the rapidity and vivacity which it imparts to style, is supplied by Victorius from Demosth. c. Androt. § 68, ὦρμω μετώπεσις, Ἀθήναια, δεόν, ἄπαγω, βασώ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐπὶ τῶν βήματος. Add Cicero’s abiti, excessit, evasit, erupit.

The vivacity imparted to style by asyndeton and the opposite (the employment of connecting particles) is admirably explained and illustrated by Campbell, Phil. of Rhct. Bk. III sect. 2, near the end (2nd ed. Vol. II pp. 287—293.)

‘Further asyndeta have a certain special property; that (by their aid) many things seem to be said in the same time’ (as one thing would be, if they had been employed); ‘because the connecting particle (or connexion) converts several things into one, (Harris, Hermes, II 2, p. 240,) and therefore if it be withdrawn (extracted), plainly the contrary will take place; one will become many. Accordingly (the asyndeton) exaggerates (or amplifies: or multiplies, increases the number): ‘I came, I conversed, I supplicated’: (the hearer or reader) seems to overlook or survey a number of things that he (the speaker) said’. (I have followed Bekker, Ed. 3, πολλὰ δοκεῖ ὑπενδείῳ ὡς εἶπεν. Spengel has, πολλὰ δοκεῖ,

1 The opposite of this, the employment of σύνδεσμος, sometimes tends to produce the same effect. Demetr. π. ἐρμηνείας, § 54, ὃς παρ’ Ὀμηρῷ (II. B 497), τῶν Βοιωτικῶν πολέων τὰ ὅρματα εὐτέλη ὡς καὶ μικρὰ ὄγκον τινὰ ἔχει καὶ μέγεθος διὰ τὸν συνδεσμὸν κ.τ.λ., and again, § 63.
ΠΡΟΣΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 12 §§ 4, 5.

Νιρέος αὐ τῷ Σύμηθεν,
Νιρέος Ἀγλαίης,
Νιρέος ὁς καλλιστός.

περὶ οὖ γὰρ πολλὰ εἰρήται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρήσθαι· εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὡστε ηὔξησεν ἀπαξ μυθῆθησι διὰ τῶν παραλογισμῶν, καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὑστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος,

§ 5 ἂς οὖν δημηγορική λέξει καὶ παντελῶς έσοικε τῇ

ιππείδεω σαί εἴπων, which does not agree with MS A, and is also ob-

scurer. Bekker, Ed. 1, has πολλά δοκεί δε ιππείδεω σαί εἴπων, σαί φημί].

'And this is Homer's intention also in writing Nireus at the commen-

ccement of three lines running'. II. Π 671. On this Demetrius, π. ἔρ-

μηνειάς §§ 61, 62, τῶν δὲ Νιρέα, αὐτῶν τε ὡντα μικρῶν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτῶν

μικρότερα—all this is raised to magnitude and importance by ἐπαναφορά,

repetition, and δίωνος, asyndeton. He then quotes the three lines; and,

§ 62, continues, καὶ σχέδων ἀπαξ τοῦ Νιρέων ὄνομασθεῖτο ἐν τῷ δράματι (dra-

matic poetry) μεμνημέθα ούδεν ἦτον ἦ τοῦ 'Αχιλλεώς καὶ τοῦ 'Οδυσσέως, κατά

κατ’ ἔτος ἐκισσῶν καλομεμένων σχέδων κ.τ.λ. concluding with an ingenious

simile; ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεις τὰ ὀλύγα διαταχθέντα πως (a few meats

by a certain disposition or arrangement) πολλὰ φαίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς λόγοις.

Comp. also Hermogenes, περὶ ἐπαναληψιῶν, de repetitione, π. μεθοδῶν

dεινότητος, § 9 (Rhet. Gr. Π 433, Spengel), who gives this example of

Nireus, with others from Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. Illus-

trations of this emphatic repetition, and especially of that of the pro-

noun αὐτός, occur in a fragm. of Aeschyl., Fragm. Inc. 266, quoted at

length in Plat. Rep. II 383 B, the most forcible of them all: καγώ (Thetis)

τὰ φοιβῶν θεόν ἀνέφες στόμα ἥπισθον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρῶν τέχνῃ. ὡ δ’

αὐτός ύψων, αὐτὸς ἐν βοίνῃ παρῶν, αὐτός τάδ’ εἰσών, αὐτός ἔστων ὁ κατανόων

τὰ πλάθα τῶν ἔρμ. After this it will be unnecessary to quote inferior speci-

mens; such as Xen. Anab. III 2. 4, Aesch. Eumen. 765, with Paley's

note, and Blomfield's note on 745, in Linwood's ed. p. 188, where several

references are given.

'For a person (or thing) of which many things are said must neces-

sarily be often mentioned; and therefore (this is a fallacy) they think it

follows (καί, that it is also true) that if the name is often repeated, there

must be a great deal to say about its owner: so that by this fallacy (the

poet) magnifies (Nireus) by mentioning him only once (i.e. in one place),

and makes him famous though he nowhere afterwards speaks of him

again'. This is the fallacy of illicit conversion of antecedent and conse-

quent, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 1, ὡ δὲ παραπόμονον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ ὑστερθαι

ἀντιστρήψει τῆν ἀκολούθησαν κ.τ.λ. and Rhet. I 7. 5. Analogous to this is

the fallacy exposed in III 7. 4.

§ 5. It seems as if in the following section Aristotle had, probably

unconsciously misled by the ambiguous term, used ἀκροβίζη and its πτώ-
σκιαγραφίας: ὅσω γὰρ ἐν πλείων ἡ ὁ χλος, πορρωτέρω ἡ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περίεργα καὶ χείρω φαινεῖν in two distinct senses: exactness and high finish in style and reasoning. The general subject and connexion of the chapter will oblige us to refer the first clause, with its comparison of public speaking to a rough sketch in black and white, without details, and producing no effect on close inspection, to the style of the speech—which indeed is the subject of the whole book as well as this chapter—though it may possibly include also minute details of reasoning. The same thing may be said of ἡ διή ἀκριβεστερον: in this the style and the argument may be minutier, exacter and more detailed in proportion to the diminished size of the audience, and the increased probability of their paying attention to such things (see note ad loc.). But when we come to the third degree, the single judge, it seems to be false and absurd to say that exactness and high finish of style is more suited to speeches addressed to him: no man would endeavour to attract or impose upon an arbitrator by such artifices. The exactness in this case seems therefore to be confined to exactness of reasoning and minute detail, as of evidence and the like. A single judge—as in our own courts—would always be more patient, more inclined to listen to, and more influenced by, exact reasoning and circumstantial evidence than either of the two preceding: the mob of the assembly would not hear them, nor follow them, nor listen to them at all: the large body of dicasts would be more ready to do so: but most of all the single judge. The last clause of the section brings us back to the point from which it started, viz. differences of style, and seems to apply this exclusively to what has been said of ἀκριβεία in forensic pleading.

'Now the style of public-speaking is exactly like scene-painting; for the greater the crowd, the more distant the point of view, and consequently' (in these crowded assemblies; held too in the open air—which should be added in respect of the style required, though this does not distinguish it from forensic rhetoric,) 'all exactness, minute and delicate touches, and high finish in general appear to be superfluous and for the worse (deviating from the true standard of public speaking) in both'. Compare with this Whately's remarks, partly borrowed from Ar., Rhet. c. iv (Encycl. Metrop. p. 299), on the "bolder, as well as less accurate, kind of language allowable and advisable in speaking to a considerable number": he quotes Ar.'s comparison of scene-painting, and then proceeds "to account for these phenomena"—which Ar. has omitted to do. His explanation is derived from the various sympathies which are especially awakened in a great crowd.

σκιαγραφία is a painting in outline and chiaroscuro, or light and shade, without colour, and intended to produce its effect only at a distance—herein lies the analogy to public speaking—consequently rough and unfinished, because from the distance all niceties and refinements in style and finish would be entirely thrown away (περίεργα). This point is well brought out in a parallel passage of Plat. Theaet. 208 γ, νῦν δήτα, ο Θ., παντάπασι γε ἕως ἐπειδὴ ἐγγύς ὀπέρ σκιαγράφηματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ἔννοια ουδε σμικρόν ἔως ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν ἐφαινέτο μοι τῇ λέγεσθαι.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 12 § 5. 153

νεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἢ δὲ δικανική ἀκριβεστέρα. ἐτι
dὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνὶ κρίτῃ ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν ῥητο-
ρικοῖς· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγ-

1 Correxist Tyrwhitt; secutus est Bekker et Spengel. MSS δικὴ ἀκριβεστέραν.

(Heindorf, note ad loc.): “as long as he was at a distance he seemed to understand the meaning of what was said; on a nearer approach all the apparent clearness vanished, and it became confused and indistinct.” In Ἰαδό, 69 B, σκιαγραφία is a mere rough sketch or outline; a daub, without any distinct features (see Wytenbach ad loc.). Parmen. 165 C, οἶνον ἐσκιαγραφήμενα, ἄποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα,... προσελθόντι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἑτέρα. Rep. X 602 D. Ἰβ. II 365 C, where it has the same sense as in the Ἰαδό. Ast ad loc. Comm. p. 410. And in several other passages of Plato. As the point of comparison here is solely the difference between the near and distant effects, I have translated it ‘scene-painting’ (as also Whately) which represents this better to us: the proper and literal meaning of the word is “the outline of a shadow”, the supposed origin of painting. See further in Mr Wornum’s art. on ‘painting’, in Dict. Ant. p. 680 b. With πορρωτέρῳ ἡ θεύ, comp. de Soph. El. I 164 b 27, where the ‘appearance’ as opposed to the ‘reality’, is compared to this distant view, φανεται δὲ δὲ ἀπειρίαν οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροῦ ὁσπερ ἐν ἀπέξοντες πόρ-

ῥωθεὶς θεωροῦσιν.

ἡ δὲ δικὴ ἀκριβεστέραν] ‘Whereas justice (forensic pleading) admits of more exactness and finish’. The audience is less numerous, and nearer, literally and metaphorically, to the speaker; they are nearer to him locally, so they can hear better what he says, and also nearer to him in respect of the knowledge of persons and circumstances, which permits him to enter into more minute detail. Also they are not personally interested in the dispute, and can afford to bestow more attention upon minutaie of style, action, intonation, and such like, and being comparatively unoccupied are more likely to notice and criticize such things. All these are reasons why ἡ δικη is ἀκριβεστέραν in various senses. See Quint. III 8.62 seq. After speaking of the declamatory style, he continues, Alia veris consiliis ratio est; idque Theophrastus quam maxime remotum ab omnī affectatione in deliberativo genere voluit esse sermonem: secutus in hoc auctoritatem praeceptoris sui; quamquam disserte ab eo non timide solet. Namque Aristoteles idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrati-

vam, proximamque ab ea judicialem putavit et seq.

‘And still further (in respect of the reduction of the number of hearers, and the consequent admissibility of accuracy and finish in the speech) that (subaudi δικη, the pleading) before a single judge: for he is least of all subject to (liable to be imposed on by) rhetorical artifices (appeals to the feelings and the like); for he takes a more comprehensive view of what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it (this seems to define the kind of ἀκριβεια that is here intended) and the contest is absent (there is no room for partisanship and prejudice) and his judgment clear or pure (i.e. free and unbiassed; sincerum, pure of all alloy, such as the preceding). And this is why the
same orators don’t succeed (become popular, distinguish themselves) in all these (at once): but where action or delivery is most required, there is least of exact action to be found. [With ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπεστὼν comp. Cic. ad Att. i 16. 8 remoto illo studio contentions quis augeat vos apellatis.]

With μάλιστα ὑποκρίσεως something must be supplied: whether we should understand δει or the like; or simply ἔστι, ‘when it (the speech, or the thing in general,) belongs to, is concerned with, when it is a question of, delivery’. ‘And this where voice is required, and especially loud voice’ (to reach a larger assembly).

φωνή, voice in general, means the various qualities of voice, flexibility, sweetness, power, &c.; out of which a powerful voice is especially distinguished as the most important. It seems that Aeschines was very proud of his sonorous voice. Demosth. alludes to this, de F. L. § 383, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀλλως ἐνταῦθ’ ἐπαρεί τὴν φωνῆν καὶ πεφωνασκοκός ἔσται. And § 389, καὶ τοι καὶ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἐναὶ εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη πάνω γάρ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ φρονεῖν αὐτῶν ἀκόνω. And elsewhere.

§ 6. ‘So now, as I was saying, the demonstrative, declamatory, branch of Rhetoric is the best adapted for writing; for its special function (the purpose which it was made to serve, its ἔργον) is reading: and in the second degree the dicastic branch’ (and its pleadings). Comp. supra III 1.4 and 7. Cic. Orat. LXI 208 (already referred to). Quint. u. s. (III 8.63) referring to this place, Namque Ar. idoneam maxime ad scribendum demonstrativam, proximamque ab ea judicialem putavit: videlicet quoniam prior illa tota esset ostentationis; have secunda egerat artis, vel ad fallendum, si ita poposisset utilitas; consilia fide prudentiagae constant. It is very manifest, and had already been pointed out by Victorius and Spalding, ad loc. Arist. et Quint., that this is not Aristotle’s meaning.

‘To make the further distinction, that the language must be sweet and magnificent is superfluous’—the author of this ‘distinction’ is Theodectes, in his ‘Art.’ Quint. IV 2.63, Theodect...non magnificam modo vult esse, verum etiam incundam expositionem—1 for why that more

1 The ἔργον of a thing is always directed to its τέλος. If the end of a knife and of a horse be respectively to cut and to run, their ἔργον will be fulfilled in sharpness and fleetness. So here the end of one of these compositions is to be read, its ἔργον or appropriate function is exercised in reading, fulfilled in being pleasant to read.
than continent (or perhaps 

\[ \text{prosodiaireis} \text{the} \text{t} \text{iv} \text{lexeis}, \text{ot} \text{i} \text{hdeian dei} \text{ka} \text{me} \text{galo} \text{roprepi}, \text{periergon} \text{ti} \text{g} \text{ar} \text{mallo} \text{n} \text{h} \text{swphrona} \text{ka} \text{eleutheron} \text{kal} \text{ei tis allh i} \text{hous areti}; \text{to} \text{g} \text{ar} \text{i} \text{hdeian einai} \text{pouisei di} \text{lon oti} \text{ta} \text{eirmeina, eip} \text{per orthos \wriста} \text{n} \text{h} \text{areti tis lexeos} \text{tinos gar} \text{eneka dei saphi kai mi tapevi} \text{nh einai alla pr} \text{epousan; an te gar} \text{adolosechih, ou saphi, oide an syntomos. Alla di} \text{lon oti to me} \text{son armod} \text{tei. kai to hdeian ta eirmeina pouisei, an ev mu} \text{chhi, to i} \text{wthos kai e} \text{neikov, kai o} \text{rho} \text{mos, kai to pibainon ek tov pr} \text{epousot.}
\]

peri mene oon tis lexeos eirnetai, kai kouyi peri apanvnon kai idia peri ekasiston genos. Lupten de peri

\[ \text{for prosodiairei} \text{thea, Brandis' Anonymus, quoted in Schneidewin's Philologus [iv. i.] p. 45, has prosodiairei} \text{thea.}
\]

\[ \text{Breviss esse laboro, obscurum fio. adolosechih, said of idle chatter: here of verbosity, vain repetition, tautology. Comp. de Soph. Ei. c. 3, 165 b 15, to pouisai adolosechisa ton prodialegemewon' touto d' esti to polalikis anagkizeasbha (by the opponent) tauto legein. Comp. supra c. 3-3, to usaphes dia tiv adolosechein, and 11 21.3, where it is applied to unnecessary accumulation of steps of proof in reasoning, or drawing inferences.}
\]

\[ \text{But (on the contrary) it is quite plain (of itself, and without rule or precept) that the mean is the appropriate style'. Of this the preceding example is an illustration: clearness or perspicuity is the mean between the excess of garrulity, verbosity, and the defect overconciseness, in the amount of words. Also the rules (ingredients) already stated will produce sweetness of language if they be well mixed, viz. the familiar (these are the onoma kima, the customary), and the foreign (glottai, eisylagmeina, eisynh ton dialekton, c. 2 3, c. 3 3, sub init. eisynikov poiei tiv lexiin, and the rhythm, and the plausibility that arises out of (the due observation of) propriety' (supra c. 7).}
\]

\[ \text{We have now finished our remarks upon style or language, of all (the three branches of Rhetoric) in common (cc. 2-11), and of each kind individually (c. 12): it now remains to speak of the order (division and arrangement) of the parts of the speech'.}
\]
Of the two divisions of this third book, proposed at the conclusion of Bk. II, and the opening of Bk. III, peri λέξεως καὶ τάξεως, πῶς χρη τάξιν τα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, the first having been dispatched in the preceding chapters 2—12, we now proceed to the second, on the arrangement of the parts of the speech: this will include a criticism of the anterior, and the current, divisions, with a new classification in c. 13: and an explanation and discussion of the proper contents of each. A full account of the various divisions which prevailed before and after Aristotle has been already given in the Introd. p. 331, 332, and the notes, and need not be here repeated. It will be sufficient to say that Aristotle in this chapter takes the fourfold division, adopted by Isocrates, and accepted by his followers, as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex., viz. προοίμιον, διηγήσεις, πίστεις, ἐπιλογος, criticizes it, and reduces it to two, πράξεις and πίστεις, as the only two parts necessary to the speech; adding notices of some superfluous distinctions introduced by Theodorus (of Byzantium) and Licymnius. [See Kössler's pamphlet, Rhetorum antiquorum de dispositione doctrina, pp. 30, Budissin, 1866; and Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 38.]

On the importance attached to the arrangement of the topics of these divisions, and especially to the order of the proofs, Whately has some good remarks, Rhet. c. 1 (Encycl. Metrop. p. 256). This is illustrated by the contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines. "Aeschines strongly urged the judges (in the celebrated contest for the Crown) to confine his adversary to the same order in his reply to the charges brought which he himself had observed in bringing them forward. Demosthenes however was far too skilful to be thus entrapped; and so much importance does he attach to the point, that he opens his speech with a most solemn appeal to the judges for an impartial hearing; which implies, he says, not only a rejection of prejudice, but no less also a permission for each speaker to adopt whatever arrangement he should think fit. And accordingly he proceeds to adopt one very different from that which his antagonist had laid down; for he was no less sensible than his rival that the same arrangement which is the most favourable to one side, is likely to be least favourable to the other."

§ 1. 'Of the speech there are (only) two parts: for it is only necessary first to state the subject, and then to prove (your side of) it. It follows from this necessary relation between them (δι'u), that it is impossible (if the speech is to be complete) either to state your case without going on to prove it, or to prove it without having first stated it', (the impossibility lies in the absurdity of the supposition: it is a moral
§ 2. 'Of these the one is the statement of the case (the setting forth of all its circumstances, as a foundation for judgment and argument), the other the (rhetorical) arguments in support of it, just as if the division were (the dialectical one) the problem (alternative question proposed or stated) and its demonstration'. \( \text{πρόθεσις}, \text{propositio} \): Rhet. ad Al. c. 29 (30). 2, προεπιθέθαι τὸ πράγμα. 1b. § 21, τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐκδόσομεν. c. 35 (36). 1, φρομμαστέων...πρωτὸν προβεμένου τὰς προθέσεις: \( \piστις \) \text{confirmatio}. "πρόβλημα διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα, Top. A 11, 104 b 1, quod in disputando quaestione bipartita efferrī solebat, ex. gr. voluptas estne expetenda, annon? mundus estne aeternus, annon?" Trendelenburg, \textit{El. Log. Ar.} § 42, p. 118.

§ 3. 'The present' (current, Isocrates) 'division is absurd; for surely \( \text{narratio} \) (διήγησις narratio, the detailed description of the circumstances of the case) belongs only to the forensic speech, but in a demonstrative or public speech how can there be a \( \text{narrative} \) such as they describe, or a \text{reply to the opponent}; or an epilogue (peroration) in argumentative or demonstrative speeches? On this Quint. says, II 9. 5; \text{Tamen necissi assentior qui detrahunt refutationem (sc. \( τὰ \) πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον) tanquam probationi subjectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constituat, illa quae destruat. Hoc quoque idem aliquatenus notat, quod proemio non narrationem subiungit, sed propositionem. (This is one of Quin- tilian's ordinary misrepresentations of writers whom he quotes. Ar. says nothing here of the proemium, theoretically disallowing it: though in compliance with the received custom he afterwards gives an account of it and its contents). \text{Verum id fœcit quia propositio genus, narratio species videtur: et hac non semper, illa semper et ubique credit opus esse}. The last clause very well explains Ar.'s substitution of \( \text{πρόθεσις} \) for \( \text{(προοίμιον and) διήγησις} \).

In \textit{Intro.} p. 333, I have given at length from Cic. de Inv. I 19. 27, the distinction of \text{διήγησις} in its ordinary sense and \( \text{πρόθεσις} \). It is here said that the \text{narrative} or statement of the case, strictly speaking, belongs (he means necessarily belongs) only to the forensic branch of Rhetoric: \textit{there} there \text{is} always a case to state; in the declaratory, panegyrical branch, not a \text{regular} systematic narrative or detailed statement as of a case; in this the \text{διήγησις} is dispersed over the whole speech, \textit{infra} 16. 1: and, in \text{διηγορία} equally, there is not universally or necessarily, as in the law-speech, a \text{διήγησις}, because
minds against it and its author, or some other special reason, there is no occasion for this: and also, the audience is usually well acquainted with the subject. See further on this, c. 14. 11. Comparison of argument, and review, can only be required when there is an opposition." Introd. pp. 335, 6. The Rhet. ad Alex. expressly tells us, c. 28 (29) ult., that the προοίμιον is "common to all the seven species, and will be appropriate to every kind of (rhetorical) business."

The following argument καὶ γὰρ—πολλάκις is a reductio ad absurdum of the preceding. You say that προοίμιον, ἀντιπαραβολὴ and ἐπάνωδος are essential parts of the public speech—'Why at that rate (is the reply) so are accusation and defence, for they are frequently there'—this involves the absurdity of introducing the whole contents of the forensic genus into the ἀνάγνωστον γένος as a mere part of the latter—'but not qua deliberation': not in the sense or character of deliberation, which is essential to the deliberative branch, but as mere accidents.

There can be no question that we should read ἦ for ἦ συμβούλη. So Victorius, Schrader, Buhle, Spengel. Bekker alone retains ἦ. The following clause requires an alteration of punctuation to make it intelligible; suggested long ago by Victorius, Majoragius, Vater, and adopted by Spengel; not so by Bekker. Spengel also rejects ἦ τι [delendum aut in estin mutandum]. With the altered reading, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος ἦ τι οὐδὲ δικαρίου κ.τ.λ. it is certainly out of place. I am by no means persuaded of the certainty of this alteration—perhaps Bekker had the same reason for withholding his consent to the two alterations—I think it quite as likely that a word or two has dropped out after ἐπίλογος.

'But further' (if ἦ τι be retained) 'neither does the peroration belong to every forensic speech; as for instance if it be short, or the matter of it easy to recollect; for what happens (in an ordinary epilogue) is a subtraction from the length'—not the brevity, of a speech: i.e. an epilogue is appropriate to a long speech, not a short one. This is Victorius' explanation, and no doubt right (that which I gave in the Introd. is wrong, and also not Victorius', as stated in the note).

'Consequently the (only) necessary parts are the statement of the case, and the proof'. § 4. 'Now these two are peculiar to, and characteristic of, speeches in general'.

It is possible that Ἐδων here may be the proprium of logic, one of the predicables: that which characterizes a thing, without being absolutely
essential to it, as the genus and differentia are. The proprimum is a necessary accident or property, though it is not of the essence itself: "but flowing from, or a consequence of, the essence, is inseparably attached to the species" (J. S. Mill, Logic, i p. 148). All this would apply very well to these two parts. They are not of the essence of the speech, and do not enter into the definition: the speech could exist without them. At the same time they are immediate consequences of that essence, and inseparably attached to all species of speeches, according to the view put forward here.

We might therefore be satisfied with these. 'If we add more' (following the authorities on the subject), 'they must be at the most, preface, statement of case, confirmatory arguments, conclusion: for the refutation of the adversary belongs to the proofs' (Quint. u.s. III 9. 5, Tamen nec tuis ascensior qui detrahat refutationem, tanquam probationi subiectam, ut Aristoteles; haec enim est quae constitutam, illa quae destruetam), 'and counter-comparison, (a comparative statement of your own views and arguments placed in juxtaposition with them to bring them into contrast,) which, being as it is a magnifying (making the most) of one's own case, must be a part of the confirmatory arguments, or general proof: for one who does this proves something: but not so the prologue; nor the epilogue, which merely recalls to mind'.

§ 5. 'Such divisions, if any one choose to make them, will be pretty much the same as the inventions of Theodorus and his school, that is, to distinguish narration from after-narration and fore-narration, and refutation and per-re-refutation'. In this compound word ἐπι 'in addition' is represented by re, and ἐς, 'out and out', 'outright', 'thoroughly', 'completely' by per. διέ and περ in composition are the more usual and direct exponents of 'thoroughness' or 'complete carrying through', of a thing. On ἐπιδύγησις, repetita narratio, see Quint. IV 2. 128, res declaratoria magis quam forensis. He accepts it as a division, but thinks it should be rarely used. Plato, Phaedr. 266 d seq., in speaking of these same superfluous divisions of Theodorus, leaves out ἐπι- and προ-δύγησις, and introduces πιέσωσιν καὶ ἐπιπλαστῶσιν in their place. These plainly correspond to the other pair ἐλέγχος and ἐπεξελεγχος, the one being confirmatory, the other refutatory arguments. See Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III p. 285, and Thompson's notes on the Phaedrus.

The general drift of the last clause is this; if you introduce such divisions at all, you may go on dividing and subdividing for ever, as Theodorus does in his τέχνη. This is followed by the statement of the true
PRITIKHES Γ 13 § 5; 14 § 1.

καὶ διαφορὰν όνομα τίθεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρόδες, οἶνον Δικύμινος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν όνομαζών καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.

1 τὸ μὲν ὁνὸν προοίμιον ἐστιν ὀρχή λόγου, ὁ περ ἐν CHAP. XIV.

principle of division: the foundation of my own twofold division, hints Ar. ‘But a name (like one of these, the class-name, or, as here, the name of a division) should be given to mark a kind and a specific difference’. It is the genus plus the specific (εἰδοποιός, species-making) difference that constitutes the distinct species or kind. Now these names, though supposed to mark distinct kinds, have no specific differences which thus distinguish them. A special name demands a real distinction of kinds. Waiz ad Categ. 1 b 17. Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 59.

‘Otherwise they become empty and frivolous, such as Lycymnius’ inventions in his art, the names which he coins, ἐπούρωσις, ἀποπλάνησις and ὄζοι’. On Lycymnus and his productions, see Heindorf ad Phaedr. u. s. p. 242, and Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Vol. III pp. 255—7; where an attempt is made to explain these three obscure names. Lycymnus was a dithyrambic poet, συρμα ΠΤΣ 12. 2, as well as a rhetorician, and his prose style seems to have participated in the dithyrambic character. ἐπούρωσις I take to be a word coined by Lycymnus for his own purposes: it is a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον. It seems to be formed from ἐπουρωύν, a synonym of ἐπουρίζειν, ‘to speed onward by a fair gale’, also συνεπουρίζειν, Hist. Anim. VIII 13. 9, de Caelo, III 2. 17: Polybius has ἐπουροῦν ΠΠ 10. 6, and κατουροῦν, I 44. 3, 61. 7, both as neut. The Schol. quoted by Spengel, Artium Scriptores p. 89, defines ἐπούρωσις (ἐπούρωσις) τὰ συνεπουρίζουται καὶ βοηθοῦτα τῶν ἑνθυμάσια, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα λέγονται βοηθοῦτα τῇ ἀποδείξει. All which seems to favour the notion that the figurative rhetorician represented ‘subsidiary’ or ‘confirmatory arguments’, Theodorus’ πίστωσις and ἐπίπτωσις, under the image of ‘a fair wind astern’. ἀποπλάνησις is no doubt, as in Plato Polit. 263 c, ‘a digression’, wandering off from the main subject, Schol. τὰ ἔξο τοῦ πράγματος; and ὄζοι, ‘branches’, most likely means places in which the discourse ‘branches off’ in different directions, ‘ramifications’: unless the same Scholiast’s explanation be preferred, τὰ ἄκρα, ήτοι τὰ προοίμια καὶ τῶς ἐπιλόγους. This would mean the ‘branches’ opposed to the stock or trunk, as something extraneous, or at all events non-essential. (I think this is preferable.)

CHAP. XIV.

Having considered the divisions of the speech in general we now come to the details, to the enumeration and examination of the ordinary contents of each of the four. These in each case are discussed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric. The treatment of the προοίμιον occupies the 14th chapter, to which is appended a second, c. xv, which analyses the topics of διαβολή, the art of ‘setting a man against his neighbour’, infusing suspicion and hostile feeling against him in the minds of others, raising a prejudice against him—especially of course in the minds of judges against your opponent. One would be sorry to be

AR. III,
ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ' εἰσὶ, καὶ οἶδον ὁδοποίησις τῷ ἐπιώτι. τὸ μὲν ὅν ἑν προαύλιον ὁμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίω· καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐληταῖ, ὃ τι ἀν ἐν ἕχωσιν αὐλήσαι, τὸν προαύλισταντες συνήψαν τῷ ἐνδοσί-

obliged to call this 'calumnianting'. Δύγγησι is treated in c. xvi, πίστεις in xvii: to which is attached in xviii a digression on ἐρώτησις, the mode of putting questions—this includes the 'answer', repartee: and the 19th chapter, appropriately enough, concludes the work with the conclusion (ἐπιλογος, poration) of the speech.

The προοείμι is thus defined by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30). 1, ἀκροατῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν κεφαλαίῳ μη εἰδόται δὴκλασις, ἵνα γνωστόκοσι περὶ ὅν ὁ λόγος παρακολουθοῦσι τῇ ὑποθέτει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ προσέχει παρακαλέσαι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον τῷ λόγῳ δυνατον εὑροῦσι ἡμῶν αὐτῶθ ποιήσαι. These rules seem to be chiefly derived from the actual practice of the Orators. Some of the arts to which public speakers had recourse in the topics of their προοείμι are mentioned by Isocrates, Paneg. § 13. Compare Cic. de Orat. II 19, 80; de Invent. I 15. 20; where it is defined: it has two parts, principium (the object of this is to make the hearer benevolent aut docilem aut attentum,) and insinuation, oratio quadam dissimulatione et circuittione obscura subiens auditoris animam. Quint. IV. c. 1, seq. principium exordium. He agrees with the preceding; see § 5. On the προοείμι as a hymn, see Stallbaum ad Phaed. 60 D. On the προείμι in Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. II 78, 79, principia dicendi. [See also Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen ii. Römer § 12, die Einleitung.]

§ 1. 'Now the προοείμι is the beginning of a speech and stands in the place of the prologue in poetry (i.e. tragedy, and specially of Eupides' tragedy), and of the prelude in flute music'.

προοείμιον an introduction, ornamental, and preparatory to, not an essential part of, the theme or subject of the composition; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving of the way (preparation, pioneering of the road) for what follows (ὁδοποιήσις, note on i 1. 2).

'Now the flute-prelude is like the προοείμι of the epideictic branch: that is to say, as the flute-players first open their performance with whatever they can play best (in order to gain attention and favour of the audience) which they then join on to the ἐνδόσιμον (the actual opening, preliminary notes, of the subject which gives the tone, or cue, to the rest), so in the epideictic speeches the writing (of the προοεί-

μιον) ought to be of this kind: for (in these the speaker) may say first (ἐπιστάμε) anything he pleases, and then should at once sound the note of preparation, and join on (the rest)'.

This represents the epideictic προοείμι, like the flute- prelude, as hardly at all connected with what follows; it is a preliminary flourish, anything that he knows to be likely to be most successful, as already observed, to conciliate the audience and put them in good humour.

"For here, as there is no real interest at stake, the author is allowed a much greater liberty in his choice of topics for amusing (and gaining
μω, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτω γράφειν· ὁ τι γὰρ ἄν βούληται εὑρή εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάσφαι. ὁ περ πάντες ποιοῦν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἐλένης προοίμιον οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰκεῖον over) an audience; a license which would be intolerable in a case of life and death, or in the suggestion of a course of action which may involve the safety or ruin of the state. Here the audience are too eager to come to the point to admit of any trifling with their anxiety." Introd. pp. 337, 8. Cic. de Or. II 80. 325, Connexum autem ita sit primum consequenti orationi, ut non tanquam citharoedi prooemium affectum aliquod, sed cohaerens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur (Victorius). Quint. II 8.8, in demonstrativis (Arist.) prooemia esse maxime libera existimat.

The ἐνδοῦμον (subandis ἄσμα or κρόοσμα, Bos, Ellips. s. v.) occurs again Pol. v (viii) 5 init. apparently in the same sense as here, 'introduction'; also Pseudo-Arist. de Mundo, c. 6 § 20, where we have κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἀναθεῖν ἐνδοῦμον ἐπὶ τοῦ φερομένου ἀν κορνίσαν προσαγορευθέως κεινίτα μὲν τὰ ἄστρα κ.τ.λ. 'for according to the law above, by him who might be rightly called leader of the chorus, the stars are set in motion, &c.' I have given this in full because it throws some light upon the meaning of ἐνδοῦμον, and explains its metaphorical application, God is here represented as the leader of a chorus who gives the time, the key-note, and the mode or tune, to the rest, and thus acts as a guide to be followed, or (in a similar sense) as an introduction, or preparatory transition to something else. It thus has the effect of the 'key-note', and takes the second sense of a 'guide', 'preparation for', 'introduction to', anything. So Plut. de disc. adul. ab amico, c. 55. 73 B, ὀσπερ ἐνδοῦμον ἔγει πρὸ τοῦ μείζονα τῶν ἀμφισβήτων, ubi Wytenbach, occasio, incitamentum; similarly Ib. c. 30, 70 B, καὶ ψάγως...ἡ ἐπανός ὀσπερ ἐνδοῦμον εἰς παράρτησιν ἐστίν, 'gives the tone, the cue, i.e. the occasion or incitement, to freedom (taking liberties)'. See other passages from Plutarch and others in Wytenbach's note on 73 B. Gaisford and Wytenbach refer to Gataker ad Anton. XI 20, p. 336 (g), XI 26 (w), "ἐνδ. usurpatur pro modulationis exordio, quo praecentor sive choro preces cantandi reliquis auspiciis facit. Hesychius, ἐνδοῦμον, τὸ πρὸ τῆς φόβος καθήμενον." ap. Gaisford Not. Var. Wytenbach describes ἐνδοῦμον as "signum et adhortatio in certaminibus et musicis et gymnicis: tum ad alias res translatum." Lastly Athen. XII 2, 556 A, of certain authors, οἰκ τὸ ἐνδοῦμον 'Ἀριστοτέλεις ἐδωκεν ἰστορον τούτου ἐν τῷ περὶ εὐγενείας, 'gave the tone, i.e. hint', furnished the occasion for their statement. Schweig- häuser, ad loc. says, "Dalecampioni vertit quos ad id scribendum proo- cavit Ar. Dicitur autem proprii praeceps praecudium, exordium melo- diae quod praeeit chorodidascalus cui dein acciseres adhortem chorum. H. Stephanus' Thesaurus. Budaecus in Comm. Gr. Ling. p. 874 sq. ἐνδο- σμον διδόναι or παρέχειν is expressed in one word ἐνδοῦμαν XII 520 D," as it is here by Aristotle.

'And this is done by all. An example is the prooemium of Isocrates' Helen: for there is nothing in common between the disputations dia-
λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπίδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου: ὁδοὶ Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῇ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ "υπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιων θαυμάζεσθαι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἐλληνες" ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας. Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς车道icians, and Helen'. The prooemium, which occupies the first thirteen sections of the speech, includes many other subjects besides the ἐριστικό, and is certainly an excellent illustration of the want of connexion between proem and the rest in an epidemic speech. Quint. III 8, 8. In demonstrativis vero proemnia esse maxime libera existimat (Ar.). Nam et longe a materia duci hoc, ut in Helenae laude Isocrates fecerit; et ex aliqua rei vicinia, ut idem in Panegyrico, cum queritur plus honoris corporum quam animorum virtutibus dari.

'And at the same time also (it has this further recommendation) that if (the speaker thus) migrate into a foreign region, there is this propriety in it, that the entire speech is not of the same kind' (it removes the wearisome monotony which is characteristic of this branch of Rhetoric).

ἐκτοπίζων is to 'change one's residence', and applied especially to migratory birds and animals. It is always neuter in Aristotle. Hist. Anim. VIII 12, 3 and 8, IX 10, 1, IV 8, 23, ἐκτοπισμοῦ ποιοῦται, VIII 13, 14, ἐκτοπιστικὴ ἐφα, I 1, 26. In the primary sense of absence from one's proper or ordinary place, Pol. VIII (v) 11, 1314 δ 9, τοῖς ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας, and so ἐκτοπος, ἐκτοπιος, ἀτοπος 'out of their proper place'.

§ 2. 'The introductions in the epidemic branch are derived from praise and blame (naturally: see I 3 §§ 3, 4); as, for instance, Gorgias' opening of his Olympic oration (a πανηγυρικός λόγος, delivered at the Olympic games), "By many" (or ύπερ, 'for many things'; which seems more in accordance with what followed) 'are ye worthy to be admired, O men of Hellas": that is to say (γὰρ videlicet) he praises those who first brought together the general assemblies'. Comp. Quint. III 8, 9, (continuation of the preceding quotation) et Gorgias in Olympico laudans eos qui primi tales instituerunt conventus (translated from Ar.). Another short fragment of this oration is preserved by Philostr. Vit. Soph. 19. 'Ο δὲ Ὀλυμπικός λόγος, says Philostratus, ύπερ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτό (Gorgiae) ἐπολεμηθη': σταυρίζοντας γὰρ τὴν Ελλάδα ὅρων ὁμοιότης ξύμβολος αὐτοῦ ἑγένετο τρίτων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πειθῶν ἥλια ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὁπλῶν μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις ἀλλά τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν. The rest of his fragments, genuine and spurious, are collected by Sauppe Or. Att. III 129, seq. [See also Appendix to Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias.] Hieronymus adv. Iovin. (quoted by Wyttenbach on Plut. 144 b), "Gorgias rhetor librum pulcerrimum de concordia, Graecis tunc inter se dissidentibus, recitavit Olympiaca." Isocr., Panegyr. § 3, after stating the nature of the contents of his own speech, adds, in allusion to this,
§§ 2—4. δωρεάς ἐτίμησαν, τοῦς δὲ εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὔθεν ἄθλον ἐποίησαν. καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς, οἴον ὅτι δὲι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἣ τοὺς τοιούτους οὐ μὴτε εὐδοκιμοῦσι μὴτε φαύλοι, ἀλλ’ ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἀδιλοί, ὅσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ 4 Πριάμου οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει. ἔτι δ’ ἐκ τῶν Ἱ. 1.145. δικαιικῶν προοιμίων τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τῶν

with others, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν προσποιομένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀρέσκει.

‘But Isocrates blames them for that bodily excellences they rewarded with gifts, whilst to intellectual excellence they awarded no prize’. This is the substance of the two first sections of Isocr. Paneg. Mr Sandys, in his note ad locum, gives a summary of the whole exordium §§ 1—14. Victorius points out this as one of the places in which Aristotle’s hostility to Isocrates appears! The problem here proposed by Isocr.—the omission of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition—is solved by Arist., Probl. XXX 11.

§ 3. ‘(A second topic for an epideictic prooëmium) is derived from advice (the deliberative branch); for instance “men are bound to pay honour to the good”, and therefore he, the speaker, himself is going to praise Aristides’ (ἀὐτός ἐστὶ ὁ συμβουλέως: the directa oratio would have been ἐγὼ; it is a sort of semi-quotation: where it comes from no one seems to know); ‘or, to all such as though not distinguished are yet not bad, only their merits are buried in obscurity, as Alexander (Paris), Priam’s son. For one who speaks thus offers advice’. The encomium Alexandri here referred is doubtless the same as that which has been already mentioned in II 23. 5, 8, 12 and II 27. 7, 9; the author is unknown.

§ 4. ‘Further (a third kind) they may be borrowed from the forensic introductions; that is to say, from the appeals to the audience, or as an apology to them, (comp. infra § 7)—when the subject of the speech happens to be either paradoxical (contrary to ordinary opinion or expectation, and therefore incredible), or painful1, or trite and worn-out, and therefore tiresome (τεθρυληκῶν that which is in everyone’s mouth, decantatum, note on II 21. 11)—for the purpose of obtaining indulgence (with an apologetic object); as Choriclus says, for instance, “But now

1 χαλεπῶς, Victorius, Majoragus, ardua; Vet. Transl. et Riccobon difficilis. Is it ‘hard to do’ or ‘hard to hear’? χαλεπῶς has both senses. If the former, it may mean, either, difficult, to the speaker to handle, or to the hearer to understand, or the recommendation of some scheme, undertaking, or policy, difficult to encounter or execute, (but this belongs to the deliberative rather than the epideictic branch); if the latter—which seems equally probable—it is simply painful, unpleasant. So Pind. Fragm. 96 (Böckh, Fragm. P. II p. 621) v. 9, τερπάντων ἐφαρμοσάρχα χαλεπῶς τε κράνος. Pl. Protag. 344 b, χαλεπῆ ὑπάρ ‘a hard season’. Legg. [744 b] χαλεπῆ πενία. Et passim ap. Hom. et cet. So in Latin durus.
When all is spent" (lit. has been distributed sc. amongst others; and nothing is left for me). [Compare Virgil's *omnia iam vulgata* in the Exordium of the third Georgic.]

Of the four Choriluscs distinguished by Nāke, this is the Epic poet of Samos, born, according to Nāke, in B.C. 470. His principal work, from which this fragment is taken, was a poetical narrative of the Persian wars with Greece under Darius and Xerxes—"all that was left him" by his predecessors—very much applauded, as Suidas tell us, and "decreed to be read with Homer." Aristotle (Top. Θ 1, ult. παραδειγματα...οια ομηρος, μη οια Χοριλος) thinks less favourably of it; and it was afterwards excluded from the Alexandrian Canon in favour of the poem of Antimachus. An earlier Chorilus was the Athenian tragic poet, contemporary with Phrynichus, Pratinas, and Aeschylus in early life; the third a slave of the Comic poet Ephchantides, whom he is said to have assisted in the composition of his plays; and the fourth, Horace's Chorilus, Ep. II 1. 232, Ars Poet. 357, a later and contemptible epic poet who attended Alexander on his expedition, and according to Horace, inculsit qui versibus et male natis retullit acceptos, regale nomisma, Philippos. Suidas tells this story of the Samian Chorilus, an evident mistake. The fragments of the Chorilus of our text are all collected and commented on by Nāke in his volume on Chorilus. This fragm. is given on p. 104. See also Dünzter Epic. Gr. Fragm. p. 96 seq. where five lines of the poem, from which our extract is made are given; and the four articles in *Biogr. Dict.* The context is supplied by the Schol. on this passage—see in Spengel's ed., *Scholia Graeca*¹, p. 160: printed also in Nāke and Dünzter—and runs thus: ἀ μάκαρ, ὃς ζην κεῖνον χρόνον ἄδικα κοιδής, Μουσάων θεράπων ἥε' ἀκήρατος ἢν ἦτι λειμών νῦν θ' οὗτο πάντα δέδασται, ἦχους δὲ πείρατα τέχναι, ἦσαντο ὡς τρόμον καταλειψάμεθ' ὡδὲ πη ἐστὶ πάντῃ παπατινώσα νεογένες ἄρμα πελάσασα. καὶ τὰ ἐγής. Which are certainly pretty lines enough; perhaps the rest was not equal to them. Compare with λειμῶν Μουσάων, and the whole passage, Lucr. 1 925 seq. *aviu Pliridum peragro loca, nullius ante trita solo, et seq.*, which might possibly have been suggested by this of Chorilus. An apology of the same kind is introduced by Isocrates in the middle of his Panegyr. § 74; and another in his ἀντίδοσις, § 55. In the latter the word διατεθεμενόν occurs.

¹ On these Scholia, see Spengel, Praef. ad Rhet., p. VIII.

² Nāke, *Chorilus* p. 105, thinks that this, and not the second fragm. in § 6—"as Buhle, Wolf, Vater, agree in supposing—was the opening of the poem. This is rendered probable by the λόγον ἀλλον in v. 1, of the other.
So the introductions of the epideictic speeches are derived from the following topics; from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer: and these "introductions" (see the note on § 1: ἐνδόσιμα is used here for προοίμια in general, instead of the more limited sense of the preceding passage) 'must be either foreign or closely connected with the speeches (to which they are prefixed).

ἡμιο, a stranger or foreigner, is properly opposed to ὅικεios, domesticus, one of one's own household. This last clause, δει δε ἑπίνια, is, as Vater remarks, introduced as a transition to the next topic, the forensic prooemium.

§ 5. 'The introduction of the forensic speech must be understood as having the same force (or value, or signification) as the prologue of a drama (ταῖ, the drama to which it belongs), or the introduction to an epic poem: for to the epideictic exordia the preludes (introductions, ἄνοβολαι) of the dithyrambs bear resemblance, "for thee and thy gifts, or spoils". On the ἄνοβολαι, the openings or introductions of dithyrambs, and their loose, incoherent, flighty character, see note on III 9. 1. Introd. p. 307, note 1. It is this which makes them comparable to the epideictic exordia, as above described.

The dramatic, i.e. tragic, prologue, and the introduction of the epic, are compared to the exordium of the didactic speech, in that all three contain 'statements of the case'; the last, literally; the tragic and epic, virtually. The prologue of Euripides (who of the three extant tragedians can be the only one whose prologues are referred to) actually states all the preceding circumstances of the story of the drama, which it is necessary that the spectator should be acquainted with in order to enter into the plot. The introduction of the Epic poem is neither so long nor so regular. That of the Iliad occupies only seven lines, and states the subject very simply and in few words. That of the Odyssey is concluded in ten, and little or nothing of the story told. The Aeneid, and Pharsalia have seven apiece.

§ 6. Having hinted at the points of resemblance between the dithyrambic ἄνοβολαι and the epideictic prooemium, he now proceeds to explain further the resemblance of the didactic proem to the prologue of tragedy and prelude of the Epic poem.

'In the prose speeches as well as the poetry' (Victorius understands
διάνοια: τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾶ: ὁ δευς οὖν ὡςπερ εἰς τὴν χεῖρα τὴν ἄρχην ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἁκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τούτο
μὴν ἂείθε θεά.
ἀνδρὰ μοι ἑνεπε μουσα.
ἡγέο μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὁπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαῖνς
ἡλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.
καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ τὸ δράμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς
ὡςπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που [δη-
λοι], ὡςπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς
ἐμοὶ πατήρ ἢν Πόλυβος.

τ. λόγος¹, fabulae poetarum, meaning the dramas as contrasted with the
Epics: the other contrast of prose and verse is more natural as well as
more suitable here) ‘these προομια are (present, offer) a specimen or
sample of the subject (of the speech or poem) in order that they may have
some previous acquaintance with the intention of it’ (if ἐν, ‘about what it
was to be’, as in τὸ τί ἐν ἐνα; the object, purpose, or design), ‘and the
mind not be kept in suspense; for all that is vague and indefinite keeps
the mind wandering (in doubt and uncertainty): accordingly, (the speaker
or writer) that puts the beginning into his hand supplies him with a clue,
as it were, by which he may hold, so as to enable him to follow the
story (or argument). This is why (Homier in the Iliad and Odyssey,
began the two poems with the lines quoted; and Choeirus—if Nāke u. s.
is right about the order of the two fragments in our text—did not begin
his poem with ἡγέο μοι κ.τ.λ., but introduced it in his ἔσορδιον)—here
the quotations from the three poems are introduced, and the sentence
remains unfinished.

‘Similarly the tragic poets explain the subject of their play, if not
immediately at the opening, as Euripides, at any rate somewhere or
other the poet explains it in his prologue or introduction), as even Sopho-
cles (who does not usually employ it; in the Oedip. Tyr. 774 seq.) “Po-
lyphus of Corinth was my father, &c.”, and the following.’

“The Commentators object to προλόγῳ here because the passage that
it indicates occurs not at the beginning, but in the middle of the play.
But, it seems that Aristotle has here used προλόγος in a more compre-

¹ Spengel puts λόγος καὶ and ἐν in brackets, as spurious or doubtful: Bekker
retains ἐν. MS. Αε has ἐν. By rejecting the words Spengel seems to shew that he
thinks that λόγος alone cannot mean ‘stories’ in the sense of dramas. I think it is
doubtful. Otherwise, this interpretation is certainly more suitable to the general
connexion and what follows. On the other hand, our author here seems to be
rather digressive, and not to observe any very regular order of succession in his
remarks. So that perhaps upon the whole, we may let the other consideration
have its due weight in deciding the point.
hensive sense than that which it usually bears, for an 'explanatory introduction' in general, wherever it may occur: and that it has much the same relation here to its ordinary signification, as πρόθεσις has to διήγησις in c. 13. Also the analogous προοίμιον is applied twice in § 10 infra to introductory speeches anywhere in a play." Introd. p. 339 note.

'And comedy in like manner': that is, wherever an introductory explanation is required, there it is introduced. Victorius notes that this appears in Terence, the Latin representative of the New Comedy, and Plautus. Simo in the Andria, Menedemus in the Haecautontimorumenos, Micio in the Adelphi, perform this office. And similarly, Strepsiades in Aristoph. Nubes, Demosthenes in the Equites, 40 sqq., Dionysius in the Kanae—Victorius says "tum maxime cum Servo narrat, &c." but the conversation referred to is with Hercules, not Xanthias, lines 64 seq. There is another explanatory introduction, preparatory to the dramatic contest between Aeacus and Xanthias, 759 seq.

'So then (to resume) the most necessary function of the prooemium, and that peculiar to it, is to make it clear what is the end and object of the speech or story' (the former is the λόγος in Rhetoric, the latter in the Epic and the drama). Compare Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30), 1, def. of προοίμιον. 'And therefore if the subject (the thing, the matter in hand) be already clear and short (or, of trifling importance) the prooemium is not to be employed'. Comp. Cic. de Or. II 79. 320, in parvis atque infrequentibus causis ab ipsa re est exordiri saepe commodius: Victorius, who writes frequentibus: repeated in Gaisford, Not. Var.

§ 7. 'The other kinds (of prooemia) which are employed are mere cures (remedies [specifics] for the infirmities or defects of the hearers—διά τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, III 1. 5—such as inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the like), and common', to all parts of the speech. κοινά is opposed to the special office, peculiar to the προοίμιον, καὶ ἰδιὸν τοῦτο supra: all these other kinds may be introduced in the exordium—and also anywhere else, wherever they are required.

'These may be derived from the speaker himself, from the hearer, the subject, and the adversary' ('the opposite'). Cic. de Or. II 79. 321, seq. Sed quum erit utendum principio, quod plerunque erit, aut ex reo, aut ex adversario, aut ex re, aut ex eis apud quos agitur (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ), sententias duci licebit. Ex reo—reos appello, quorum res est—quae significant bonum virum seq. followed by the illustration of
the remaining three. Cicero, who is certainly following Aristotle, seems here to translate τοὺς λέγοντος by 

\[\text{νῦν, in the sense which he explains, of both parties in the case. Quintilian, iv 1. 6, seems to charge Aristotle—}\]

if he includes him in the plerique who have been guilty of the omission—

with having neglected to include the ‘actor causa’ amongst the sources of topics for prœomnia. Victorius defends him against this, by pointing out, as Cicero, that ὁ λέγων includes both parties in a suit or prosecution, actor as well as 

\[\text{νῦν (in its ordinary sense). See the passage of Quint., with Spalding’s note.}\]

‘The topics derivable from the speaker himself and the opponent, are all such as relate to allaying (litt. ‘refuting’ and exciting prejudice and ill-}

\[\text{feeling (after ποιήσαο understand αὐτήν): but with this difference: that in defending oneself all that relates to διαβολή (i.e. the removal of prejudice and ill-will from ourselves, and exciting against them the opponent) must be put first (subaudī lectēōn, viz. in the exordium), but in the accusation of another reserved for the peroration. The reason of this is not difficult to see; that is, that the defendant, when he is about to introduce his own case, must necessarily begin by doing away with all hindrances (i.e. to the establishment of it; all prepossessions against him on the part of the judge); and therefore must make the removal or refutation of all calumnies or prejudices against him his first point; whereas the accuser (the speaker whose office it is to ‘set’ the defendant ‘against’ the judges, conciliate their ill-will to him) must reserve all that tends to prejudice his antagonist for the epilogue (peroration, conclusion), that they may better remember it’ (that his accusations may ‘leave their sting behind them’ in the judges’ minds). Both Spengel and Bekker write αὐτῶν after εἰκάζειν for the vulgata lectio αὐτῶν; which as far as appears to the contrary is the reading of all mss. I think αὐτῶν for ‘his own case’, litt. himself, is defensible. We often say ‘him’ for ‘himself’, leaving the reflexive part to be understood, in our own language. See note on i 7. 35, and Waitz on Organ. 54 a 14. Vol. I. p. 486, there referred to.

‘The topics of the προοίμιον which are addressed to the hearer (i.e. in the dicastic branch now under consideration, the judges,) are derived from (subaudī γιγνεται, or as before, λέγεται) the conciliation of his good will (towards ourselves) and irritating him (exciting his indignation against the adversary, δείνοντι), and sometimes too (δὲ), (but only when it is required,) from engaging his attention or the reverse: for it is not always
ἐκροατὴν ἐκ τοῦ εὖνου ποιήσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὄργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίστε δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προσεκτικῶν ἡ τοναντίον οὐ γὰρ ἄει συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικῶν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα περιώνται προάγειν, εἰς δὲ expedient to make him attentive, and this is why many (speakers) try to move or provoke him to laughter. Προάγειν εἰς γέλωτα, to move, or provoke to'. Herod. II 121. 4, σκόψαι μὲν καὶ ἐς γέλωτα προαγάγονται. Rhet. I 1. 5, εἰς ὄργίν προάγοντας ἡ φθόνον ἡ ἔλεον, I 2. 5, εἰς πάθος, et sim. 'to carry forward, i. e. stimulate, excite, provoke'.

εὖνου ποιήσαι] "The three requisites in the disposition of the audience, according to the later writers on the subject, are that they should be benevoli, dociles, attenti. Cic. de Inv. I 15. 20, Quint. IV I. 5: and frequently elsewhere. Ar. includes the two latter under one head προσεκτικὸ: and in fact if a man is inclined to attend, he shews that he is already inclined to or desirous of learning. The two are closely connected, Cic. de Inv. I 16. 23." Introd. p. 340, note i.

Causa principii nulla est alia, quam ut audiorem, quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodator, praeparemus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus, inter auctores plurimos constat si benevolum, attentum, docilem fecerimus; non quia ista non per totam actionem sint custodienda, sed quia inititis praecipue necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis, ut procedere ultra possimus, admitterim. (Quint. IV I. 5).

οὐ γὰρ ἄει συμφέρει κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Or. II 79. 323. He begins by saying that neither of these topics is to be confined to the proovemium § 332, nam et attentum moment Graeci ut principio faciamus iudicem et docilem (this is included in προσεκτικὸ); quae sunt utilia, sed non principii magis propria quam reliquarum partium; facilius etiam in principiis, quod et attenti tum maxime sunt, quam omnia exspectant, et dociles magis inititis esse possunt. Quint., IV I. 37, 38, criticizes Aristotle's remark on this point: Nec me quanquam magni auctores in hoc duxerint ut non semper facere attentum ac docilem iudicem velim: non quia nesciam, id quod ab illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa qualis ea sit non intelligi: verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis contingit, sed errore. Dixit enim adversarius, et forte persusit: nobis opus est eius diversa opinione: quae mutari non potest nisi illum fecerimus ad ea quae dicimus docilem et attentum, seq. That is, the judge's inattention often arises not from negligence, but from a mistaken supposition that the adversary is right and we are wrong: in order to set him right we must rouse his attention. The supposition implied here in explanation of οὐκ ἄει συμφ. κ.τ.λ., which Quint. refers to and criticizes, is that inattention on the judge's part is sometimes expedient when our cause is bad. Quint.'s reply is, it is not his inattention that would be of use to us in such a case, but his attention to the arguments which we are about to use in order to convince him to the contrary. Another disadvantage that may arise from over-attention on the judge's part, occurs when we want to slurr over an unfavourable point in our case. In illustration of the following διὸ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Gaisford very appositely quotes Arist. Vesp. 564, Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες μῦδος ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' Ἀισώπου τι γελοῖον' οἱ δὲ σκώπτουσ', ἦν
The Scholiast on this place (see in Spengel’s Ed. p. 158), tells, after
some of this, the story from Demosth. de Cor. §§ 51, 52, with
consisted in an intentional mispronunciation of the word μισθωτός, which he applied to Aeschines, pronouncing it μισθωτος, in order to divert
the attention of the audience: he appealed to them to say whether the word
was not well applied: they burst into a roar of laughter, accepted the
application, and shouted λοιπών μισθωτός, λοιπών μισθωτός, with
the pronunciation corrected. I entirely agree with Dissen that this is a
foolish and improbable story, absurd in itself, and receiving no counte-
nance from the text of Demosthenes. All that he did say is found in the
existing text, viz. that he interpreted Aeschines’ ελεύθερον Ἀλεξάνδρου—which
Aesch. claimed—as meaning that he was not a εῖνος, a guest and friend,
but a μισθωτός (a hireling) Ἀλεξάνδρου and nothing more, and that the
people accepted this version. See Dissen’s note on § 52.

(ευμάθεια, docilitas, need not be made a separate topic, because) any
speaker may refer to this (carry back, i.e. apply) any thing he pleases
(any of the topics of the προοίμων), even the appearance of worth and
respectability; for to these (τοῖς ἐπιεικέις) the audience is always more
inclined to attend. ‘This is in fact the ἀρέτη which the speaker must
always assume by his speech, in order that his hearers may have confi-
dence in him, that he may have weight and authority with them; one of
the three ingredients in the ἱθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, II 1. 5. Introd. on ἱθος,
p. 108 seq.) In short, ευμάθεια need not be made a separate topic, pro-
vided only the speaker treats the other topics of the προοίμων with the
view of making the audience docile, that is, ready to receive the informa-
tion which he is prepared to communicate to them.

‘The things to which the audience is most inclined to listen are
things great (momentous, important), things of special interest (to the
hearers themselves), things wonderful (surprising), and things pleasant
(to hear; either in themselves, or in their associations); and therefore
the speaker should always try to produce the impression (ἐν in his hear-
ers’ minds) that things of such kinds are his subject. If he wish to make
them inattentive (he must try to convey the impression, ἐὰν μη, subaudic
ποιεῖν ἐκλήσι τις—προσεκτικοκώς) that his subject is trifling, has no reference to
them and their interests (that is, is unimportant in general, or to them
in particular: the opposite of the τὰ ἴδια in this preceding topic) or that it
is unpleasant.'
On interesting and uninteresting topics, see the parallel passages in Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 3, where those of Aristotle are subdivided: Cic. de Inv. i 16. 23: Cic., Orat. Part. c. 8, expresses Ar.'s idia, Coniuncta cum ipsis apud quos agetur.

§ 8. 'However it must not be forgotten that all such things as these (all these ordinary contents of the προσεφόρα) are foreign to (outside; extra, not secundum, artem) the speech (and its real object, which is the proof of the case, and that alone, αἱ δὲ πίστεις ἐντεχνῶν ἐστὶ μόνος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσδηκαί, i 1. 3) : it is only because the audience is bad, and ready to listen to things beside the real question, (that these are addressed to them); for if he be not such, there is no occasion for an exordium (to flatter him into a good humour, and the rest), except just so far as to state the case in a summary way, that, like a body, it may have a head on it'. There is probably a reference in this to σώμα τῆς πίστεως, as the enthymemes, or direct logical proofs, are called i 1. 3.

φαύλος, as applied to the audience or judges, means here not morally bad, but only defective in intellect and patience, too ignorant and frivolous to attend long to sound and serious reasoning: they require to be relieved and diverted occasionally. So Schrader. Comp. what is said of the 'single judge' in i 12. 5. Of the summary προσεφόρα, the Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 2, gives two examples.

[ινα—κεφαλήν] Comp. Eth. Nic. vi 7, 1141 α 19, of σοφία; νόσι καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁσπερ κεφαλήν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων. Plat. Gorg. 505 δ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μῦθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπεις, ἀλλ' ἐπίθειτα, ἵνα μὴ ἀνεί κεφαλής περὶ. Phaedr. 264 c, δεῖν πάντα λόγων ὁσπερ ζησον συνεστάναι σώμα τί ἐχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὡστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον μήτε ἄπων, κ.τ.λ. Phileb. 66 d. Polit. 277 c. Legg. vi 752 α. Stallbaum and Heindorf ad loc. Gorg. Thompson ad loc. Phaedr [et Gorg.]. The notion conveyed in all these places is the same, a headless animal is incomplete. See note in Introd. p. 341, on the book, which, without a preface, looks like a man going out into the street without his hat. This gives the same notion of want of finish and completeness. Quint. iv 1. 72, Haec de proemio, quoties erit eius usus: non semper autem est; nam et supervacuum aliando t, est si praeparatus satis etiam sine hoc index, aut si res praeparatione non eget. Aristoteles quidem in totum id necessarium apud bonos indices negat; seq. Comp. xiiii.10.52, Quod si mihi des concilium indicum sapientium...Neque enim affectus omnino movendi sunt, nec aures delectatione mulcendae, quum etiam proomia supervacua esse apud tales Aristoteles existint.

§ 9. 'Besides, this making the hearers disposed to listen (keep up
§§ 9, 10.

Their attention, is common to all the parts of the speech alike, wherever it is required: for they are more inclined to relax it anywhere rather than at the opening. It is absurd therefore to fix its place (‘post’ it) at the beginning, a time when everybody listens with the greatest attention’.

Cic. de Or. ii 79. 323 quoted on § 7, οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ συμφέρει. Also Quint. iv. 1. 73, who follows Arist. in quoting Prodicus’ artifice. ‘And therefore, (not only at the beginning, but) wherever there is occasion, such phrases as this must be used, “And now attend to what I say, for it is no more my affair than yours”; or, “I’ll tell such a strange thing—or a thing so marvellous—as you have never yet heard before.” And this is like what Prodicus said, “whenever his audience were inclined to be drowsy, he would slip them in a taste of the fifty drachm’.

παρεμβάλλειν, throw them in by the side of the rest, on the sly, (παραδηγεῖσθαι, ἐνὶ θαλασσαῖς). The ‘fifty drachm’ was Prodicus’ most famous, and interesting, and expensive lecture. Plat. Crat. 384 B, Σωκρ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἄκροτην παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχον ἑπίδειξίν, ἥν ἀκούσαντι ὑπάρχει περὶ τοῦτο πεπαιδευθαί, ὡς φησιν ἵκεινος, οὐδὲν ἃν ἐκώλυσε σε αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι τὴν ἀληθείαν περὶ ὄνομάτων ὀρθότητος, ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἂκροτη, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμαίαν.

§ 10. ‘But (that all this is beside the point, and extra artem;) that it is not addressed to the hearer as a hearer (read by all means ἵνα ἄκροτης sc. ἐστι: i.e., that it is addressed to him as a hearer and something more, as a man liable to all the defects and infirmities and feelings above mentioned) ‘is plain: for speakers invariably employ their exordia either in prejudice (the audience against the adversary), or in the endeavour to remove similar apprehensions (of the like suspicions and prejudices) from themselves’. If the audience were mere impartial listeners, met there to hear and judge the case, and nothing more; there would be no occasion for all this accusation and defence with which the orators always fill their ὑποκείμενα.

The first example referred to, the excuse of the φίλαξ for his lack of speed and his unwelcome message, Soph. Antig. 223 seq, is a case
The topics for conciliating good will have been already stated' (Phil. II 4, Erot. II 8, especially, from the quotation following. II 1.7, peri δ' ευνοιας καὶ φιλιας ειν τοις peri tа παθη λεκτων νυν. Cic. de Inv. I 16. 22, benevolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur, seq.) as well as (for exciting) any feeling of the same kind in general (any of the παθη in Bk. II 2—11). And since the saying is true, seeing that it is well said "Grant that I may come to the Phaecians an object of love and pity"—Hom. Od. η [VII] 327,—it follows that these two (to make ourselves loveable and pitiable) are what we ought to aim at (for this purpose).
τούτων δει δυο στοχαζεσθαι. εν δε τοις επιδεικτικοις οι σθαι δει ποιειν συνεπαινεσθαι τον ακροατην, 
η αυτον η γενοσ η επιτηδευματ αυτου η αμως γε πως ο γαρ λεγει Σωκρατης εν τω επιταφιω, αληθες, οτι 
ου χαλεπον 'Αθηναιους εν 'Αθηναιοις επαινειν αλλ εν 
Δακεδαιμονιοις.

12 Τα δε του δημηγορικου εκ των του δικαιου λο-
γου εστιν, φυσι δι ηκιστα εξει και γαρ και περι ου 
ισασι, και ουδεν δειται το πραγμα προσιμου, αλλ η 
δε αυτον η τους αντιλεγοντας, η εαιν μη ηλικον βουλει 

δυο] here is indeclinable, like άμφω sometimes. As only the first four 
numerals in Greek (and Sanskrit; the first three in Latin) are declinable; 
δυο occasionally follows the general rule of indeclinability. In Homer 
this is the usual form (see Damm's Lex. s. v.); in later and Attic writers 
not so frequent. Several examples are to be found in Ellendt's Lex. Soph., 
Sturz, Lex. Xen. See Schweighäuser, Lex. Herod. for instances with 
fem. plur. Analogous to this of Arist. is δυο νεων ανελκυσμενων, Thuc. 
III 89. Aristoph. δυο μυριαδες των δημοτικων. Plat. Gorg. 464 Β, δυο 
λεγο τεχνας. Eur. Bacch. 916, δυο ηλιους. Orest. 1401, λευτες δυο, 
Phoen. 53, &c.

'In the epideictic prooemia the hearer must be made to suppose that 
he is a sharer in the praise, either personally, or by his family, or his 
studies and pursuits, or at any rate somehow or other: for what Socrates 
(i.e. Plato, Menex. 235 ι, supra Ι 9.30) says in his funeral oration is 
quite true, that it is easy enough to praise Athenians at (friendly) Athens; 
the difficulty lies in doing it at Sparta (amongst rivals and enemies)'. The 
old adj. άμως, 'some,' survives in several forms found in most Greek 
authors; άμως (γε πως) and άμη (γε πη), sc. άδω, άμοι, άμόθει, and the 
compounds ουδαμός, ουδαμώς, ουδαμοι, ουδαμη (or μη), ουδαμόθεν, ουδαμώςε, 
and the same with μη.

§ 12. 'The exordia of the public oration are borrowed from those of 
the forensic speech, but are naturally very rare in it: for in fact the sub-
ject of it is one with which they are already well acquainted, and there-
fore the facts of the case require no preface (no preparatory explanation) 
except—if at all—on his own account or that of the adversary (δε αυτων 
to put himself right with the audience, the ηδος εν τω λεγοντι; η τους 
αντιλεγοντας to meet the adversary's charges, combat the prejudices the 
other has raised against him: both of these therefore are accidental), or 
in case the subject (this is essential) is not considered by them of the 
precise degree of importance which you wish, but rated either too high 
or too low.' As to τους αντιλεγοντας, we had been told before, c. 13.3, 
προσιμων δε...εν τοις δημηγοριαισ τοτε γίνεται όταν αντιλογια η: as in De-
mosth. de Corona, and de Falsa Legatione. Comp. Quint. III 8.8, who 
borrows this from Aristotle, Aristoteles quidem nec sine causa putat et
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 14 § 12. 177

υπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλὰ ἡ μεῖζον ἡ ἐλαττον. διὸ ἡ p. 139.
diaβάλλειν ἡ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἡ αὐξήσα τῇ
μείωσαι. τούτων δὲ ἐνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἡ κόσμου
χάριν, ὡς αὐτοκάβδαλα φαίνεται, εὰν μὴ ἔχῃ. τοι-
ότων γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείους: οὐδὲν
γὰρ προεξαγωγώνσας οὐδὲ προανακίνησας εὐθὺς ἀρχε-
tαι "Ἑλις πόλις ευδαίμων."

a nostra, et ab eius qui dissentiunt persona, duci frequenter in consiliis
exordium, quasi mutuamitibus hoc nobis a iudiciis genere; nonnullum estiam ut minor res maiore videatur: in demonstrativis vero prooemia
esse maxime libera existimavit.

'And hence the necessity of either raising or doing away with preju-
dice (διὸ, because when there is an adversary, as there always is in
dicastic practice, the same treatment in deliberative speaking is neces-
sarily required) and (the topics) of amplification and diminution (to meet
the other requirement, ἐὰν μὴ ἥλικον βουλεῖ, ύπολοιπόν, κ.τ.λ.)'

On the κωνός τόπος (or τόποι) αὔξησις and μείωσις, see Π 26.1. Ib.
18. 4.

'These are the circumstances in which a preface is required (δεῖται,
ὁ λόγος, or ὁ λέγων); either these, or for mere ornament's sake, because,
without it, the speech has an off-hand, slovenly (impromptu, extempor-
aneous) air (note on Π 7. 1). For such is Gorgias' encomium on the
Eleans; without any preliminary sparring (flourish) or preparatory stir-
ring up he starts abruptly (rushes at once, in medias res; without any
previous warning or preparation) with "Elis, blessed city."

No. iv. Nothing more is known of the speech.

προεξαγωγώνσα] is a metaphor from boxing, and denotes a preliminary
exercise of the boxer, a swinging, and thrusting to and fro of the arms
(lit. elbows), as a preparation for the actual blow, "ex athletarum
disciplina ... qui bracchiis sublatis et vibratis pugnæe proludunt (I
think this is not quite exact: the exercise is not so much to prepare for
the encounter with the antagonist, though this of course may be
included, as to give weight and impetus to the actual blow). Hinc ab
Ar. ad oratorem traductum, qui prooemo quodam utitur priusquam ad
rem ipsam deveniat." Spanheim ad Callim. Hymn. Del. line 322. This
word is a ἀπό λέγομεν.

προανακινεῖται expresses much the same thing by a different metaphor;
the rousing, stirring up, excitement of emotion or interest, as a prep-
ARATION (προί) for what is to follow. This is illustrated by Plato, Legg.
iv 722 D, λόγων πάντων καὶ ὅσων φωνη κεκοιμύσα προαιρήμα τ' ἐστι καὶ
σχέδου οὐούς ἄνακηνσῆς, ἡχονεί τοια ἐντεχιόν ἐπιχείρησε χρῆσιμον
πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περαινέσθαι. Ib. vii 789 c, of the inspiring, animating,
exciting process—'quo validiores atque animosiiores ad certamina fierent,'
Stallbaum ad locum—which is the object of the training of fighting
cocks and quails, (πάνως) ἐν ὡς αὐτά ἄνακηνσαι γυμνάζοντες. Meno, 85 c,
The following chapter is a continuation of the preceding on the ordinary contents of the προοίμιον, two of which, as we have seen c. 14 § 12, are διαβάλλειν and ἀπολύεισθαι: and on these two the orator is supplied with topics.

The same subject is treated in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 29 (30), at even greater length than by Aristotle: and a summary of its contents, with some remarks on its moral character, and its connexion with Isocrates, may be found in Introd. pp. 441—443. A comparison of this with Aristotle’s treatment of the subject is altogether in favour of the latter. He had already told us that he disapproves of the προοίμιον, as distinct from the πρόθεσις, altogether: but he is obliged, by the practice of his predecessors, and the evident importance of the subject, which in spite of its unscientific character cannot be altogether passed over in a complete treatise on Rhetoric, to give it a place in his system; but it will be observed that in dealing with it he occupies at least three-fourths of the chapter with the topics of the defensive use of it, confining his observations on the aggressive side to two topics in a single section. See also especially § 10, τοιούτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικότατοι κ.τ.λ. The reckless and unscrupulous precepts of the other treatise present διαβολή in its very worst character: it is truly here the ‘devil’s art’, ἥ τοῦ διαβολοῦ τέχνη, the art of insinuating by whatever means prejudice and ill-will against your opponent—merely because he happens to be such, and for no other reason—and so prejudicing his case. There is something further on this in c. 36 (37), 46, 47. There is an invective against διαβολή in Isocr. ἀντίδ. § 18. ‘διαβάλλειν is ‘to set at variance’, ‘to make hostile’; and so to inspire ill-will, insinuate suspicions, or prejudice a person against another. It applies as a technical term to all insinuations and accusations by which one of the parties in a case endeavours to raise a prejudice against the other, which are to be reflected upon, but do not directly help to prove, the main charge or point at issue; and are therefore extra artem, ἡξο τοῦ πράγματος. See III 15. 9; and comp. the example, infra § 3. ἀπολύεισθαι is to clear oneself of such insinuated charges, to remove evil suspicions. Aristotle begins with this, because, as he told us before (c. 14. 7), it is more appropriate to the exordium, as the opposite (in accusation) is to the peroration.” Introd. p. 344.
§ 1. ‘With respect to διαβολή, (intentional and malicious) calumny or (accidental, undesigned) prejudice, one (the first) topic is anything from which arguments may be derived for removing offensive (unpleasant, injurious) suspicion: for it makes no difference whether (the charge or insinuation) has been actually spoken (expressed, in the shape of a direct personal calumny) or not’ (i.e. has merely been conceived, not openly stated; ὑπόληψις as a mere conception or supposition—against us by inference, from our words, actions, or manners, or altogether accidentally, when people have a bad opinion of us: in either case the prejudice requires to be removed); ‘and therefore this is a general rule’; includes everything, every kind of argument which tends to remove any bad opinion or prejudice which for whatever reason may be entertained against us: and this, whether the charge we have to meet be a direct statement, or merely an uncertified suspicion. This is illustrated by Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 8, 9.

In Benseler’s Isocrates, Π 276, a ref. is given upon διαβολή to Isocr. τέχνη, Fragm. τέχνη. No. 2 (from Anon. et Maxim. Planud. V 551. 10, Waitz), which runs thus: ἐν γὰρ ταῖς καταστάσεις τὰ τε οἰκεία συνιστῶμεν (establish) καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων διαβάλλομεν πρὸς τὸ οἰκείον σύμφερον ἐργα-ζόμενοι τὰς καταστάσεις, ὃς Ἰσοκράτης ἐδίδαξεν.

§ 2. ‘Another way (of clearing oneself) is to meet the charge on any of these issues’ (στάσεις or ἀμφισβητήσεις, status, the turning-point of the case, on which issue is joined: on these see Appendix E to Book ΠΙΙ in Introd. p. 397 seq. where the various classifications of them are given;) ‘either by denying the fact (τὸ δὴ, status contextualis); or admitting that, and asserting that the alleged act was not injurious (ab utili, Victorius); or at any rate not to ἥμι (the complainant); or that the amount of injury is overstated; or that it was either no wrong at all (not unjust: not a legal crime), or a slight one; or, (taking the other view of morality, supposing it to be strictly speaking unjust, at any rate) not disgraceful, or a mere trifle, of no importance at all’. ὃς μέγα differs in this from οὐκ ἐξον μέγεθος: the former qualifies merely the wrong of the ἀδικον, the latter is “no great matter”; of greatness, in the sense of magnitude or importance in general. ‘For these are the points upon which the issue (of a case) turns, as in that between Iphicrates and Nausicrates: for he admitted the fact and the injury, but said it was no wrong’. Nausicrates or (always in the Latin Rhetoricians) Nauicrates, is mentioned by Cicero, Orat. L 172, de Orat. Π 23.94, and ΠΙΙ 44. 173, as a pupil of Isocrates. Quint., ΠΙΙ 6.3, stating the same fact, tells us also that some attributed to him the first systematic division of these στάσεις or status. See Art. in Biogr. Dict. s.v. Westermann’s Gesch. der Gr. ii. Röm. Beredtsamkeit, 30. 5, comp. 83. 10.
'Ifikrathe pro Nauσiκратην' εφη γαρ ποιησα το ελεγε καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ' ουκ ἀδικεῖν. ἦ ἀντικαταλ- λάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἴ βλαβερὸν ἀλλὰ καλὸν, εἰ 3 λυπηρὸν ἀλλ' ἀφέλιμον ἢ τι ἀλλὸ τοιοῦτον. ἄλλος τρόπος ὁς ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ ἀναγκαῖον,

Spalding, on Quint. III 6, 60, retains the vulgata lectio toto (instead of toto) in the sense of ὑποθή τοῖσι or filiiio. On the redundant ὧστε in τρόπος ὧστε ἀπαντάω, add to the examples from the Tragic poets collected by Monk ad Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύρου γὰρ ἦθελ' ὧστε γέγνεσθαι τάδε, Thuc. I 28, ἕστων εἶναι ὧστε (provided ἰδεῖ), Ἰβ. c. 119, δεσπότα ὧστε ψυφίσσεσθαι, VIII 45, ἐδίδακτε ὧστε, Ἰβ. c. 79, δύον ὧστε διαναμαχεῖν, Ἰβ. 86, ὧστε...πάνω ἐπαινεῖ. Pind. Nem. V 64, κατένευσεν ὧστε πράξαι. Herod. I 74, συνήνεικε ὧστε...νῦκτα γενέσθαι, Ἰβ. III 14, συνήνεικε ὧστε...παρέμεινεν. Plat. Protag. 338 c, ἀδύνατον ὧστε, where see Heindorf's note, and also on Phaedr. 269 D, τὸ δύνασθαι ὧστε...γενέσθαι. Phaedo 93 B and 103 E, ἔστω...ἀφέλιμον (Stallbaum's note). Isocr. Archid. § 40, γέγονεν ὧστε...καταθῆσαι. Dem. de F. L. § 124, κακὸν ἤν ὧστε 'ἰδεῖν ἀπαντα (with Shilleto's critical note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49 § 158, ἐσάπτο...ἀπαντά...ἀναστρέψθωσα. Ar. Pol. II 1, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει... ὧστε πάντας ἁρχεῖν, Ἰβ. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστων ὧστ' ἔχειν. Ἰβ. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβαθήκην ὧστε...τὴν πολιτ. εἶνα. Soph. Oed. Col. 570, Ἰβ. 1350 (Dind.), δικαίων ὧστ' ἐμοὶ κλίνειν, Philoct. 656, ἄρ' ἔστων ὧστε κάγετων θεῶν λαβεῖν. Eur. Iph. T. 1017, ποῖον ὦν γενέσθαι ἢν ὧστε μῆθ' ἡμᾶς βανεῖν.

'Or (in justifying oneself), admitting a wrong done, to balance (or compensate) it (by something else which may be taken as a set-off, or drawback, in diminution of the wrong); for instance you say, what I did was injurious no doubt, but honourable; or painful, but serviceable; or anything else of the same sort.' The comparison of a few passages will best illustrate the meaning of ἀντικαταλάττεσθαι. Ar. de part. Anim. I 5, 3, 644 b 22. The author is comparing the interest and value in natural philosophy of the objects of sense, things that we can see and touch and handle, and so examine and satisfy our curiosity about, with those that are beyond the reach of our senses, οὐσίας ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀφήνητος τῶν ἀπαντα ἀιων. Though the latter are in themselves higher and more excellent, "yet by their greater nearness to us, and more immediate connexion with our nature, there is a sort of compensation, ἀντικαταλάττεσται το, when they are compared with the things divine as objects of study." Dem. de Cor. § 138, τὸς ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡδονῆς καὶ χάριτος τὸ τῆς πάλαις συμφέρουν ἀνταλλαττόμεναι, 'bartering, exchanging for, compensating by.' Plat. Phaedo 69 A, ἡδονᾶς πρὸς ἡδονάς, καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας, καὶ φῶς πρὸς φῶς καταλάττεσθαι...ἀστερ νομίζεται : and other passages collected by Wytenb. ad loc. Dinarch. adv. Dem. § 2, μὴδ' τὴν κοινῆν σωτηριαν ἀντι- καταλάττασθαι τῶν τοῦ κραυμενίου λόγων. Aesch. c. Cesiph. § 92, ῥήμα μύων ἀντικαταλαττέμενοι ἀνι τοῖσιν. Isocr. Phil. § 135, ὑπὲρ ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένος ἢ ἢ τῶν ἀντικαταλατταμένος. (Ernesti Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v., ex- cessare enim.)

§ 3. 'Another method is (to extenuate the ἀδίκημα by the milder
οίον Σωφοκλῆς ἐφή τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλλων ἐφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης: οὐ γὰρ ἐκόντι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἐτη ὀγδοίκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ ὦν ἑνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβοῦλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο ὁ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνεβη δὲ βλαβών: "δίκαιον δὲ μισέω, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν." 4 ἄλλος, εἰ ἐμπεριεῖληται ο ὁ διαβάλλων, ἦ νῦν ἦ πρό-

15 terms, (to say) that it is a mistake, or an accident, or compulsory', done under compulsion: θία, see i 10.14, and Appendix C to Bk. i., Introd. p. 225, and the references there. ἀνάγκη or βία, 'overpowering force', forza mag-
ggiore, force majeure, absolves from responsibility. Four degrees of cri-
minality are thus distinguished in Eth. Nic. v 10, 1153 b 11, (1) ἀτέχνη, a mere accident, an injury done unintentionally without knowledge of the special circumstances of the case: (2) ἀμάρτημα, an error or mistake, where the act is intentional but the injury unintentional (the case of killing a friend with a gun supposed not to be loaded); this does not include the case of moral ignorance, ignorance of right and wrong, for which a man is responsible: (3) ἁδικήμα, a wrong, intentional in a sense, but without deliberation or malice prepense, as a deadly blow dealt in a fit of passion, when the judgment is for the moment overpowered; (this is, I believe, the only place in which this degree is distinguished from the following: at all events the ordinary division is threefold.) All these are short of actual guilt or crime. The last stage, of actual crime, is (4) ἁδίκαια, a wrong act committed with full knowledge of the circumstances, and deliberate purpose, ὅταν ἐκ προμηθέου ἁδίκος καὶ μοιχήρος. With this compare iii 2, on the intentional and unintentional. Comp. also Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 8, 9.

'As for instance Sophocles said that his trembling was not, as his accuser (or traducer) said, assumed to convey the appearance of old age, (and thereby obtain the sympathy and compassion of the judges) but compulsory (and therefore he was not responsible for it); for his eighty years were quite unintentional'. On Sophocles—not the poet—see note on i 14. 3. The same Sophocles is mentioned again iii 18. 6.

'And again, by a balance (compensatory interchange or substitution) of motives; (for instance) that you had no intention of injuring him; what you really intended to do was so and so, and not that which was falsely laid to your charge; the injury was an accident (not of the essence of what you did: a mere συμβεβηκός). "I should deserve to be hated if that were my intention in doing it". This seems to be introduced as a specimen of what might be said on such an occasion; and contrary to his usual practice, Aristotle's own manufacture.

§ 4. 'Another (way or topic) is recrimination, when the accuser is involved in the same charge, either at the present time or on some previous occasion; either himself or any of those near to him (relatives, connexions, intimate friends)'. If you can shew that your adversary or any one very near to him is liable to the same charge as that of
5 τερον, ἦ αὐτὸς ἦ τῶν ἐγγύς. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπερι- λαμβάνονται, οὐς ὀμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἰναι τῇ δια- βολῇ, οἶν εἰ ὁτι καθάριος ὁ 1 μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα. 6 ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους διέβαλεν, ἦ ἄλλος αὐτοῦς, ἦ ἀνεν δια- βολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὡσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἱ πεφήνασιν 1 fortasse transformatum aut prorsus omittendum,

which he accuses you, though the charge may not therefore fall to the ground, at any rate you can silence him by saying, that he at all events was not the person to make it. Majoragus cites Cic. pro Ligaro. § 2. Habes igitur, Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum, confitentem reum, sed tamen ita confitentem, se in ea parte suisse, quae te, Tubero, qua virum omni laude dignum, patrem tuum. Itaque prius de vestro delicto confiteamini necesse est, quam Ligarii ullam culpam reprehendali. He adds that the whole of the exordium of the fifth action against Verres is to prove, neminem debere alterum accusare de ea re qua ipsa sit infectus.

§ 5. 'Again, if others are included in the charge who are admitted not to be liable to the accusation; for instance if (it be argued) that so and so is an adulterer because he is a smart dresser, (the reply is) why in that case so must Smith and Jones be adulterers'—although it is perfectly well known that Smith and Jones are entirely free from that vice. Bekker and Spengel accept Riccoboni's, and Bekker's own, suggestion καθάριος for vulgāta lectio καθάριος: but they retain the article ὁ in its old position ὁτί καθάριος ὁ μοιχός. With this reading the only translation can be, “that all adulterers dress smartly”, which is not to the point. The converse is required by the argument—which is, to free yourself from a suspicion which has arisen from some accidental association, by shewing that, if the two things were really associated, others would be liable to the same suspicion, who are known not to be obnoxious to it: “if, as is alleged, all smart dressers were adulterers, then so and so, who are known not to be liable to the charge, would be involved in it” and besides this, the following passages on the same subject shew that this was the argument that was used. καθάριος, II 4. 15, for 'neatness and cleanliness in dress' and attention to personal appearance: the argument from this appears II 24. 7, ἐπί καλλοπιστῆς, καὶ νίκτωρ πλανάτας, μοιχός τοιοῦτο γὰρ; and de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 δ 9, βουλόμενοι γὰρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλαθον, ὅτι καλλοπιστῆς ὃ ὡς νίκτωρ ὀρᾶται πλανούμενος. It is necessary therefore, besides the alteration of καθάριος into καθάριος, either to change the position of the article, ὅτι ὁ καθάριος μοιχός or to omit the article altogether ὅτι καθάριος μοιχός. If such a mistaken inference has been drawn, you infer from this example by analogy to a like case.

§ 6. 'Again, if (your accuser) ever brought against others (the same) charges (which he is now bringing against you); or if, without a direct accusation, these same were ever subjected to the same suspicions as you yourself are now; who have been shewn to be entirely innocent of them'—you may infer by analogy that a similar mistake is likely to have been made in the present case.
§ 7. ‘Or again, (another topic may be derived) from recrimination, by a retort upon the accuser: (the inference being, that) it is strange that where (in what, δ) a man himself is not to be trusted, his statements should be trustworthy’. MSS ὃ αὐτός, Bekker Ed. 3, and Spengel (apparently from Bekker) ὅς. I read ὅ as nearer to the text, ‘in what’.

§ 8. ‘Another is, the appeal to a previous decision; an instance of which is Euripides’ reply to Hygiaeon, in the exchange case, in which the latter accused him of impiety for the verse that he wrote in recommendation of perjury, “the tongue hath sworn; but the mind is unsworn”. His reply was that the other had no right to bring cases (decisions) out of the Dionysiac contest into the courts of law: for he had already given an account (stood his trial) of them (his words, αὐτῶν, included in the verse), or was prepared to do so, if the other chose to accuse him’. This celebrated verse, Hippol. 608, probably owes a good deal of its notoriety to Aristophanes’ parody of it near the end of the Frogs. Seldom has so “much ado about nothing” been made as about this unlucky line. The charge of recommending perjury is at any rate a gross exaggeration. Nor does it necessarily imply even mental reservation. Cicero, de Off. III 29.107 (quoted by Monk ad loc.), puts the case very clearly. Quod ita iuratum est ut mens conciperet fieri opotere, id servandum est: quod aliter, id si non feceris nullum est per iurium. Non enim falsum iurare per iurare est; sed quod ex animi tuo sententia iuratis, sicut verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere per iurium est. Sei enim Euripides, Iuravi lingua, mentem iniuratam gero. See the whole of Monk’s note. Paley in his note follows Cicero. Of course the deceit, if there be any, lies in the intention and not in the word; and this is all that Hippolytus seems to say. He never intended that his oath should be kept in that sense: and his ignorance of the circumstances absolves him from the responsibility, or obligation of the oath. See above in note on § 3.

We learn from this passage that Euripides (the tragic poet) was

1 I find this note in one of my copies of the Hippolytus. “I don’t think the principle implied in this (the verse of Eurip.) can be defended. Hippolytus says that he swore to keep the secret in ignorance of the nature of it; now that he knows that, he’s freed from the obligation of keeping it. Has a man a right to lay himself under an obligation, of the nature of which he is ignorant?” However the question still remains, if the oath has been taken in ignorance, is he still bound to keep it? The last sentence was added when this Commentary was written.
§ 8, 9.

Another public speech, in an embassy to Syracuse, is attributed to him in II 6. 20 ult., where see note.

On the ἀντίδοσις, the compulsory "exchange of property," in the case of an unfair assignment of a liturgy at Athens, see Böckh Publ. Econ. Bk. iv. ch. 16. It does not appear from the text which of the two parties it was that proposed the exchange.

Valckenaer ad Hippol. 612, p. 232, would change the name in the text to Ὑγιαίνετον, as more agreeable to the analogy of Greek proper names. The name is right. Harpocr. quotes twice the speech of Hyperides πρὸς Ὑγιαίνετα, sub vv. ἐν καὶ νέα et ἑσθαώ.

§ 9. "Another (may be borrowed from the accusation of calumny and malicious insinuation itself, (shewing) its enormity (magnitude, how great it is)—and this in particular that it raises extraneous points for decision' (ἀλλας different from, foreign to, the question at issue: like Hygianon's quotation in the last section, which may perhaps have suggested this topic. This seems to fix the meaning of ἀλλας and so Victorius: otherwise it might be "gives rise to other trials," one trial generated out of another ad infinitum); 'and because it places no reliance on the facts of the real matter at issue'. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 29 (30). 12, and Isocr. peri ἀντίδοσεως § 18, who διαβάλλει διαβολήν—and in good round terms.

'Common to both (τὸ διαβάλλοντι καὶ ἀπολογομένῳ) is the topic of sigs and tokens: as, for example, in (Sophocles') Teucer, Ulysses charges him with being closely connected with Priam (i.e. with the enemy: closely connected in a double sense: it is an inference from his connexion by blood to his political connexion, to his favouring the cause of Priam); for Hesione (Teucer's mother) was his (Priam's) sister: the other (Teucer) replies (in the same topic) that his father (a still nearer relation. See Apollo's speech in Aesch. Eumen. 657—673 and in many other places, on the nearer connexion, and higher obligation, of the son to the father than to the mother) 'Telamon, was Priam's enemy, and also that he did not betray (inform against) the spies to him.' This play of Sophocles has already been named before—in II 23. 7. There are only two short fragments of it remaining (Dind., Wagn. Soph. Fragm.), from

1 On this connexion, Victorius refers to Virg. Aen. viii 157, Nam memini Hesiones visuitem regna sororis Laomedontidem Priamum seq.; and Soph. Aj. 1299 seq., where Teucer in answer to Agamemnon, boasting of his descent, says, ὡς ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν εἰμι Τελαμώνος...ὅτες...ἰσχεί Ξύκυνος μητέρ, ἡ φύσει μὲν ἦν βασιλεια, Λαομέδοντος.
which absolutely nothing is to be learned as to the plot of the play. It is clear from this passage, that Ulysses' accusation was that Teucer had betrayed the Greek cause, and had dealings with the enemy. The charge is supported by the sign of Teucer's connexion—in the double sense above explained—with Priam; and met by the other with two signs or tokens leading to the opposite inference. Wagner, Soph. Fragm. (Fr. Trag. Gr. I, 385—391, Τεῦκρος), supposing that Pacuvius "Soph. fabulam imitatione expressisse", collects a number of his fragments from various Latin writers, from which he derives an interpretation of the story of the play, totally different—as he candidly admits—from that which we shall gather from this passage. But as the interpretation of this passage is perfectly clear, and his hypothesis altogether the reverse, uncertain in every particular, there is little doubt which of the two is to be preferred for the elucidation of Ar.'s text—provided we confess our entire ignorance of all else in and about the play in question.

§ 10. 'Another, for the accuser, is to praise some trifle at great length, and then (under cover of that) to introduce in concise (and pregnant) terms a censure of something that is of real importance; or after a preliminary enumeration of a number of advantages (virtues and accomplishments, which have little or nothing to do with the point at issue) hold up that one thing to censure which has a direct and real bearing on the question'. προφερεων, to promote (carry forward), aid, assist, further. Hes. Op. et D. 579, ἥσος τοι προφέρει μὲν ὀδοῖ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐργον. Thuc. I 93, καὶ αὐτοῦς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρεως ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν.

Victorius illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. i 4. 94 seq. and the following well-known passage from Cic. pro L. Flacco, iv 9. Veruntamen hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras: do mullarum artium disciplinam: non admio sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam: denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non reprehendo: testimoniorum religionem et fidem nuncum ista natio coluit: totiusque huic rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus, ignorant.

'Topics) such as these are at the same time most artful and most unfair: for they endeavoure to do harm with what is good (to convert the good into an instrument of mischief) by mixing it with the bad'; like one who mixes poison with wholesome food. 'Another topic common to both accuser and excuser is, that since the same act may always be attri-
ἀπολυμομένω, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἐνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλουσι κακοθυστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χειρὸν ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυμομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον οἴον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσέα προ- είλετο, τῷ μὲν ὧτι διὰ τὸ ἁριστὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τῷ δ' ὧτι οὕ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαύλον.

καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα, διάγνοις δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἄλλα κατὰ μέρος· δεὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἦς ὃν ὁ buted to several (different) motives, the accuser has to depreciate (disparage, put a bad character or construction upon) it, by selecting the worse (lit. by directing his selection to what is worse), the apologist to put the more favourable interpretation upon it (interpretari in peius, in melius).


‘For instance, (to say) that Diomede preferred Ulysses (to be his companion in the nocturnal adventure), on the one side because he supposed Ulysses to be the best (i.e. the most valiant) of men (or the best companion, for such an occasion), on the other, not for that reason, but because, from his worthlessness, he was the only (one of the heroes) of whose rivalry he (Diom.) was not afraid’. Supra II 23. 20, 24: where the same case is given, and the two sides opposed, in illustration of two different topics. See Hom. II. K [X] 242 seq.

‘And so much for the treatment of διαβολή’.

CHAP. XVI.

On the various divisions of the parts of the speech, including διά- γνωσις, the special subject of the following chapter, see the introductory remarks to c. 13. Introd. p. 331 seq., and in the Commentary. 'Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ φρεσκόν ὡς ἐν τῇ διηγήσεις λεκτικόν τό τε πράγμα καὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὰ μετὰ τό πράγμα καὶ τᾶς διανοιας, αἰς ἀκέτατος τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων χρόνιοις τότε τι πέπραξεν ἢ μέλλει πράττειν, καὶ τούτων τῶι συμβάλλομενοι ἡμῖν χρηστεῖον (from Syrius, Sopater, and Anon. ap. Walz, Benseler Isocr. 112 276, ἀποσπάσμ. No. 3); Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37).
...
§ 3 οὐ λιτός. δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμμηνήσκειν·
διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷν εἰ θέλεις
Ἀχιλλέα ἐπανεῖν. ἵσασι γὰρ πάντες τὰς πράξεις,
ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ. εἰώ δὲ Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ p.

λιτός] connected with λισσός and λέος. The metaphor is from
a smooth and easily travelled road; like the road to vice, smooth and
casy, λεῖν μὲν ὄδος, μάλα δὲ ἐγγύθει ναίει, in Hesiod's often-quoted lines,
II 64, λεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐπίκροτος—"it seems indeed to the eye
a smooth and well-beaten track"—e i δὲ τις αὐτήν εἰσβάινει χαλεποῦ τρη-
χυτῆρ σκόλοπος. It is applied frequently by Dionysius to style in the
sense of ἀπλοίας, εὐτελῆς (Hesych.). In de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 2
init., the terms λεῖτα καὶ ἀφελῆς are applied to a style like that of Lysias,
plain, smooth, simple, easy, opposed to the rough, rugged, contortions
of that of Thucydides. In de vet. script. cens. c. 2 § 11, it is opposed to
ὑφήλος, 'low or mean', ὃ δὲ Ἐδρίαθεν οὐτε ὑψήλος ὡστὶ οὐτε μὴν λιτός:
de Thuc. Iud. c. 23, it is 'simple and unadorned'; λέειν λεῖτα καὶ ἀκόσμων
καὶ μῦθον ἔχουσαν περιττόν: and in de adm. vi dic. in Demosth. c. 34, it
is again opposed to ὑφήλος, 'low', τὴν λεῖτα καὶ ἱσχυρή (thin, ὑπιμιῆς) καὶ
ἀπέριττον (without any striking points or features, 'flat').

§ 3. Of well-known actions the hearer should merely be reminded
(they should merely be suggested, by a brief allusion, not dwelt upon);
and therefore most people1 (i.e. men of ordinary education) in such
cases don't require a regular narrative of them—everybody at once
remembers that Achilles conquered Hector; people only need to be
reminded of that—as for instance, if you want to praise Achilles: for
his actions are known to everybody, they only require to be employed
(that is, to be enlarged upon, and commented, for the purpose of en-
hancing their glory). If Critias is to be praised (or censured), he
does want one: for not many people know anything about him.1
Critias too—one of the Thirty—was a famous man in his day: one wonders that
he should have been so entirely forgotten in Aristotle’s time. Pericles
and Alcibiades still lived fresh in men's memories; though I don't
mean that the three were absolutely on a level in contemporary repu-
tation,

It appears that between ἵσασι and νῦν δὲ γελοῖοις there has been a
gap in the mss, including Α2, which has been filled up with an extract
from i 9, on ἔπανος, §§ 33—97. Comp. Spengel, in a paper on the
Rhet. ad Alex. in Zeitschrift für Alt. Wiss. 1849, p. 1226. Bekker's
Variae Lectiones include Α2 with the rest, as having the interpolated
passage: Buhle, ad h. 1., says "in nearly all the Edd. except that of
Victorius and his followers," the interpolation is found.

The abrupt transition from the epideictic to the dicastic branch had
already made Vettori (for once I will give him his proper name) suspect

1 There is a temptation here to understand οἱ πολλοὶ as 'the heroes of the
declaration'; 'those who have their actions narrated'—which is to be resisted.
It is not true in this sense.
§ 4. Something is here lost. 'But as it is, it is absurd to say' (as the writers on Rhetoric do in their treatises; and especially Isocrates) 'that the narration ought to be rapid.' This precept is suggested in Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 3, in the word βραχυλαχύρια; and 30 (31). 4, it is further recommended that the narrative of a δημηγορία should be βραχεία and σύντομος. See Spengel's note on ed. of Anaximenes' Ars Rhet., pp. 214, 5; and 219. Cic. de Orat. II 80. 326. Quint. IV 2. 31, 32, (Narrationem) plerique scriptores, maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate, voluit esse lucidam, brevem, verisimilem....Eadem nobis placet divisio; quanquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate in parte una discusserit, praeceps brevitas irridens, tantum necesse sit longam aut brevem esse expositionem, nec liceat ire per medium. From Plato Phaedr. 267 A, it appears that this precept appeared in rhetorical treatises as early as those of Tisias and Gorgias; and a remark of Prodicus, to precisely the same effect as that of the customer to the baker here, is quoted, 267 B. The precept, that it should be σύντομος, is found also in Dionysius de Lys. Iud. c. 18, (p. 492 R): probably taken from Isocrates. (Spengel's Artium Scriptores, p. 158).

The extract from Isocrates, on this quality of the δημηγορία, is quoted at the commencement of this chapter. This is one of Vettori's evidences (perhaps the best) of Aristotle's dislike of Isocrates. This subject is discussed in Introd. pp. 41—45, and the probability of the hypothesis reduced to a minimum. If they ever were enemies—as is likely enough in Ar.'s early life—after the death of Isocrates, by the time that this work was completed and published, all trace of hostility (γελοιώσας φασίν can at the worst hardly imply hostility) must have long vanished from Aristotle's mind.

'And yet—just as the man replied to the baker when he asked him whether he should knead his dough (τὴν μάγιαν) hard or soft,1 "what", said he, "is it impossible to do it well?"—so here in like manner: that is to say (γάρ), the narration should be no more over long2 than the prose-

1 Spengel, Art. Script. 169 note, has discovered here some fragments of a comic verse: which he thus restores: σκηλραν δε...η μαλακρην μάξων τι δι; άδινατον ευ εμάτσεω σε... [The addition of πότερον would fill the blank left in the first line.]

2 It would be difficult to assign any sufficient reason (in point of the sense) for making the distinction of μη and ωδε here; though we may say, grammatically, of course, that the μη is joined immediately with the inf. mood, whereas the two ωδε's following require δε to be supplied after them in each case.
§ 5. ‘You may slip into your narrative (bring in by a side wind, on the sly, μακροβιάλλειν, supra c. 14. 9) anything that tells to the advantage of your own character—as for instance, “and I always admonished him to do what was right, not to leave his children behind him in the lurch” (in distress and difficulty), or to the disadvantage of your opponent’s; “but he made answer to me, that wheresoever he was himself, there would he find other children:” the answer, as Herodotus tells us, of the revolted Egyptians (to the king who was inviting them to return).’ The story of the latter part of the alternative is told by Herodotus Π 30, with the addition of certain circumstances, which add indeed to its graphic character, but cannot be here repeated. Aristotle seems to have tackled on the first part of the alternative—out of his own head—to make a little “imaginary conversation.” ‘Or (to slip in) anything else that is likely to be agreeable to the judges’.

§ 6. ‘In defence’—when you have to narrate circumstances in order to correct an opponent’s statement of the facts—the recital may be shorter (because most of the story has been already told by the other), and as the issues (ἀμφιβολὴς is Arist.’s term for what were afterwards called στάσεις, status) are (on the defensive side) the denial either of the fact, or the injury, or the wrong, or the degree (the estimated amount of the crime and penalty), we must therefore waste no time upon proving what is already admitted, unless it (the proofs of any of the facts) chance
ΠΙΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 16 §§ 6, 7.

§ 7. ‘Events should generally be recited as past and gone—except those which by being acted’ (represented as actually done, passing before the eyes, πρὸ ὄμματοι, note on III. 11. 2.) ‘may afford an opportunity for exciting either commiseration or indignation’. δείνωσις, and ἔλος, ὀίκτος, σχέλβασις, are two ordinary ‘common topics’, (subordinate varieties of αὐθεντικός and μείωσις,) of appeals to the feelings in use amongst rhetoricians. See notes on II. 21. 10, and 24. 4. Of Thrasymachus, and his use of these in his Rhetoric, Pl. Phaedr. 267 c, d, and of the early rhetoricians in general, Ib. 272 A, where βραχυλογία is joined with the other two.

An example of this is ‘the story of Alcinous,’ (it is an example) because it is told (πεποιηται, composed, written) to Penelope in sixty verses, i.e. the long story of Ulysses’ wanderings, which occupies in the narration of it to the Phaeacians four whole books of the Odyssey, ix—xii, is condensed by Ulysses, when he repeats it to Penelope, Od. ψ’ [XXIII.] 264—284, 310—343, into a summary of 55 verses—which here (with the characteristic inaccuracy of the ancient writers in calculations and descriptions of all kinds) are called in round numbers sixty—and thus furnishes a good example of the summary treatment required in an ordinary narrative. Vater, who explains all this in his note, understates the actual number by two. “Hi versus quinquinaginta et tres numero rotundo recte (correctly enough for the occasion, I suppose) ἐξήκοντα ἐπη nominatur.”

‘And as Phayllus reduced (condensed: ἐποιηρε, I suppose, must be understood from πεποιηται, ‘composed’) the Epic cycle: and Euripides’ prologue to the Oeneus’. These three cases are appealed to as well-known instances of concise summaries. The Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, in its original form, when given at length with all its details, became proverbial for “a long story.” Erasmus Chil. Ἀπόλογος Ἀλκίνου ἐπὶ τῶν φιλαρεύτων καὶ μακρὰν ἀποτελοῦντων λόγον, Suidas s.v. Plato, Rep. X 614 b, uses it in the same proverbial application. See Ast and Stallbaum ad locum. The Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος appears in Aelian’s list of μνημοσύναι into which the Homeric poems were divided for recitation (Var. Hist. XIII 13, π. ‘Ὀμήρου ἐπών καὶ ποιήσεως, quoted by Paley, Pref. to Hom. II. p. xlvii). It is quoted again to supply an instance of ἀναγροφίας, Poet. XVI.

Of Phayllus nothing whatever is known. It seems that this is the
only place in which his name occurs; neither is it to be found in Smith's
Biogr. Dict. We gather from the notice of him here, that whether poet
or rhapsodist, he attempted to reduce the whole of the Epic Cycle into
a brief summary. F. A. Wolf is so staggered by the overwhelming
labour of such a task that he prefers to read Κύκλωπα, from a correction
in one of the MSS; overlooking the fact that τὸν Κύκλωπα is not in point
here; τῶν κύκλων, which gives a second instance of a summary, is.

The third example is the prologue to Euripides' Oeneus. Four lines
and a half of this are to be found in Wagner's collection, Fragm. Eurip.
p. 290, Oen. Fr. 1. and Dindorf, Eur. Fr. Oeneus. They are written with
Euripidean compactness, and seem to justify their citation for this
purpose.

§ 8. 'The narrative should have an ethical cast: this will be effected
when (if) we know what imparts this ethical character. One thing in
particular that does so, is any indication of a moral purpose (Π 21.16,
Π Π 17.9, Poet. VI 24): it is by (the quality of) this that a moral quality is
given to character: and the quality (good or bad) of the moral purpose
is determined by the end'. On προαίρεσις, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, VI 2.
'Consequently Mathematics (mathematical calculations or reasonings,
lόγοι) can have no moral character, because they have no moral purpose:
for they have no (moral or practical) end in view'. (Their end is the
intellectual one, truth.) 'But the "Socratic dialogues" have (a moral pur-
pose, and an ethical and practical end), for they treat of such (ethical)
subjects'. On this class of works, called collectively 'Socratic dialogues',
see Grote, Plato III 469; also Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Ar., die dial. des
Arist. pp. 140—144. By 'Socratic dialogues' are meant dialogues on
moral philosophy, after the manner of Socrates, and therefore bearing
his name, whether (as in Plato and Xenophon) he was an interlocutor,
or not; the compositions of Socrates' friends and followers, the Socratic
'family', Xenophon, Plato, Aeschines, Antisthenes, Phaedo, (Socraticam
Ars Poet. 310. Socraticae chartae, all meaning moral philosophy). On
Socrates' philosophical pursuits and studies see Arist. de part. Anim.
Athen. XI 505 c, 'Αριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ ποιητῶν οὐτὸς γραφεῖ, "Οὐκόν
οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρου τῶν καλομένων Σώφρωνος μίμους ...μὴ φῶμεν ...η τῶν Ἀλέξ-
αμενοῦ τοῦ Τιτίου τῶν πρῶτων γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων," ἀντι-
κύριος φάσκων ὁ πολυμαθέστατος Ἄρ. πρὸ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους γεγραφέων τῶν
Ἀλέξαμενον. This extract will serve as a corrective to Poet. I 8, from
which it might seem that the 'Socratic dialogues' were in verse. See
§§ 8, 9.

Tyrwhitt's note ad loc. p. 110. The meaning of that passage is, that the Socratic dialogues are not to be called poetry or verse, although they have a dramatic character (Gräfenhan).

§ 9. 'Another, different, kind of ethical drawing or representation (άλλα; no longer confined to moral qualities, but the representation of character in general) are the characteristic peculiarities that accompany each individual character: for instance, "so and so walked on as he was talking"—an indication of audacity and rudeness of character'. The rudeness and insolence are shewn in not stopping to speak to the other; it is a sign of slight esteem and contempt, ἀλογία. The characters here spoken of differ in one point from the dramatic characters of III 7. 6,—though they belong to the same family, the third kind of ἡθη, Introd. p. 112—in that these are the characteristic peculiarities of individuals, the others those of classes. A good specimen of this ethical description occurs in Demosth. de F. L. § 361, a portrait of Aeschines; and two similar traits in c. Steph. a § 63, οὕτος γὰρ, ἧνικα μὲν συνεβαινεν εὐτυχεῖν ἀριστολόχῳ τῷ τραπεζίτῃ, ἢσα βαίνους εβαίδευεν ὑποπεττοκὸς αὐτῷ...ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπάλετε εἴκενος κ.τ.λ. and § 77, ἐγὼ δ...τῆς μὲν ὅψεως τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ ταχέως βαδίζειν καὶ λαλεῖν μέγα (signs apparently of ill-breeding) οὐ τῶν εὐτυχῶν πεφυκότων ἐμανῦν τρίην. The ἢσα βαίνειν in the former passage, is 'to keep pace with', 'to walk on a level', 'place oneself on equal terms with' another. See Shilleto ad loc. de F. L. (His reference to the passage of c. Steph. should be § 63, not 77.)

'And again, in speaking, let your words seem to proceed, not from the intellect (as the effect of calculation, deliberation), but as it were from a moral purpose or intention (the will; or, as we should say, the heart). 'Let your style bear the impress, not so much of intellectual subtlety and vigour, as of good feeling and sound moral purpose: the one may be the mark of a wise man, the other is that of a good—and, what is more to the purpose in Rhetoric, a popular—character.' Introd. (slightly altered). "And I wished this to take place; in fact such was my purpose and intention: it is true that I gained nothing by it; but even so it is better." The one is characteristic of a wise or prudent man, the other of a good one: for prudence (worldly, practical, wisdom) shows itself in the pursuit of one's interest, goodness in that of the fair, high, noble, right'.

'If any (trait of character that you introduce) seem incredible, then add the statement (or explanation) of the cause or reason, as (in) the example that Sophocles gives, the passage of (from) his Antigone "that

AR. III.
she cared more for her brother than for her husband or children, for the one could be replaced (recovered) if they were lost—but when father and mother are buried in the grave, no brother can spring up evermore". This is Antigone's reason for preferring the burial of her brother's body to marriage with Haemon, a husband and children: she has shewn her character in the preference, and the obstinacy in which she adheres to it. It is the conclusion of a beautiful passage, beginning, δ' τίμιον, δ' υμι- 

The same answer is put into the mouth of the wife of Intaphernes, when Darius, having condemned her husband and the whole of his family to death, allows her to choose one of the number whose life is to be spared. She chooses her brother, and when Darius expresses his surprise and demands the reason, replies thus: Ὠβίσαλεία, ἀνήρ μὲν μοι ἄν ἄλλος γένοιτο, εἴ δαλίων θελοι, καὶ τέκνα ἄλλα, εἴ ταύτα ἀποβάλομι: πατρὸς δὲ καὶ μητρὸς οὐκ ἔτι μεν ἐωντων, ἀδελφεῖν ἄν ἄλλοι οὐδὲν τρίσφι γένοιτο. ταυτή τῇ γνωμῇ χρεωμένη ἔλεξα ταῦτα. The comparison of these two passages of the poet and historian, and another equally close correspondence of Herod. II 35 with Soph. Oed. Col. 337, have led to the inference that there was some connexion or acquaintance between the two. When or where they met, if they ever did meet, cannot now be ascertained: Samos (which has been suggested) is out of the question; for Herodotus was at Thurium before Sophocles was appointed to his command in the expedition under Pericles against that island. The Antigone was produced in 440 B.C. It is probable that some parts of Herodotus' history had been published1 before the final completion of the work at Thurium, and Sophocles may have thus obtained access to them. That he was the borrower, there can be no reasonable doubt. At all events that Sophocles was an admirer of Herodotus we know from Plutarch, who gives us the first line and a half of an epigram by Sophocles in his honour: φῶν Ἡροδότῳ τεῦξεν Σοφροκλῆς ἐτέων ὢν πέντε ἐπὶ πεντή- 

1 There is a doubtful story of a recitation at Olympia.
people never believe in disinterested motives." (Lit. people always disbelieve that any one does anything intentionally except what is for his own interest.) Even such a reason is better than none at all.

§ 10. 'Further, besides the ἰδός, topics may be also derived from the expression of emotion of various kinds, by introducing in your narration both the usual accompaniments of these emotions (the outward expressions, attitudes, and other external indications), which everybody is acquainted with, and also any special peculiarities by which you yourself or the adversary may be distinguished (which may be attached to, belong to, πρόσῳτα). These special touches and traits in the expression of individual emotion will lend a lifelike character to the descriptions of your narrative, and impart fidelity to your own impersonations of feelings, and your representation of them as they manifest themselves in others. How true and lifelike all that is, the audience will say: that can be no counterfeit: the man is evidently in earnest. Again, the same popular fallacy as before; the illicit inference from the faithfulness of the imitation to the sincerity of the feeling and truth of the fact.

'Such indications are "and he went away with a scowl at me from under his eyebrows" (so ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας of an angry glance', Pl. Phaed. 117 B; three other examples in Ast.'s Lex., where it is joined in the same sense with ὃς καταφρονῶτα, Symp. 220 B, ὅσπερ τι ἄδικομενος, Eryx. 395 A, ὑποβλέψουται σε διαφθορά ἡγούμενοι, Crit. 53 B. ὑπό represents an 'under-look'. Comp. the Homeric ὑποδρα ἰδών): 'and as Aeschines says of Cratylos "furiously hissing and shaking his fists" (διὰ in both participles is intensive, 'thorough, thoroughly'; here 'violently': Aeschines and Cratylos are supposed by Victorius to be, the one Socrates' intimate, the other Plato's instructor in the Heraclitean philosophy, and the Eponymus of one of his dialogues: but nobody really knows): 'these are persuasive, because these things (indications of passion) which they do know are made (by the speaker) signs or tokens of those that they don't know (in the manner above explained). A great number of these (indications of

1 Comp. Rhet. ad Al. 7 (8). 10, περὶ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν καὶ ὃς λυσιτέλες ἴν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ποιεῖν οἱ γὰρ πλείστοι τῶν ἄνθρωπων αὐτοὶ τὸ λυσιτέλες μᾶλλον προσμόιωτες καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου νομίζουσιν ἕνεκα τοῦτοι πάντα πράττειν.
feeling) may be obtained from Homer: "Thus then he spake; and the aged dame (Euryclea, Ulysses' old nurse) held fast (clasped) her face with her hands" (Hom. Od. r [xix] 361)—for people, when they are beginning to cry, are apt to lay hold of their eyes. Introduce yourself at once (to the audience) in a particular character (in that, namely, which you wish to bear in their eyes) that they may regard you as such: and the adversary in the same way (mutatis mutandis): only take care that the design isn't detected. That there is no difficulty in this—in conveying these impressions to the audience, how readily they seize, and draw inferences from, these indications of emotion, expression of features, action and the like—must needs be seen' (retaining δε with Bekker, Spengel omits it) 'from the case of messengers: of things that we know nothing whatever about, we nevertheless (instantly) conceive a notion or suspicion' (from the face, expression, gestures, general appearance of the messenger; as if he is hot and tired, and so on).

See what a ready tongue suspicion hath! He that but fears the thing he would not know, hath by instinct knowledge from others' eyes, that what he feared is chanced. Northumb. Henry IV. Act i, Sc. 1, 84. Victorius refers to Soph. Trach. 869 (Dind.) as an instance of this, the suspicions of the Chorus gathered from the old woman's face.

'The narrative should be (not confined to one place and continuous, but) distributed over the speech (πολλαχοὶ 'in many places'), and sometimes not at the beginning'. In saying οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ, Ar. is referring to his own division of the speech, which excludes the προϊόμενοι and commences at once with the πράξεις, c. 13. The narrative, he says, should sometimes even be entirely out of its proper place, which is at the beginning.

§ 11. 'In public speaking there is least occasion for narrative, because no one ever gives a narrative of things future' (the only provision of deliberative Rhetoric, from which all its materials are derived; ὡς ἐποίησεν εἶπεν): 'but if there be a narrative, it must be of things past, in order that with these in their recollection they may be better able to deliberate about things to come'. Gaisford refers to Dionys. Ars Rhet. X 14, ὅλη μὲν ίδια συμβουλευτική διηγήσεως οὐ δεῖται ἵσαυ γὰρ οἱ βουλευόμενοι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦνται, κἂν δέοντα μαθεῖν ὡς πρακτέων ἵσαυ, οὐξ ὑπὲρ βουλευτῶν.

'Or it may be employed in the way of accusation or of praise', διηγήσονται, εἰ διηγοῦνται, to be understood from the preceding. 'But in
that case, (the speaker who thus employs it) does not fulfil the proper function of the adviser' (whose office is to exhort and dissuade).

The following sentence to the end of the chapter I have done what I can to elucidate in the Introd. p. 354. No commentator, except Victorius, whose explanation I have there criticized, has bestowed a single word upon it; not even Spengel in his recent edition: I suppose he has given it up as hopeless. What it seems to me to mean is something of this kind—but I think there is most likely some latent corruption. 'If there be anything incredible in your narrative, you may promise your audience (omit τέ) to add a reason (i.e. explanation, to account for it), and a full, detailed, explanation of it as long as they please'. διατάτειν is one of the chief difficulties of the passage. The only appropriate meaning that occurs to me is to 'set out in order, i.e. set forth in full and clear detail': δις βουλονταί 'with what, with as many details as, they please'. 'As Carcinus' Jocasta, in his Oedipus, is perpetually promising, in answer to the inquiries of the man who is looking for her son—(something or other, which is left to be supplied by the hearer's knowledge of the context: probably, to satisfy him). And Sophocles' Haemon'. This last example must be given up as hopeless: there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as is required here. And what Carcinus' Jocasta has to do with the topic to be illustrated, is not easy to see. Carcinus' Medea has been already quoted Π 23. 28, where an account is given of him in the note. His Thyestes is referred to, Poet. XVI 2, and a fault pointed out, XVII 2. And as if to aggravate the difficulties which surround the interpretation of this passage, Wagner, in his collection of the Tragic Fragments, has chosen to omit this reference to Carcinus.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the various kinds of proof, the various ways in which facts and statements may be made to appear probable, πιστεῖς, some are direct and logical, and appeal exclusively to the reasoning faculty; others indirect, which by appealing to the moral sense ἠθος, or to the emotions πάθος, support the logical arguments by the favourable impressions they produce upon the hearts and feelings of the listeners, who are ever ready to

1 καὶ αἷρειν a reason in addition, besides the mere statement.
draw inferences from what they feel to the truth of what is said; and further the adventitious and external aids, which are not invented by the speaker but found ready for use and applied by him in evidence of the facts of his case: of these three the first only have any pretension to the character of \( \text{απόδεικτικά} \). But not even these are entitled to the name in its strict and proper sense, \( \text{απόδειξις} \) ‘demonstration’ implying conclusions universal and necessary and a rigorous exact syllogistic method. This belongs, strictly speaking, exclusively to the domain of Science and to the sphere of certainty, to which no conclusion of Rhetoric can ever attain. When it is said therefore in § 1, that “the proofs of preceding statements, and refutation of those of the adversary”—which from the third division of the speech—“must be demonstrative”—no more is meant than that they must be demonstrated, so far as the nature and limits of rhetorical proof permit, that is, that they must be such, so far consistent with sound reasoning and the rules of logic, as will induce those who hear them to believe what they seek to establish. We have very frequently had to remark the language of strict Logic applied to the laxer methods of Rhetoric, here it is done a little more formally than usual.

‘The point to which this \( \text{πρότασις} \) must be directed (addressed) of the four questions on which the issue may turn, is the particular point on which the issue is actually joined between the two contending parties: for example, if the issue is the question of \( \text{fακτόν} \), was the thing done or not? in the trial this is the point that he must most aim at establishing; if of \( \text{χάραξις} \) or \( \text{λογίαν} \), injury, at \( \text{αυτό} \); or if—these two being admitted—the question is one of the \( \text{αρχής} \) or amount of the injury; or of the justice of the action—admitting the fact and the injury and even the amount charged—of that; just as much (in the three last cases) as if the issue had been one of that same thing as a \( \text{fακτόν} \). Spalding, ad Quint. III 6. 60, seems to understand \( \text{περί τού γενέσθαι τούτο} \) of a distinct issue, the \( \text{οστάσις} \) \( \text{σημείων} \), or \( \text{status finitus} \).

§ 2. ‘But let it not be forgotten that this issue (of \( \text{fακτόν} \)) is the only one in which it may happen that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue: for in such cases, ignorance (which exempts from responsibility, see note on c. 15. 3) cannot be pleaded (cannot be assigned as the cause or reason), as it may when the issue is the justice (or injustice) of the act—and the same of the \( \text{ινδυρία} \), and alleged degree or amount of the offence—‘and therefore in this issue alone the topic may be dwelt
§§ 3, 4. upon, but not in the (three) others. It is important to observe here a qualification of the apparent meaning, which has not been—at all events distinctly—pointed out by the Commentators. It would not be true to say universally that when the issue is that of fact, whether the act alleged has or has not been committed, that one of the two parties concerned must necessarily be a rogue: as when A accuses B of murder, the question is one of fact, is B guilty or not guilty? B may be perfectly innocent, though the circumstantial evidence is so strong as to justify A in bringing the charge. All that is meant is, that there is a certain class of cases which fall under the status or issue, in which this topic may be safely used. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 30, ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλαγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέθαι αἵμασβητοῦσιν, ὦν ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἐπερων εἶναι μοχθῆρον, ἀν μὴ διὰ λήθη αὐτὸ δρῶν. This is the case of a deposit, which A seeks to recover from B, who denies having received it. Here—unless either of them has forgotten the transaction—either A, if he seeks to recover what he knows that he has never confided, or B, if he refuses to restore what he knows has been lent him, must intend to defraud the other (Schrader). This is repeated from Introdt. p. 356, note.

MS A° (Bekker) has χρηστίων, which has not been adopted either by Bekker or Spengel. The Schol., quoted by Gaisford Not. Var., manifestly reads χρηστίων.

§ 3. In the epideictic branch, in its ordinary topic, amplification is mostly employed in shewing that things are fair (fine) or useful—the other, μειώσει, ‘detraction’ employed in censure, is omitted as less usual—the facts must be taken on trust: declaimers seldom adduce proofs of these; only when they seem incredible, or some one else has got the credit of them (been charged with them; made responsible for them). Bekker and Spengel have both adopted ἄλλοις without manuscript authority, from a conjecture of the former in his 4to ed. I think they must have overlooked the natural interpretation of ἄλλοις given in the translation. πιστεύεσθαι belongs to the family of irregular passives, of which an account, and a list, are given in Appendix (B) [Vol. I p. 297].

§ 4. In public, deliberative, speaking (the four forensic issues may be applied to its special subjects), it may be contended (against an opponent), (1) that the future facts alleged will not be (i.e. that the consequences which are assumed to result from the policy recommended will not take place); or admitting that, (2) that it will be unjust; or (3) inexpedient; or (4) that the amount and importance of them will not be so
μὲν ἄ κελεύει, ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὁφέλιμα ἢ οὐ τηλικά. δεὶ δὲ καὶ ὤραν εἰ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος· τεκμηρία γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν 5 ἀλλων, ὅτι ψεύδεται. ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἢ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον· ἄστε· ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἢ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ 6 τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην. οὐ δεὶ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ
great as the other anticipates. (The principal attention of the speaker is
case to be directed to the point immediately in question,) but he
must also be on the look out for any lurking fallacy or misstatement out-
side the main point or issue: for the one may be shewn necessarily to
imply the other. τεκμηρίον, a necessary sign, or indication, I 2. 17. The
construction is, ταῦτα φαίνεται τεκμηρία τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ψεύδεται ἐν αὐτοῖς.
§ 5. 'Examples are most appropriate to public speaking, enthymemes more so to forensic'. Pleading gives more occasion to the
employment of logical reasoning; it admits of closer and subtler argumenta-
tion; for the reasons stated in III 12. 5. Comp. I 9, 49, where the facts
are the same, but the reason assigned for the latter different.
'For the one', (understand δημηγορία, from δημηγορικώτατα. Victorius
understands συμβολή, and Vater πίστις, 'dealing as it does with the future,
is forced consequently to derive examples from past events (from which the
analogous events future are inferred), whilst the other (understand in like
manner δίκη from δικανικώτερα; not πίστις as Vater) 'deals with matters of
fact, true or false, which admit to a greater extent (than deliberative
speaking) of demonstrative reason and necessary conclusions (not to the
full extent, which is found only in science): for past facts involve a kind
of necessity'. Past events are beyond recall, fixed and definite, and thus
have a sort of necessary character about them; and they can be argued
about, and their relations deduced, with some approach to certainty:
about things future no exact calculation is possible, anticipation and
inference from the past is all that nature allows: uncertainty is the cha-
acteristic of the future.
§ 6. 'The enthymemes, or argumentative inferences, should not be
all brought forward one after another, in a continuous connected series,
but mixed ὑπ' (ἄνα) with other topics: otherwise they injure one another
by destroying (κατὰ) the effect'. (And this is not all,) for there is also a

1 This is, "to relieve the weariness, and assist the intelligence of the un-
cultivated audience. A long and connected chain of arguments not only puzzles
and confounds a listener unaccustomed to continuous reasoning, but also wearies
and overwhelms him: so that, one argument coming upon another before he
has perceived the force of the preceding, they clash together, come into conflict,
as it were, and the force and effect of the whole is weakened or destroyed. Comp.
I 2. 12, 13, II 22. 3, alibi." From Introd. p. 357.
§ 6—8. ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ' ἀναμηνύναι: εἰ δὲ μὴ, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὄρος.

ὁ φίλ', ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅστ' ἀν πεπνυμένοι ἁνήρ, 7 ἀλλ' οὐ τοιαύτα. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα ἤπειρν: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιήσεις ὁ περ ἐνίοι ποιούσι τῶν φιλοσόφων, οὖ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα 8 καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἔξ ὧν λέγουσιν. καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιήσ, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούει τὸ πάθος ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἐσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἄλληλας αἱ ἁμα, καὶ ἢ ἀφανίζοντι ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιούσιν. οὕτ' ὅταν ἡθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ

limit of quantity; (as Homer says, Od. iv 204, Menelaus to Nestorides Pistratos,) “Dear boy, seeing that thou hast said as much as a prudent man would” (speak and utter, ἐποι καὶ ρέει) — τόσα he says, not τοιαύτα', shewing thereby that it is the quantity and not the quality of the words that he had in view.

§ 7. ‘(Another topic is) not to look for arguments about every thing (see again Π 22.3): otherwise, you will do like some philosophers, who draw conclusions better known and more to be trusted (easier to believe, more self-evident or evident at first sight) than the premises from which they deduce them. Quint. v 12.8, Nee lumen omnibus semper quae inve- nerimus argumentis onerandus est index: quia et taciturna afferunt et fidein detrahunt... In rebus vero apertis argumentari tam sit stultum quam in clarissimum solemn mortale lumen (a lamp, or other artificial light, made by human agency) inferre.

§ 8. ‘Also, when you are trying to excite emotion (appealing to the feelings) use no logical argument: for either it will knock out (drive out, expel) the emotion, or (the emotion will get the better of it and) the argument will have been stated in vain: all simultaneous motions mutually drive out one another, and are either obliterated altogether (by the co-existence) or (the less powerful) is (still further) weakened'; overpowered by the stronger. Comp. Poet. xxiv 22, νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιησις ἀφανίζει ἤδυν τὸ ἀτόπον, and again § 23, ἀποκρύπτει γὰρ πάλην ἢ λιαν λαμπρὰ λέξεις τὰ τε ἕθη καὶ τὰς διανοίας. Long. de Subl. § 15, φύσις δὲ ποις, εν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀπασιν, αἰε τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούσαν ὅθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτοὶ περιμικόμεθα εἰς τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐμπληκτικόν, φ' τὸ πραγματικὸν ἐγκρύπτεται περιλαμπόμενον. And again § 17 ult. τῶν λόγων τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ὑψί, ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἤκου ἐγγυτέρῳ κείμεν διὰ τε φυσικὴν τωσ συγγενείαν καὶ διὰ λαμπρότητα, αἰε τῶν συγκλάλων προεμβαίνεσται, καὶ τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν ἀποκαλύπτει καὶ ὅλων ἐν κατακαλύπτει τηρεῖ. Twining ad Poet. p. 424, note 227.

‘Nor again, when you would give the speech an ethical cast, should there be any attempt to combine enthememe with it; for proof has no
moral character nor moral purpose'. When the hearer's mind, says Schrader (in substance), is occupied with the impression of the moral and intellectual good qualities which the speaker is endeavouring to convey to them, of his intelligence and good intentions, he has neither time nor inclination to attend to the proof of anything else.

§ 9. 'Still, general maxims are to be employed both in narrative and in proof, by reason of the ethical character which belongs to them'. (See II 21. 16, III 16. 8.) This is illustrated by a γνώμη that “it is folly to trust” any one, in the instance of a deposit which has not been returned (Victorius). The maxim is expressed by Epicharmus in the well-known verse, Νάφε, καὶ μέμναση ἀπιστεῖν ἀρθμα ταῦτα τῶν φρενών, quoted by Polybius, Dio Chrysostom, and Lic. ad Att. I 19. 6. Müller, Fragm. Phil. Gr. p. 144. Epicharm. Fr. 255.

'And I have given it, and that, knowing all the while “that trust is folly”. If your object is to appeal to the feelings (ἐλεος is the πάθος here appealed to), (express it thus) "And I don't regret it, though I have been wronged: for he (the opponent) it is true has the advantage in profit, but I in justice"'. Compare the first example in c. 16. 9.

§ 10. '(Here again, as in general) public speaking is more difficult than pleading (see I 1. 10); and naturally¹ [so, because it is concerned with the future.]

[On the 'times' with which the three classes of speeches, λόγιον ἰδιαίτερα, συμβουλευτικοί and ἐπιδικτικοί are concerned, see I 3. 4, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι τὸ μέλλον...τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ τὸ γενόμενος κ.τ.λ. ἐκεῖ δὲ—ἀδήλων δὲ] 'whereas in the former case (forensic oratory) the speaker is concerned with the past, which, as Epimenides the Cretan said, is already known even to diviners; for he himself was not in the habit of divining the future, but only (interpreting) the obscurities of the past.'

καὶ τοὺς μάντευκαὶ as has been noticed elsewhere, "was doubtless meant by Epimenides as a sarcasm upon his prophetic brethren, who pretended to see into futurity. 'Even diviners', said he, 'impostors as they are, can prophesy what is past'". Intro. p. 358, note.

¹ At this point the manuscript of Mr Cope's Commentary comes to an end; the rest of the notes have accordingly been supplied by Mr Sandys.
The statement that Epimenides especially devoted himself as a soothsayer to solving the riddles of the past, is exemplified by his being invited by the Athenians to advise them as to the purification of the city from the pestilence which arose in consequence of the crime of Cylon (Plutarch, reipubl. ger. pr. 27, Pausanias, I 14.4, Diogenes Laert. I 10: Grote, H. G. chap. x sub fineem). Plato, who calls him a θεϊος ἀνὴρ, speaks of his foretelling the future (Legg. 642 δ), and the very gift which in the text he appears to disclaim is similarly ascribed to him by Cicero, who after saying est enim ars in iis qui novas res coniectura sequuntur, veteres observatione didicerunt, classes Epimenides among those who are destitute of this art; qui non ratione aut coniectura, observatis ac notatis signis, sed concitatione quodam animi, aut soluto liberisque motu, futura praeventiunt (de divin. I 18. 34). But the office of the prophet, or intermediary interpreter between God and man, was not necessarily confined to the prediction of the future, but also included the expounding of the will of heaven respecting the present and the past. Spengel observes: "dictum ἐμαντεύετο, non ἐμαντεύσατο, i.e. plerumque, non semper."

καὶ οὐκ ἄνωθεν] 'Besides, in forensic pleadings, the law supplies a subject; and when you once have your starting-point, it is easier to find your proof'.

'And it (namely, public speaking) does not admit of many digressions, such as references to one's opponent or to oneself; or again, appeals to the emotions'. The subject of οὐκ ἔχει is τὸ ὁμιμηρεῖν, all the intervening clauses from ἐκεί δὲ down to ἀπόδειξιν being parenthetical.

By διατριβὰς are meant 'landing-places', where the speaker may pause and linger for a while, and whence he may even expatiate into a passing digression. This use of the word, which is not noticed in Liddell and Scott, is defined in Erneste's Ἑκατ. Gr. as commoratio, exerciso et quodam ἐπεισιδῶν, quo orator subinde utitur, ornatus atque amplificationis gratia. Comp. Menander, διαφρισίς ἐποδικικῶν (Spengel's Ῥητ. Gr. III 338), ἐπειστά (τὰς διατριβάς) εἶναι τὸ ποιητῆς μὲν ἄλλα (ἀλλος Waitz) προσφόρως; ἡ γὰρ ἐξοσκόπησαι καὶ τὸν κατὰ σχολήν λέγειν, καὶ τὸ περιστέλλειν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς κόμοις καὶ τοῖς κατασκευασίς οὕτω κόρων οὕτω ἀνθρώπων παράστημι, (καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοοῦ ὕπατῶς ὦτε ἔναν τῶν ποιητῶν προσφέρουσι τὰς ἀκαίρους διατριβάς) συγγραφεύει δὲ ἡ λογοποίους ἐλαχίστη ἐξοσκοπία.

ἀλλ' ἥκιστα—ἐξιστητα] 'On the contrary, there is less room (for digression) in this than in either of the other branches of Rhetoric, unless the speaker quits his proper subject'. With ἐξιστητα, compare supra 14. 1, εἰν ἐκτοπίσῃ.
This does not imply that Aristotle himself was absent from Athens while writing the Rhetoric; here and elsewhere he simply uses the phrase which would be most intelligible to his readers, whether at a distance from Athens or not. Poet. v 6, 1449 b 7, τὸν Ἀθήναν (κομωδοτοικῆ) Κράτης πρῶτος ἢμεν κ.τ.λ. and συνέταν II 23. II Ἀθήνας Μαντία τῷ ῥήτορι. This usage is rather different from the suspicious phrase in c. 11 ad fin., οἱ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.

The Panegyric of Isocrates is strictly speaking a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, as its ostensible object is to advise Athens and Sparta to unite their forces against Persia, under the lead of the former state, but incidentally it becomes a λόγος ἐπιδεικτικός, in so far as it eulogizes the public services of Athens (§§ 21—98), while it also digresses into the region of λόγος δικαύκος when it attacks (κατηγορεῖ) the conduct of Sparta and her partisans (§§ 110—114).

By this means the pamphlet generally known as Isocrates de Pace, where the policy of the Athenian general Chares in the conduct of the Social war is criticised, though his name is not mentioned, § 27, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἐξω τῶν εἰσιμενῶν ἐπιχειροῦντα δημηγορεῖν... τά μὲν αὐτοῖς εἰσαχθῆσαι τῶν δὲ κατηγοροῦσαι.

§ 11. ‘In speeches of display you must introduce ladunions into your speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does; for he is always bringing in some character’. The reference to Isocr. is explained by his laudatory episode on Theseus in the Helen §§ 22—38; on Agamemnon in the Panathenaicus §§ 72—84; and on Timotheus in the ἀντίδοσις § 107 seq. Spengel, who gives the first two references, also cites some less striking instances, the episode on Paris in Hel. §§ 41—48, on Pythagoras and the Egyptian priests in Busiris §§ 21—29, and on poets ib. §§ 38—40. Comp. Dionys. Halic. de Isocr. lfd. c. 4, where, among the points in which Isocrates appears superior to Lysias, special mention is made of τὸ διαλαμβάνοντα τὴν υἱοθετίαν ἰδιὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐξίους ἐπιστολοῦς.

The reference to Poet. XVII 7, ὑποδίκας τὰ ὀνοματά ἐπιστολοῦν, ὅτους δὲ ἦσσαι οἰκεία τὰ ἐπιστολά σκοπεῖν. ib. XXIV 7, (of epic poetry) τούτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ τὸ μετάβαλλεν τῶν ἀκούσται καὶ ἐπιστολοῦν ἀναμέλησε επιστολοῦς. Quintil. III 9. 4, egressio utroque vel...excessus, sive est extra causam, non sive esset esse pars causae; sive est in causa, adiutorium vel ornamentum partium est earum ex quibus egreditur.
RHETORIKS Γ 17 §§ 11, 12.

τούτο ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει, Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἴτε Διακόν, εἴτε τὸν θεόν, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἡ ντὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ· ὁ τοιόυτος ἐστίν. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικὸς λεκτέων καὶ ἀποδεικτικὸς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχης ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθικῶς καὶ μάλλον τὰ ἐπιεικεί- Π. 1418 ὃ· κε ἄρμοττει χρηστῶν φαίνεσθαι ἡ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

Achilles, he (naturally) praises Peleus, next Aeacus, then Zeus himself (the father of Aeacus); and similarly valour also (the special virtue of Achilles), and so and so (so ad infinitum); and this is just what I have been describing.

From this passage of Gorgias the existence of a panegyric oration 'in praise of Achilles', is inferred by Dr Thompson (on p. 178 of his ed. of the Gorgias), who also suggests that "a fragment preserved by the Scholiast on Iliad IV 450 may have belonged to this speech; ἀνεμίσγοντο δὲ λίταν ἀπελλα καὶ εἰχαίοις οἰμωγαί." The unfailing resource of complimentary episodes on which Gorgias appears to have prided himself, may be paralleled by Pindar's favourite device of leading up by easy transitions to the praises of the Aeacidae (Isthm. IV (v) 20, τὸ δ' ἐμὸν ὅν χρι αἰτρὰ Διακήδων κέαρ ὑμῶν γενεται); and also by the artifice adopted by the rhetorician Lycephon, de Soph. El. 15, 174 ὃ ὡς, as explained by Alexander Aphrodisiensis:—"the sophist Lycephon, when he was compelled by some persons to write an encomium upon the lyre, and found that he hadn't very much to say about it, first very briefly touched upon the praises of the sensible lyre, which we have here on earth, and then mounted up to that in heaven...the constellation called the Lyre, upon which he composed a long and beautiful and excellent discourse" (from Cope's translation in Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. II, No. V, p. 141).

In Vol. III, No. VII, p. 75 of the Journal above mentioned, Mr Cope has the following note: "The sentence hangs so ill together, and the ἡ has so little meaning, that I think we ought to change it into the relative pronoun ὅ; and then the sentence will run 'and in like manner valour, which performs such and such feats,' i.e. he first praises valour generally, and then proceeds to enumerate different acts of prowess; which may be multiplied ad infinitum." This suggestion, it may be remarked, harmonizes fairly with the reading of MS Α' ἡ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἡ (not ὃ) τοιόντε ἐστίν. It has been anticipated by Foss (de Gorgia p. 77 ap. Spengel) who proposes ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἡ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ὃ τοιὸν γ' ἐστίν.

Spengel's own suggestion is εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων (Ας, Ὅ, 2) Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίαν ἡ τὰ καὶ τὰ, ποιεῖ ὃ τοιόντε ἐστίν.

§ 12. "If you have proofs to produce, you may express yourself both in the ethical style, and in that of proof besides; but if you are at a loss for enthymemes, then in the ethical style alone. In fact, it better befits a man of worth to appear in his true character than that his speech be elaborately reasoned. The change of subject in the last clause would have been more sharply marked by αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι χρηστὸν ἡ τῶν λόγων
13 τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἐλεγχοῦν ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δήλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται: παρ' ἀλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τάναντια γνωρίζεται.

14 τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐκ ἐτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν λύσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρὸτερον, ύπ' ἐντερόν δὲ πρὸς τάναντια ἀπαντάν λύοντα καὶ πρὸ-π. 1

άκριβη. Spengel asks with some reason, "nonne nexus flagitat χρηστὸν τῶν λόγων φαίνεται ἡ ἀκριβή; magis enim convenit probo viro, ut ἡδικῶς quam ut επιδεικτικὸς loquatur."

§ 13. 'Of enthymemes, those that refute are more popular than those that prove; because a syllogistic conclusion is more clearly drawn (thereby); for opposites are more readily recognised when set beside another'. Comp. II 23, 30, εὐδοκιμεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ ἀναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παράλληλα δὲ ἐφαρμόζει τῶ ἀκριβῆ μᾶλλον. The ἐλεγχὸς which is described in Anal. Pr. II 20, 66 b 10, as ἀντίφασες συλλογισμὸς, meets the opponent's conclusion with a contrary-syllogism drawing a conclusion contrary to that of the opponent, while the ἐνστάσις checks the opponent's argument at an early point by attacking one of his premisses (see Introd. pp. 264, 5).

§ 14. 'The refutation of your opponent is not a distinct division of the speech; on the contrary, it is part of the proofs to refute the opponent's positions either by contrary proposition or by counter-syllogism' (i.e. by ἐλεγχὸς).

Quint. III 9, 5, Tamen nec his assentior, qui detrahant refutationem, tamen probatio subiectam, ut Aristoteles, haec enim est quae constitutat, illa quae destrutat.

'Now both in public deliberation and in forensic pleading it is necessary, when you are the opening speaker, to state your own proofs first, and then to meet the arguments on the other side, by direct refutation and by pulling them to pieces beforehand.'

For ἀπαντάω, comp. Apsines Rhet. περὶ λύσεως c. 7 (Spengel's Rhet. Gr. II 366), σὺ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπαντήσῃς κατὰ πληκτότητα ἡ ποσότητα ἡ ἀλλο τί τῶν αὐξητικῶν ἡ κατὰ ἀντιπαράστασιν.

For προδιασύρωντα ('cutting up by anticipation') comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 18 (19), 13, προδιασύρειν λέγων, ib. § 12, προκατελαβε...προδιασύρει...διασάντων πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ib. 33 (34), προκαταλαμβάνων διασύρεις. Isocr. ἀντίδοται § 199, διασύρουσι (τὴν παιδείαν) ὡς όνειδον ὀφελείς δυνα-μένην (ib. § 300); Dem. Or. 13 § 12, διασύρε τὰ παρόντα καὶ τούς προγόνους ἐπήρεσε.

'But if there is much variety in the opposition, you should begin with the points opposed to you'. For πολύχως (manifold, complex, diversified,
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 17 §§ 14, 15.

διασύροντα. ἃν δὲ πολύχωσι ἡ ἠναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνικῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ: ἃ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελὼν οὕτω 15 τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν. ὑστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογίζομεν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν εὐθοκιμηκότα ἦ· ὑστερον γὰρ ἀνθρωπὸν προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρήκειν. δεὶ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἐσται δὲ ἄν ἀνέλης. διὸ ἡ ἀπὸ πάντα ἡ τὰ μέγιστα ἡ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἡ ποιεῖται), comp. de Part. Anim. II 10, 656 a 5, πολυχωστέρα ἢ, where it is combined with πολυμορφοτέρα.

On Callistratus, see note on 17. 13. The reference is probably to the embassy on which Callistratus was sent into the Peloponnesus, shortly before the battle of Mantinea, B.C. 362. η Μεσσηνική ἐκκλησία can hardly mean anything else than 'the public assembly of the Messenians', and not 'the assembly held (at Athens) respecting the Messenians', (which last appears to be the view of Sauppe, Or. Att. II 218, note 1; A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit I p. 113, rightly understands it die Volksgemeinde der Messenier). It was on this embassy that Epaminondas, cum in conventum venisset Arcadum petens ut societatem cum Thebanis et Argivis facerent, was confronted by Callistratus, Atheniensium legatus qui eloquentia omnes eo praestabat tempore, who urged them to ally themselves with Athens (Nepos, Epam. 6, quoted by A. Schaefer).

προανελὼν κ.τ.λ.] i.e. It was not until after he had by anticipation got rid of the arguments of his opponents that he stated his own arguments. οὕτω, 'accordingly'; similarly used after the participle μαχεσάμενον, at the end of the next section.

§ 15. 'When you are speaking in reply, you should first mention the arguments against the statement on the other side, by refuting that statement and drawing up counter-syllogisms, and especially if the arguments on the opposite side are well received; for just as the mind refuses to open itself favourably to one who has been made the victim of prejudice, the same applies to oratory also, if your opponent is held to have made a good speech'.

'You must therefore as it were make room in the hearer's mind for the speech that is about to be made, and this will be effected by getting out of the way your opponent's speech' (with which the minds of your audience are pre-occupied).

'Hence you should establish the credibility of your own case, by first contending either against all or the most important or the most popular or the most easily refuted of the adverse arguments'. As an instance, Aristotle refers to the lines in the Troades of Euripides, beginning with
RHTORIKHS Γ 17 §§ 15, 16.

τα εὐελεγκτα μαχεσάμενον οὐτω τα αὐτοῦ πιστα ποιητέον.

ταῖς θεαίσι πρώτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι: ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἡραν.

ἐν τούτοις ἦνατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐήθεστάτου.

16 περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταύτα: εἰς δὲ τὸ ἢδος, ἐπειδὴ ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίρθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἄντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἅλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἄγορικιαν, ἐτερον χρή λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὁ περ Ίσο-

969, the first line of Hecuba's lengthy reply to Helen's speech in her own defence; then follows a line καὶ τήρετε δείξα μη λέγοσαν ἐνδικα. After this, in a passage beginning with the lines ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἡραν παρθένον τε Παλλάδα ὧν ἐσ τοιοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἠλθεῖν δοκο. she disposes of Helen's weakest argument first, an argument which Euripides, like a skillful rhetorician, has placed in the middle of Helen's speech, lines 932—5, ηκά Κύπριος θεᾶς, καὶ τοσόνδ' οὔμοι γάμοι ἄνησαν Ἑλλάδ', οὐ κρατεῖσθ' ἐκ βαρβάρων.

§ 16. 'As regards ethical proof, since there are some things, which, if you say them of yourself, are either invidious or tedious or provoke contradiction, or which, if said of another, involve slander or rudeness, you must ascribe them to some one else instead'.

The reference to the Philippus of Isocrates points (according to Victorius) to p. 96 D §§ 72—78, where the writer gets rid of the indelicacy of himself reminding Philip of the current imputation that his growing power οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἀλλ' ἐτὶ ταύτην αὐξάνεται, by attributing it to others in the words, αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ σε διαβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοὶ φθονοῦντων in § 73, and by describing it in § 78 as τοιαύτην φήμην σαντὶ περιφρυμένη, ἦν οἱ μὲν ἐχθροί περιβείναι σοὶ ξηροίς. This, however, seems to be open to the objection pointed out by Spengel, that Isocrates can hardly be regarded as putting what are really his own views as a friend of Philip into the mouth of that monarch's enemies ("at vix Isocrates ipse haec animo probans vera putatbat"). Spengel accordingly prefers taking it as a reference to §§ 4—7, where, instead of expressing his own satisfaction with one of his compositions, he states that his friends who have heard it recited had been struck by its truthful statement of facts, § 4, and had expected that, if published, it would have led to the establishment of peace; it so happened, however, that Philip had concluded peace, before the fastidious rhetorician had elaborated his pamphlet to a sufficient degree to think it deserving of publication. Perhaps a still more apposite passage, which is omitted by Victorius and Spengel, is that in p. 87 1, § 23, where the writer, after describing himself as deterred by his friends from addressing Philip, adds that finally ἐσπευδόν μᾶλλον ἡγό πεμφθαι σοι τῶν λόγων τούτων, ἔλεγον δ' ὡς ἐλπίζονοι οὐ μόνον σε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξων μοι χάριν ὑπὲρ τῶν εἰρημέων ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας ἀπαντα.
κράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὁ Ἀρχιλόχος ψέγει: ποιεῖ γάρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ
χρημάτων δ’ ἀελπτον οὐθὲν ἐστὶν οὐδ’ ἀπώμοτον,
καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἱάμβῳ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.
καὶ ὁς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμωνα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης
ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει] §§ 141—149, ἀκρογόνος δὲ τις τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν κ.τ.λ. In the course of the passage referred to, the rhetorician makes his imaginary friend compliment him on his writings as οὐ μείψας ἄλλα χάριτος τῆς μεγάλης ἄξιως ὑτας, an expression which would have been open to the imputation of indelicacy (περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγει ἐπίφθονοι), had not the writer ingeniously placed it in another man’s mouth. The device is sufficiently transparent, even if it were not for the candid confession in § 8, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπαυνεῖ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπικεφαλήν, ἑώρων οὕτε...ἐπιχαρίτως οὐθ’ ἀνεπίφθονος εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν δυνησόμενος.
The same device, in a less refined form, may be noticed in the modern parallel from Martin Chuzzlewit, which will occur to every reader (chap. xxv).
’Ἀρχιλόχος ψέγει...ἰάμβῳ’ Hor. A. P. 79, Archilochum proprio rabies armatum iambō. Comp. note on II 23.11. Archilochus (Lycambæi spretus inido gener, Epod. vi 13), instead of directly attacking Neobule, the daughter of Lycambes, puts his lampoon into the mouth of her own father, thereby ostensibly refraining from a coarseness of invective, which would imply ἄρρωσια on his own part, but really intensifying its bitterness; as the reader will naturally argue, ‘If her own father can say nothing better of her, what will the rest of the world say?’ Comp. Bergk, Gr. Lyr., p. 542, ed. 2, Archil. fragm., οὖν Δυκάμβιω παῖδα τὴν ὑπέρτην. Stobaeus (cX 10, Bergk u. s. p. 552) has preserved nine trochaic lines beginning with the first of the two quotations given by Aristotle, but there is nothing in the passage, so far as there quoted, which illustrates Aristotle’s object in here referring to it. There is a rendering of the lines by J. H. Merivale in Wellesley’s Anthologia Polyglotta p. 220, beginning Never man again may swear, things shall be as erst they were.
οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω] τοῦ πολυχρύσου μελεί. The four lines of which this is the first are preserved by Plutarch de tranquill. an. c. 10 (Bergk Gr. Lyr. p. 541) and are thus rendered by Milman, No care have I of Gyges’ golden store, Uneasurious I for nought the gods implore; I have no love of wide and kingly sway But turn from pride my reckless eyes away. On Gyges, the wealthy king of Lydia, compare Herod. I 12, τοῦ (sc. Γύγεω) καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος ο̂ς Πάρως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρώμαν γενόμενος ἐν ἱάμβῳ τριμέτρῳ ἐπεμφάσα. Archilochus is inveighing against the vice of envy and the vanity of riches, and with a dramatic skill that is one of his characteristics, gives expression to his own feelings by ascribing them to Charon the contented carpenter (comp. Mure, H. G. L. III 167).
Σοφοκλῆς Antig. 688—700, where Haemon quotes the talk of the

AR. III.
17 πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἑτέρων. δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον "χρή δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τους νοῦν ἐχοντας ἐντυχοῦντας. οὕτω γὰρ ἀν μεγίστα πλεονεκτοῦεν." ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ, "εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὑφελιμώταται ὁσὶ καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εντυχοῦντας δὲ καταλλάττεσθαι."

I. peri δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὐκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἑτέρων ἑιρήκως ᾧ, ὡστε ἐνὸς
town about Creon’s treatment of Antigone, instead of himself directly attacking him. 693, τὴν παῖδα ταύτην οὐ ἰδόρεται πόλις... 700, τοιᾷδ᾽ ἔρεμῳ στῇ ἐπέρχετα φάτει.

§ 17. ‘Further, you should occasionally transform your enthymes and express them as general maxims’. Comp. II 21. 1, 2, with the notes in Vol. II 206. On the ‘enthyme’, see Saint-Hilaire’s Rhetorique d’Aristote, Vol. II pp. 345—376; and Jebb’s Attic Orators, II 289.

Aristotle’s example of a γνώμη seems to be a general reminiscence of a passage in Isocr. Archidamus p. 126 B § 50, χρή δὲ τοὺς μὲν εὖ πράττοντας τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν: ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλεῖστον αὖ τις χρόνον τὰ παρὸντα διαφιλάζειν τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τὸ πολέμῳ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἐκ γὰρ τῆς παραχῆς καὶ τῆς κανονογίας βάσταν ἀν μεταβολῆς τύχοιεν. Spengel gives a reference to Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3). 32, δεῖ τοὺς νοῦν ἐχοντας µὴ περικείσαι εἰς ἀν πέλαγος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. In expressing the γνώμη in the form of an ἐνθύμημα, Δτ. alters διαλλαγάς into its synonym καταλλαγαί, possibly for no other reason than to avoid the reiteration of similar sounds in δεῖ...διαλλαγαί...διαλλάττεσθαι, and the harsh collocation δεὶ διαλλάττεσθαι.

CHAP. XVIII.

This chapter treats of ‘Interrogation’ of one’s opponent (§§ 1—4), and of ‘Reply’ to his interrogations (§§ 5, 6); it concludes with a few remarks on the use of ‘ridicule’, as an accessory to argument. These may be regarded as subdivisions of the general subject of proofs, πίστεις, dealt with in the previous chapter; to which the present is an appendix.

“A favourite instrument of debate with speakers in the public assembly and law-courts is the interrogation of the adversary. The object of this is to enforce an argument; or to take the adversary by surprise and extract from him an unguarded admission; or to place him in an awkward dilemma, by shaping your question in such a way that he must either by avowing it admit something which his antagonist wishes to establish, or by refusing seem to give consent by his silence to that which the questioner wishes to insinuate; or to gain some similar advantage.” Introd. p. 362.

A Greek paraphrase of the first six sections of this chapter, with the headings περὶ εἰρηνήσεως and περὶ ἀποκρίσεως, which owes its interest
προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἀτοπον' οἷον Περικλῆς
Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας
mainly to the rareness of such commentaries on the Rhetoric, was edited
in 1838 by Seguer from a MS in the library in Paris, and is reprinted in
Spengel’s Rhetores Gracci I pp. 163—8, and also in his edition of the
Rhetoric, Vol. I pp. 147—152. It is a puerile piece of composition,
but one or two extracts from it will be given where the writer’s language
really illustrates the text of Aristotle.

On the subject of Interrogatories it may be noticed, that by
Athenian Law either party to a suit might put questions to the other,
and demand a reply, not only at the preliminary hearing (ἀνάκρισις)
but also at the trial itself (Plato, Apol. 25 D, ἀπόκριναι ο' ὑπεθε' καὶ γὰρ
ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀπόκριναι). In the former instance, the answers were
taken down in writing, and produced in court if wanted; in the latter,
the questions could only be asked by the party addressing the court,
who could not himself be interrupted by any interrogation on the part
of his opponent, but only by the enquiries of the jury, which were some-
times even invited by the speaker. (Comp. C. R. Kennedy’s Demosthenes
IV Appendix VIII On Interrogatories).

Such interrogations, judging from the few specimens that have come
down to us, were of the simplest kind; and owing to the large number
and the natural impatience of the audience present, (whether as members
of the general assembly or of the jury, in cases of the deliberative or
the forensic class respectively), anything approaching an elaborate and
protracted cross-examination was quite out of the question.

As instances we may quote the following: Isaecus Or. 10 (π. τοῦ
'Αρηίου κλήρων) §§ 4, 5, σὺ τ' ἀνάζηθι δεύρο... ἐρωτήσω σε. ἀδελφὸς ἐσθ'
ὁ παῖς 'Αρηίου, ἀδελφίδος εἶ ἀδελφός ἡ ἐξ ἀδελφής γεγονός, ἡ ἀνεψίος,
ἡ ἐξ ἀνεψίου πρὸς μητρός ἡ πρὸς πατρός;... δεὶ δή σε τῆς ἀγχύσεις, διὸ τι ὁ
παῖς 'Αρηία προσήκει, τὸ γένος εἰπείν. φράσον οὖν τουτοις.—ἀλλάθισθεν
ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὴν συγχέεναι εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνεται πάντα μάλλον ἡ δὲ
μαθεῖν ψῆμα. κατοί τὸν γε πράττοντα τι δίκαιον οὐ προσήκει ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ',
eυδώς λέγειν.

Lydius Or. 22 (κατὰ τῶν σιτοπόλων) § 5, (a) μέτοικος εἰ; (b) ναί.
(a) μετοικεῖ ἰδ' πότερον ως πεισόμενος τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τῆς τόλμως,
ἡ ὡς ποιήσω ὅ τι ἀν βουλή; (b) ὡς πεισόμενος. (a) ἄλλο τι οὖν ἄξιοι ἡ
ἀποθάνειν εἰ τι πετοίκης παρὰ τοῖς νόμοις, εὕρ' οἷς θάνατος ἡ ξίμη; (b) ἔγογ
(a) ἀπόκριναι δὴ μοι, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς πλείω σίτον συμπρόσθειν πεπιθύμητα φόρμων,
ὡς κἀκεῖνος καλεύει; (b) εἰγὸ τῶν ἄρχοντῶν (not the Archons but the
σιτοπόλακες of § 7) κελευόντων συνεπράμαν. ib. Or. 13 (κατὰ Ἀγοράτου)
§§ 30—33, εὗτ' αὐτοφώρῳ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν ἐξέλεξα, ἀπόκριναι δὴ μοι κ.τ.λ. ib.
Or. 12 (κατ' Ἐραστοθένους) § 25, set forth at length in Introd. p. 364, note.
Spengel also gives a reference to Dem. de Cor. § 52.

The subject of questioning and replying in sophistical debate is
treated by Aristotle himself in the Sophistici Elenchi, esp. c. xv and xvi,
(Grote’s Aristotle II pp. 109—115; see also Top. Θ). Some of the more
striking parallels will be quoted in the course of the commentary.

§ 1. ‘As to Interrogation, you may opportunely resort to it, when
your opponent has said the opposite, so that as soon as one more

I4—2
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ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Γ 18 § 2.

ιερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὧτι οὐχ οἶον τε ἀτέλεστον ἄκουεν, ἥρετο εἰ οἰδὲν αὐτὸς, φάσκοντος δὲ, “καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστον ὑν;” δευτέρον δὲ ὧταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ἦ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δήλον ἦ ὧτι δώσει πυθόμενον γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτάν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἶον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν εἰ δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι, ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ ἥρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαιμόνες ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶν ἦ θεῖον τι, φήσαντος δὲ, “ἐστιν οὖν” ἐφη “ός τις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἴεται εἰναι, θεοῦς

question is put to him, a contradictory result ensues', i.e. the result is a reductio ad absurdum.

This Topic is exemplified by Pericles’ retort to Lampon, the soothsayer, who is mentioned in Arist. Av. 521, Δάμπων δ’ ὁμώνυ κτι καὶ νυνί τῶν χην’ ὧταν ἐξαπάτα τι, and Plut. Pericles c. vi, Δάμπωνα τὸν μάντιν. On τελετή, see note on Π 24. 2.

The fragment περὶ ἐρωτήσεως (as Spengel points out), besides having ἥρετο and ἄνηρετο instead of ἐπῆρετο and ἥρετο respectively, closes with the paraphrase συμβηθάνους δὲ τοῦ λαμπτωνος, καὶ πῶς εἰπεν ἀτέλεστον ὡν.

§ 2. ‘Or, secondly, (you may employ interrogation) when one point is self-evident, and it is clear that the person interrogated will grant you the other as soon as you put the question. For, when you have obtained your first premiss by asking your opponent to admit it, you must not proceed to put what is self-evident in the form of a question, but simply state the conclusion yourself’. Soph. El. 15, 174 b 38, οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτασικόν ἐρωτάνεν ειναι δ’ ουδ’ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ’ ὥς ὁμολογεῖσαι χρηστέον. Τορ. Θ 2, 154 a 7, οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρωτήμα ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνακείσασαν, οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέιν συλλογισμὸς.

The illustration is taken from the Apologia of Socrates. ‘Socrates, when accused by Meletus of denying the existence of the gods, asked (νυλγ. lect. said), if there was anything which he called divine, and on his admitting this, he enquired whether the divine beings (δαιμόνες) were not either children of the gods or of godlike nature, and on his answering “Yes”, “Is there any one” he said “who believes in the existence of the children of the gods and yet denies that of the gods themselves?” This corresponds only partially to the well-known passage in Plat. Apol. p. 27, already commented on in the note on Π 23. 8. There is probably some corruption in the word εἰρήκεν where we should expect ἡρώτα or ἥρετο. Spengel, following Δ and the vetus translaticio, reads εἰρήκεν ὡς ἦν δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι, ἥρετο. “Illud ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ sensui et consilio Aristotelis repugnatis, neque εἰρήκεν εἰ significavit quae sevitas ex Meleto num daemonion quid crederet. Sed Meletus de Socrate εἰρήκεν ὡς ἦν δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι.” After quoting part of the passage of Plato, he says in conclusion, “Vides Socratem id quod Meletus dixit, non interrogare, sed affirmare.”
RHETORIKHE Γ 18 §§ 3, 4. 213

3 δὲ οὖ;" ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἥ ἑναντία λέγοντα δεῖξειν ἥ 4 παραδόξον. τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐπὶ ἀλλ ἥ σο-

φιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λύσαι· εὰν γὰρ οὗτος ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι έστι μὲν ἔστι δ᾽ οὗ, ἥ τὰ μὲν τὰ
d᾽ οὗ, ἥ πὴ μὲν πὴ δ᾽ οὗ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντες. ἀλλὰς δὲ μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν· εἀν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατήσθαι
dοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε πολλά ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὴν ἀσθενείαν
tοῦ ἀκροατοῦ. διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα
συστρέφειν δεῖ.

§ 3. ‘Further, (interrogation is appropriate) when the speaker is in-
tending to shew up his opponent either in a self-contradiction or a paradoξion’.

§ 4. ‘Fourthly, when it is impossible (for the opponent) to meet the
question, without giving a sophistical answer’. For the examples of this

topic, ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ᾽ οὗ, κ.τ.λ., comp. Soph. Elench. 19, 177 a 21, ‘the

proper way for the respondent to deal with questions involving equivoca-
tion of terms or ambignity of propositions is to answer them, at
the outset, with a reserve for the double meaning’: ἀσπερ τὸ σιγώντα λέγειν
ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὃς οὗ. καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἂ, ἔστι δ᾽ ἂ οὗ
(Grote’s Ar. ii 114), where the interrogation is characterized as sophisti-
cal, while here the same invocative epithet is applied to the answer.

Comp. Top. θ 7, ἕπι τῶν ἀσαφῶς καὶ πλεονάκως λέγομενον...τὸ μὲν τεύδος
tὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς. As an instance of a quibbling answer, we may compare the

subtle distinction drawn by the over-intelligent servant in reply to the
enquiry whether his master Euripides was at home; Ar. Ach. 396,
(ἔνδον ἔστι Ἑυρίσκομεν;) οὐκ ἔνδον, ἔνδον τ᾽ ἔστιν, εἰ γραμμὴ ἐγείη.

...θορυβοῦσιν] This is a neutral word, and may be used of expressions of
either pleasure or displeasure on the part of the audience, any ‘sensā-
tion’ in fact, whether breaking out into applause or the reverse (see
Riddell’s note on its application to δικαστά, Intro. to Plato’s Apology,
p. ix). Isocr. αντίδοτος, § 20, μετὰ θορυβοῦν καὶ χαλεπότητος ἀκροάσθαι τῶν
ἀπολογουμένων. It is used of disapprobation (as here) in Rhet. ad Alex.
18 (19). 3, 6, 7, 8.

ὡς ἀποροῦντες] It is not the audience that is perplexed; on the con-
trary it has a perfectly clear opinion on the obviously shuffling character of
the answer, and expresses its displeasure accordingly. It is the person
who gives a ‘sophistical’ answer, who is apparently perplexed;
hence we should accept the correction ὡς ἀποροῦντας proposed by Spengel
and Schneidewin. The Paris MS A actually has ἀποροῦντας, which sug-
gested to Spengel the alternative emendation ἀποροῦντα. Similarly the
fragment πείρα ἐρωτημένος has, πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς οὕτω ἀποκριναμένοις οἱ ἀκροάμενοι
θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντας καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντας ἀντιπόθεν.

‘But otherwise’ (i.e. except under the above limitations), ‘the speaker
must not attempt interrogation; for if his opponent should interpose an
objection, the question is considered beaten’. ἔνστῃ is here used of
giving a check by interposing an ‘instance’ or ἐνστάσις. See Intro. p. 269.

ἔτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν] ‘to pack into as small a compass as possible’. 
§ 5. ‘In answering, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing a distinction, and not expressing yourself too concisely’. Top. Θ 7, 156 a 26, ἐὰν (τὸ ἐρωτηθέν) ἐπὶ τὲ μὲν ψεῦδος ὄ, ἐπὶ τὲ δὲ ἀλήθεις, ἐπιστημότεροι ὅσι πλεοναξός λέγεται καὶ διότι τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἀλήθεις· ὅστερον γὰρ διαφορο-
μένον ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεώρα τὸ ἀμφίβολον. In the fragment περὶ ἀποκρίσεως (as Spengel notices) the latter part is paraphrased in such a manner as to shew that the writer read διαφοροῦτα λόγος (omitting καὶ μη) συντόμως.

‘In answering questions that appear to involve you in a contradiction, you must give your explanation immediately in your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion’. This corresponds to what in the old style of our legal pleading would have been termed ‘confession and avoidance’.

ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] namely in Top. lib. VIII (θ), in the opening words of which πῶς δεὶ ἐρωταίν is mentioned as one of the subjects of the book; περὶ ἀποκρίσεως is treated from c. 4 to c. 10; (Grote's Ar. Vol. II 47—54). Spengel somewhat questionably remarks: “notandum imperativus ἔστω, hoc enim ut eirphw, librum illum nondum compositum esse indicare videtur;” (on the perfect imperative, see note on I 11.29). He adds, “neque ἔσται, quod deteriores exhibent, placet, praesens expectamus, aut intelligendum potius verbum in hac formula.”

§ 6. A second precept for ‘answering’. ‘When a conclusion is being drawn, if your opponent puts the conclusion in the form of a question, you must add the cause of your conduct’. συμπεραινόμενον is a neuter accusative absolute. It is here passive, not middle, though the venetus translatio renders it consequentem, which is contrary to the sense required and to the general use of the verb, which is rarely found in the middle. Spengel even asserts non dicitur media forma, but this assertion (unless I misunderstand his meaning) is refuted by Top. Η 5, 150 a 33, μήδεν γὰρ ἐν συμπερινάγαθα ἢ πολλά, and by Eth. Nic. 1 1, 1094 b 22, ἀγαπητόν περὶ τοιοῦτων καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτων λέγωντας παχολος...τάλθεσιν ἐνδεικνύονται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιοῦτων λέγωντας τοιαύτα καὶ συμπεραινέθαι (which cannot be taken as any other than the middle voice).
§§ 6, 7.


7 ΠΕΡΙ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδή τινα δοκεὶ χρήσιν ἐχεῖν ἐν τοῖς αγώσι, καὶ δεῖν ἐφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν

Σοφοκλῆς] On this statesman and orator (not the poet), and on the ten προβούλουι τον το ης των εφορίας] 'called to account for his administration of the office of ephor'. The ephors are charged with being liable to venality in Pol. II 9, 1270 b 10, διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὄνωι. The ephor in the present instance repudiates the charge, and insists that he had not acted on the prompting of bribery, but 'on principle' (γνώμη). οὖν ἐπερωτῶν—ἀλήθειας] 'hence (to avoid being thus foiled), you should neither put a further question after drawing the conclusion nor express the conclusion itself in the form of a question, unless the truth of the facts is superabundantly clear'. Comp. Top. Θ 2, 154 a 7, already quoted on § 2.

§ 7 treats very briefly of 'jests', as a useful accessory in debate; Ridiculum aceri Fortius et melius magnas plurumque sectat res (Hor. Sat. I 10, 14). The subject of ridiculum is treated by Cicero de Oratore, 11 58, 236 seq., Quintil. VI 3, 22—112, haece tota disputatio a Graecis peri γελοίου inscribatur (§ 22) . . . usus autem maxime tripexus, aut enim ex aliis visum petimus aut ex nobis aut ex rebus mediis (§ 23). For other references see note on I 11, 29.

δεῖν ἐφη Γοργίας—οὗδες λέγων] 'Gorgias laid it down, and rightly too, that you should confound (spoil the effect of) the seriousness of your opponents by ridicule, and their ridicule by seriousness'. In a Scholium on Plat. Gorg. p. 473 E, (where Socrates says to Polus) γελᾶς; ἀλλὰ αὖ τούτο εἴδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδῆ τις τε εἰπη, καταγελᾷ, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μὴ, the dictum of Gorgias is quoted in the following form: (δεί) τὰς σπουδὰς τῶν
anthropos γελατείκειν τῶν ἑνάντιων γέλωτι τὸν ἰδιός λέγων, εἰρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοῖον ἐστίν. ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρω τὸ δ' οὖ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ ληφθεί. ἐστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθερώτερον. ο μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἐτέρου.

26

§

8

(εν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς) See note on I 11. 29, διώρισται περὶ γελοῖον χωρίς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.


τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ ληφθεί] Cic. Orator, § 88, ridiculo sic uerbum oratoren, ut nec nimis frequenti, ut scurrile sit...neque aut sua persona aut indicum aut tempore alienum. There is a kind of quiet irony observable in Aristotle's hint that the orator is to select his special line of pleasantry according as he happens to be a gentleman or the reverse.

εἰρωνεία—ἐτέρου] 'Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery: one who resorts to irony makes his joke for his own amusement only, whereas the buffoon does so for an ulterior object'. On βωμολοχία, comp. Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 4, οἱ τῷ γελοίῳ ἐπερήματαις βωμολόχοι δυσκόουσι εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλειψάμενοι παίστα τοῦ γελοίου καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γελόστα ποιήσαι ἃ τοῦ λεγεῖν ευςχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τοῦ σκωπτόμενον. ἗δ, line 34, ο δὲ βωμολό—
The book appropriately closes with a chapter on the Peroration: the contents of that portion of the speech are distributed under four heads: (1) to inspire the audience with a favourable opinion of yourself and an unfavourable one of your opponents, (2) amplification and extenuation, (3) the excitement of the emotions of your audience, (4) refreshing their memory by recapitulation.

Cornificius, II 30.47, gives three divisions, (1) enumeratio, (2) amplificatio, (3) commiseratio. Cic. de Inv. I 52.98, (1) enumeratio, (2) indignatio, (3) conquestio. Apsines 12 p. 384, (1) ánýmýsios, (2) Æl aio, (3) deýnòsis (γι δε δεινώσις κατά τήν αὐξήσιν βεβείται). *Amplificatio* and *commiseratio* are sometimes brought under one head, thus reducing the divisions to two, as in Cic. part. orat. 15.52, (1) amplificatio, (2) enumeratio (Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, § 29).

In spite of what is here said about *αὔξησις*, the student of ancient eloquence cannot fail to be struck by the quiet character of most of the perorations of the Attic orators. Perhaps the tamest of all (to our modern taste) is the closing sentence of Lysias Or. 22 (κατά τῶν σιτισώλων) § 22, ὀκοδ ὅσο τει σείω λέγειν περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀδικούμων, ὅτε δικάζωμαι, δεῖ παρὰ τῶν κατηγορίων πυθέσθαι, τὴν δὲ τούτων πνεύμαν ἀπαντες ἐπίστασθη. ἄν όνω τούτων καταψήφισθη, τὰ τε δίκαια πούςετε καὶ ἀξίστερον τῶν σιτῶν ωνήσεσθε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τιμιότερον. It is well remarked by Brougham that “the perorations, if by this we mean the concluding sentences of all, in the Greek orations, are calm and tame, compared with the rest of their texture, and especially with their penultimate
 Portions, which rise to the highest pitch of animation' (vol. vii, Rhetorical Dissertations, pp. 25, 184; see also especially Jebb’s Attic Orators 1 p. ciii).

πέφυκε—ἐπιχαλκεύειν] ‘For the natural order is first to prove your own case to be true and your opponent’s to be false; and after that, to use praise and blame, and to elaborate these topics’. These words give the reason for giving the first place in the four heads to inspiring in the audience a favourable opinion towards yourself.

ἐπιχαλκεύειν] is a difficult word to translate satisfactorily in the present context. Victorius dubiously explains it: ‘explore et quod factum iam est cursim festinanterque eo consilio ut concinnes, iterae ac repetere.’ It is metaphorically used in Arist. Nub. 422, where Strepsiades offers himself (not his son, as Ernesti says Lex. Techn. s.v.) to Socrates, as sturdy and tough material for him to hammer upon and forge to his purpose, ἀλλ’ ἐνεκέν γε ψυχής στερρᾶς...ἀμέλει βαρρῶν, οὐκετα τούτων ἐπιχαλκεύειν παρέχουσ’ ἂν (for a Latin metaphor from the anvils, comp. Horace, A. P. 441, male tornatos incudi reddere versus). At first sight the word might be supposed to refer to ἀνάμφωσις, which is subsequently explained in the words πολλάκις εἰπεῖν, in which case it would mean ‘to hammer your subject down’, ‘drive it home’; but μετὰ τοῦτο in § 2 shews that in the present section Ar. is only dwelling on the first of the four heads of the epilogue, and does not at present touch on ἀνάμφωσις, which is reserved for § 4. Consequently we must understand it to mean ‘to elaborate’, ‘to finish off’, the topics belonging to the first head. It may also mean to mould the audience to one’s purpose. Brandis in Schneide- win’s Philologus 11 v 1, p. 45, points out that his Ἀνωνύμουs read the clause as follows: καὶ μετὰ (not ὅπως) τὸ ἐπιανεῖν καὶ ψέγειν τὸ (not καὶ) ἐπιχαλ- κεύειν, in which case the last word corresponds to the third head, εἰς τὰ πάθη καταστήσας τὸν ἄκροντιν.

‘Now (in this) you must aim at one of two objects; to represent yourself as either relatively or absolutely good, and your opponent as either relatively or absolutely bad’. As is remarked in the Introd. p. 308, ‘the virtue assumed may be either virtue per se, and independent of all other considerations, as times, places, and persons—or in default of this, at any rate good to the judges or audience; as it may be, useful, or well-disposed’. On ἄπλωσ, see note on 1 2. 4.

ἐἰρήνησι τοῖς τόποις] Sec 1 9. 1.

§ 2. δεδειγμένων—ἐστίν] ‘The next point in the natural order is to proceed to amplify what has already been proved (δεδειγμένων), or again to depreciate (what has been proved by your opponent); for the facts must be
admitted, if one is to treat of the question of degree (by way of amplification or the reverse); just as the growth of the body arises from something pre-existing: δεδειγμένων is supported by the vetus translatio and all the MSS except Α, which has δεδειγμενων, an awkward genitive absolute which is left standing alone owing to the loss of some words which would have made the sentence run like the next transition in § 3, μετα δε ταυτα, δηλων ουνων και οια και ηλικα. Spengel suggests as an alternative that the participle refers to "ipsam argumentationem, i.e. confirmationem et confutationem, quod suadent verba δε γαρ τα πεπραγμενα ωμολογησαι."

§§ 2—4. See I cc. 7, 9, 24; and II 7. 2.
§ 3. ηλικα referring particularly to αυξειν και ταπεινον.

ἐλεος] 'commiseration'. Cic. de Inv. I 55. 106, Conquestio oratio auditorum misericordiam captans, ib. § 100. Supra II 8. 2.


On οργη see II 2. 1 and 4. 31; on μισος, II 4. 31; on φθονος, II 9. 3 and 10. 1; on ζηλος, II 11. 1.

οι τοποι] See I cc. 1—11, where however δεινωσις and ἐρις are not, like the other topics, specially treated of.

§ 4. 'The remaining branch of the peroration is the recapitulation of the previous parts of the speech. At this point you may appropriately do what some, absurdly enough, advise one to do in the exordium. They recommend you to to state your points again and again that they may be distinctly understood. In the exordium, however, you should simply state the subject of the speech, that the point at issue may be clearly seen; in the peroration you have to state summarily the means whereby your case has been proved'.
The first point (in the recapitulation) that you have performed all that you have promised. Isocr. ἀντίδοτα § 75, οἷμαι γὰρ ἀποδεδεικνύμενη τὴν ὑπόσχεσίν.

(The recapitulation) may also consist of a comparison (of the opponent’s case with your own); you may either compare what both said on the same point, or else (you may do so) without setting each point over against the other.

ἡ ἐκ παραβολῆς] as ἀντιπαραβολὴ is actually the subject of all the preceding part of the section, ἐκ παραβολῆς cannot be contrasted with οἴτος, but must be identical with it. Hence we should either strike out this clause, or at any rate (with Victorius and Spengel), put ἦ into brackets, in which case ἦ δὴ οἴτος will be explained if necessary by ἐκ παραβολῆς. Possibly, however, the clause is due to the intrusion into the text of a marginal explanation of οἴτος such as an abbreviated form of ἡ γονίων (the scholiast's common equivalent for scilicet) ἐκ παραβολῆς.

κατὰ φύσιν] i.e. your recapitulation may follow and contrast your own points in the natural order, as they were spoken; and then, if you please, separately, what has been said by your opponent.

τελευτὴ—λόγος] As a conclusion (to a speech) the most suitable style is that which has no conjunctions, to make it a true peroration, and not an actual oration.

τελευτὴ is with much plausibility conjectured by Victorius, and the conjecture is supported by F. A. Wolf. The nominative is possibly due to the copyist being misled by the apparent parallelism above, ἄρχη δὲ διὰ τοῦ κτ.λ.—τῆς λέξεως is constructed with ἦ ἀνώνυμος; on this kind of ‘attraction’, comp. note on III 9. 3, ἢ εἰρωμένη τῆς λέξεως.

ἐπιλογος...λόγος] Quint. vi 1. 2, nam si morabimur, non iam enumera-tio, sed quasi altera fict oratio. Sibra III 9. 6, a pa ris oioi ai μακρα ἦνται λόγος γίνεται.

εἰρήκα, ἀκριβῶς, ἔχετε, κρίνατε] ‘I must now close; you have heard all; the facts are in your hands; I ask for your verdict’. Considering the carelessness of style which characterizes many portions of the Rhe-toric, it is all the more striking to find its close marked by a sentence so happily chosen,—a sentence which at once illustrates the point under
6 ἐναντίον λόγου. τελευτὴ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὁπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ἦ· "εἱρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἐξετε, κρίνατε."

consideration and also serves as an appropriate farewell to the subject of the treatise; as though Aristotle had added at the conclusion of his course: 'I have said all that I had to say; my lectures are now finished; I leave the subject in your hands, and trust it to your judgment.' The closing words of the Sophistici Elenchi are at least equally effective, λοιπὸν ἂν εἰ ἡ πάντων ὑμῶν ἡ τῶν ἡκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλειπαμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγενήμην τοῖς δὲ εὐρημένοις πολλὴν ἐξεῖν χάριν.

The illustration is doubtless a reminiscence of the closing words of one of the best-known speeches of Lysias, Or. 12 (καὶ Ἐρατοσθένους), παύσαμαι κατηγορών ἀκηκόατε, ἐωράκατε, πεπόνθατε ἐξεῖτε, δικάζετε, a passage which may perhaps find its modern equivalent in some such words as these:

'The speech for the prosecution must now close; I have appealed to your ears, to your eyes, to your hearts: the case is in your hands; I ask for your verdict.'
APPENDIX (E)

Shilleto’s Adversaria on the Rhetoric of Aristotle.

[Among the books belonging to the late Mr Shilleto which have been recently acquired by the University Library, are two interleaved copies of the edition of the Rhetoric printed at the Oxford University Press in 1826. One of these, which is in bad condition owing to many years of use, contains a large number of annotations of very unequal value, written in various hands; in the other, which bears on the title-page the name Richard Shilleto with the date Dec. 15, 1863, apparently all the notes on which his maturer judgment set any value, are copied out by himself in a hand rivalling that of Richard Porson for clearness and beauty. All these notes, and a few selections from the older book, with some trifling omissions, (parallel passages, for instance, already quoted at large in these volumes,) I have transcribed in full by permission of the Syndics of the University Library, and I append them here as an epilogue to Mr Cope’s Commentary.]

BOOK I.

1. 12, ἀναγκῇ δὲ αυτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] δι’ αὐτῶν ἢ. c. τῶν ῥητορικῶν. Plat. Meno. 87 E, σκεψόμεθα δὴ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντες, τοῖα ἐστὶν ἢ ἡμᾶς ὕφελεί. ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἱσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ ταύτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὕφελμα...ταύτα δὲ ταύτα φαμέν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτει ταύτα. 1.14, σοφιστῆς μὲν] Intellige; σοφιστῆς μὲν (σοφιστῆς ἐστὶ)...dialek- tikós δὲ οἱ (σοφιστῆς ἐστὶ) κ.τ.λ.

2. 12, η ἡγεύσαται η ἡσεθαι η ἡ χειν] χειν: Plat. Theact. 183 A, 204 A, 1 Rep. 351 c inter ἔστιν et χει lis est in Codd. Edit.)


3. 2, ἡ θεωρῶν εἶναι ἢ κριτῆς κ.τ.λ.] Cicero Orat. Part. 3. 10, Quid habes igitur de causa dicere? Cicero Pater: Auditorum cam genere distinguī. Nam aut auscultator est modo qui audit, aut disceptator, id est rei sénentiaeqve moderator: ilia, ut aut delectetur, aut statuat aliquid. Sta-
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uit autem aut de praeteritis, ut index, aut de futuris, ut senatus. Sic tria sunt genera, iudicii, deliberationis, exorationis: quae quia in laudationes maxime conferunt, præprimum habet iam ex eo nomen. 1 de Oratore 31. 141, (non negabo me didicisse) causarum...partim in indicis versari, partim in deliberationibus: esse etiam genus tertium, quod in laudandis aut vituperandis hominibus poneretur. de invent. II 4. 12, omnis et demonstrativa et deliberativa et iudicialis causa...Aliud enim laus aut vituperatio, alium sententiae dicit, alium accusatio aut recusatio conficere debet. In indicis quid acquum sit quaeritur, in demonstrationibus quid honestum sit et quid utile.


ov'de...ou qui. [Rhet.] I 5. 15; (ἀλλ') ou', I II. 9.


5. 11, ὁν τὸ γῆρας λαβάται] ὁν = τοῦτων ἂ (nominativus).

5. 12, τοσοῦτο ὡμοῖον ὡστε μὴ...ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Transl. 'by an amount just so far larger as not to render.' Si voluisset Ar. 'so that we make our movements not more tardily,' scripturus fuit poieisata.

5. 15, ou'dé ἄλωτος καὶ πολυχρώνος ou't' ἀνευ:] Quid si ou'dé ἄλωτος καὶ πολυχρώνος οὐχ ἀνευ...? Si vera lectio est, ἀλ. καὶ πολ. idem fere valet quod πολυχρώνος ἄλωτος, ut in Tac. XI Ann. 5, continuus inde et saevus accusandus rei Suillius.—[ou't'] lękк. st. De ou'dé...ou vid. ad I 3. 8.


7. 14, ἀριστον μὲν ὑδαρ] "So then I will conclude with the saying of Pindar us ophiina res aqua; not for the excellency but for the common use of it." Bacon, Speech Touching Purveyors, vol. IV, p. 306, ed. MDCCCX.


7. 21, δ' κρίνειν ἀν ἡ (vel) κεκρίκασαι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοί (sapientes sive omnes sive quam plurimi; cf. II 23. 12) ἡ (aut) οἱ πλείους ἡ (aut) οἱ κράτιστοι.
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9. 41, ἔχομενων] Cf. II 22. 11, 16.

11. 10, πεισθα] ἐκπιοῦνται, II 20. 6. ["Lobeck, ad Phrynich. p. 31" u.s.]

11. 23, "Not only what is great strange or beautiful, but anything that is disagreeable when looked upon, pleases us in an apt description... for this reason therefore the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the imagination, if the image be represented to our minds by suitable expressions; though perhaps this may be more properly called the pleasure of the understanding than of the fancy, because we are not so much delighted with the image that is contained in the description, as with the aptness of the description to excite the image." ADDISON, Spectator, 418.

11. 8, η δὲ ἀπορίαν] η (εὶ) δὲ ἀπορίαν Bekk. st. sed in οἷς latet εἰ τιν.

12. 23, προφάσεως δεῖται μοῦν ἢ θονηρία] Proverbii scriptor sic scripsisse videtur: δεῖται προφάσεως μοῦν ἢ θονηρία, vel το τοι θονηρόν προφάσεως δεῖται μοῦν.


14. 5, δεξίως πίστεος vide ne aut δεξίως πίστεος (Eur. Med. 21 et ibi Porson) scribendum aut πίστεος omittendum tanquam gloss. vocabuli δεξίως.


15. 10, ἐφ' ὅποτέρον κ.τ.λ.] Cf. II 4. 32. Suspensa et quo ducentur inclinatura respondet, Tac. xi Ann. 34.


BOOK II.

B 1, αὐτῷ διακείμενοι πως] = οἱ κριταί, sive ēkklēsiastai sive dikastai.

2. 5, ο ὑβριζόντων—ἡσθή] 113. 10, οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε πάντως ὑβριζομένων] ἀλλ' εἰ ἄνεκά του, οἷον τού ἀτύματα ἐκέκοιν υἱὸς ἄνεκα ἀνθρώπη.

3. 10, ἀδύνατον ἀμα φοβεῖται καὶ ὑγίειοθεῖ] "My affright at his baleful aspect begins to abate, and my hatred to arise," Scott, Kenilworth ch. xix. "Under this iron domination scarce a complaint was heard:
for hatred was effectually kept down by terror," Macaulay, *Hist. Eng.* 1 p. 628.

3. 13. παίει...όργην...λυπθείση τιμωρία πρότερον] ‘I have little doubt of procuring a remission for you provided we can keep you out of the claws of justice till she has selected and gorged upon her victims; for in this, as in other cases, it will be according to the vulgar proverb, “First come, first served.”’ Scott, *Waverley* ch. X.II. “After the first storm there is naturally some compassion attends men like to be in misery.” Clarendon, *Rebellion*, Book 1 p. 3 b.  washington το πολύ οι τελευταίοι κρινόμενα σώζουσι πεπαμμένοι γάρ τῆς ὀργῆς αὐτῶν ἀκροάσθε, καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἥδη ἐθλοντες ἀποδέχεσθε, Lysias XIX § 6 p. 152 St = 166 R.

3. 17. αὐτούς...παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους] αὐτοὺς i.e. τοὺς κριτᾶς. Cf. 9. 16. Quid sibi velit Bekkerianum αὐτοὺς, me quidem latet.

4. 18, εἰδότας (τὰ τῶν πληθυνῶν κακά)] ‘Who make themselves acquainted with.’ Thus Plutarch Π 73 C, ὁ ἀγγέλευσε διὰ καὶ πανταχοῦ πικρῶς καὶ ἀπρητῆς, καὶ πάντα γυνώσκων καὶ πουλυπαγμονῶν [from Shilleto’s older copy].


4. 32, ὃς] 1 15. 10.

5. 17, ἢ πλείους...ἡ κρείττου...ἡ ἀμφω] vid. ad 12. 6.

5. 10, πάντα: vid. ad 9. 3.

6. 20, τοὺς πρώτους δεθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται] Plato Sophist. 217 C, ἡ τούτων, ὃ ἔχει, ἡμῶν τῆς γε πρῶτης αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρεθρεῖς γένε. Hinc explicandus est Aristoph. in Nub. 1215, ἀλλὰ κρείττον ἐὰν εὐθὺς τότε ἀπερθοῦσαι i.e. ἡ αἰσχυνεῖται τοῦ δεθέντα.


8. 6, ὃς γὰρ ἐλευθεροῦσιν ὁ ἐκπληρηγμένοι] Shakesp. Κ. Lear v 3.231.


9. 3, ἀπασω] all who possess these two feelings (νέμεσις and φθόνος).

Cf. Politic. ΙΙΙ 9. 1, τί το δίκαιον τὸ τὸ ἀληθερικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικὸν, πάντες (all who uphold either form of government) γὰρ ἄποται δικαίου τινός. πάντα = πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 6. 10.


AR. III.
SHILLETO’S ADVERSARIA.

Xen. Anab. ii 1. 5, § 159, Anm. 4.” Transcribed from adv. on Aristoph. l.c.

9. 5, φθονερὸς] Plat. Phileb. 48 B, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γ’ ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἤδειμεν ἀναφανύσεται.
10. 11, ἄδιαυμενοι] ‘for whom a claim is put in.’ Vid. nos ad Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 293.

12. 6, ἀμφώ ταύτα] i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνικοι. Vid. ad Plat. Phil. p. 37 C. ["Plat. Theact. p. 154 B, εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἑφαπτόμενον ἐκαστὸν ἢ τούτων, i.e. μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θέρμων. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 19 = 8, 13, καθ’ αὐτός ἂν εἶναι αἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἤδειαί· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθὰ γε καὶ καλὰ, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἐκαστὸν, i.e. ἤδι, ἀγαθὸν, καλὸν. Rhetor. 11 12. 6, καὶ ἀμφῶ ταύτα μάλλον ἡ φιλοχρήματος, i.e. φιλότιμοι, φιλόνικοι, 5. 17, ἢ ἐὰν πλειόνοι ὁσὺν ὁσ ταῦτα συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττονες, ἢ ἀμφῶ." From Shilte's copy of Badham's Philebus, l.c.]


18. 3, πάσι γὰρ ἀναγκαίοι, τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνάτου καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι] Vide ne ἀναγκαία (aut τὸ) Ar. scrispat. In 1 3. 4, προσχρῆται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμμηνευτές καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προειλημμένουs accusativus cum participiis coniungitur. In Xenoph. Agesil. xi 11, καὶ τὸ μεγαλόφρον (τὸ μεγαλόφρον Schneider) οὐ σὺν ὕβρει ἀλλὰ σὺν γνώμῃ ἐχρῆτο.

19. 21, εἰ ἐπείρασεν, καὶ ἐπραβεῖ] ‘if he courted, he also succeeded.’


21. 14, ἑγαν...ἐγαν] ‘in excess,’ ut servetur ὁ παραλογίμος.


22. 3, λεκτέον = λέγειν δὲι, itaque postea εἶναι...συνάγειν.

22. 8, συμβουλεύοντες δὲ] potuit addere (post δέ) ἢ ἀποτρέποντες. Cf. I 3. 6, II 18. 4. Vid. nos ad Plat. Protag. 331 E. ["Minus negligentem scripsit, nam συμβουλεύομεν ἢ προπρέποντες ἢ ἀποτρέποντες, quanquam allibi (c.e. g. I 3. 6, II 18. 4) συμβουλεύσαντες opponitūr ἀποτρέψεις." Extracted from a long note on Protag. l.c. [τὸ ἅπαμον ἢ] τὸ ἅπαμον.]

22. 11, ἔχεται] passivum est ut § 16.


BOOK III.

2. 3, ἢ περὶ [λίαν] μικρῶν] ‘or if one speak about very trivial matters.’
2.8, οὐκ ἔστων] Cf. Ethic. Nicom. III 1.8, ἐνα δ' ἐσῶς οὐκ ἔστων ἀναγκαζόμεναι, ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀποδιατεύων.

2.13, ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριῶτερον] Quintil. X 1.6, cum sint aliis alia aut magis propria.


5.4, πότε] Dem. de fals. leg. § 260.


9.8, ἐλθόντες ὡς ύμᾶς] εἰσελθόντες θ' εἰς Cobet Var. Lect. p. 368. Si acque εἰ ύμῖν (i.e. τοὺς δικασταίς Aphob. I. 813 § 1) et par' ύμῖν § 2, et i contr. Stephan. 1101 § 1, alibi, dicitur; quidni acque dictatur εἰς ύμᾶς ὡς ύμᾶς? Vide etiam ne ἐλθόντες possit defendi Aphob. I. c. εἰς θ' ύμῖν τοὺς οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀκριβίδος εἰσισταμένους ἐλήλυθεν.


11.13, μύστα] luscitiosum (Gell. IV 2). Arist. XXXI Probl. 8, διὰ τι οἱ μύσται μικρὰ γράμματα γράφοντο; ἀτομον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὅξτος ὀρθῶς συνέχειν ἐργον ὅξιον ὀρθῶς, πότερον ὅτι μέγαλα φαίνεται τὰ μικρὰ εὰν ἥ ἐγγύς; οἱ δὲ προσάγουσιν γράφουσιν; ἡ διὰ τὸ συνάγωντας τὰ βλέφαρα γράφειν; cf. 15 et 16... [From Shilleto's older copy].

11.14, ο Καπρᾶθος...τῶν γλαγω] "In Iceland, the reindeer were introduced by the Danish Government about the middle of the last century; but they are understood to have proved a nuisance instead of a benefit. They have not the wolf to check the tendency of their population to exceed the means of subsistence, and they have multiplied so as to devour the summer pastures on which the inhabitants depend for their cattle; and having been allowed to run wild they are of no use." Laing, Norw. p. 418.

14.6, κἂν μὴ εὑθὺς ὁσπερ Εὐρυπίδης, ἄλλ' ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ ποι] An ὁσπερ Εὐρυπίδης ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ ἄλλ' ἐν τῷ προϊόντι γέ ποι?

19.1, ἐπισαλεκείειν] "auditoris animum sibi conformare et conciliare," —velut "incude formare." [From Shilleto’s older copy.]
GREEK INDEX

TO TEXT AND NOTES.

The references are to Book, Chapter, and Section.
a 2.4\textsuperscript{n} refers specially to the note;
\beta 7.4\textsuperscript{m} indicates the notes in small print at the foot of the page.
ap. for apud denotes words and phrases quoted by Aristotle.

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θαρρείν, θάρσος

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β 5. 18

tὸ μέλλοντα
tὸ βαυμάζεν Ὧδυ
tὸ βαυμαζοῦσι
tὸ βαυμάζεσθαι Ὧδυ
tὸ βαυμαστῶν ἑπιδιομητῶν
tὸ βαυμαστῶν ὧδυ
tὸ βιωμαστὸν
tὸ βαυμασταῖ

α 11. 21

α 6. 29

α 11. 18

α 11. 21

α 2. 19

β 6. 24; γ 2. 3

θεσαγής ἐν Μεγάροις

θέλειν (for usual prose form ἐθέλειν)

ἐι βέλειν

διδόναι βέλειν
tὸ βέλειν

μὲν βέλειν

μὴ βέλειν

μὴ βέλειν

θελον

β 19. 25

θεμέλιος

α 15. 14

-θεν, peculiar use of words ending in,

α 11. 16

α 15. 32

α 15. 31

α 15. 32

α 15. 30; 32

Ο Θεοδόκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ

Αίας ὁ Θεοδόκτου

"Ἀλκαιών τῷ Θεοδόκτου

ἐκ νόμου τοῦ Θεοδόκτου

ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδόκτου

ἐν τοῖς Θεοδόκτειοις

Θεόδωρος

περὶ Θεόδωρον

ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη

tὸ Θεοδώρου

Θεόδωρον φαυή

θερίζειν κακῶς

θερμοί

ὁ θεωρός

θεωριματα

Θησαῦν διείναι Φιλίππου

tοῦ Ὀθῆσιον ἀποδινώστος

ἐγγ. θερ. θῆρα

θηρεύειν

θηρευτική

tὸ θηριώδεστερον ἀδίκημα μείζον

tὸν θηριαρχὸν εὐρέν

α 11. 29

α 1. 10

α 11. 15

α 14. 5

α 5. 17

α 2. 10

α 7. 5

α 8. 14

α 23. 22

α 23. 30

γ 7. 5

γ 8. 4

β 23. 29

γ 1. 7

γ 11. 13

γ 8. 4

α 9. 29

β 14. 1

γ 11. 6

κατὰ θυμοῦ...θεέν

τεθυρίμεναι καὶ κοίναι γνώμαις

β 21. 17

διὰ θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆν

οἱ θυμοὶ ὁξεῖς

θυμικοί

θυμοδέες

τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδραν

θυσαμένως

θυσιαί

εἰς τὸ λαμβεῖον μετέβησαν

ιαμβεία φέβηγονται

λαμβοῦ λέξεις ή τῶν πολλῶν

ἰαίω

λάσων ὁ Οθέταλὸς

ἰατρὸν ἥρω

ιατρέματα

ιατρική

ἐπὶ τῇ ἵδεᾳ φιλοτιμοῦμενοι

ἰδίος καὶ κατὰ μέρος

ἰδίος νόμος

τὰ ἵδαι αἴγαθα

τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἵδαι καλά

ἵδια

ἵδια ὑδατά

ἱδιωτήρ

ἱδιωτικοῖ

ἵδιεὺς

ἱέναι εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν

α 9. 26

α 5. 14

α 2. 10

β 23. 22

β 23. 30

γ 11. 13

β 23. 29

γ 1. 7

γ 8. 4

α 9. 29

β 14. 1

β 23. 27

β 21. 17

γ 7. 9

α 10. 17

β 13. 13

β 12. 5

β 12. 9

α 6. 23

β 21. 11

α 5. 9

γ 1. 9

γ 8. 4

α 14. 2

α 12. 31

β 4. 31

γ 14. 7

α 2. 1

β 2. 13

α 15. 21

α 10; 3; 13; 2

α 6. 28

α 9. 26

β 22. 12

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β 23. 5

γ 12. 22

γ 4. 3

α 11. 3
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Pίνδαρος  
pιστευεσθαι  
pιστευτικος  
πιστις  
πιστεις απόδειξις της  
pιστεις κουνα  
ap πιστεις έντεχνον μονον  
pιστεις ὁποιεικτικις  
pιστεων ατεχνων ειδης  
pιστεων ατεχνων...έντεχνοι  
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pλοιτων οιον τιμη τις  
pλοιτου μερη  
toπ λοπωτον α ἐπεται ηθη  
pλοπηρον  
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pνιμα  
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