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ELIZABETH BRETT WHITE

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

FROM LAFAYETTE TO POINCARÉ

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


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AMERICAN OPINION

OF

FRANCE

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
AMERICAN OPINION *OF* FRANCE

From Lafayette to Poincaré

BY

ELIZABETH BRETT WHITE

PH. D. • URSINUS COLLEGE : COLLEGEVILLE : PENNSYLVANIA



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TO
THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER AND MY MOTHER,
WHO LOVED TRUTH, JUSTICE,
AND PEACE

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PREFACE

THE material used in this book is largely taken from official records of facts. Partly also it is taken from personal documents, biographical and autobiographical, from public addresses, and from newspapers and periodicals. Journalistic material has been especially emphasized, since the object of the writer was to discover and to present what the people thought about any occurrence or series of occurrences, and why they thought as they did, rather than to prove that their opinions were right or wrong.

The American Antiquarian Society Library, the Congressional Library, the Libraries of Clark University, the University of Pennsylvania, Williams College, Bryn Mawr College, and the Widener Library of Harvard University, have furnished particularly valuable sources, and special thanks for courtesy and assistance are due to Dr. Louis N. Wilson of Clark University, Mr. Asa Don Dickinson of the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. W. B. Briggs of Harvard University, and Mr. Clarence S. Brigham of the American Antiquarian Society.

The earlier chapters were first written at Clark University, in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the Ph.D. degree. Revised, and with several chapters added, the manuscript received the Justin Winsor Prize Award of the American Historical Association. Further revisions and additions have since been made.

Professor George H. Blakeslee, head of the department of History and International Relations at Clark University, has made the work possible through his unfailing interest and encouragement, and has criticised all

PREFACE

of the material. Dr. Harry Elmer Barnes of Smith College has also read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions. Mr. C. Grove Haines, of Ursinus College, has been of great assistance in various details of the work, and I am indebted to Mrs. Robert R. White, Jr., for a careful reading of the proof.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	xi
1 THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE CLOSE OF THE NAPOLEONIC ERA	1
2 RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS—EARLY STAGES	35
3 RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS—LATER PERIOD	65
4 THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE	94
5 FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III	130
6 THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR	172
7 THE THIRD REPUBLIC	208
8 SIGNS AND PORTENTS	235
9 FRANCE IN ARMS	268
CONCLUSION	310
BIBLIOGRAPHY	315
INDEX	331

INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL relations are governed not alone by economic laws or by selfish interests, but by those subtler forces which have to do with community of thought and of ideals. Psychological study has of late years developed much information as to the reactions of individuals to various stimuli. It is possible to make a similar study of a nation, imperfect of course, yet contributing something to the understanding of the sources of international friendliness or prejudice and therewith some of the motives which determine international action. The relations of any country with any other, that is, lend themselves to such analysis as will indicate what qualities each group of people admires or dislikes, and what behavior most easily stirs irritation or encourages friendly coöperation.

The relations of the United States with France offer a problem of peculiar interest. We fought the World War side by side with France and in the enthusiasm of that period we revived old tales of Lafayette and of that alliance which so heartened and aided us in the dark days of the Revolution. We declared that France and America were traditional allies, were bound together almost in blood brotherhood, and we rejoiced that fighting in France we might serve the cause of our first friends at the same time that we settled our own grievances. The War has been over eight years. We are to-day as critical of France as of Germany, and the old alliance has not made us willing to serve French interests in afterwar settlements, in spite of the fact that we fought a common foe, and that our battle-cry was the sacred name of Lafayette. As a result we are charged with ingratitude, with bad faith or with fickleness, and to some even of our own folk our policies appear to be unstable and capricious. As we look back over our history, however, we find that such fluctuations in our sympathies, contradictory as they are, have not been infrequent, and that they are by no means so baseless as they appear to be. Perhaps if we analyze with care the relations of France and the United States in the past, we may serve the cause of present and future harmony, by providing material for the better evaluation of the considerations upon which our actions have been based, so that we may see more clearly which of them have been worthy and justifiable, and which have been only evidence of our shortsightedness

or lack of full understanding of the situation. Only by thoughtful studies of human relations shall we ever be able to establish such bases of comprehension and justice as shall resist surface irritations and provide a firm foundation for the building of future and lasting peace and harmony.

Between France and the United States there was, to begin with, greater probability of friction than of friendliness. Generations of European rivalry had fixed in the consciousness of Anglo-Saxon and Gaul a pattern of dislike and distrust. Among the early colonists this was made more marked by the clash of interests along the Great Lakes and in the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. It appeared natural to continue in America quarrels begun on the continent. These early wars left a deep imprint upon the hearts and minds of the settlers, especially in New England and the Middle Atlantic States, where French use of Indian allies envenomed the border raids. Nor did Puritan Massachusetts and French Catholic Canada tend in any case toward harmonious relations. The "Bostonnais" were ceaselessly active in the attempt to break up the French control in Acadia and in Canada at large, and the line of New Brunswick and Maine was always disputed, with frequent murderous raids from both sides. The first two attacks on Quebec were at the instigation and with the active participation of the New England states. Pepperell's siege and capture of Louisbourg in 1745 was carried out by colonials alone, and they shared in every British expedition except the last. The history of the Ohio Valley shows no greater friendliness between the colonists and the French, and in Georgia, at the time of the signing of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the following ode, published in an influential newspaper, reflects the popular aversion in its bearing upon relations between the provinces and the mother country:—

"Whence, Britons, these desponding cares,
 This vain accusing of your fate?
 Whence these unnecessary fears,
 While *George* is guardian of your fate?

 What then can generous Britons dread,
 Their leagues preserved, their faith unstained?
 If to the choice of peace they're led,
 Their power, their rights shall be maintained:
 If war their choice, revolving o'er
 Hawke's deeds, and ¹ Abram's glorious field,
 Again they'll waste the Iberian shore,
 Again the crafty Gaul shall yield.

¹ The plains near Quebeck"

INTRODUCTION

Who fears the schemes of Gallic art?
Who shall of Carlos' arms complain?
While Heaven its aid shall still impart,
And *George* shall live and rule the main?

(*Georgia Gazette*, Apr. 28, 1763)

In Pontiac's War which broke out soon after peace had been made between the French and the British, common report credited the French with complicity. "In short, Monsieur is at the bottom of it . . . we have undeniable proofs of this," wrote the settlers at Detroit.

When the Revolutionary War was upon us, however, we sank our old hatreds in the pressing necessity for aid, and did not scruple to stir up all possible European difficulties for Great Britain. With especial cleverness American envoys played upon the desire of France to weaken her great rival, and depended upon French interests far more than upon French altruism, as the story of Franklin's negotiations abundantly witnesses. Washington himself, though most willing to entertain a favorable opinion of the new ally, warned openly against an excess of confidence, or an expectation that France would go further than would best serve her own ends.

John Jay, working in Madrid for a Spanish alliance, felt himself hampered by French intrigues intended to assure that while the activities of American rebels should embarrass England the colonies themselves should not grow strong enough or independent enough to interfere with French or Spanish domination in the New World. Said John Adams, in his Diary,—

"Mr. Jay likes Frenchmen as little as Mr. Lee and Mr. Izard did. He says they are not a moral people; they know not what it is; he don't like any Frenchman; the Marquis de Lafayette is clever, but he is a Frenchman. Our allies don't play fair, he told me."¹

Adams himself, after some friction with the French court, went to Holland to "try if we can do something to make us less dependent upon France," and Washington's writings indicate that in spite of the general popular enthusiasm for "our generous ally" there was a strong party in Congress, led by the Lees and the Adamses, which never trusted the French, and that the practical working of the alliance in America had its serious difficulties and was accompanied by considerable friction at times.

Much dissatisfaction was caused by the various French intrigues which accompanied the negotiations for peace, and which finally led the American commissioners to disregard their Congressional instructions and work out independent agreements with the British through which they were

¹ C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, 34.

able to obtain for this country more advantageous terms than would have been possible if they had permitted the French to dominate the situation. Nor were the French themselves any too generous in their commercial arrangements with the new commonwealth.

All this, however, did not prevent the close association with France during the Revolutionary period from influencing in many ways American thought and customs. A better understanding existed between the two peoples than had ever before been the case, and many a warm personal friendship grew up. When the French Revolution occurred, it was hailed with enthusiasm in America, especially by Jefferson and other leading democrats, but also by the general public, which saw it as harmonizing with their own ideas and actions, the promise of another victory for the principles of liberty and self-government. As they watched the course of events, however, American observers were shocked by the violence of the revolutionists. They tried to excuse the occurrences of which they could not approve, to think of them as inevitable and natural consequences of the great evils of the old régime, and as representing only a temporary, if regrettable, aspect of a movement otherwise wholly praiseworthy, but nevertheless a reaction of horror was inevitable. The religious sensibilities, too, of many were antagonized by the free-thinking or atheistic tendencies so marked in the French leaders. Then the arrogance of the representatives of the French Republic who were sent to the United States touched the pride of the Americans, and their interference in domestic affairs and attempts to dominate our foreign policy led to the development of a strong anti-French sentiment on the part of many, a sentiment which was in conflict with the pro-French sympathies of others. Party politics in America came to reflect every change in the French situation, thus augmenting the difficulties already inherent in the business of erecting and stabilizing a new commonwealth. Relations with France became so strained as to amount practically to a state of war, though it was never formally declared.

It is not proposed to offer in this study any detailed treatment of the period before 1812, but a few citations from current newspapers may serve to connect the years of "our partial war with France" with those which followed, and to suggest the shifts in American sentiment which were so important and so marked.

"Americans, be just. Remember . . . who stood between you and the clanking chains of British ministerial despotism. . . . Let us . . . make it known that while we prefer a state of neutrality and peace, yet we cannot but feel an anxious solicitude for the success of the glorious struggle which the French are now making to obtain that heavenly jewel which we so justly prize."

(*New York Journal*, cited *Georgia Gazette*, July 18, 1793)

Resolutions, New York Chamber of Commerce, August 6, 1793,—

... “Resolved, that the President of the United States is the only organ through which the national will can be made known to foreign powers; and that any attempt of the said powers or their ministers to communicate with this country upon national objects, otherwise than through him, is an indignity to our constitution and offence to the nation, and ought to excite the apprehension and displeasure of all good and orderly citizens.”

Resolutions adopted by a popular meeting at Richmond, Virginia, Aug. 17, 1793,—

... “Any communication . . . or any interference of a foreign minister with the political parties of this country would violate the laws and usages of nations, would be a high indignity to the government and people of America, and would be a great and just cause of alarm . . . leading to the introduction of foreign gold and foreign armies, with their fatal consequences of dismemberment and partition.”

Chancellor Wythe presided over this meeting, and the resolutions were sponsored by John Marshall.

“If the French suppose the people of America will oblige the government to be passive under any and all kinds of injuries from France and that in the case of a rupture they will put on tri-coloured cockades they mistake the temper of our people most egregiously. . . . If France should be the aggressor, France will find the Americans foes: except the democrats, who like the Tories in the late revolution would, spaniel-like, kiss the rod. . . . American sympathy has been universally in favor of the French Revolution, so far as its object was to destroy tyranny and reform abuses. . . . Yes, Frenchmen, it is interest alone that has united France and America; and be on your guard that you do not make it our interest to dissolve the connection.”

(*New York Herald*, cited *Washington Gazette*, July 9, 1796)

The *Connecticut Courant*, very influential in New England, published in 1796 a summary of recent Franco-American relations, emphasizing the French “perfidy” at the time of the making of the peace treaties. Sections of this editorial run as follows,—

... “we acquired [through our separate negotiations with England] more than we expected, and certainly much more than France intended we should have.” French conduct was “of a piece with this” down to the dissolution of their monarchy. . . . “Nor can it, alas! be said that ‘regeneration’ has made France any better for us, or less a deceiver and troubler of nations than she had been for ages before.” . . . We were entitled to her good offices with the Barbary pirates, but their agent has laid obstacles in the way of our negotiations, “and had his means happened to have been sufficient, our prisoners might have rotted in their chains, and our commerce have been sacrificed to pirates in order to depress the American Marine, and monopolize the Levant trade. . . . There have been unceasing efforts to distract and destroy our national government. Disunited, the states would feel their weakness

INTRODUCTION

and would be more manageable by intrigue; might be played off against one another and at any time plunged into a foreign or a civil war."

(Cited *Danbury Republican Journal*, Nov. 28, 1796)

"Doubtless, Citizen Adet, as you have made a publication by way of an address or appeal to the people, you wish to know what effect it has and expect an answer. Know, then, that we are as little flattered as deceived by your opening a correspondence with us. Having ordained and dignified our well-beloved President to receive and answer ministerial addresses, and whose heart you will find sound enough and head long enough, for the trust, it is insulting us, that you do not confine yourself to him. . . . You might have learned something from your predecessors. . . . One thing we have sense enough to know, that halts are not the cords of love."

(*Connecticut Courant*, in *Washington Gazette*, Dec. 14, 1796)

. . . "Why are we so often reminded of the debt of gratitude? Is it really because more than gratitude,—because compensation—is expected to cancel it?"

(*Danbury Republican Journal*, Mar. 6, 1797)

AMERICAN OPINION

OF

FRANCE

CHAPTER I

The War of 1812 and the Close of the Napoleonic Era

THE military achievements of Napoleon and the autocratic form of his government could not have failed to create an unfavorable impression in the United States, but when, in the pursuit of his ambitious aims, he showed himself utterly unscrupulous in regard to the rights of neutrals, American irritation became acute. Yet the United States was ill-equipped to carry on an open war with a powerful enemy, and wisdom dictated the maintenance of a policy of conciliation for as long a period as possible. As the Napoleonic aggressions increased, this became ever more difficult. President Madison's Message of November 5, 1811, reflects the unenviable situation in which his administration found itself:—

"The justness and fairness which have been evinced on the part of the United States toward France, both before and after the revocation of her decrees, authorized an expectation that her government would have followed up that measure by all such others as were due to our reasonable claims as well as dictated by its amicable professions. No proof, however, is yet given of an intention to repair the other wrongs done to the United States and particularly to restore the great amount of American property seized and condemned under edicts . . . founded in such unjust principles that the reparation ought to have been prompt and ample." ¹

Matters were complicated by the fact that Great Britain, determined to defeat Napoleon, also attacked neutral commerce. Far more powerful on the sea than France, Great Britain could do much more concrete damage to the interests of America, and by the unconciliatory language she employed in diplomatic discussions she concentrated upon herself much of the enmity which otherwise would naturally have been turned against France. No one pretended that France was not guilty; but the question resolved itself into a decision as to which of the belligerents was more culpable and which could most effectively be punished. Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, well known in state and national politics, and a close friend of the Administration leaders, wrote,—“The Devil himself could not tell which government, England or France, is the most wicked.” ² And the country at large took somewhat the position expressed in a Fourth of July toast of—

ferred at Raleigh, N. C., in 1811:—"The French Tiger and the British Shark,—Paring to the nails of the one and a file to the teeth of the other." ³ Some ardent patriots did not hesitate to say that war should be declared against both France and Great Britain, but the majority realized that the United States was not prepared, from a financial, military, or naval standpoint, to prosecute war successfully against one antagonist, to say nothing of two. The lot fell upon Great Britain, and the conclusions through which this decision was reached, and having been reached was justified, are full of interest. In April, 1812, Jefferson wrote a long letter to an old friend in England, discussing quite fully the position of the United States as it appeared to him. He said that he thought the overwhelming power of Great Britain on the sea, and the strength of France on the land, were both destructive to the prosperity and happiness of the world. Both should be reduced. Bonaparte's claim to be fighting for the freedom of the seas was on a par with England's claim to be fighting on land for the liberties of mankind. Both were fighting to gain their own ambitions at the expense of the rest of the world. "We resist the enterprises of England first because they first come vitally home to us. And our feelings repel the logic of bearing the lash of George the III for fear of that of Bonaparte at some future day. When the wrongs of France shall reach us with equal effect, we shall resist them also. But one at a time is enough; and having offered a choice to the champions, England first takes up the gauntlet." ⁴ Jefferson characterized as "Quixottic" the idea of "choosing to fight two enemies at a time rather than to take them in succession." ⁵ "It would prevent our eastern capitalists and seamen from employment in privateering, take away the only chance of conciliating them, and keep them at home, idle, to swell the discontents: it would completely disarm us of the most powerful weapon we can employ against Great Britain by shutting every port to our prizes, and yet would not add a single vessel to their number; it would shut every market to our agricultural productions, and engender impatience and discontent with that class which in fact composes the nation; it would insulate us in general negotiations for peace, making all the parties our opposers, and very indifferent about peace with us, if they have it with the rest of the world." ⁶ To General Thaddeus Kosciusko he wrote that France had "kept pace with England in iniquity of principle, although not in the power of inflicting wrongs on us. The difficulty of selecting a foe between them has spared us many years of war, and enabled us to enter into it with less debt, more strength and preparation." ⁷

President Madison, who was accustomed to avail himself freely of the counsels of his predecessors in the executive office, John Adams and Jefferson, wrote to the latter:—

“The business becomes more than ever puzzling. To go to war with England and not with France arms the Federalists with new matter and divides the Republicans some of whom . . . make a display of impartiality. To go to war against both, presents a thousand difficulties, above all, that of shutting all the ports of Europe against our cruisers who can do so little without the use of them. It is pretty certain also that it would not gain over the Federalists, who would turn all those difficulties against the Administration.”⁸

Governor Plumer of New Hampshire, in his address to the Legislature on June 6, just after the President’s message to Congress had indicated that the declaration of war against Great Britain would not long be postponed, expressed the opinions of many throughout the country, when he said: “From both France and England we have long suffered and still continue to suffer, great injustice. They have unjustly captured and condemned our commerce, imprisoned and held in servitude our seamen, and grossly violated our national rights; whilst towards both these nations the government of the United States has steadily and uniformly pursued a course of conduct founded in the strictest justice and marked throughout with the most impartial neutrality.” The government of France, he added, had in some measure changed its attitude, which encouraged us to hope for eventual justice from that country. If these hopes should end in disappointment, he did not doubt that our government would take the necessary steps to secure our rights. In the meantime, Great Britain’s crimes appeared the worse, and fully justified the war.⁹

The editor of that unique and influential journal, *Niles’ Register*, wrote in reply to an article in the *Boston Centinel* condemning the policy of the government:—

“It is an unhappy circumstance that while we have so many just causes for complaint against England, France is highly culpable. But we must act as any individual would do, were he assailed by two persons at once. He would endeavor to separate them, and first attack the one he believed could be attacked effectively. This being done, he could devise means for annoying the other, if his wrongs were still unredressed.”¹⁰

Just after the declaration of war, he summarized the situation thus:—

“The injuries received from France do not lessen the enormity of those heaped upon us by England: nor can the crimes of one nation palliate the offences of the other. In this ‘straight betwixt two’ we had an unquestionable right to select our enemy. We have given the preference to Great Britain, not only for our supposed ability to coerce justice from her, but also on account of her more flagrant wrongs. For putting her on a par with France as to her violations of our commercial rights, what shall we say of impressment, of the murders by the Indians, of the mission of Henry? Besides, France is invulnerable to us. We might as well declare war against the people of the moon as against her; but Great Britain is tangible in her tenderest

points. It is contended by some that if one of these powers does us justice, the other will follow her lead. Though we do not subscribe to this doctrine in its fullest extent, we cannot suffer from making an experiment of that which it was impossible to avoid." ¹¹

The Governor of Delaware followed much the same line of argument in his Message to the Legislature, closing with the statement that the "correct conclusion would be to repel wrongs when perpetuated against us by one nation, in such a manner as to render others cautious how they offer us either injury or insult." ¹² Samuel Perkins in his *History of the Late War*, published in 1825, says that "in selecting Great Britain as an enemy, when equal cause of war existed between her and France, it was considered that the latter had no assailable points, no colonies on the continent of America, no Islands in the West Indies unoccupied by the British, no commerce on the ocean to invite and reward the enterprise of American privateers." A declaration of war against her could then be no more than an "empty threat" with no practical result except to force the country into "an unequal and dangerous alliance with Great Britain." ¹³

The debates in Congress of course reflected the sharp differences of opinion which prevailed throughout the country on the question of "choosing an enemy." The speeches of Clay, Grundy, Calhoun, Randolph, and others, in the debate on the Embargo, April 1-3, 1812, Randolph's speech against the war, May 29, and Josiah Quincy's speech in the debate on the pay of the army, Nov. 21, are conspicuous illustrations. The House Committee on Foreign Relations, in the report presented in October, justified the action of the government in selecting Britain as the enemy, but nevertheless stated that "the committee does not hesitate to declare that France has greatly injured the United States, and that satisfactory reparation has not been made for many of these injuries. But that is a concern which the United States will look to and settle for themselves." ¹⁴

Sentiment throughout the country was firm in the conviction that acceptance of the British challenge must in no way be construed to mean condoning of the French offences, or the abandonment of the right to resent them in whatever way and at whatever time the country should see fit. The President recognized this in his Message of June 1, when he said:—

"Having presented this view of the relations of the United States with Great Britain, and of the solemn alternative growing out of them, I proceed to remark that the communications last made to Congress on the subject of our relations with France, will have shown that since the revocation of her decrees, as they violated the neutral rights of the United States, her government has authorized illegal captures by its privateers and public ships; and that other outrages have been practiced on our vessels and our citizens. It will have been seen also that no indemnity had been provided or satisfactorily pledged, for the extensive spoliations committed under the

violent and retrospective orders of the French government against the property of our citizens, seized within the jurisdiction of France. I abstain at this time from recommending to Congress definitive measures with respect to that nation in the expectation that unclosed discussions between our minister plenipotentiary at Paris and the French government, will speedily enable Congress to decide, with greater advantage, on the course due to the rights, the interests, and the honor of our country." 15

Monroe, the Secretary of State, had written a year earlier to Joel Barlow, the American Minister in France, that pressure on that country would not be diminished by any change which might take place in the relations between the United States and England, no matter to what extent that change might be carried, since the nation was acting from a strong sense of injury in both cases.¹⁶ President Madison now wrote to Barlow that the conduct of the French government would "be an everlasting reproach to it" and that if the difficulties with England should be arranged, "the full tide of indignation with which the public mind here is boiling" would be directed against France, and if due reparation for wrongs should not be made by that country, war would be called for "by the nation almost *una voce*." Even without a peace with England, the President said, the further refusal or prevarication of France upon the subject of redress might be expected to produce measures of reprisal in the next Congress. "This result is the more probable, as the general exasperation will coincide with the calculations of not a few, that a double war is the shortest road to peace." He warned Barlow to be prepared to withdraw from France on short notice, even before the next session of Congress if the policy of France continued to be as provoking as it had been, and advised him to inform the French government fully of the temper of the Americans.¹⁷ When Monroe officially notified John Quincy Adams, then American Minister at St. Petersburg, of the declaration of war against Great Britain, he took occasion to speak also of the strained relations with France, and to remark significantly that even if a satisfactory settlement should be obtained, it was not likely to produce anything in the nature of an alliance. "It is not anticipated that any event whatever will have that effect." 18

At the popular demonstrations occurring in different parts of the country fiery resolutions breathing defiance to France were frequently adopted. At a meeting in Baltimore of democratic delegates representing the city and its surrounding precincts, the resolutions advocated the war with Great Britain, but went on to say that the conduct of France had been "scarcely less atrocious than that of England," and that if the present negotiations should fail to bring about an honorable adjustment "we have full confidence that our government will direct the most active hostilities to be

commenced against her.”¹⁹ A Fourth of July gathering in Pendleton District, South Carolina, applauded warmly the sentiment that “Viewing the conduct of France as scarcely less hostile than that of Great Britain, we are highly gratified by the government’s determined resolution of manifesting an equal resistance.”²⁰ The Cavalry Troop of Duplin, N. C., resolved “That the declaration of War against Great Britain and her dependencies meets with our decided approbation, and that unless France makes reparation for the depredations committed on our commerce, a similar measure ought to be adopted against her.”²¹ The people at the Fourth of July celebration in Carthage, Tenn., were “ready to shew the infamous Napoleon that notwithstanding his success with most of the powers and potentates of Europe and a few of the demagogues of faction here, yet the people of America, the great sovereigns of the nation, are firm and united, impatient under injuries, and jealous of their honor to the last punctilio, with whom there can be no shuffling prevarication. Seven millions of freemen will never yield a tame submission to the arbitrary, audacious alterations and modifications of the law of nations, at the mere will and caprice of a foreign despot.”²² And the editor of the *Carthage Gazette*, a few days later, reported that the Senate had declared in favor of the recall of Barlow from France if justice was not speedily done. The *Hornet* might be sent out to bring home the minister and consuls, “or a fair and honorable settlement.” If a breaking of diplomatic relations should come, “the government would be true to the feelings and spirit of the people. That spirit breathes war against France if France denies us justice.”²³

Governor Barbour of Virginia, in his address to the Legislature, expressed the same feeling, though in more moderate terms. Calling upon the people to be loyal in their prosecution of the war against Britain, he gave as a reason “the long catalogue of unredressed wrongs” on the part of France, “for which little hope is now entertained of an honorable reparation by pacific means, and which in due season should be avenged by the most energetic measures.”²⁴ The Ohio Legislature, in passing its resolutions in support of the war, did not fail to add:—“And be it further resolved, that we have seen with emotions of much concern, the protracted delay of the French government to render justice to this nation for its outrageous depredations upon us, and that we will afford to the constituted authorities in whose wisdom and firmness we place confident reliance, our utmost support in their efforts to sustain the honor of the nation, and to obtain suitable satisfaction for its injuries.”²⁵ Perhaps the most vigorous pronouncement of this sort came from Governor Hawkins of North Carolina, a faithful and most valuable adherent of the Administration, who spared no effort to create a strong support for the war measures.

"While we are vigorously pursuing the course which our government has been compelled to adopt against Great Britain, it may be essential to our safety to guard against the wiles and intrigues of a no less inveterate enemy to our rights and liberties—the emperor of the French. Our differences with him, as the President of the United States in his recent communication to Congress has informed the nation, are yet in an unsettled state. He has furnished incontrovertible evidence of his superior claims to a pre-eminent practical knowledge of all the vices and enormities which render a human being odious in the eyes of God and man. Crimes and intrigues the most wicked, the most shocking to humanity, he has resorted to, in order to accomplish his nefarious purposes, and gratify his boundless ambition and insatiable thirst for universal dominion. . . . From such a character, . . . have the United States reasonable grounds to expect restitution for the multiplied injuries and spoliations they have experienced at his hands? Knowing the governing principles of his actions, the United States would be lost to a sense of everything conducive to the preservation of their honor and best interests, were they to enter into an alliance with him on any conditions or in any manner whatsoever. . . . It is not to be doubted that an open and direct war with the French nation is an evil less to be dreaded than an entangling alliance which would not fail to produce the most humiliating effect upon our national character, and from which we should not be able to extricate ourselves but by an appeal to arms.

"Therefore, gentlemen, as Americans, let us unite in vigorously prosecuting the war against England, and as Americans, let us unite in demanding justice from, and guarding against the intrigues of France. Let us teach both these nations, that the condition of our friendship is the redress of our wrongs." ²⁶

Here, even from a friend of the Administration, we have an indication of the criticism which was to prevail until the end of the war. The charge of "French influence," of a "French alliance" was coupled with a hatred for Napoleon, and a prejudice against France and against everything French which amounted almost to hysteria sometimes. The shade of "French influence" dogged the footsteps of the government unfailingly. It had to be debated in every discussion of any importance that occurred in Congress. It embittered politics even in local elections. It was offered as the explanation of every unfortunate military or diplomatic occurrence. Most public addresses and many a sermon dealt with it. Madison had foreseen this to some degree, but he could not have dreamed how bitterly it was to annoy and embarrass him.

It will be noticed that the citations given above, to illustrate the war spirit, which show such strong anti-French feeling, come from the West and South, the districts which most strongly supported the war with Great Britain. From these states came most of the young Republican leaders who had forced the war decision: Henry Clay, the brilliant young Speaker of the House, and William Johnson from Kentucky, Felix Grundy from Tennessee, Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, and Lowndes, from South Carolina. And the Administration was still the "Virginia dynasty."

In the New England States, where large elements were strongly against the policy of the government, for party reasons and because its measures interfered with their industries, the Administration and the French government were linked together on all occasions and both were anathema. It was, the critics declared, an alliance with a nation "whose touch is pollution, whose embrace is death." The United States, it was urged, had but one plain path to pursue. The despotism of France must be recognized as an "implacable enemy," "essentially and passionately hostile" to American institutions and prosperity. No concessions should be made to propitiate this despotism, and no trust could be placed in professions of friendship emanating from it. "To be incessantly on the watch against the wiles and intrigues of France,—to contribute in no way to the augmentation of her strength or to the promotion of her schemes, to cultivate industriously in the minds of the whole American population" as a means of self-defence "the most lively feelings of hate and jealousy," "to seek the friendship of England, which is the only shield against French invasion,—this is wisdom and is a duty also to the cause of liberty and of civilization."²⁷

The Massachusetts and the Connecticut Legislatures both protested against the war. The Connecticut body said:—"That nation of the two is selected which is capable of inflicting the greatest injury. In this selection we view with the deepest solicitude a tendency to entangle us in an alliance with a nation which has subverted every republic in Europe, and whose connexions, wherever found, have been fatal to civil liberty."²⁸ The New Jersey Legislature disapproved the war, condemned the methods employed in conducting it, and declared that it viewed "with inexpressible concern, the course of that destructive policy which leads to a connection with the military despotism of France . . . And if it should so happen that a convention or confederacy with that power either exists or is intended we do not hesitate to declare that such an event will be considered by us more dangerous than the war itself, and as tending in its consequences to the dissolution of the United States."²⁹ The minority in the United States Congress issued a letter signed by thirty-four persons, and addressed to their constituents, in which they asked whether, with full knowledge of the wrongs inflicted by the French, the government of this country ought to aid the French cause by engaging in war against the enemy of France.³⁰

Amos Kendall, later well-known as a Jacksonian Democrat, wrote at this time,—“Had it been consistent with our honor and the preservation of our rights to have sided with Great Britain, it would have been more consonant to the feelings of every friend of liberty.”³¹ The New Eng-

land leaders went much farther, and echoed Rufus King, New York's Revolutionary leader and politician,—“How absurd that we should talk of the Repeal of the French Decrees! Congress should declare immediate war against France and make peace with England.”³² Or, as he expressed it on another occasion: “Mr. Madison may make a French alliance. If he dare, I fear he would: The country will not bear it, . . . But come the worst, let the French alliance be made, and French troops introduced; the certain, and I think the immediate consequence will be a civil war and the introduction of English troops. No event would be more calamitous.”³³

Pulpit and platform speakers found the topic a fruitful one. Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts perhaps pointed the way when in his message enjoining the day of fasting and prayer called for by the President soon after the opening of the war, he spoke of England as the “bulwark of our religion.” The Rev. S. J. Gardiner, Rector of Trinity Church, Boston, is said to have taken for a text, in allusion to Madison, a portion of Mark 10: 41,—“They began to be much displeased with James.”³⁴ In a powerful sermon preached on the day of the “Publick Fast” he said,—“The war is ruinous because it involves a French alliance, an alliance with the enemy of the human species, a monster redeemed by no virtue.”³⁵ Timothy Dwight, the honored President of Yale College, preached a series of very scholarly discourses, in which, buttressed by many an erudite quotation and developed with profound care, he demonstrated thoroughly the arguments against France. She is atheistic, or, where she admits the claims of religion, Romish, which is almost worse. Her government is a military despotism of the most abominable type. Her people are sunk in immoralities of all sorts. For her sins, the wrath of God will fall upon her, and all nations joined with her partake of her sins and will share in her punishment. “Come ye out from among them; and be ye separate; touch not the unclean thing!”³⁶ In a discourse at Byfield, Elijah Parish said: “Have you concluded, for yourselves, your children and children's children, to subject to greater commercial restrictions, voluntarily to submit to the miseries now endured by a hundred million slaves in Europe? Then, it is suitable and fit that you should be slaves. You are strong, and are able to hew wood and draw water for French Tyrants.”³⁷ And Peter Whitney of Quincy urged that in forming an alliance with that wicked nation the country was digging with its own hands the grave in which its liberties would shortly be laid.³⁸ Examples of such utterances are available in large quantities. Here it will suffice to add one more, a portion of a sermon delivered by William Ellery Channing, the “father of Unitarianism,” at Boston.

"I am not prepared to deny that the orders of England are infractions of our rights, but when I consider the atrocious and unprovoked decrees of France, on which these orders were designed to retaliate; the unprecedented kind of war, which these orders were designed to repel,—when I consider the situation of England, that she is contending for existence, while her enemy is avowedly contending for conquest,—and when I consider the conduct of our own government in relation to the two belligerents—the partiality and timid submission they have expressed toward the one, the cause of suspicion they have given the other . . . I am unable to justify the war in which we are engaged.

"We are linking ourselves with the acknowledged enemy of mankind, with a government which can be bound by no promise—no oath—no pledged faith—which prepares the way for its armies by perfidy, bribery, corruption—which pillages with equal rapacity its enemies and its allies—which has left not a vestige of liberty where it has extended its blasting sway. . . . Into contact and communion with this bloody nation, we are brought by this war—and what shall we gain by building up its power? What, but chains which we shall deserve to wear?

"On this subject too much plainness cannot be used. Let our government know, we deem alliance with France the worst of evils, threatening at once our morals, our liberty and our religion. The character of that nation authorizes us to demand that we be kept from the pollution of her embrace—her proffered friendship we should spurn—from her arms, stained, drenched with the blood of the injured and betrayed, we should scorn to receive aid or protection." ³⁹

The Rev. John Giles of Newburyport endeavored to refute the arguments of the Federalists, these "deluded citizens," as he called them, who "twist and turn all the patriotic measures of our Executive, as being under the controul of French influence! Which their own conscience cannot subscribe to, neither do they themselves believe so. But . . . this outcry against French influence is raised as a mist to blind the eyes of the public, and to subserve the design of pulling down our present rulers, and to raise themselves on their ruin." (Sermon, August 12, 1812). The opposition party took the trouble to print this speech in pamphlet form, with an appendix full of invective, for distribution.

If it was thus difficult for the government to defend its choice at the moment of declaring war, it was natural that its position should become more difficult as the struggle progressed. The inglorious campaigns of the American armies, relieved only by an occasional naval success, the evident incapacity of some officials, the inevitable results of the conditions of unpreparedness under which the war had been initiated, but for which the Administration could not reasonably be held wholly to blame, all offered opportunity for sharp criticism. Moreover, the French government did not show a disposition to grant the reparations so clearly demanded by public sentiment. Napoleon continued to evade, to provoke, and to procrastinate. Our Minister to France died suddenly, and negotiations came to a standstill till his successor could be accredited. President Madison

found himself totally unable to carry out his undertaking to secure a speedy and satisfactory agreement. His reports on the French situation had to be confined to brief statements that there was no change in the relations as previously announced, although he continued to hope for favorable results. The facts therefore lent themselves easily to the charge of French influence, which continued to be reiterated on all occasions. To read the proceedings of Congress is to read a succession of debates over resolutions involving requests for information from the President as to when and how he received the information of the Napoleonic decrees, on what ground he believed his information genuine, how he explains the disappearance from the archives of the State Department of a certain letter of unpleasant tenor, written by the French Minister Turreau, a letter written some years ago and now published in the newspapers; why the letter was withheld from publication when it was received; why secrecy in regard to various other matters involved in the French situation was observed; and what his latest information on the subject comprised. The Administration had to defend its relations with France whenever it wished to pass a measure for raising a larger army, for building more ships, for getting money to pay its bills. The charge became also steadily more concrete. It ceased to be merely a recognition of the obvious, and for party purposes, useful, fact that whatever embarrassed an enemy of Napoleon benefited him. It took on a specific character, and included direct aspersions against the honesty and the character of the government.

Governor Gilman, taking office in New Hampshire, in his first address to the legislature, asked sarcastically,—“And may we not, without being liable to the charge of justifying the conduct of Great Britain, enquire . . . whether our professions of strict and impartial neutrality in the important contest between Great Britain and France had been constantly maintained, and whether there had not been a manifest difference in our resentment, and in the language and manner of our seeking redress for wrongs, exhibiting an unwarrantable partiality for France?”⁴⁰ Said Elijah Parish, in one of his public addresses, which was quite widely quoted,—

“The President wages war from humane motives, to protect our seamen. . . . If he be so humane, why does his house ring with joy at the success of the Corsican Moloch? . . . Let him, in some tender moment, when the ice is melting round his heart, express one sentiment of horror, or utter one word of emotion, at the rivers of blood shed by his friend Napoleon . . . French influence rests on the firmest possible basis, on congeniality of character, on unity of opinion, on mutual contempt of Christianity. Here is a bond of union infinitely stronger than sameness of origin or sameness of language. Time will not weaken it; injuries will not dissolve it; nothing but a radical change in the character of our government can dissolve the fatal charm. . . .

Which sooty slave in all the ancient dominions, has more obsequiously watched the eye of his master; or flew to the indulgence of his desires, more servilely, than they [at Washington] have waited and watched and obeyed the orders of the great Napoleon?" ⁴¹

Part of a poem read before the Washington Benevolent Societies of Brookfield, Mass., and adjacent towns on July 5, 1813, runs as follows:—

“When Washington, our staff of strength and good,
 The nation’s fearless firm supporter stood,
 We were, what we professed ourselves to be,
 One people, independent, sovereign, free.
 Dependent then we were not upon France
 For skill to lead a maddened country’s dance;
 We all preferred, all foreign bias far,
 Old Yankee Doodle to their Ça Ira:
 Nor did our tickled rulers then aspire
 To be the string-led babes of any Gallic Sire.

.
 If England look askance, we boil with rage;
 And blood, blood only, can the wound assuage;
 Yet, whipt, robbed, kicked, and spit upon, by France,
 We treat her with the greater complaisance.” ⁴²

Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts was one of the most unfailing critics of the government policies. In 1812 he wrote a series of letters which were published in the *Boston Repository*, letters full of invective and of charges of French influence. *Niles’ Register* reprinted them, with the editorial comment that there were three reasons for doing so: “first, because one political section of the people of the United States look up to him as an oracle, esteeming him one of the most honest and intelligent of men; second, because another and greater portion of the citizens regard him as a prejudiced, superannuated and babbling old gentleman, whose absurdities amuse them; and thirdly and chiefly, because both parties for a time read his productions.” ⁴³ Some interest therefore attaches also to a second series of his letters, which appeared in the *Salem Gazette*, beginning in March, 1813. These outlined the position which he expected to maintain as a member of the next Congress. Said Mr. Pickering:—

“I have long entertained the opinion that the few men who, for the last twelve years, have moved all the springs of public action, . . . intended to involve us in a war with Great Britain, to indulge their inveterate hatred of that country, to subserve the views of France, and to secure themselves in the possession of power. For to the passions and prejudices of the people in favor of the French and against the English, which these men have zealously and perseveringly excited and cherished, they are deeply indebted for the power now in their hands. This is so true that for many years

past, their partisans have deemed it sufficient to ruin any man in the eyes of the people to pronounce him a friend of Great Britain. . . . And this is the lot of any independent citizen who expresses his abhorrence of the abominable acts of the French, and condemns the mischievous and unwarrantable measures of his own government." 44

In the *Salem Gazette* at about this time also, there appeared an attack on Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, who had been mentioned as one of the commissioners to represent the United States, if the Russian offer of mediation between America and England should be accepted.

"Signior Abramo Alberto Gallatini, it is now ascertained, is appointed an Ambassador to negotiate a Peace. This gentleman is of foreign extraction—came to our shores about 30 years ago—taught our citizens the French tongue, and the French doctrines of the 'holy right of insurrection'—was pardoned by General Washington—has had the care of the surpluses of the Revenue . . . and has accumulated a princely fortune from his liberal salary and by other thrifty means in which foreigners generally excel. . . . Since it is a fact, that native-born citizens are excluded from office and honor, and this War is a Foreign War on account of Foreigners only, no man can certainly be so well qualified to treat about these foreign affairs as Mons. Gallatini." 45

The indignation of the victims of these attacks was extreme. Had they really been partisans of Napoleon in spirit, their position would not have been so galling. But they were not. The Administration leaders disliked and distrusted the French government even more cordially, if that were possible, than did their opponents, for they knew intimately, and without question or surmise, the difficulties and disasters it had caused them. They were being accused of crimes they had not even wished to commit, and they had no adequate proof of their innocence. They could not, even for purposes of argument, accept the challenge and defend Napoleon, for his crimes and those of Great Britain resembled one another too closely, and the sentiment of the country would in no degree have supported them. They had gone as far in this direction as was possible in fixing the quarrel upon Great Britain in the first place. The means of defense was limited. They might, if they had sufficient self-control, maintain a dignified silence, but this would not be effective in maintaining the public morale. They might, and frequently did, try to out-do their rivals in hurling invective at the French,—a somewhat difficult matter in view of the rich and varied vocabulary at the disposal of the New England orators or of such a veteran debater as John Randolph of Roanoke, who was numbered with the opposition. This proved most effective, perhaps, when coupled, as the *Raleigh Register* advised, "with the lie direct." "No republican print" says

this editor, "has ever dared defend the conduct of the French government toward this country. Has it ever been defended? Not to our knowledge. On the contrary, that government has received on all hands the tribute of execration it so justly merits for its unprincipled and rapacious conduct toward us." ⁴⁶

In the same paper a little later is this vigorous discussion of the question,—

"Because while the French People were struggling for a free government like our own, and all the powers of Europe were united in their exertions to perpetuate the tyranny of the Bourbons,—because at that time the friends of liberty in this country wished success to the Republicans of France and defeat to the Royalists of Europe, they have been accused even down to the present day of partiality for France. This accusation is unjust and untrue. When the flame of liberty was suffered to be extinguished in France and a military despotism erected in its place, we no longer felt that sympathy for the French that one free people will and ought to feel for another, and that we once felt for them. . . ." ⁴⁷

The Secretary of State, Monroe, thought it advisable that the Administration should issue a categorical denial of the charges.

"It was anticipated by some, that a declaration of war against Great Britain would force the United States into a close connection with her adversary, much to their disadvantage. The Secretary of State thinks it proper to remark that nothing is more remote from the fact. The discrimination in favor of France, according to law, in consequence of her acceptance of a proposition made equally to both powers, produced a difference between them in that special case, and in that only. The war with England was declared, without any concert or communication with the French government; it has produced no connection between the United States and France, or any understanding as to its prosecution, continuance, or termination. The ostensible relation between the two countries is the true and only one. The United States have just claims on France for spoliations on their commerce on the high seas and in the ports of France, and their late minister was, and their present minister is instructed to demand reparation for these injuries, and to press it with all the energy due to the justice of the claims and the character of the United States." ⁴⁸

The debate in the House of Representatives on the bill for increasing the size of the army and improving its equipment, the "New Army Bill," lasted from December 29, 1812, to January 14, 1813. Both the opposition party and the friends of the Administration included in their speeches evidence of marked anti-French prejudice. Gold (N. Y., Fed.) said that in uniting forces with France against England the United States had "joined in a baleful conspiracy." Sheffey (Va., Fed.) spoke of uniting our efforts with those of "the great destroyer of mankind." Kent (Md., Fed.) said that men on both sides had admitted that the provocation from France had been "ample," and asked how with such an "overflowing cup" of injuries anyone could "justify our relation to that destroyer who, devising death

to all that live, sits like a cormorant on the tree of life, who cannot be glutted, nor tired, with human carnage; the impersonation of death, himself an incarnate death." Archer (Dem.) replied that he beheld with as much "detestation and abhorrence the conduct of the French Emperor as anyone could possibly do . . . trusted that the vengeance of heaven would arrest his career," and was certain that the Administration would never "so engulf us" as to become entangled in a French alliance.⁴⁹ Macon (Dem.) characterized the charge as "degrading to the House and disgraceful to the nation." "What," he continued, "in the name of God, is there in the administration of our government, or in the known principles and character of the men who administer it, like the administration of the French government or the principles and character of the men who administer that? The principles of their abominable government are not more unlike ours than the men who administer it are unlike the men who administer ours. . . ." He followed this by a detailed comparison of French and English influence in the country, showing the English as the more dangerous and the more powerful.⁵⁰

One of the most influential of the young leaders of the war party was Langdon Cheves, who became Speaker of the House when Clay was sent abroad as a member of the Peace Commission. Speaking on the New Army Bill, Cheves said dramatically,—“But gentlemen say that their great aversion to this war comes from the danger of French alliance. . . . Do we want the armies of France, or if we did, could they reach our shores? Do we want her navy? Has she any that dare venture out to sea? Where can she aid us? Where can we unite? . . . Gentlemen would resist France, would declare war against France, merely to show their indignation at her perfidy and injustice, and here I confess my feelings go with the gentlemen—I would do so too had we no other enemy to contend with.”⁵¹ Calhoun’s contribution to this discussion ran,—

“An attempt has been made to shake our fortitude with a cry of French alliance. It has been boldly said that we are already united with that country. We united with France? We have the same cause? No; her object is dominion, and her impulse ambition. Ours is the protection of the liberty of our sailors. But, say our opponents, we are contending against the same country. What, then? Must we submit to be outlawed by England, in order that she may not be by France? Is the independence of England dearer to us than our own? Must we enter the European struggle not as an equal, consulting our peculiar interest, but be dragged into it as a low dependent, the slave of England? The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Randolph] has told us that we are contending against religion in the person of England—that she is, in a word, the patroness of Christianity. Unhappy country! Doomed to submission to preserve the purity of religion! Doomed to slavery that England may be independent! Because Bonaparte is not a Protestant, you must surrender your rights! Because he is a despot, you dare not resist!”⁵²

From Henry Clay we have frequent phrases like this,—“I will concede to gentlemen everything they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God that our ability was equal to our disposition to make her feel the sense we entertain of that injustice.” And the following rather full expression of his position may serve as well to illustrate that of the government adherents in general.

“During all this time, the parasites of the opposition do not fail, by cunning sarcasm, or sly innuendo, to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to be false, which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is by the lie direct. The administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The administration of this country subservient to France! Great God! What a charge! How is it so influenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation does it rest? Is it similarity of language? No! We speak different tongues, we speak the English language. On the resemblances of our laws? No! The sources of our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! We have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments? No! Here alone is the liberty of man secure from the despotism which everywhere else tramples it under foot. . . . Preposterous and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it incredible (but I have nevertheless been told it as a fact) that an honorable member of this house, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a silly story in his district that he was the first cousin of the Emperor Napoleon. The proof of the charge rested upon the statement of facts which were undoubtedly true. The gentleman in question, it was alleged, had married a connection of the lady of the President of the United States, who was an intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States; who, some years ago, was in the habit of wearing red French breeches.

“ . . . The opposition has been distinguished, amid all its veerings and changes, by another inflexible feature, the application to Bonaparte of every vile and opprobrious epithet our language, copious as it is in terms of vituperation, affords. He has been compared to every hideous monster and beast, from that mentioned in the Revelations, down to the most insignificant quadruped. . . . If gentlemen ask me if I do not view with regret and horror the concentration of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply, that I do. I regret to see the Emperor of China holding such immense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain possessing such uncontrolled command over all the waters of the globe. . . . I have no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united we are too powerful for the mightiest nation in Europe or all Europe combined. If we are separated and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey for the weakest of them.”⁵³

Another important debate was that running from June 10 to June 21, 1813, upon a resolution offered by Daniel Webster, asking the President when and how he received information in regard to the lifting of the Milan and Berlin Decrees. The object was to show that if all the informa-

tion in the hands of the Administration had been published, England would not have been fixed upon as the enemy. Hanson (Fed.) said:—

“We, the minority, contended that there had been a positive violation of a plain law to favor France and embroil us with England,—that a palpable juggle had been practiced to induce a state of insurmountable repulsion in our relations with one belligerent, as a manifestation of our partiality to the other, and finally with a view to connect our destinies with France.”

Grosvenor (Fed.) thought that the honor of the country could not long survive “the dark and pestilential vapors” which hung around it. Shipard (Fed.) said he had no confidence in the promises of “our loving friend, this cut-throat Emperor.” Gaston (Fed.) thought the wrongs of both England and France should be resented, or the wrongs of neither. Pearson (Fed.) said that though reams of remonstrances had been directed to England, the insults of France had not even been protested against properly. McKee (Dem.) who had in 1812 actually introduced a motion to declare war against France, defended the Administration, but declared that France was “insincere, base, and abominable.” Felix Grundy (Dem.) said, “Great, indeed, are the injuries and insults which we have received from the French government.” Montgomery (Dem.) said that both France and England had “violated our perfect rights, and we had a right to select our enemy.” Telfair (Dem.) would despise more than he could express an administration allied with France. Such a charge “is the bitterest insult that could be offered.” And Calhoun, steadily defending the government’s course, said that he should “ever deem the conduct of France to have been improper.”

The debate on the extension of enlistments, Jan. 14–18, 1814, brought out similar remarks; that on the accrediting of an American Minister to France did the same; and the Loan Bill, February 9 to March 3, furnished the opposition with an especially good opportunity to challenge the Administration’s relations with France. Said Bigelow (Fed.), “Until, sir, my mind is better satisfied upon this subject, I will vote for no loans, I will vote for no men or money to prosecute this war.” In the debate on the report of the Ways and Means Committee, Oct. 22–25, Daniel Webster sums up these charges:—

“Whether the measures of this government grew out of a previous stipulation, signed, sealed, and interchanged with that of France, or whether in these matters it had acted gratuitously and only followed the bent of its own inclination . . . these measures were brought into play precisely at the moment when they were most likely to aid in the overthrow of Governments and the subjugation of the nations of Europe.”⁵⁴

Discounting, therefore, the utterances of members of both parties to allow for political animosities, it is clear that the mass of the American people, both those who favored the war with England, and those who opposed it, were unanimous in their distrust and dislike of France, and whether they were or were not pro-British, were definitely anti-French.

Meanwhile the situation on the continent had been undergoing a change. News still travelled very slowly, and it was not until long after the retreat from Moscow had occurred that the United States understood the magnitude of the disaster. As the power of Napoleon gradually gave way, after this, under the pressure of the coalition, the Americans, first incredulous, since the idea of Napoleonic domination had become fixed, received with rejoicing the news of his downfall. As Gouverneur Morris, New York's famous orator and politician, wrote to Harrison Grey Otis, "Everything which contributes to depress and much more to destroy the power of Bonaparte, is in my opinion a benefit, and therefore a proper subject of rejoicing to mankind."⁵⁵ In Boston, April 10, 1813, there was a dinner, with Harrison Grey Otis as the speaker, and the Russian consul as the guest of honor. Otis, an active Federalist and a bitter opponent of the government, said that the United States had for several years exhibited a "coincidence in the measures and a conformity to the plans of Napoleon too plain to be mistaken," and that in the fall of Napoleon the basis of this disastrous policy was undermined and the country rescued from its greatest danger.⁵⁶ At a similar dinner at Georgetown, in June, Robert Goodloe Harper, then prominent in Virginia and Maryland politics, is said to have coined the phrase "Alexander the Deliverer," which became a great favorite with all those who saw in the Russian Emperor the prime cause of the overflow of the French.⁵⁷ Timothy Pickering recorded in his diary that he went from Washington to Annapolis with several other congressmen to attend a celebration of the victory of the allies.⁵⁸

An oration by Thomas Snell illustrates the way in which these new developments affected the criticism of the government policy.

"What evidence stands upon record in the secrets of our cabinet, that our servile aid has been pledged, and our independence bound to the altar of Napoleon's ambition to be sacrificed, I will not presume to conjecture. But the friends of peace, for the purpose of undeceiving the public and saving our beloved country from impending ruin, would contribute millions, for a fair exhibition of the diplomatic correspondence between France and America for the last twelve years. Nothing of this correspondence but garbled extracts have we ever been permitted to see: while every syllable of that between Great Britain and ourselves has been permitted to the public. Why this difference in the cases? . . . Why? if there be not hidden iniquity, that would alarm the public mind and consign its authors to merited infamy? Such continued secrecy excites just suspicion. And in the present case, this suspicion is strengthened

in the public mind by the consideration that Mr. Madison, as well as his predecessor in office, is understood to be a citizen of France. . . .

"I cannot refrain from congratulating my fellow-citizens, that the bonds of enslaved Europe are bursting asunder: that the natives are asserting their independence and casting off the yoke of oppression; that by the singular interposition of Heaven the arms of Russia have completely triumphed over the boasted strength of the despot. . . . What influence this singular change in Europe will have upon the policy of our rulers and the state of our country is still uncertain. While it may raise the demands of England in settling a peace, and animate her to a more vigorous prosecution of the war, must it not destroy the confidence of our administration in the French Emperor as invincible, and induce them to abandon his commercial system as a desperate cause?"

The newspapers had much to say of the relation of the new situation abroad to American affairs. "Nothing decisive will be done," said the *Georgetown Federal Republican*, "by our government towards an accommodation with Great Britain, until Mr. Madison is satisfied that the war power of France is at an end. Whenever he is so satisfied, we have not a doubt a treaty of amity and commerce will be negotiated. . . . France forced us into this war, and while she is able to supply the force to keep us in it, there is no hope of getting out of it." ⁵⁹ From the *Newburyport Herald* came the following effusion,—

"That baleful meteor which has for years carried in its train pestilence and war, blighting the hopes and confusing the prospects of the whole Christian world, is now extinguished, leaving nought but the effects of its noisome exhalations and odious deformity for (it is hoped) the benefit of all mankind, and a salutary lesson to posterity. . . . Well may it be for our rulers if they should escape the just and merited fate of their beloved master." ⁶⁰

The *Boston Centinel*, one of the most bitter critics of the Administration's policy, said,—

"From 1800 to a late day, France (i. e. Napoleon) has in fact ruled this country. . . . For her we checked our trade with Britain; for her we . . . laid a perpetual embargo and kept it as long as we could bear it. For her we declared war. For her we adopted the colonial system and interdicted British goods. . . . For her we have robbed our own citizens. For her, we have incurred immense debts. For her we have destroyed, or attempted to do so, the liberty of the press. For her we have adopted the most odious taxes, ten times as grievous as those to avoid which the revolutionary war was undertaken. . . . Such are the privations and evils, which France has either required or brought upon us. She did not do it by coaxing, or flattering us. She did it by the lash of a scorpion. . . . She plundered, and whipped, and insulted us, and we were submissive in proportion to her insolence, injustice, and cruelty." ⁶¹

Said the *Providence American*,—

"The recent intelligence from France . . . justifies the opinion that the throne of

the Bourbons will no longer be profaned by a plebeian exotick usurper. . . . The calamities she [Paris] must now experience may chasten the corrupt morals, reform the lax principles and discipline the sanguine temper of her inhabitants. They may teach her that the career of vice is seldom successful, and that the sturdy unostentatious virtues deserve and command more genuine regard than all the delirious splendors of embroidered vice." ⁶²

Charles Carroll of Carrollton, the famous signer of the Declaration of Independence, who had manifested throughout the period a strong antipathy to France, and a belief that the policy of the American government was bound up with that of Napoleon, declared,—“Till Bonaparte is defeated so as to be forced to relinquish all his conquests and to make peace,—or, what would be more desirable, till death rids the world of the tyrant, I am persuaded no peace will take place between this country and England.” ⁶³ Rufus King “cared nothing about the Bourbons” but thought that their reëstablishment might and probably would bring about a general peace, and therefore hoped earnestly that the Allies would persevere until Bonaparte was expelled from France. ⁶⁴

The sermon of Samuel Cary, to the “Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company” at their anniversary celebration in Boston, on June 6, created a sensation and was quoted far and wide, receiving liberal quotas of both praise and blame. It was a scathing indictment of the Napoleonic system, coupled with a vigorous application of the old charges of “base servility” and of “French influence.” The Fourth of July address of Rev. Daniel Dana at Newburyport was also considered an important effort. “Do any object,” he said, “that to rejoice in the recent triumphs of the allied powers is to rejoice at the success of our enemies? . . .” But nothing but good, he thought, could come to the country from the defeat of Napoleon. At the opening of the Massachusetts Legislature in June of this year Governor Strong spoke of the dissatisfaction that the war had caused in that state, but added that the changes in the European situation would soon bring it to a close. The two houses of the legislature responded in a similar strain. The Senate reply said:—“The arm of the mighty oppressor, in whose cause our government seemed disposed to engage, is broken. Europe is delivered from thralldom, and our liberties ransomed from his grasp. The . . . despotism which had nearly exterminated freedom from the earth . . . is at length overturned.” ⁶⁵ The lower house congratulated his Excellency upon “the entire prostration of that monstrous military despotism.” “Upon this subject we can scarcely command language to express our feelings.” ⁶⁶

Perhaps it will not be amiss to include here a somewhat full description of the most notable celebrations which expressed the popular enthusiasm.

The *Boston Centinel* of June 4 had carried what were huge black headlines for a newspaper of that day.

“GLORIOUS NEWS FOR EUROPE! Bonaparte Banished to Elba— The Ancient Family and Ancient Boundaries of France Restored— A General Peace in Europe made!”

On the following days it summoned the citizens of Boston to a “Splendid and Solemn Religious Festival” to be held in the Stone Chapel, on June 15. On the appointed day the chapel was filled to the doors. Among the guests were the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor, the City Council, and a number of members of the legislature. The elaborate program included “A full organ Voluntary,” “A Solemn Invocation,” “Music from Handel, with the chorus, ‘The Lord shall reign forever and ever’ sung by a choir of more than a hundred voices and accompanied by the organ and various instruments,” “Very appropriate and sublime Lessons from the Holy Scriptures,” “Music from Handel, with the ‘Hallelujah Chorus’ sung and accompanied as before,” a Prayer, and “An Ode, written by request of the Committee of Arrangements” sung as a solo, “the repeats accompanied by the whole choir” :—

“France! at the throne eternal
 Of Great Jehovah bow!
 For Heav’n’s avenging thunderbolt
 Has laid thy tyrant low!
 The bloody, baleful star shall guide
 The monster’s way no more,
 Where the slain, o’er the plain,
 Lie weltering in their gore,
 And through a thousand thousand streams,
 Life’s ebbing torrents pour;

 The hand of Heav’n whose vengeance
 Is ’gainst the despot hurled,
 To France her rightful king restores,
 And Freedom to the world.
 Hosannas to the King of Kings
 Let Freedom’s voice bestow;
 Again raise the strain,
 Till the patriot’s heart shall glow,
 And Heaven on high approve the song
 Of grateful man below.”

A sermon by Rev. William Ellery Channing followed, then a Psalm, sung by the whole congregation, with the organ and choir. After the conclud-

ing prayer and benediction, the following resolutions, introduced by Senator Gore, in an "impressive speech," were adopted with much enthusiasm.

"Resolved, that the citizens of Massachusetts here assembled, contemplate with unfeigned joy the emancipation of the French people from the usurped power of a ferocious military adventurer, and they rejoice in the prospect that thirty-five millions of their fellowmen have a reasonable expectation of being blest with temperate liberty, adapted to their state of society and habits, and a constitution and administration of government, apparently conformed to their wishes. They congratulate the venerable head of the house of Bourbon on his restoration to the throne of his ancestors, to which he is called by the entreaties of his people, and from which he has been excluded by a series of crimes at which humanity shudders. They remember the language of their own revolutionary sages and patriots, glowing with affection and respect towards the late unhappy and injured possessor of the throne of the Bourbons; nor can they forget that the good understanding between this country and France was never interrupted so long as that family were in power, but that injuries and insults, such as no nation ever before submitted to, have been heaped upon it by all their successors, from the transient despot of a day, to the more permanent tyrant clothed with imperial authority. . . ."

The resolutions further congratulated Holland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Prussia, Spain and Portugal on their liberation, and highly complimented the "Great Head of the Confederacy" "Alexander the Deliverer." In the evening the State-House was "most brilliantly illuminated" "by about 2000 lamps," and a band played national tunes in the "Colonnade." Several hundred rockets, and other fire-works, were set off on the Common. From the Neck "heated shot and 40 or 50 carbonic comets" were set off. The mansions of the late Governors Hancock and Bowdoin on each side of the State-House, bore in the attic windows, the one a *fleur de lis*, the other a transparency with the words "In honor of the Allies."⁶⁷ The *Boston Patriot* disapproved of this demonstration, and remarked scornfully that several attempts were made to raise a general huzza, but they were unsuccessful, as the people did not know what it was all about.⁶⁸ The *Essex Register*, too, thought that the great body of citizens, even including Federalists, were not in favor of the celebration, and did not care to share in it.⁶⁹ The *Philadelphia Aurora* approvingly quoted an editorial from the *Baltimore Patriot*,—"The Bostonians are about to have a festival,—and why? Because the British have, by a change abroad, been enabled to send twenty-five thousand troops (to begin with) to spread desolation, if practicable, over our land! . . . The whole history of the world never presented an instance of such absolute fatuity, out of the walls of a mad house." The *New York Columbian* took the same attitude.⁷⁰ At Hartford, Conn., the celebration took the form of a dinner, with the

usual addresses and toasts. Among the latter was:—"The people of the United States. As they have learned that the tyrant was not invincible, may they also learn that his adherents are not infallible!" ⁷¹ The *Essex Register*, again critical, remarked that the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, every member of Council except a certain Federal editor, and most of the House of Representatives, declined to attend this dinner.

The Federalists of New York were not to be outdone by Boston. Rufus King acted as chairman of the committee on arrangements, and it is somewhat significant to note that when he wrote to John Jay inviting him to be present, he said, "Mr. Morris is to deliver an oration. Notwithstanding our admiration of his rare talents and extensive information, I should, I confess, like that you and I should see the discourse before it is pronounced—cannot this be brought about?" ⁷² Mr. Jay was ill and unable to be present, but sent word that he sincerely rejoiced in the downfall of Napoleon, and regretted that he could not be with his friends on "so joyful an occasion." ⁷³

The ceremonies opened with a dinner, at which all the foreign consuls were present, except the British consul, who was not invited, and the French, who declined the invitation offering as excuse the statement that he "had not yet received instructions from his court to rejoice"! The hall was elaborately decorated with the arms and colors of the allied powers, except England. Austria, Prussia and other German States, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, the Papal States, Holland,—the flags of all these were entwined with that of the United States and with the white flag of the Bourbons. A Temple of Concord, its pillars wound with laurel; wreaths; festoons; flowers; allegorical representations of historical incidents; portraits of Washington and of other heroes of liberty,—everything that could be devised to increase the gala effect, had been included. Among the toasts at this dinner were:—"France, the first friend of America: may the recall of her king become the harbinger of concord at home, and the restoration of her antient rank among the nations of the world." "Louis 18, King of France and Navarre, heir-at-law to American gratitude." There were toasts, too, to the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and to all the European rulers except the English king. Unfortunately, in spite of this carefully correct attitude, the rumor got abroad that the British flag had been placed above the American in the decorations. A mob gathered, cries of "Tory" were heard, the guests were the recipients of insulting remarks, and some stones were thrown. Several arrests had to be made before peace was restored.

On this occasion Gouverneur Morris delivered one of his most important

addresses. The opening phrases were copied far and wide, and the whole speech created an unusual sensation. For years afterward it was quoted by both friends and enemies.

“’Tis done! The long agony is over. The Bourbons are restored. France reposes in the arms of her legitimate prince. We may now express our attachment to her consistently with the respect we owe to ourselves. . . . Thank God, we can, at length, avow the sentiments of gratitude to that august family, under whose sway the fleets and armies of France and Spain were arrayed in defence of American liberty. We then hailed Louis the Sixteenth Protector of the Rights of Mankind. We loved him. We deplored his fate. We are unsullied by the embrace of his assassins. . . . But where, my country! O where shall I hide the blush, that these monsters were taken to your bosom? I retract the charge—Nations of the earth! believe not the imputation. The virtuous sons of America were not guilty of ingratitude. . . . No! holy martyr! their grateful bosoms reëchoed thy dying groan. In humble submission they viewed events whose mystery they could not comprehend, and waited the development of eternal wisdom. . . . The Bourbons are restored. Rejoice, France! Spain! Portugal! You are governed by your legitimate kings. Europe! Rejoice. The Bourbons are restored. The family of nations is completed. Peace, the dove descending from Heaven, spreads over you her downy pinions. And thou, too, my much-wronged country, bleeding as thou art, rejoice. The Bourbons are restored. Thy friends now reign. The long agony is over. The Bourbons are restored.”⁷⁴

Typically American is the comment which the *New York Columbian* made on this address: “‘It is done—The agony is over—the Bourbons are restored.’ This is the bold onset of Gouverneur Morris’ oration. But he did not tell us how far the restitution to the Bourbons was to extend, and whether the Hon. Gov. Morris himself is to restore the furniture of the unfortunate Louis XVI he purchased for assignats. No doubt the patriotic orator will deliver up the gorgeous plate, the splendid tapestry, the noble clock etc., etc., formerly belonging to the royal household, and gotten from the regicides by him for a song! If ‘the king must have his own again’ surely the plunder of the Thuilleries must be embraced in the general restitution, and the royal orator find the agony not quite over yet!”⁷⁵

Evidently not all the people of the United States found themselves able, in spite of their strong prejudice against Napoleon, to rejoice wholeheartedly in the successes of the allies. Their satisfaction over the misfortunes of the Emperor were accompanied by serious misgivings as to the effect they might have on the war with Britain. They also showed an interest in the future fate of France herself. In February, 1814, William Wirt, the well-known Maryland lawyer, wrote to his friend Judge Carr,—

“What effect will Napoleon’s reverses have on us? Some think that Britain will take if not higher, at least more obstinate ground against us on account of her triumphs. Others, again, think that having gotten the

Emperor down, she will be anxious to devote all her powers to his annihilation, and therefore be the better inclined to have peace with us. My own notion is that she has no intention of giving up any point in the quarrel. . . . As for Napoleon, I care no more for him, in himself considered, than I do for any other tornado that is past. But will France, drained and exhausted, be able to make head against this northern hive, or will she share the fate of Poland? I am curious to see the character of France in this new situation in which she is placed.”⁷⁶ Calhoun thought that England might have lost by the changes which seemed to be so much in her favor. She could at least no longer claim to be fighting for her existence, and justify all her deeds by this excuse. Moreover, the charge of “French influence” must be decidedly weakened.⁷⁷ Most of the Republican editors agreed with him in this. The *Philadelphia Democratic Press* thanked God that the “extinguisher” had been finally put upon this “stale charge.” “It can no longer be made an excuse for holding back that we are at war to aid Napoleon; he is to all political purposes dead and buried. Whatever doubts may have existed as to the motives or objects of the war, there can no longer be any doubt as to the necessity for its being vigorously conducted. There can no longer be admitted to be any parties in the United States other than an American and a British party. ‘Those who are not for us are against us.’”⁷⁸ *Niles’ Register* “heartily desires that the fate of the invaders of Russia shall be the fate of the invaders of France.” The editor feels that British pressure has made the terms given to Napoleon unduly hard. He believes that the allies will yet experience the most signal disasters that have marked the pages of history, and will deserve them. They have abandoned all the great principles they affected to support, and calamity may teach them not to do to others what they would not should be done to themselves.⁷⁹

John Quincy Adams, writing from Reval to his mother, May 12, also fears “what use the Avengers will make of their Victory” and especially that the policy of crippling France will be carried too far.⁸⁰ The Americans who had been sent abroad as Peace Commissioners all felt that the disasters of France would have an unfavorable reaction upon their task. Gallatin wrote to Clay:—“You are sufficiently aware of the total change in our affairs produced by the late revolution, and by the restoration of universal peace in the European world, from which we alone are excluded. A well-organized and large army is at once liberated from any European employment, and ready, together with a superabundant naval force, to act immediately against us. How ill-prepared we are to meet it in a proper manner, no one knows better than yourself.”⁸¹ Bayard wrote to Clay in the same vein, and Crawford, the Minister at Paris, sent the

Commissioners a long, anxious letter. The instructions from home bore the same troubled note.

In the *Boston Patriot* of May 18 appeared this statement:—

“The federalists manifest the most extravagant joy at the idea of the restoration of the Bourbons in France; but if the allies should succeed in re-establishing the old dynasty what would be the effect upon the United States? If the Bourbons should be restored a general peace would probably take place throughout Europe, and England become the predominating power of the world. In truth, the restoration of the Bourbons might be considered the conquest of France by England; England being the soul of the coalition through which that event would be effected. Having no longer any object in Europe against which to direct her arms, she might send her fleets and armies to Canada, and from thence march them into the very heart of the United States. . . . We would therefore advise the federalists to moderate their joy, and weigh well the consequence before they so fully indulge in the wishes of the British cabinet for the total overthrow of Bonaparte. . . . We caution them not to be too outrageous in their prayers for the downfall of Napoleon and the restoration of the corrupt and immoral Bourbons.”

The *General Repository* struck a note which was to become frequent after the return from Elba: The allies, said this journal, had no right to dethrone the Emperor and reinstate the Bourbons. “After the defeats the armies of Bonaparte have met with, the French people can, if they please, get rid of their tyrant themselves. If they do not wish to do this, no foreign power has the right to interfere.”⁸² Other papers show the trend of conservative public opinion. The *Boston Patriot*,—

“Louis, bred up in England, amid all the prejudices of the Britons, and owing to that country his fortune, his prosperity, nay, his very throne, . . . cannot of course become ungrateful to her. England will sway every action of the court of France; she will rule her councils, govern her king, and steer the nation by her own chart and compass. Louis will be but the shadow of the French government, England the substance.”⁸³

The *Philadelphia Aurora*,—

“The late intelligence from Europe is of such a character as to awaken the patriotic feelings, and to fill with anxiety the breast of every American. A revolution which defied all human calculation to have foreseen, has been brought about through the corrupting agency of our enemy. . . . France, governed by a British pauper, must from necessity as well as policy, be for some time nothing more than a province of England.”⁸⁴

The *National Advocate*,—

“Hence we could not bring ourselves to rejoice at the victories of Russia, who was fighting the battles of our enemy. Whether the invader or the invaded, we could regard her in no other light than as shedding her blood in the cause of Britain.”⁸⁵

The *Albany Argus*,—

“French influence is producing astonishing changes in the opinions of federalists. But a short time since, Talleyrand was an archfiend second to none but Bonaparte; the French generals mere upstarts and the French nation a parcel of infidels, cut-throats, and frog-eaters! They have suddenly undergone a surprising transformation; and are now all considered good and loyal subjects of his most Christian majesty Louis XVIII. What has brought about this remarkable change in federal opinion? Frenchmen have ceased to make war against England!”⁸⁶

These are the main lines of argument in the newspapers. From the “elder statesmen” a few quotations must be included, for they had known the French alliance, had seen the Revolution in all its phases, and had watched the Napoleonic Empire rise and wane. It was against these men that the Federalist orators had been most bitter, and Jefferson especially received a constant flow of invective as a partisan of France. Yet in his correspondence we find frequently repeated the statement that Napoleon is an unprincipled tyrant, whose defeat must be a cause for rejoicing. But,—and he makes this point very clear,—the Emperor should not be so weakened as to keep him from chastising England. He did not wish to see Napoleon conquer Russia, but he did wish to see him close the Baltic to the British. And when the success of the allies was evident, and the sentence of banishment was issued, he wrote,—

“The Attila of the age dethroned! the ruthless destroyer of ten millions of the human race, whose thirst for blood appeared unquenchable, the great oppressor of the rights and liberties of the world, shut up within the circle of a little island in the Mediterranean, and dwindled to the condition of an humble and degraded pensioner on the bounty of those he has most injured. . . . How meanly he closes his inflated career! . . . I own that while I rejoice, for the good of mankind, in the deliverance of Europe from the havoc which would never have ceased while Bonaparte should have lived in power, I see with anxiety the tyrant of the ocean remaining in vigor, and even participating in the merit of crushing his brother tyrant.”⁸⁷

And John Adams said,—

“Napoleon is a military fanatic like Achilles, Alexander, Cæsar, Mahomet, etc. . . . But is it strict to call him an usurper? Was not his elevation to the empire of France as legitimate and authentic a national act as that of William the III or the House of Hanover . . . or as the election of Washington to the command of our army, or to the chair of the states? . . . I wish that France may not still regret him . . . but I agree with you that the milk of human kindness in the Bourbons is safer for mankind than the fierce ambition of Napoleon.”⁸⁸

The forebodings as to the effect of the French defeat were only partially fulfilled. The parleys indeed dragged on until the end of the year, but the huge British reinforcements which were feared did not reach America,

and the glorious victory at New Orleans filled the country with enthusiasm and hope. The genius of the Peace Commissioners proved equal to the occasion, and the peace which they signed was far better than anyone in the early days of the war could have hoped. And even though there was criticism, and plenty of it, and the fate of Moose Island and of the fisheries caused warm discussion, yet the war was over, somehow, and everyone was glad. The nation drew a long breath, and set itself to the rebuilding of its prosperity, and the payment of its debts. Even the party animosities slackened somewhat and the newspapers found it possible to include more news and less abuse. Napoleon, so far as anybody thought or seemed to care, was "Cæsar, dead and turned to clay" and rarely did anyone even recall the ghost of his troublesome "influence."

And then, without a hint of warning, there came, in the last days of April, the news of what had happened nearly two months before,—the return from Elba. At first, so great was the astonishment that no one thought of praise or blame, or of political results that should concern America. The magic of the Napoleonic name reasserted itself. This was news only, news of the greatest, demanding the biggest type and all the space the details could fill. These details were eagerly gathered, from masters of incoming ships, from returning travellers, from personal letters, and from rare copies of French newspapers, hastily translated in the office of the first paper that received them and shared with friendly editors all over the country.

The first clear reaction, which appeared in newspapers of all shades of political affiliation, was the recognition of the probability of a renewal of the continental war, and the strong feeling that the United States must maintain a strict neutrality. The fear, too, was expressed that a renewal of the continental war might mean a renewed series of provocations on the part of England which would make necessary the reopening of war with that country.⁸⁹ Next, the anti-British feeling showed itself in the recognition of the fact that a strong France would limit the power of England, and might for this reason be welcomed.⁹⁰ The Federalist papers at first showed a surprising moderation. They seemed to be dazed by the overwhelming success of the plot, and to feel a sort of hopeless resignation. Moreover there was an amazing lack of enthusiasm over the Bourbons. With the celebrations of the previous year in mind, one would scarcely expect to find this in the *New York Evening Post*,—

"We certainly feel and may be allowed to express our deep regret at what has happened to the throne of the Bourbons; we lament the reverse of fortune which has befallen this amiable, but we are compelled to say, weak prince. . . . The Bourbons have given, not only evidence of imbecility, but there is too much reason to fear

there was a subservience to England. Evidence of this appears in the decree they passed, preventing American vessels from entering the ports of France, which had captured any British vessel on the passage, although her prize might have been taken to a port in the United States.”⁹¹

This from the *Boston Centinel*, also, differed somewhat from previous utterances.

“The *Journal de Paris* gives many addresses to Napoleon, with his laconic answers. Though short, these answers show him to be a totally altered man. ‘Sweet are the uses of adversity!’ We see now no tirades against England; nothing about continental systems; not a lisp about conquering the freedom of the seas or other *ci-devant* nonsense, but everything (on paper at least) is as liberal as air and as correct as truth.”⁹²

A violent attack on this article from a correspondent brought out the further comment,—

“The ‘head and front of our offending,’ it seems, is that we have remarked that the answers of Napoleon to the addresses made to him on the last of March, shewed him to be a ‘totally altered man.’ . . . We have no evidence that these were not his sentiments at the time he uttered them, notwithstanding they are much at variance with his former language and conduct. Reformations as astounding as this would be have taken place. . . . He may yet repair some of the wrongs he has done to the world. . . . The French people have had a recent sample of the governing talents of a Bourbon and a Corsican and it certainly cannot be unworthy an American citizen to hope they may have a fair opportunity of choosing which of them to serve.”⁹³

Rufus King thought France could be ruled only with the sword, and “The poor Bourbons were without the means as they seem to have been without the talents to rule the country.”⁹⁴ And Gouverneur Morris, of all people, said,—“Louis deserved, in some measure, what happened. I anticipated trouble and turmoil, though not so great a catastrophe.”⁹⁵

Before very long, however, as it became evident that the allies were ready to unite in the strongest measures against Napoleon, the Federalist papers resumed their abuse of him, and continued this until after Waterloo. But it is to be observed that there were no elaborate festivities on this occasion. Throughout the country there was a strong feeling that the French people had a right to decide for themselves who should be their ruler, and that while the allies might be justified in defensive measures, they had no excuse for a second dethronement of Napoleon. He had returned; the people had received him willingly. If they preferred him the choice was theirs; and the cause of human liberty demanded that they should be undisturbed in their decision. Even the Federalist papers showed this feeling to a degree.⁹⁶ Jefferson illustrated it in his letter of June 14, 1815, to his friend Mr. Leiper. He had made comments not at all flattering to Napoleon, then added a postscript,—

"Before I had sent my letter to the post-office, I received the new treaty of the allied powers, declaring that the French nation shall not have Bonaparte, and shall have Louis 18 for their ruler. They are all then as great rascals as Bonaparte himself. While he was in the wrong, I wished him exactly as much success as would answer our purposes, and no more. Now that they are wrong and he in the right, he shall have all my prayers for success, and that he may dethrone every man of them." ⁹⁷

And to John Adams, a little later, he wrote,—

"At length Bonaparte has got on the right side of a question. From the time of his entering the legislative hall till his retreat to Elba, no man has execrated him more than myself. . . . But at length, and as far as we can judge, he seems to have become the choice of his nation. At least, he is defending the cause of his nation, and that of all mankind, the rights of every people to independence and self-government." ⁹⁸

The *National Intelligencer* said,— (May 6)

"The will of the French nation is to stand for nothing . . . and the first of the allies who chooses to let slip the dogs of war, is privileged to stain the fields of Europe in blood. . . . It is not simply a question between this or that man, between him who calls himself a legitimate sovereign and him who is stigmatized as an usurper, but between the French people and the kings of Europe, whether they shall choose a king for themselves, or have one forced upon them. . . . Bonaparte is to be the ruler not of the Russians or the English, but of the French only."

The *National Advocate* declared,—

"The principles upon which he regained his throne are the only ones on which any just or free government can exist. . . . Now that the object of the coalition must be to extinguish the last glimmering light of freedom in that quarter of the globe, and to degrade the whole human species to vassals of a few hundred bipeds, we will not hesitate to avow that we wish success to France. Her cause is no longer the personal cause of Napoleon, but the cause of national independence and freedom." ⁹⁹

Niles' Register was emphatically for Napoleon, for all the reasons which have been given; and also because the editor thought he had constructive qualities needed for the prosperity of France, and most especially because "If ever there was a 'legitimate king' (which I doubt) that king is Napoleon Bonaparte, for the people have willed freely and frankly that he should have the supreme authority." ¹⁰⁰ The *Lexington Reporter* thought the "league against the rights of man" very formidable, and was sorry that the United States "are not a hundred years older, that they might help to demonstrate that the rights of the people are not to be ignored." ¹⁰¹ The *Carthage (Tenn.) Gazette* said: "If the allies dare to strike against the rights of independent France we hope that they will, like the battle-

ments of the Bastille, be prostrated in the dust and ashes.”¹⁰² The *North Carolina American Recorder* declared that the “Proclamation of the allies against Napoleon is indeed the most wicked and diabolical state paper we have ever read.”¹⁰³ When the news of Waterloo came, these champions of liberty refused as long as they could to believe it. When they were at last convinced, little sympathy for Napoleon in person was shown, but for France the feeling was:—

“We cannot forbear the expression of our profound regrets, principally on account of the state of anarchy and confusion in which it involves the French Nation. If the report prove true, then has France begun a retrograde march of five and twenty years in the science of government. Her trials are beginning rather than ending; and she is menaced, we fear, with the extinction of her very name from the map of Europe.”¹⁰⁴

“The nation appeared to be for him, and the army adored him. . . . He nearly exterminated two armies by his masterly manœuvres and the fury of his troops; when treachery seemed to have effected an explosion, which was the signal for his retreat, and the prelude to his fall,—but firmness and magnanimity gave dignity to his descent. If his resignation preserves the independence and prevents the devastation of France, it is well! But of this we have feeble hopes. . . . France has not been faithful to the man who was fittest to protect her. . . . If any talent could uphold her, it was his. The money and the intrigues of the British government, more effective than the allied armies . . . have moved everything. . . . At any rate, the enemies of freedom have triumphed. . . . Bonaparte has lost all except honor—France seems likely to lose even that.”¹⁰⁵

Henry Clay was in London when the Battle of Waterloo was fought. It is said that he dined with Lord Castlereagh, and the question of Napoleon’s going to America was raised. “If he goes there,” said Lord Liverpool, “will he not give you much trouble?” “None whatever,” instantly replied Mr. Clay. “We shall be glad to receive such a distinguished though unfortunate exile, and we shall soon make a good democrat of him!”¹⁰⁶ So, for the United States, ended the glory of Napoleon.

Looking back over the varieties and changes of public sentiment during this period, we see that it has been largely influenced by American interests and by American party struggles, and that no firm foundation for a policy of friendliness with France has been laid. It is true that on a question of Liberty, that principle so dear to the hearts of Americans, and so near to their experience of the moment, sympathy for France was quick; but recent injuries lay unrepaired and unforgotten, and the temper of the day held for the ally of a few decades earlier both criticism and suspicion. Friendly relations were possible, but irritation and sharp difference of opinion were probable, and there was no background of mutual understanding and confidence to smooth the way for conciliation.

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- ³ *Raleigh Register and North Carolina State Gazette*, July 5, 1811.
- ⁴ Jefferson to Jas. Maury, Apr. 25, 1812. From *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, P. L. Ford, ed., IX: 349. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London.
- ⁵ Jefferson to Madison, June 6, 1812. *Ib.*, IX: 355.
- ⁶ Jefferson to Madison, May 30, 1812. *Ib.*, IX: 354.
- ⁷ Jefferson to Kosciusko, June 28, 1812. *Ib.*, IX: 361.
- ⁸ Madison to Jefferson, May 25, 1812. From *Writings of James Madison*, G. Hunt, ed., VIII: 191. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London.
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- ¹⁰ *Niles' Register*, II: 207.
- ¹¹ *Ib.*, 284.
- ¹² *Ib.*, III: 439-40.
- ¹³ S. Perkins, *History of the Late War* (New Haven, Conn., 1825), 51.
- ¹⁴ T. H. Benton, *Abridgment of Debates in Congress, 1789-1856*, IV: 544-550; *Niles' Register*, II: 259-266; *Benton*, IV: 586; *American Review*, IV: 79-80. (Appendix).
- ¹⁵ *American Review*, IV: 71. (Appendix).
- ¹⁶ Jas. Monroe, *Writings*. S. M. Hamilton, ed., V: 199; *American State Papers*, III: 517.
- ¹⁷ Madison to Barlow, Aug. 11, 1812. Madison, *Writings*, Hunt, ed., VIII: 209-10.
- ¹⁸ *Niles' Register*, V: 348-9. Monroe to J. Q. Adams, July 1, 1812.
- ¹⁹ *Niles'*, II: 202. May 21, 1812.
- ²⁰ *Niles'*, II: 412. July 4, 1812.
- ²¹ *Raleigh Register*, July 7, 1812.
- ²² *Carthage* (Tenn.) *Gazette*, July 18, 1812.
- ²³ *Ib.*, July 11, 1812. Daniel Webster, in a Fourth of July Address before the Washington Benevolent Society of Portsmouth, spoke in similar tenor. Geo T. Curtis, *Life of D. Webster*, I: 105.
- ²⁴ *Niles'*, III: 246-8. Nov. 30, 1812.
- ²⁵ *Niles'*, III: 855. Jan. 4, 1813. Similar pronouncement from the Pennsylvania legislature, Dec., 1812, *Niles'*, III: 343.
- ²⁶ *Niles'*, III: 214.
- ²⁷ Timothy Dwight, July 23, 1812, *Fast Day Sermon at Yale College* (Pamphlet): Francis Blake, July 4, 1812, *Oration at Worcester, Mass.* (Pamphlet); *American Review*, III: 157.
- ²⁸ *Niles'*, II: 273-4; Perkins, *History of the Late War*, 61.
- ²⁹ *Niles'*, II: 213.
- ³⁰ *Niles'*, II: 309-315.
- ³¹ Amos Kendall, *Autobiography*, 72.
- ³² From *Rufus King, Life and Correspondence*, C. R. King, ed., V: 290. King to Gouverneur Morris, Oct. 28, 1812. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London.
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- ³⁴ Duyckinck, *Cyclopedia of American Literature*, 1: 536.
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- ³⁶ July 23, 1812; August 20, 1812 (Pamphlet).
- ³⁷ July 23, 1812. (Pamphlet).
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- ⁴² Charles Prentiss, *Poem* (Pamphlet).
- ⁴³ *Niles'*, II: 197. *Pickering Letters, Ib.*, II: 155-6, 185-6, 201-2.
- ⁴⁴ O. Pickering and C. W. Upham, *Life of Timothy Pickering*, IV: 230-231.
- ⁴⁵ *Salem Gazette*, Apr. 10, 1813.
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- ⁴⁷ *Raleigh Register*, Aug. 13, 1813.
- ⁴⁸ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, III: 612. July 12, 1813.
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- ⁵³ *Raleigh Register*, Feb. 25, 1813; *Henry Clay, Life, Correspondence, and Speeches*, C. Colton, ed., V: 55-57. Jan. 8, 1813.
- ⁵⁴ Benton, V: 17-57, 65, 125-160, 163-166, 174-287, 293, 343-55.
- ⁵⁵ Jared Sparks, *Life and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, III: 288.
- ⁵⁶ *Niles'*, IV: 89-90.
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- ⁶⁰ June 7, 1814.
- ⁶¹ July 9, 1814.
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- ⁶⁵ *Boston Centinel*, June 8, 1814.
- ⁶⁶ *Ib.*, June 11, 1814.
- ⁶⁷ *Boston Centinel*, June 18, 1814.
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- ⁶⁹ June 17.
- ⁷⁰ June 20. *New York Columbian*, June 18.
- ⁷¹ *Connecticut Mirror*, quoted in *Boston Palladium*, June 17.
- ⁷² King to Jay, June 20, 1814. Jay, *Letters*, V: 374-5.
- ⁷³ Jay to King, June 23, 1814, *Ib.*, V: 375-6.
- ⁷⁴ *New York Herald*, July 1, 1814.
- ⁷⁵ Quoted, *Boston Patriot*, July 9, 1814.
- ⁷⁶ William Wirt, *Memoirs*, J. P. Kennedy, ed., I: 329-330. Feb. 15, 1814.
- ⁷⁷ Calhoun, *Works*, Crallé, ed., II: 88. Feb. 25, 1814.
- ⁷⁸ *Democratic Press*, quoted in *Boston Patriot*, June 18; *Ib.*, June 4.
- ⁷⁹ *Niles' Register*, Apr. 2, 1814. VI: 81.

- ⁸⁰ *Letters of John Quincy Adams*, in *American Antiquarian Society Proceedings*, XXIII: 168-9.
- ⁸¹ Gallatin to Clay, London, Apr. 20, 1814. Clay, *Works*, Colton, ed., IV: 30; Bayard to Clay, Apr. 20, 1814, *Ib.*, IV: 28-9.
- ⁸² *General Repository*, IV: 144-5. July, 1813.
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- ⁸⁴ *Philadelphia Aurora*, June 27, 1814.
- ⁸⁵ *National Advocate*, cited with approval, *Aurora*, June 6.
- ⁸⁶ *Albany Argus*, cited with approval, *Boston Independent Chronicle*, June 30; *Ib.*, June 24.
- ⁸⁷ From Jefferson, *Writings*, Ford, ed., IX: 422-3; *Ib.*, 443-6. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and Boston; Jefferson, *Works*, H. A. Washington, ed., VI: 352-3. Yet the *New York Herald*, quoting an article in the *Richmond Enquirer* in which fear was expressed lest the fall of Napoleon should strengthen England, could say, "Well may Thomas the Philosopher of Monticello lament, for in the destruction of Bonaparte he has lost the 'former god of his idolatry.'" *New York Herald*, June 2, 1814.
- ⁸⁸ Jefferson, *Writings*, Washington, ed., VI: 358-9. See also Madison's Message, *Statesman's Manual*, 1: 320.
- ⁸⁹ *National Intelligencer*, quoted in *New York Evening Post*, June 12, 1815; *New York Evening Post*, Apr. 27, 1815; *Boston Centinel*, Apr. 29; May 10, 1815; Monroe to J. Q. Adams, May 11, 1815, Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton, ed., V: 380.
- ⁹⁰ *Pennsylvania Republican*, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, May 25, 1815; *Niles' Register*, VIII: 159.
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- ⁹² May 6, 1815.
- ⁹³ May 10, 1815. But Bonaparte was a "common outlaw," according to the *Boston Gazette*, May 15, 1815.
- ⁹⁴ King to J. Trumbull, May 22, 1815, King, *Life and Letters*, King, ed., V: 479.
- ⁹⁵ *Gouverneur Morris, Diary and Letters*, A. C. Morris, ed., 11: 589-90.
- ⁹⁶ *Boston Centinel*, May 6; *Boston Gazette*, May 8.
- ⁹⁷ Jefferson, *Works*, Washington, ed., VI: 466-7; 458-9.
- ⁹⁸ *Ib.*, VI: 490-91. August 10, 1815.
- ⁹⁹ *National Advocate*, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, May 15; *Baltimore American*, similar, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, May 13, 1815.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Niles'*, VIII: 159.
- ¹⁰¹ June 28, 1815.
- ¹⁰² August 22, 1815.
- ¹⁰³ June 30, 1815, and quoting *Philadelphia Democratic Press*.
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- ¹⁰⁶ E. L. Magoon, *Living Orators in America*, 140.

CHAPTER 2

Relations with the Restored Bourbons—Early Stages

WITH the re-establishment of the Bourbons upon the throne of France, Franco-American relations entered upon a new phase, radically different from that which had preceded it. Neither government had anything to gain from an unfriendly attitude. Both saw advantages in conciliation, the French in the creation of support for a badgered and isolated state, the United States in providing a counterpoise to Great Britain.

In 1815, the return of Crawford to America left the United States without a Minister in Paris. To fill the vacancy President Madison chose Albert Gallatin, who was then on his way home after acting as one of the American Commissioners in the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent. Mr. Gallatin's authority as one of the leaders in American politics, together with his known tact and diplomatic skill, contributed to make him especially well fitted for the post. Moreover, his Swiss birth, which had laid him open in America to attacks as a "foreigner," and a tool of "French influence," made him acceptable in France. His family, though without title in democratic Geneva, was of the old French noblesse. He had many friends in that country, among them Madame de Stael, who was distantly related to him and whose daughter married the Duke of Broglie, influential in French affairs. Gallatin had an insight into political conditions on the continent, and an appreciation of the difficulties to be met, unusual among the American leaders of the day.¹ Largely because of this knowledge, however, he at first declined the appointment. He wrote to Jefferson, November 27, 1815, that he was satisfied that at the moment nothing could be accomplished in France, and that he was reluctant "to be on a mission to a degraded monarch and to a nation under the yoke of foreign armies."² But the administration urged him to reconsider his decision. In December Monroe wrote saying that he had not published Gallatin's letter of refusal and he hoped the latter would consent to withdraw it. "The prospect of a separation of France from England, and a better understanding between France, Russia and the United

States," he argued, "has made it probable that the situation of our minister in Paris will be more eligible than circumstances seemed to admit when you were here. The appointment of the Duke of Richelieu as foreign minister was made in direct opposition to the British Cabinet, and was resented in an open and harsh manner by the Duke of Wellington. It is understood to have been made at the instigation of the Emperor Alexander." These facts Monroe thought indicated a division between Russia and England, and might contribute to the independence of France. "Since you were here," he added, "I have received a letter from the Duke of Richelieu announcing his appointment, and expressing in strong terms a desire to establish a good understanding between the United States and France." ³ This argument had weight with Gallatin, and finally, January 2, 1916, he accepted the position. Just before he sailed, in April, Jefferson wrote to him:

"I sincerely rejoice that you are going to France. I do not think with you that nothing can be done there. Louis XVIII is a fool and a bigot, but bating a little duplicity he is honest and means well. He cannot but feel the heavy hand of his masters, and that it is England which presses it, and vaunts the having had the glory of effecting their humiliation. His ministers too, although ultra-royalists, must feel as Frenchmen. Although our government is an eyesore to them, the pride and pressure of England is more present to their feelings, and they must be sensible that, having a common enemy, an intimate connexion with us must be of value to them. England hates us, dreads us, and yet is silly enough to keep us under constant irritation instead of making us her friends. She will use all her sway over the French government to obstruct our commerce with them, and it is exactly there you can act with effect by keeping that government informed of the truth in opposition to the lies of England." ⁴

Gallatin described his first greeting from the Duke of Richelieu as "friendly, even cordial" and that from the King, a few days later, as "what is called gracious." ⁵

Louis XVIII, in his turn, chose wisely his diplomatic representative to America. Serrurier, who had been Napoleon's minister during the War of 1812, was withdrawn early in 1816 and in his place was sent M. Hyde de Neuville. The new minister was not a stranger in this country. A convinced and loyal royalist, descended on his father's side from an English family exiled for its Stuart sympathies, he had narrowly escaped the guillotine during the French Revolution. He had been concerned in plots to rescue the royal family, had assisted in the escape of aristocratic refugees, shared in the Vendean uprising, and conspired against Napoleon, who had ordered him to be taken dead or alive. In 1807 he fled to America, with his family. Here he travelled, studied medicine, and settled for a time in New York, where he became well known through his generous interest

in the other French refugees who came there, many of whom were quite poor. He founded an "Economical School" for the children of these exiles, and to aid in its support he published a little magazine, and organized various "benefits" of a social nature. The United States government recognized the value of this enterprise, and granted it an appropriation. In 1811 he purchased a small farm in New Brunswick, N. J. and made it his home, dispensing therein a pleasant hospitality to his many friends, both French and American, until the fall of Napoleon, when he hastened back to France to assist in the restoration of his legitimate king. M. de Neuville, then, possessed an advantage similar to Mr. Gallatin's, of previous contact and helpful acquaintance in his new field of labor. In character and temperament he was also well fitted for his task. After three years of close association, part of the time under circumstances especially trying, John Quincy Adams wrote of him,

"In all the intercourse that I have had with European statesmen, I have not met a man of higher sentiments of honor, of kinder and more generous feelings, or of a fairer and more candid mind." ⁶

And again,

"He is a man of singularly compounded character,—a mixture of ultra-royalism and republican liberality; frank, candid, honorable, generous, benevolent, humane, adoring his country . . . adhering upon principle to his party, but detesting the foreigners by whom his king was restored, and most especially the English. He is flighty but not inconstant in his sentiments; accessible to reason, but not powerful as a reasoner; quick but placable in his temper; . . . somewhat vain, and manageable chiefly by his vanity—altogether a safe man with whom to transact business, and one whose good qualities greatly outweigh his failings." ⁷

M. de Neuville understood that his mission was of exceptional importance. He was instructed to endeavor to regulate in an orderly and durable manner the relations between the two countries, which had suffered so severely from the disorders in France; to cultivate good feeling; and especially to prepare the way for France to use her good offices in averting a conflict between the United States and Spain in the matter of the colonies.⁸ The cultivation of even formally friendly relations was no easy task. So long had the French been the subject of abusive comment from all parties in the United States that the habit seemed to be firmly fixed. People commonly applied to the Bourbons such terms as "besotted,"⁹ "bloody," "cruel," "treacherous," "tyrannical,"¹⁰ and "usurpers of the people's rights."¹¹ "Imbecile Bourbon" was used so frequently as to represent less an epithet than a name.¹² King, of Massachusetts, in a speech on the Direct Tax Bill, declared that it was just that the French should pay "drop

for drop of blood; life for life; till the same measure of suffering which they have meted to other nations should be meted back to them again, heaped up and running over.”¹³ Such vindictiveness was rare, but the feeling was general that France had fallen on evil days. Henry Clay, in the same debate on the Direct Tax, declared that she was “blotted out of the map of Europe,” that her power, as a counterpoise to that of Great Britain, was “annihilated—gone; never to rise again, I believe, under the weak, unhappy and imbecile race who now sway her destinies.”¹⁴

Governor Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey, in his Address to the Legislature, said that “the humbled and degraded state of France, while it claimed the tear of sympathy for suffering humanity,” should teach us to be thankful for our freedom, and to deserve it by our behavior.¹⁵

Governor Simon Snyder of Pennsylvania drew a similar moral from the situation. “United, they would have stemmed the tide of invasion, and turned back the waters of bitterness.” Now, “France, the first and most faithful ally of the United States, is devastated and dismembered by foreign arms” and suffers the evils of civil war.¹⁶

Niles' Register reported the celebration of the Fourth of July by the American colony in Paris. One of the toasts was,—“France, our oldest ally; all our wishes are for her happiness and prosperity.” The editor commented thus:

“France seems the natural counterpoise of England, and we heartily wish her restoration to ‘happiness and prosperity.’

“A distinguished French gentleman, one of the old nobility, I believe, and holding an office under Louis the Eighteenth, observed to one of my friends some time ago, that he felt surprised at the apparent hostility of representative Americans to the Bourbons. ‘I never did believe you loved Bonaparte, as the English reported of you,’ said he, ‘but why hate Louis?’ ‘We are opposed to Louis,’ said my friend, ‘as well because we believe that he was imposed on the French people for their king, as because we do not believe that he *is* king. We think the Bourbons a weak and imbecile race, entirely unfit to direct the destinies of a great nation like France; better calculated for the cowl than the crown. If in these we are deceived—if they shall come out from under the foreign bayonets and cast themselves upon the love and affection of their people, giving them in return for it, a liberal constitution, and doing their utmost to make France independent, as she ought to be—you will find that all of us will become Bourbonites.’”¹⁷

The *Philadelphia Aurora* said:

“Britain has at last accomplished the great object for which she has so long and anxiously contended. She has reduced France to the condition of a tributary province.”¹⁸

Criticism of the measures of the French Government was constant throughout the year 1816. Derisive comments were frequently added to items of news. For example:

"Marshal Count Grouchy has made his escape from the 'deliverers' and is safe in Baltimore!" "30,000 persons are said to be confined in French prisons, 'suspected of being suspicious.'" ¹⁹ "Glorious is the return of the Bourbons. . . . To the dungeon, is the order of the day." ²⁰

After the execution of Labédoyere,

"Though Louis le Desiré cared nothing for the body or life of Labédoyere, he seems to have had a tender concern for his soul! . . . It is undoubtedly true that the King sent the sum of 600 francs to each of the principal churches in Paris to pay for masses for its repose." ²¹

Sharp criticism was applied to "legitimate rulers," ²² to royal ceremonial and extravagance, ²³ to the religious intolerance, ²⁴ and to the arrests and punishments which characterized the restoration of order.²⁵ The discussion of the execution of Marshal Ney may be taken as fairly typical of the general sentiment of the country during this year. Most of the newspapers manifested strong disapproval. The *Eastern Argus* (Portland, Maine). called it "Murder most foul!" "to appease the blood-thirsty Bourbons." ²⁶ *Niles' Register* said:

"The gallant and accomplished Ney is no more! It is to be feared that his fate will be the fate of every great man in France. Talents must be rooted up, before the tree of legitimacy can flourish there." ²⁷

And the *Georgia Journal*:—

"A braver man or better general France could not produce. Indeed, in the present state of things, the possession of these qualities, combined with a large share of popularity and patriotism, were alone, with the timid but cruel monarchists, sufficient to constitute guilt and ensure punishment. . . . Let not his epitaph be written until his country shall have escaped from foreign domination, and taken her stand among the nations of the earth." ²⁸

A few Federalist papers defended this execution and other repressive acts as proofs of the strength and stability of the French government. "It proved that Louis was not a king of dough as he had been reported." ²⁹ They said that the republican form of government had been shown to be unsuited to the French temperament. It had been a tyranny. France, relieved from it, and from the Napoleonic despotism, was entering now upon an era of peaceful and loyal development. They minimized the accounts

of disorder and friction, to which the other papers gave importance, and reported regularly,—“France is tranquil.”³⁰ “Quiet, not tranquil,” was the retort, “the ominous and awful stillness of despotism.”³¹

There seemed to be a wide-spread belief in the United States that the Bourbon government could not last; certainly not without further concessions in the way of self-government on the part of the people, and the expulsion of the foreign control. “The time is fast approaching,” said the *Eastern Argus*, “when the distinguished exiles who have sought refuge on our happy shores will be called back to support the independence of their country, and to assist in raising the French name from the degradation to which these puny Bourbons have reduced it.”³² Jefferson said:

“France has now a family of fools at its head, from whom, whenever it can shake off its foreign riders, it will extort a free constitution, or dismount them and establish some other on the solid basis of national right. . . .”³³ And later,

“That nation is too high-minded, has too much innate intelligence and elasticity, to remain quiet under its present compression. Sampson will arise in his strength and probably will ere long burst asunder the cords and webs of the Philistines. . . . Whatever may be the convulsions, we cannot but indulge the pleasing hope that they will end in the permanent establishment of a representative government, a government in which the will of the people will be an effective ingredient.”³⁴

John Quincy Adams, writing from London to James Monroe, in April of this year, struck an extremely pessimistic note. He thought there was little prospect of the dissolution of the European combination against France, and felt that the impatience and desperation of the French people would break out in abortive insurrections, which would lead to further dismemberment and the final partition of the country. “It is scarcely possible,” he said, “that France should escape the fate of Poland. The manner in which this event is to be consummated and the distribution of the spoils will form perhaps for some years the great subject of negotiation and discussion among the allies.”³⁵ Occasionally one of the American papers remarked that “of course the form of the French government does not really make any difference to us, anyway. France is our oldest ally and a natural friend. Our commercial interests are bound to draw us together. Naturally it would be more agreeable to us to see in such a nation political institutions of which we could approve, but we must not sacrifice a profitable relationship on that account. The critical feeling of individuals on the subject will necessarily find expression sometimes, but the government has nothing to do with such effusions, nor should they in any way affect diplomatic intercourse.”³⁶

However, it can hardly be considered surprising that the French failed to view the matter in this calm light. One of the French papers complained because President Madison did not mention the Restoration with approval in his Message to Congress, and accused him of ingratitude, party spirit, and bad policy. The *Baltimore Patriot* retorted sharply:

“Do these French parasites of ‘legitimacy’ think that Mr. Madison has nothing better to fill his messages with than approbatory notices of the accursed events in Europe, which have destroyed the best hopes of general freedom, and debased France to the condition of a British colony?”³⁷

At Gallatin’s first interview with the Duke of Richelieu the attitude of the American newspapers was mentioned. Gallatin explained it as actually due to hatred of Great Britain or apprehension of her power,³⁸ and this analysis of the situation seems to be borne out to some degree by the evidence. Through a not unusual psychological process, criticism of the Bourbons was caused, in many cases, by hatred of the British who were believed to control them.

American travellers and merchants in France complained of a great change in the treatment they received. Whereas under the Bonapartist rule and under the first Restoration they had been treated with great favor, in strong contrast to the English, so that they often wore the tricolored cockade or the American eagle in their hats to protect themselves from being taken for English and insulted,³⁹ they now found, at least among the royalist cities, and in Bordeaux especially, constant friction. A riot even developed in the latter city because an American captain, in hanging his signal flags to dry, inadvertently included a tricolor. The people thought it a direct and intentional insult, and threatened to hang all the Americans in the city, including the consul, who afterwards had to be withdrawn. The Mayor said that reports were in circulation that Bonaparte had landed in France at the head of 50,000 Americans. The United States was called “the Botany Bay of France,” and the people designated as “pirates.” The Duke of Richelieu refused to recognize the American consul at Nantes, “because his politics are so obnoxious,” and he also had to come home.⁴⁰ “Much sensibility,” wrote Gallatin, “is on every occasion expressed on the subject of the hostility to the government of France, apparent in most Administration newspapers in America. This is not brought as an official ground of complaint, the extent of the liberty of our press being understood, but is stated as an evidence of unfriendly disposition. I mention this because several paragraphs in the *Moniteur* . . . may in some degree be considered as a kind of retaliation for certain pieces in the *National Intelligencer*.”⁴¹

M. de Neuville, the French minister, was irritated to the point of allowing one instance of American free speech to assume the proportion of a diplomatic incident. The Postmaster at Baltimore at a Fourth of July celebration gave as a toast, "The generals of France in exile; the glory of their native land—not to be dishonored by the proscriptions of an imbecile tyrant." This was evidently intended as a compliment to one of the guests, the exiled General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who responded with: "To the generous citizens of the United States! Every unfortunate stranger finds here a family and brothers." ⁴² The newspapers reported these toasts among others without noticing anything extraordinary about them. But M. de Neuville believed that he had here something which might be dealt with. The American press and the speech of American individuals as such could not probably be restrained. But here was a government official,—a Postmaster. In this case surely the government could and should act. He sent therefore a sharp protest directly to the President, demanding the removal of the offender from office. Both President Madison and his Secretary of State, Monroe, resented the action and considered it entirely unwarranted. Said Madison:

"Mr. de Neuville could not have given a greater proof of want of judgment than in putting the amity of the two countries on such an issue, or of a personal wish to flatter the ultra-royal Bourbons who may ere long accede to the throne. The proper answer to him will be facilitated by his undertaking to dictate the precise reparation in the case. Common delicacy would have demanded an adequate one in general terms, leaving the mode to the Government, and the arrogance of the manner in which he has disregarded it, forfeits the respect that might otherwise be due to his complaint. . . . It would seem as if De Neuville hoped to hide the degradation of the Bourbons in Europe under a blustering deportment in a distant country." ⁴³

The French minister continued to press for the punishment of "this outrage," "this crime," urging "the dismissal, or at least the removal" of the culprit, who "has permitted himself a coarse insult and the most dastardly calumny against his Majesty Louis XVIII." ⁴⁴ Receiving no satisfaction he reported the matter to his government. Gallatin was instructed to present conciliatory explanations in Paris, but to concede nothing. He was told to explain that from the nature of our institutions it would under no circumstances seem feasible to remove the offender from office for the cause alleged, and that the peremptory tone of the French minister had made it in this case utterly impossible. The United States could not allow a foreign minister to dictate measures to it, particularly in a case so closely connected with the principles of its government. The Fourth of July is always a day of festivity when our citizens relax,

assemble and express their opinions freely on all subjects. Public officials under these circumstances lose their official character in that of citizens. The government of this country and all its public measures are regularly attacked. And we always read the Declaration of Independence and Great Britain has never protested. Moreover, without alluding to any existing sovereign in amity with the United States, this government must absolutely decline the responsibility of protecting the characters of all sovereigns who occupy the thrones of friendly powers "against all reproaches however justified by truth and notoriety!"⁴⁵

The Duke of Richelieu was inclined to view the matter seriously, and said that he could not understand how "any government could detach itself from its agents, and while professing regard and consideration for a friendly sovereign, permit him to be wantonly and openly insulted by one of those agents and refuse any reparation for such open insult."⁴⁶ Some further communications passed between the two governments on the subject, in the course of which the French threatened to remove their consul from Baltimore, as it was a scandal to leave him in a city where his sovereign had been insulted with impunity. It was also suggested that the affair would have an unfavorable bearing upon the question of indemnity for injuries under Napoleon, which the United States government was undertaking to press.⁴⁷ The "affair of the Postmaster" did not get into the papers in America until November when it was practically over. Then the *National Intelligencer* carried an editorial which was widely copied, though usually without comment. It said, in part,

"No other language, nor half so bad, has been applied to the sovereign authority of France, in the toast which is quoted, than is daily applied without censure or punishment, to the members of our own government, by our public prints opposed to the administration, and by hundreds of individuals: and the government can no more control the language of those whom it invests with office, than of any other individuals in society. It cannot even secure itself from the censure of its own officers: much less can it claim to chain their tongues and seal their lips in relation to all the foreign powers. . . . It is enough, it appears to us, if the Executive conducts itself in its intercourse with foreign powers, with a due regard to their rights and feelings. . . ." ⁴⁸

And a little later, in commenting upon the subjects likely to engross the attention of the Congress soon to open, the editor added that it was not probable that the reported demand of the French minister would be suffered to disturb the peace between the two nations who had at present no real cause for enmity, and whose governments would not suffer an imaginary one to disturb their tranquillity.⁴⁹ The *Philadelphia Aurora*, always given to speaking its mind, scorned the idea of giving satisfaction for

a toast "which there is not a friend of liberty or virtue in the universe would not repeat."⁵⁰ A few other papers added phrases of criticism, and the matter was dropped.⁵¹ M. de Neuville himself, in conversation with Monroe, finally admitted that he saw that it would be very difficult for the government to take any action in the case.⁵²

While the behavior of the French minister in entering upon this argument is generally condemned as a diplomatic error, it seems probable that his desired end was actually in some degree accomplished. That is, the attention of the Administration was forcibly drawn to the effect of the unguarded utterances of the citizens of the country upon the attempt to cultivate friendly relations with France. Whether due solely to this realization or not, there is to be noted a sudden and marked change in the tone of the papers friendly to the Administration. For the next four years they usually print items of French news without abusive comment. The editor of *Niles' Register* is an exception to this rule. He may be classed as an "irreconcilable" who seldom missed an opportunity for a slighting remark. Political events of importance in France occasionally called out a contemptuous criticism of the Bourbons, and the American people in general continued to doubt their stability and to distrust their motives. Yet there are to be found an increasing number of articles favorable to France. M. de Neuville spared no pains to demonstrate his anxiety for friendly relations, and his undoubted sincerity and his personal worth soon began to bear fruit. In March, 1817, Crawford wrote to Gallatin: "Mr. de Neuville has conciliated the people of this place and the members of Congress very much during the winter by a prudent course of conduct. The newspapers have laid aside their asperity and if the foolish affair of the toast at Baltimore could be well disposed of, I believe there would not rise any further cause of collision. . . . His wife is very amiable, and is highly respected for her excellent qualities."⁵³ And in July Gallatin reported to Monroe that although the communications first made by the French minister to his government had produced in France a very unfavorable effect, those which he had lately sent must be of a very different character, "and the effect is perceivable."⁵⁴

One of M. de Neuville's most serious responsibilities in the first years of his stay concerned the behavior of the Napoleonic exiles in the United States. The men who had served under the Emperor flocked to America in great numbers. Some of them were under sentence of death in France; others were exiled by order of the king; and still others found themselves impoverished and without prospect of office or advancement. As the British minister, Charles Bagot, wrote to his friend Sneyd,—

"All the ragamuffins of the earth are in the United States—more especially the French ragamuffins. . . .

Joseph the Just, Iberia's King,
Lefebvres-Desnouettes,
Grouchy, Clausel, St. Angely,
And all the patriot set
Who, 'scaped from Louis' iron sway,
Have reached this happy shore
And live upon tobacco quay
In lower Baltimore!"⁵⁵

The number of exiles in the country was really remarkably large. The name of Joseph Bonaparte was naturally the most conspicuous on the list, but we must add to Bagot's enumeration such names as those of the brothers Lallemand, Rigaud, Bernard, and Vandamme, all Napoleonic generals; the well-known Garnier de Saintes; Count Real, who had been prefect of police under the Emperor; the two sons of Marshal Grouchy; Joseph Lakanal, a scientist of note; and a host of lesser lights. They were always received with enthusiasm, partly because of America's traditional function as a refuge for the oppressed, and partly because honor to these especial exiles amounted to an expression of opinion in regard to the Bourbons. The arrival of a distinguished refugee was noted in the newspapers as an event of importance, his movements were chronicled with interest, and he was toasted and entertained with the utmost friendliness,—although the Executive maintained an attitude of official correctness and avoided giving the audience to Joseph Bonaparte which he seemed at first to expect.⁵⁶

Recalling his own recent experiences as a refugee M. de Neuville was inclined to be more sympathetic and tolerant of these men than the government at home showed itself. He treated them with great kindness and took pains to urge the repatriation of those whom he believed would be loyal to the administration of Louis if allowed to return.⁵⁷ As a political factor, however, he was uneasy about them. There were frequent rumors of attempts to rescue Napoleon, for whom much sympathy was expressed among Americans as well as French. The Napoleonic officers were naturally restless and ambitious. They could scarcely be expected to beat their swords at once into ploughshares. Joseph Bonaparte kept open house for all exiled Frenchmen, and his name was a natural rallying-cry for conspirators. De Neuville feared an enterprise which should take advantage of the unsettled conditions in the Spanish-American colonies to free Napoleon and found for him a new Empire in the new world. "The liberality of this government frees these refugees from all police surveillance, and their acts

from all control," he wrote to the Duke of Richelieu, and felt therefore a double necessity for watchfulness on his own part.⁵⁸

In the fall of 1816 a number of French exiles joined in organizing a "Society for the Cultivation of the Vine and the Olive," and planned to make a settlement somewhere in the West. Several of them went to Pittsburgh and down the Ohio into Kentucky, but found no place which satisfied them. They then conceived the idea of asking Congress for a grant of land in the territory recently acquired through the treaty with the Creek Indians on the Tombigbee River in what is now Alabama; and by an act passed March 3, 1817, they received for a nominal sum the right to a district four townships in extent. The act included restrictions intended to insure actual settlement and to prevent speculation, and allowed the colonists fourteen years in which to complete their payments. General Charles Lallemand became president of the company, and among the shareholders were Marshal Grouchy and his sons; Generals Henri Lallemand, Clausel, and Lefebvre-Desnouettes; Lakanal; and other prominent French exiles.⁵⁹ De Neuville at first approved of this idea, but both he and the authorities at home became suspicious of it before long, fearing lest it should prove only a cover for some dangerous conspiracy. It certainly provided an organization through which conspirators could communicate with one another freely, collect money, and purchase supplies.⁶⁰

In August, 1817, some papers intended for Joseph Bonaparte were intercepted, apparently by French agents, and came into the possession of the French minister. They purported to have been written by Lakanal, and outlined a plot to invade Mexico, to conquer a province there and to proclaim Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain and the Indies. Much excited by this discovery, De Neuville hastened to lay it before the State Department, with an urgent request for action. The American authorities thought the documents almost too absurd for credence, filled as they were with vague high-sounding phrases, and conveying little in the way of definite plans. In so far as the scheme was defined, it seemed to include the raising of a force of 900 men to be known as "Independent Troops of Mexico." Of these, 150 were said to be already enrolled. The force was to be increased by recruiting, undertaken in the District of Columbia and the Western states and territories of Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi. Joseph was asked for assistance in financing the enterprise, but was assured that he would not be involved in its difficulties and dangers, but would rather be supposed to know nothing of it until it had been carried to a successful completion.⁶¹

Spurred by the anxiety of the French representative the State Department

somewhat reluctantly undertook an investigation and did succeed in discovering enough evidence of military activities among the exiles to make it seem advisable that the government should take all necessary precautions to prevent the plots from developing into anything which would involve the United States in a charge of the violation of neutrality. Joseph Bonaparte himself, however, maintained an attitude of the greatest correctness, and was not proved to be connected with any of the schemes. But it was demonstrated that several of the shareholders in the Tombigbee enterprise had been raising money by speculating in their lands, contrary to the intention of the Congress in making the grant, and that this money was being expended in military supplies. Adams had an interview with General Charles Lallemand, who though the president of the Tombigbee company seemed to be the leader in the new schemes, and advised him strongly against undertaking anything with which the government would have to interfere, and Lallemand emphatically denied that he was engaged in anything except the cultivation of the vine and the olive. By the latter part of the year the French Minister professed himself satisfied with the preventive measures carried out by the government, and convinced that nothing dangerous was on foot.

An expedition to Texas was nevertheless actually carried out early in the year 1818, but so dismal a failure was it that it merely served to effectually discourage any similar attempts. Charles Lallemand, with General Rigaud, succeeded in getting some four hundred persons, including the wives of a few of the officers, to Galveston, Texas, and thence to a place on the Trinity River, where they declared they intended to establish a colony, to be known as the Champ d'Asile, which was to be agricultural and commercial, and military only in self-defense. The colonists were by no means all French, but Spaniards, Mexicans, Americans and Poles; pirates, adventurers, and vagabonds of all sorts. The famous pirate Lafitte, then operating in the Gulf of Mexico, welcomed them and helped to outfit them. The United States government, which had early information of the plans of the expedition, but considered that its poor organization, its small numbers, and its lack of resources doomed it to failure, found itself compelled by the complaints of the French minister to take action. A commissioner was sent in June to find out exactly where the settlement was being made and under what national authority the colonists professed to act. He was to warn them that they could not make settlements within the United States without the consent of the government. He was also to try to find out whether their funds were coming from Joseph Bonaparte, from the Spanish minister, or from both, and whether they were having any intercourse with the Viceroy of Mexico. The Spanish minister had

officially protested against the enterprise as directed against Spanish sovereignty, but was believed by the United States government to be secretly aiding it in order to strengthen the military forces along the border to prevent possible seizure by the United States. The British minister was also disturbed, on the ground that "if there was a Bonaparte in it" his government would certainly think it important. When the agent reached Galveston, he found that the colony had already been broken up by Spanish forces, and that the miserable remnant desired nothing more than to return to civilization. Lallemand returned to New Orleans with him, with the avowed purpose of getting aid and purchasing supplies, leaving Rigaud in charge of the colonists. After a terrific storm which swept over Galveston had caused still further suffering among them, the latter, through the assistance once more of the generous pirate Lafitte, succeeded in getting back to New Orleans also, with most of the surviving adventurers. And here the enterprise ended.⁶²

To demonstrate the seriousness with which the plans of the exiles were viewed at the time, it will be worth while to cite here the following editorial from the *Federal Republican*:⁶³

" . . . We have Joseph, the ex-king of Spain, already in this country. To be sure his majesty is to all appearances acting the character of the exiled Cincinnatus—he has exchanged a kingdom for a farm, and although he has not been guilty of scribbling such wretched poetry as Lucien has done, yet he is to all appearance a very mild and peaceable man; nay he had actually forgot that he ever was in the possession of a crown and sceptre at all. Meanwhile crowds of adventurers arrive from Europe—men as familiar to blood and carnage as they are to the sight of their hands, who by an airing of 3000 miles on the Atlantic are suddenly changed into contemplative philosophers; they only wish now to cultivate the bosom of the earth, to raise pinks, roses, jessamines and daffa-down-dillies. These men have followed the fortunes of Joseph when he seized the crown of Spain—they have risked their lives in his service and braved the blasts of the cannon, and so great is the influence of the royal master's example, that in imitation of him they have suddenly been transformed into soft-sighing shepherds, who are ready with crooks in their hands to sit down on the banks of our native streams to sing pastorals together. Now in opposition to all this Arcadian argument, it seems that the allied monarchs reason thus—that heads which have once been encircled by royal diadems of which they have been deprived are very apt to ache for the same bandage again; that nothing has ever yet been found capable of effecting a cure for this headache except another application of the same bandage. They think that Joseph Bonaparte is still affected with the king's evil; . . . Spain has renounced King Joseph and adopted her own monarch, King Ferdinand—the Spanish provinces in South America have renounced King Ferdinand, now (quoth Joseph) would it not be a most capital substitution if they would only substitute me! What! Why would not a South American diadem become me as well as a Spanish one! . . . and the deuce is in it if the mines of Mexico will not furnish diamonds enough to make a crown as brilliant as Ferdinand's. Upon my word I think this crown a very comfortable thing and worth looking after! Now suppose

brother Napoleon could be liberated from his cage, put himself at the head of the South American patriots, and bluster as loudly as he once did about the rights of the people. After he had acquired a quantum sufficit of popular confidence, it is only for him to say, that by the rights of the people, he meant the rights of kings,—words which mean the same in his dictionary. But how shall I without alarming the jealousy of the American government, if it has any, call to my standard my faithful friends, dispersed all over the continent of North America? It is necessary gradually to consolidate my strength and this must be done in such a manner as not to put my enemies on the alert also. The best plan that I can devise is to throw out to the world ideas of emigration—I may inform Congress, for example, that the poor and oppressed emigrants from Europe wish to preserve their own customs that have been handed down from their ancestors—we will say for example that we wish to purchase a tract of territory for the sake of planting vines—Congress will be flattered by an application of this kind and will undoubtedly lend their patronage to the proposal. We may thus gradually collect all our strength, and after our force is once collected and prepared for action, what astonishment we shall excite in the natives at the *number of vines we shall plant*; they shall see whether blood will not run faster than the juice of the grape.”

More and more during this period affairs concerning Spain and her American colonies had been acquiring importance in the eyes of Americans. Revolutionary activities similar to those through which the United States had passed only a few decades ago would have aroused attention under any circumstances. Such movements in Europe were always followed with the greatest interest and sympathy. But the South Americans were linked with us more closely. As citizens of the new world, as inhabitants of a continent physically connected with that occupied by the United States, lying so near that the fortunes of the one must inevitably affect those of the other, it is not strange that as the struggle increased in intensity, and as it appeared possible that the great European powers might intervene to decide it, our thoughts and our sympathies should have become deeply involved.

The United States had, moreover, a quarrel of its own with Spain. When, in 1803, the Louisiana Purchase was made, the boundary lines to the east and the west were imperfectly defined. The original object of negotiation had been the purchase of Florida, or “the Floridas, east and west,” as the district was known at the time,—together with New Orleans and such land as might guarantee free passage of the Mississippi. The purchase of the Louisiana territory was a makeshift, accepted only because it opened the Mississippi, and because Spain refused at the moment to cede the Floridas either to the United States or to France, which also wished them. The Louisiana district had already changed hands several times. It had been British as well as French and Spanish. Yet its boundaries had never been fully explored, much less marked out or surveyed. Every

conveyance had been the conveyance of an uncertainty, and everyone knew it. The purchase by the United States was moreover strictly speaking illegal, since France had never carried out the conditions on which she had herself acquired it from Spain, and Spain immediately protested against the transfer.

The terms of sale were "the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, that it had when France possessed it and such as it ought to be according to the treaties subsequently passed between Spain and other states."⁶⁴

The United States authorities in their eagerness for the Floridas resolved to construe the boundaries as broadly as possible, and arguing that the whole district as far east as the Perdido River had once been called Louisiana, they declared that this river marked the eastern limits of their purchase. This included most of the section known as West Florida, and the Spanish authorities refused to recognize such a claim. With the idea of reinforcing their position, the Americans inquired of the French commissioner sent to take over the province from Spain, what the French construction of the boundaries was. He replied that West Florida was not included, farther than the Iberville River, which lies near the Mississippi, though on the west the boundary ran to the Rio Bravo, which would include Texas. His reply was official, because based on the instructions given him when he was sent out.⁶⁵ Talleyrand supported this construction of the eastern boundary but attempted to becloud the issue on the west, stating that the limits there had not been clearly defined, but would have been the subject of negotiations between Spain and France, if the latter had kept the district, and "France could not even take upon herself to indicate to the United States what ought to be that precise limit."⁶⁶ And in 1816 the Duke of Richelieu stated that France ought not to be relied on in support of the American claims beyond what was just in itself; that she did not cede to the United States West Florida; that her cession was limited to the east by the River Iberville and the Lakes Pontchartrain and Maurepas, but was undefined to the West, in fixing which latter boundary she felt no concern.⁶⁷

This dispute, dating from 1803, had been constantly agitated, and the discussions were growing ever more acrimonious. Into its intricacies it will be unnecessary here to enter. The question was complicated by the fact that the Spanish authorities had so little control over the contested districts that they could be used as bases for all sorts of lawless enterprises, such as that of the Champ d'Asile, already mentioned, for piracies and freebooting exploits without end, and for filibustering expeditions connected with one or another of the Spanish colonies. White, negro, and

Indian outlaws infested the borderlands, and acts of violence unrestrained went unpunished; or, if punished, as in the case of the Seminole War, aggravated a situation already acute. Complaints, recriminations, and claims for indemnity abounded on both sides, and the chorus was swelled by those European states whose nationals happened to be involved in the acts of some of the lawless adventurers whose ships sailed the Gulf of Mexico, or who made the Gulf ports their headquarters. From such intolerable conditions, there were only a few alternatives of escape. Spain might so strengthen her control over the district as to produce orderly conditions and by a firm and independent policy put an end to the dispute. She might transfer her claims to some stronger European power, who would energetically press matters to a settlement. She might be forced, persuaded, or paid to surrender her claims amicably to the United States. Or friction might easily increase to such a degree as to bring war between the two countries. It was this latter contingency which seemed to the European countries probable, and which was most feared.

Great Britain offered her mediation, which was refused promptly and decidedly. "The United States in justice to themselves, in justice to that harmony which they earnestly desire to cultivate with all the powers of Europe, in justice to that fundamental system of policy which forbids them from entering the labyrinth of European politics, must decline soliciting or acceding to the interference of any other government of Europe for the settlement of their differences with Spain." ⁶⁸ Spain applied to France for her good offices, which the latter was most anxious to give. She felt it distinctly to her interest to avert serious trouble between Spain and the United States inasmuch as the immediate consequence probably would be the recognition of the independence of the South American colonies by America, and of this she most strongly disapproved. Erving, the American minister in Spain, wrote to Adams that he thought France very reasonably alarmed at the least symptom of discord anywhere. She knew that the smallest spark might produce a conflagration and that France was most combustible. "The government of France sees," too, "that in the event of a rupture between the United States and Spain the natural progress of things will necessarily lead to an alliance or at least a very dangerous concert of measures between the United States and Great Britain." ⁶⁹

Richelieu wrote to De Neuville that Europe could not remain indifferent to the propagation of an anarchistic system which threatened to invade all the new world. And De Neuville replied:—

"If Europe wishes to be tranquil, if she wishes to improve, but not to destroy, the institutions of her fathers, she will bring all her wisdom to bear to prevent the rise

of a colossus in this hemisphere in direct opposition to her customs and habits. Thus it seems to me that under the double aspect of the peace of nations and of our especial policy, we cannot desire that the two Americas tend too much to narrowly unite and to render themselves almost independent of the other continent, for it is certain that as long as the interest of the North Americans leads them to search for friends in Europe, it will be France and always France which they will wish to conciliate.

"If nevertheless nothing in Europe opposes it, it is more than probable that the Republic of Buenos Ayres will be recognized by the United States. . . . Then the Floridas will be occupied and never returned." ⁷⁰

Yet it was evident that French mediation would be no more acceptable to the United States than would that of Great Britain. Although, in 1816, Monroe thought it seemed probable that France might render to the United States essential services in this negotiation, "provided her government adopts just ideas on the subject," ⁷¹ when Richelieu in 1818 suggested to Gallatin that Spain had applied for the good offices of France, Gallatin replied that while we were disposed to give her as a common friend frank and full communications of our views, the mediation of no foreign power, not even of France, could be accepted, and the best office France could render Spain would be not to encourage her in her pretensions, and to urge the importance to her of an early arrangement.

In reporting this to Adams, then Secretary of State, Gallatin said,—

"Although, so far as can be judged from appearances, France is in earnest to promote an arrangement, it is consistent with that plan to induce us to lower our pretensions, and, although I have tried to discourage that attempt, she may perhaps think herself under the necessity of making some representations through her minister at Washington. Her great object in what she may do will be to serve Spain, and the knowledge and fear of our influence in the affairs of the Spanish colonies are the principal motives of her interfering in any respect." ⁷²

However, M. de Neuville had been steadily gaining in popularity in Washington. His simplicity of manner, his kindly courtesy, and his open-hearted hospitality, had made him many friends. He was on good terms with the political leaders, and he resolved to attempt an informal mediation, since it was recognized that no formal one would be considered. This was a proceeding which required both tact and perseverance, for his first moves were not welcomed with any enthusiasm by Mr. Adams. Most men would have become discouraged and given up the undertaking, or would have made some false step which would have done harm. It is most interesting to trace the steps by which doubtful tolerance, bordering on resentment, ripened into confidence. One element contributing largely to his success is to be found in the difficulty experienced by the Spanish minister and the American Secretary of State in conferring with one another.

Adams considered Señor de Onis cold and haughty, and distrusted him thoroughly, while the directness and quick temper of Adams antagonized the Spaniard. De Neuville could talk with either without offense.

A few citations from Adams' *Diary* will demonstrate clearly the earlier stages of this informal mediation.

Jan. 22, 1818, "Hyde de Neuville talked with me more than an hour, urging that we should settle our affairs with Spain, flattering and cajoling me."

April 30, ". . . De Neuville suggested a possible settlement."

May 5, "He called, . . . urging a settlement."

July 8, "A note from Hyde de Neuville asking for an interview. A discussion of our taking Pensacola."

July 10, "I had an interview at the office with Hyde de Neuville, the French minister, all about our affairs with Spain. . . . He urged this subject very strenuously for more than an hour."

July 16, ". . . went to my office, and received Mr. de Neuville. He is extremely anxious for the preservation of peace, and desirous of contributing to it. . . . He offered to use his influence with Onis."

July 19, ". . . found Mr. de N. had been at my house and expressed a strong desire to see me. He had left a request that I call at his house. I went, and we passed an hour there." They discussed the Spanish affair. "He would go to Bristol" and use his influence on Onis. . . . "I promised to show him the letter for Onis when it should be prepared."

July 22, "My letter to Onis being now prepared, I sent for Mr. Hyde de Neuville, who came to the office, and gave it to him to read. He professed to be very well satisfied with it, and said he would go to-morrow morning to his seat in the Jerseys, and would spend two or three days with Onis, at Bristol, on his way. He would use all his influence to persuade him to make his proposals, and urge his conviction that if they are not made it will be impossible to get through the next winter without a war between this country and Spain. He added that Onis had said something to him about an article stipulating not to recognize the South Americans, but he thought he could not insist upon that. I told him it must be altogether out of the question."

August 24, "Mr. de Neuville came to tell the substance of a letter he had received from Onis. He urged concession on the part of the United States on the question of the boundary west of the Mississippi."

November 17, "The French minister came to talk with me about our negotiations with Spain and to urge our yielding further upon the western boundary of Louisiana. . . . I told him that I would, however, give him a certificate that he was a faithful liege to the King of Spain. He said Onis would give him a counter-certificate that he was a true American." ⁷³

By this time, nevertheless, De Neuville's position as mediator was established. Other members of the Cabinet and of Congress talked over Spanish affairs with him, and no important step was taken in the dispute by either side without his advice. Of this Mr. Adams' *Diary* for the latter part of 1818 and the early months of 1819 gives abundant evidence.⁷⁴ His method

with De Onis may be illustrated by one of his letters, dated January 24, 1819, in which he warns the Spanish minister that the more one delays the United States, the more they demand, like one of their great rivers, which if held back undermines its banks. What they would offer a year ago is not obtainable to-day. What one can get from them to-day is less than they will give to-morrow.⁷⁵

On February 22, 1819, Señor De Onis, for Spain, and Mr. Adams, for the United States, signed a treaty covering all the points of dispute between the two countries. The United States received the Floridas, but gave up all claim to Texas. Two days later the treaty was ratified by the Senate, and immediately afterwards by the President. It was then sent to Spain for ratification, the provisions of the agreement specifying that such ratification must take place within six months.⁷⁶ Almost at once, however, arose a difficulty. Certain large grants of land in the Floridas had been made by the Spanish king to some of his favorites, grants so large that they covered most of the otherwise unsettled lands. No actual colonization had been made in these districts by the grantees, who were holding them chiefly as a speculation, and the United States did not wish to recognize their title as valid. It had been suggested that they be excluded by name in the treaty, and De Onis had objected, on the ground that this would place the king in an unpleasant position. It was finally agreed that the treaty should recognize as valid all grants made before a specified date, and declare invalid all those made later. The United States representative understood that this clearly excluded the undesirable grants, but immediately after the treaty was signed a rumor was heard that it did not. Mr. Adams promptly applied to M. de Neuville, since he had been conversant with all the details of the negotiation, asking what his understanding of this point had been. De Neuville replied clearly and unequivocally that both he and De Onis had understood the objectionable grants to be excluded. Throughout the days of delay and disagreement which followed, he firmly maintained this stand, and his testimony was of the greatest value to the United States since Spain seized upon this question as an excuse for failing to ratify the treaty.⁷⁷

M. de Neuville's behavior in this matter is discussed and analyzed rather interestingly in Adams' *Memoirs*, as follows,—

“He intimated to me that his principal motive in dispatching Bourqueney now to France was to give his Government further and more complete expositions relative to the eighth article of our late treaty with Spain, and to induce them to interpose by direct influence upon Spain to prevent her making any question upon that article in relation to the grants; particularly to state in detail the evidence which he has repeatedly told me he had from Onis during the negotiation, that the Spanish government itself knew the grants were null and void. . . .

“De Neuville’s great earnestness upon this affair may be ascribed to various motives, some highly honorable and generous, others partaking of those virtues that begin at home. (1) To a sense of pure justice and unsullied honor: knowing the professed intention and clear understanding on both sides that no error committed or deception attempted by Onis should have any effect possible to defeat it. (2) To vindicate his own integrity in the transaction, that article having been most particularly discussed between him and me, and the principles settled between us, that bona fide settlers should not be excluded, even though with grants not entirely regular, but that no fraudulent grants should be confirmed. (3) To strengthen his interest with his own government by interesting that of the United States in his favor, which he cannot fail to do by bearing testimony decisively for them upon a point of considerable importance. (4) To make a merit hereafter for himself or his government of the part he takes in this affair, as having rendered essential service to the United States, and acquiring claims to favor in return; and (5) Finally, to make himself important, and have an agency in the transaction which may add to his individual or political consequence. There is probably a mixture of all these ingredients in his impulses, and I am willing to believe that the pure and disinterested portion of them predominates in a scale adjusted by the standard of their comparative excellence. De Neuville is not a profound or gigantic genius, but he is a fair and honorable man.”⁷⁸

Meantime, in the spring of this year, the French minister, conceiving that his most important charge was accomplished, and feeling that there were questions which it would be advantageous for him to discuss in person with the authorities in France, especially in view of some political changes which had occurred there,—anxious too for a sight of the homeland from which he had been, either through duty or through necessity, for nearly ten years an exile, asked his government for a leave of absence. Acknowledging a notification to this effect, Adams wrote,—

“I am directed by the President to assure you of the great satisfaction which he takes in bearing testimony to the propriety and friendliness of your conduct and deportment since you have resided here as the representative of France, and of his peculiar sensibility to the interest which, as the organ of your Government, you have taken in promoting a conciliatory adjustment of the long-standing and complicated differences between the United States and Spain.”⁷⁹

Of greater interest and value to us in forming a judgment of the real importance of the French mediation is this unofficial and unique testimonial contained in a letter to Richard Rush dated six weeks later:

“No foreign minister accredited to the United States since their existence as a nation has ever in serving his own government rendered at the same time a service so transcendently important to this country as Mr. Hyde de Neuville. This termination of the late negotiation with Spain (so far as it has terminated) is, I am entirely convinced, in a great measure owing to his exertions. Immediately after my letter of the 12th of March, 1818, to Mr. Onis, he began to take a part in the negotiation, and from that time he pursued with great earnestness and zeal the

object of having it brought to an amicable and mutually satisfactory close. . . . You remember the mediation of Great Britain and afterwards of the allied powers was proposed by Spain and declined by us. France without offering her mediation instructed her minister to use his good offices, and they were faithfully rendered. Their great efficiency was in the operation of their influence upon Spain. He operated upon Spain, first, by his counsels to Mr. de Onis, and secondly by persuading his own government to act directly upon that of Spain. . . . But whether ultimately successful or not, Mr. de Neuville's efforts have been as active as his intentions have been sincere, and his conduct through the whole process has impressed me with a high sense of his integrity of heart and his friendliness of disposition." ⁸⁰

This tone of appreciation is reflected in the social functions arranged in Washington for the De Neuvilles when their approaching departure was announced. The *National Intelligencer* described a ball given for them on the 18th of May as an "Entertainment never surpassed." Among the decorations we find the French and American flags entwined, and a brilliant transparency with the arms of the two countries and the device "First Allies in the cause of Liberty." The band played Revolutionary tunes, and the Lily and the Pine "carried the thoughts back to that glorious period when the gallant French battled with us and for us; and renewed in all present the feelings of regard for the brave people who shed their blood in supporting our independence." Mrs. Seaton, wife of the editor of this paper, gives us in her diary a spirited bit of description, with a more personal touch:

"There has been more gayety than I have ever known here in the summer, caused by the farewell dinners, the public and private balls, given to M. and Mme. de Neuville, who have by their unaffected kindness to their equals and their munificence to the poor won upon the popular esteem and gratitude. . . . The public ball was a great success, M. de Neuville making a very impressive little speech of thanks to the citizens. William, with five other married men, officiated as master of ceremonies, and I was pleased that he had an opportunity of testifying respect for the worthy old couple. . . ." ⁸¹

Among the Fourth of July toasts, always fair indications of the sentiment of the country, we may note,—

"France, the friend of our youth. A friend in need is a friend indeed!" ⁸²

Crawford wrote to Gallatin that the French minister was quite a favorite with the administration and no less so with the citizens, and deservedly. He added that but for De Neuville's good offices the Spanish negotiations would probably have been postponed for years.⁸³ The papers in general do not speak of any French influence upon the treaty, although the *Georgia Journal* of February 23 said it appeared that the French minister favored

the cession. In August, in commenting upon a Spanish decoration awarded to M. de Neuville, the *National Intelligencer* said,—

“It is probable that this act may be traced to the late negotiations at Washington, in which it is generally understood Mr. de Neuville was unwearied in his exertions to contribute to an amicable adjustment of the difficulties existing between the United States and Spain.”⁸⁴

This “amicable adjustment” which everyone greeted with so much satisfaction, and which everyone hoped was safely concluded, nevertheless was fated to remain in doubt for many months. The Spanish ruler and his advisers seized the excuse of the debatable grants as a cause for delay, not because they thought the contention sound but as a cover for their conviction that the ratification of the treaty would be the signal for the recognition by the United States of the South American republics. The King postponed his action therefore from week to week, and finally notified the United States that he would send a special envoy, to obtain some “explanations” in regard to the terms of the agreement. In vain the American authorities protested that the treaty was perfectly clear as it stood, that it needed no explanations, but that if the King conceived that any were required, the new minister to Spain, Mr. Forsyth, was perfectly competent to give them. The Spanish government held to its decision, and also was slow in sending the envoy, so that the patience of the United States, strained by the long uncertainty, threatened to give way.⁸⁵ Occupation of the Floridas, without waiting any longer for Spain to make up her mind, was proposed. This would have been equivalent to a declaration of war.

Watching these developments, France realized in dismay that the catastrophe of a serious break between the United States and Spain, which she had so earnestly endeavored to avert, might at any moment become a fact. Gallatin found the diplomats in Paris anxious to further any arrangement which might lead to ratification, and to bring all available pressure to bear upon Spain to induce her to abandon her dilatory attitude.⁸⁶ They urged, too, that the United States should not endanger the success that was almost within its grasp by any hasty or intemperate measures which should take from it the sympathy of the powers now advocating their cause. Russia was acting in close harmony with France in this matter, and Great Britain, though she had been believed by the United States to be antagonistic, was yet showing a disposition to favor the ratification of the treaty. Spain now appeared to be wrong, in the estimation of these powers, but violent action on the part of the Americans might make them seem the aggressors.⁸⁷

Monroe, much disturbed over the situation, had taken a course unprecedented, at least in American annals, and one which manifested more strongly than anything else could have done his confidence in the French mediation, informal though it was. He had directed Adams to write to the French minister, then on the point of sailing, asking him to defer his departure and arrange to spend the winter in the United States. The request is couched in the strongest terms.

“If you could, without a grave inconvenience, defer your departure for France, you would serve the pacific and benevolent views of your government, the interests of humanity, the ardent wishes of the American government, and before everything the interests and the honor of Spain. . . . It would be especially useful if you could be here when the envoy from Spain arrives. . . . According to the wishes of the American government, I submit to your heart and that of his Majesty the King of France, the consolidation of the peace of the world. . . .”⁸⁸

To such an appeal M. de Neuville could not be deaf. He felt it his duty to stay and try to give further proofs of the friendly disposition of his government. Regretfully, for he had anticipated with much pleasure the visit to France, he cancelled his passage and returned to Washington. Mme. de Neuville said disappointedly, “France seems the Promised Land! We can vision it, but not reach it!”⁸⁹

The envoy from Spain, General Vives, did not arrive until April, 1820, and the period of waiting continued to be one of tense anxiety. De Neuville steadily urged moderation and patience, but toward the end of the year, while not regretting that he had stayed, he became convinced that his presence was useless, and that probably nothing would avail to keep the peace. His advices from home showed clearly that although the Spanish minister would speak of the grants, the key of the situation was the question of the Spanish-American colonies. Spain certainly intended to ask for a promise of non-recognition; and on this point the United States would not yield an inch. Indeed if the request appeared at all in the nature of a demand it would probably become public, and would then be met inevitably by a refusal even to discuss the matter, and an announcement that the Spanish provinces would be recognized as independent whenever it should be deemed advisable.⁹⁰

The President was persuaded, however, to agree to await the arrival of the envoy before taking any direct or irrevocable action, and the Presidential Message of December 7, which when first drafted contained some very strong expressions of sympathy with the revolting colonists, was toned down considerably before it was sent to Congress.⁹¹ This Message, speaking of the action of Spain, said,—“It is satisfactory to know that they have not been countenanced by any European power. On the contrary,

the opinion and wishes both of France and of Great Britain, have not been withheld either from the United States or from Spain, and have been unequivocal in favor of the ratification." ⁹²

Early in February, 1820, General Vives arrived in Paris, and remained there for three days before proceeding to Liverpool from whence he expected to sail for America early in March. M. Pasquier, the new French minister of foreign affairs, arranged a meeting between him and Mr. Gallatin. Vives said that the chief points of his instructions were "to see that the honor of the Crown should be saved in the matter of the grants and to receive satisfactory evidence of our intention to preserve a fair neutrality in the colonial war." Both Pasquier and Gallatin endeavored to point out to him the seriousness of the situation and the probable consequences of any provocative or unduly dilatory measures. Pasquier explained that it would be most inadvisable to ask any promise not to recognize, and said that "Spain could only rely on the moral effect which a solemn treaty, accommodating all her differences with the United States, would have on their future proceedings." ⁹³

The President's Message in March, after repeating that France and Great Britain were employing their good offices to bring about a ratification by Spain, stated that the governments of France and Russia had expressed an earnest desire that the United States would for the present take no step on the principle of reprisal which might possibly disturb the peace, and added that there was good cause to presume that this wish was founded in a belief that such extreme measures would not be necessary to attain the desired result.⁹⁴ It is worthy of note that from no quarter, during all this period, do we hear one word in condemnation of the French activity. Even Clay, who was most willing to embarrass the administration, and who at this time bitterly attacked the government for listening to Russian and British persuasions, and thus encouraging foreign interference in American affairs, did not name France in this connection.⁹⁵ But the French influence had begun to wane. In the first place, it had ceased to be so effective in Spain, for the successful Spanish Revolution of February, 1820, had thrown out of power all the extreme royalists who had been in close touch with the Bourbon government in France. The revolutionary leaders were disinclined to accept advice from beyond the Pyrenees. France, too, was threatened with a similar explosion. The murder of the Duke of Berry brought on a ministerial crisis which gave the Ultras the control of the government, and left the country filled with dissension and restlessness. For the moment the authorities were too absorbed with their own difficulties to carry on a vigorous foreign policy.⁹⁶

In America, the questions which concerned the United States and France

directly, began to press for settlement. Thrown into the background by the exigencies of the Spanish situation, they had nevertheless been the subject of considerable discussion and controversy. Gallatin had never been able to obtain any satisfaction in the matter of the indemnities for damages done under Napoleon. The United States realized that France was not in a position to pay these claims during the early days of her rehabilitation, certainly not while she was maintaining foreign troops upon her soil, but it seemed just that she should accept responsibility for them, and agree to settle them at some future date. This the French government showed itself unwilling to do. Instead, it put in a counterclaim for special commercial privileges in the ports of Louisiana, under a clause of the Purchase Treaty of 1803. The general regulations affecting commerce between the two states seemed hopelessly involved. M. de Neuville, after remaining long enough to talk with General Vives, who arrived in April, left Washington for his return to France late in May. His departure was the occasion for renewed expressions of great esteem, both from the President and in the press.⁹⁷ President Monroe directed Gallatin to advise the French government that M. de Neuville had acquitted himself entirely to the satisfaction of the administration in this country "and the members of Congress. His deportment has been conciliatory, and in our concerns with his country and also with Spain, in which he has taken a part, we have had much reason to be satisfied."⁹⁸

Yet, in this same month, a few weeks earlier, the United States Congress had passed an act laying a practically prohibitive duty on French vessels trading with American ports, a duty which the French government promptly met with a countervailing tax laid upon American vessels in French ports. With these matters the following chapter will deal in greater detail.

Once more, too, in the American papers appeared frequent criticisms of the French government. Discussing the Spanish Revolution the *Concord Patriot* remarked,—“Degraded France breathes out heavy sighs for a like deliverance.”⁹⁹ On May 18, in the *Baltimore Patriot*, appeared the statement:—“France begins to find that she has gained less than nothing by the compelled restoration of a feeble Bourbon and a corrupt aristocracy. She has lost respectability without gaining peace or quiet.”¹⁰⁰ And, finally, among the toasts on July Fourth, in contrast to that quoted from the preceding year, we find:

“Bonaparte: the only legitimate sovereign of Frenchmen; may he soon and long rule over them!”¹⁰¹

While, therefore, official relations during the first part of the reign of Louis XVIII showed a distinct improvement, this improvement was not very far-reaching, since it did not lead to a prompt solution of the points at issue between the two countries. Moreover, it had been dependent largely upon the personal influence and assistance of M. de Neuville. The knowledge of his aid and the appreciation of it was to a great extent confined to Administration circles, and could not to any degree modify public opinion, which continued to show itself in general distinctly anti-French, or at least anti-Bourbon. This attitude was based on a deeply-grounded and sincere disapproval of the reactionary policy and practice of the French government, and was to be intensified rather than lessened by the events of the next few years.

NOTES AND SOURCES

¹ Henry Adams, *Life of Albert Gallatin*, 562-3.

² *The Writings of Albert Gallatin*, Henry Adams, ed., I: 667.

³ Gallatin, *Writings*, I: 675-6; *The Writings of James Monroe*, S. M. Hamilton, ed., V: 334-35.

⁴ Gallatin, *Writings*, I: 692.

⁵ *Ib.*, II: 1-2.

⁶ Adams to Richard Rush, May 2, 1819. *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*, W. G. Ford, ed., VI: 547.

⁷ John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs*, C. F. Adams, ed., IV: 303. March 17, 1819.

See, for another description, Rowland, *Life and Correspondence of Charles Carroll of Carrollton*, II: 323.

⁸ Baron Guillaume Jean Hyde de Neuville, *Mémoires et Souvenirs* (Paris, 1888), II: 184, 202-3.

⁹ *American Watchman and Delaware Republican*, April 20, 1816.

¹⁰ Georgetown, D. C., *Messenger*, Sept. 18, 1816.

¹¹ St. Louis, Mo., *Gazette*, Oct. 19, 1816.

¹² Louisville, Ky., *Correspondent*, June 10, 1816, quoting *Richmond Enquirer*.

¹³ Benton, *Abridgment of Debates in Congress*, V: 576-7.

¹⁴ Clay, *Works*, Colton, ed., V: 85, 93.

¹⁵ *Niles' Register*, IX: 415.

¹⁶ *Niles' Register*, IX: 382.

¹⁷ *Ib.*, XI: 33-34.

¹⁸ Quoted in *Georgia Journal*, Sept. 25, 1816.

¹⁹ *Niles'*, IX: 404, 374.

²⁰ *Ib.*, X: 75.

²¹ *American Watchman*, January 6, 1816.

²² *National Intelligencer*, September 25; and quoting *National Advocate*; St. Louis, Mo., *Gazette*, August 10, 1816.

²³ *Niles'*, X: 331.

²⁴ *National Intelligencer*, September 18, October 9, November 18, quoting *Philadel-*

phia Aurora; *Savannah Republican*, September 19, and *New York Columbian* quoted; *Baltimore American*, quoted in *Boston Independent Chronicle*, January 4; *Winchester, (Ky.) Advertiser*, October 5.

²⁵ Georgetown, D. C., *Messenger*, June 15; *Niles'*, IX: 374-5; X: 364; X: 403, etc.; *National Intelligencer*, October 4, and quoting *New York Columbian*.

²⁶ January 31, 1816.

²⁷ *Niles'*, IX: 403.

²⁸ *Georgia Journal*, February 7, 1816. For articles of the same tenor, *Concord, (N. H.) Patriot*, February 6; *Boston Independent Chronicle*, January 4, January 29, quoting *New York Columbian* and September 19.

²⁹ *Boston Centinel*, March 9, 1816; *Boston Gazette*, January 29; *Boston Palladium*; *Philadelphia Democratic Press*.

³⁰ *Baltimore Federal Republican*, November 15, 1816; *Boston Centinel*, March 9, July 10, September 7; *Connecticut Courant*, January 23, August 13, December 10; *Boston Gazette*, July 1; *Kennebunk (Me.) Weekly Visiter*, May 24.

³¹ *Niles'*, XI: 124.

³² December 5, 1816. Similar articles, *National Intelligencer*, October 10; *Georgia Journal*, December 25.

³³ Jefferson to Benjamin Austin, January 9, 1816, *National Intelligencer*, March 22, 1816. See also Jefferson to Lafayette, May 17, Jefferson, *Writings*, Memorial Edition, A. Lipscomb, ed., XIX: 240.

³⁴ Jefferson to Lafayette, February 9, 1816, Jefferson, *Writings*, Washington, ed., VI: 553-4.

³⁵ Adams to Monroe, April 9, 1816. John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, Ford, ed., VI: 9-10.

³⁶ *Virginia Argus*, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, June 29; *Georgetown Messenger*, September 21.

³⁷ *Baltimore Patriot*, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, March 26.

³⁸ Gallatin to Monroe, July 12, 1816. Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 1-2.

³⁹ *National Intelligencer*, May 18, 1815; March 20, August 29, 1815; January 19, 1816; *Niles'*, IX: 97-114.

⁴⁰ *Niles'*, IX: 375; X: 124; *Boston Patriot*, quoted *National Intelligencer*, April 13, 23; *Aurora*, June 17; *American Watchman*, July 6, 1816.

⁴¹ Gallatin to Monroe, September 25, 1816. Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 9.

⁴² *National Intelligencer*, July 14, 1816.

⁴³ Madison to Monroe, August 28, 1816. *The Writings of James Madison*, Gaillard Hunt, ed., VIII: 362-364. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London.

⁴⁴ Hyde de Neuville, *Mémoires*, II: 261-2.

⁴⁵ Monroe to Gallatin. Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton, ed., V: 388-389, 390. September 10, 1816.

⁴⁶ Gallatin to Monroe, November 21, Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 19-21; January 30, 1817.

⁴⁷ *Ib.*; Hyde de Neuville, II: 262.

⁴⁸ *National Intelligencer*, November 9, 1816.

⁴⁹ *Ib.*, November 27.

⁵⁰ *Aurora*, November 8, 1816.

⁵¹ *Georgia Journal*, November 27, quoting *New York Columbian*; *Niles'*, XI: 169; *Louisville Correspondent*, December 2, 1816, quoting *National Register*.

The Federal papers ignore the matter or treat it as an unimportant rumor. *Boston Gazette*, November 18, *Trenton Federalist*, November 25.

⁵² Monroe to Gallatin, November 26. Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton, ed., V: 389.

⁵³ Crawford to Gallatin, March 12, 1817. Gallatin, *Writings*, 11: 28.

⁵⁴ Gallatin to Monroe, July 12, 1817. *Ib.*, 11: 40.

⁵⁵ Bagot to Sneyd, June 12, 1816. Josceline Bagot, *George Canning and his Friends*, 11: 24.

⁵⁶ Jesse B. Reeves, *Napoleonic Exiles in America*, 19-21 (In *Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Political Science*, Series XXIII, Nos. 9-10).

Vevey, (Indiana), *Register*, quoted in *National Advocate*, July 15, 1815; *New York Commercial Advertiser*, Sept. 9, 1815; *New York Gazette*, Sept. 12, 1815; *American Watchman*, July 13, *Niles'*, XI: 77, Sept. 28, 1816; *National Intelligencer*, Oct. 10, Nov. 19, 1816; July 27, 1818; *Boston Centinel*, July 6, 1816; *Winchester (Ky.) Advertiser*, Oct. 5, 1816; Mar. 29, 1817.

⁵⁷ *Hyde de Neuville*, 11: 206-210, 272.

⁵⁸ *Hyde de Neuville*, 11: 206-7.

⁵⁹ Reeves, *Napoleonic Exiles*, Ch. 111; *National Intelligencer*, Nov. 12, 1816; Dec. 17, 1816.

⁶⁰ Adams, *Memoirs*, Nov. 9, 1817, IV: 18-19; Jan. 12, 1818, IV: 40.

⁶¹ Reeves, Chs. IV, V; *Hyde de Neuville*, 11: 267, 319-325; John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, VI: 190-193, 195-198; *Memoirs*, IV: 9, 11, 18-20, 36, 48, 84, 100.

⁶² Reeves, Chs. VI-VII; *Niles'*, XIV: 393-4, August 8, 1818; Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 38-40, 64, 83-84, 97, 100-101; *Writings*, VI: 289, 299-300, 310.

Onis to Adams, May 7, 1818, *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV: 494.

⁶³ Quoted, *New York Gazette and General Advertiser*, July 19, 1817.

⁶⁴ Madison to Livingston. Herbert B. Fuller, *The Purchase of Florida*, 126.

⁶⁵ Madison to Livingston, Jan. 31, 1804. *American State Papers*, 11: 574.

⁶⁶ Talleyrand to Gravina, Aug. 30, 1804. Cited, Henry Adams, *History of the United States*, 11: 299; Talleyrand to de Santivanes. Cited, *Fuller*, 140.

⁶⁷ Monroe to Gallatin, June 1, 1816. Monroe, *Writings*, Hamilton, ed., V: 384.

⁶⁸ Adams to Onis, Mar. 12, 1818, *National Intelligencer*, March 16, 1818; *Niles'* XIV: 59-60.

⁶⁹ Erving to John Quincy Adams, October 22, 1818. Cited *Fuller*, 296-7.

⁷⁰ Richelieu to De Neuville, July 19, 1817, De Neuville to Richelieu, December 11, 1817. *De Neuville*, 11: 326, 331; Gallatin to Adams, Nov. 5; Nov. 21, 1818. Gallatin, *Writings*, 11: 75-82, 87; Monroe, *Writings*, VI: 94-96.

⁷¹ Monroe, *Writings*, V: 387.

⁷² Gallatin to Adams, August 19, 1818. Gallatin, *Writings*, 11: 70-74.

⁷³ Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 48, 83, 87, 105, 106, 110-112, 115-116, 124-127, 168-170, 172.

⁷⁴ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV: 621, provide a further illustration.

⁷⁵ *De Neuville*, 11: 390.

⁷⁶ *American State Papers*, IV: 625-6.

⁷⁷ Correspondence transmitted to Congress with Message, December 7, 1819. *Niles'*, XV: 255-6, 267-8, 270. *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV: 652-654, 657-660.

⁷⁸ Adams, *Memoirs*, IV: 329, 331. April 12, 1819.

⁷⁹ Adams to De Neuville, March 31, 1819. *American State Papers*, V: 157.

- ⁸⁰ Adams to Rush, May 2, 1819. John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, VI: 547-8. Courtesy of The Macmillan Co., Publishers, New York.
- ⁸¹ *National Intelligencer*, May 26, 1819; *Niles'* XV: 238; Miss Seaton, *W. W. Seaton, A Biographical Sketch*, 143.
- ⁸² *National Intelligencer*, July 7, 1819.
- ⁸³ Crawford to Gallatin, July 24, 1819. Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 112.
- ⁸⁴ *National Intelligencer*, August 25, 1819.
- ⁸⁵ *American State Papers*, IV: 650-703.
- ⁸⁶ Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, July 6, 1819. Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 109; To Forsyth, July 9, *Ib.*, 110-111; To J. Q. Adams, 29, *Ib.*, 118-119.
- ⁸⁷ Gallatin to J. Q. Adams, September 24, 1819. *Ib.*, 121; October 26, 1819. *Ib.*, 125-6; December 8, *Ib.*, 128-9.
- ⁸⁸ John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, (October 23), VI: 557-8; *De Neuville*, II: 400-402; October 26, 1819.
- ⁸⁹ *De Neuville*, II: 404-5.
- ⁹⁰ *Ib.*, 407-8, November 28; Adams, *Writings*, VI: 559; *Memoirs*, IV: 453-5, November 27, 1819.
- ⁹¹ *Ib.*, 456-462, 465-7, December 4; John Quincy Adams to William Lowndes, December 21, 1819. *Writings*, VI: 562-4.
- ⁹² Monroe, *Writings*, VI: 3.
- ⁹³ Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, February 15, 1820. Gallatin, *Writings*; II: 133-136.
- ⁹⁴ Monroe, *Writings*, VI: 117-118.
- ⁹⁵ Clay, *Life, Correspondence, and Speeches*, Colton, ed., V: 207-9, April 3, 1820; 242-3, May 10, 1820.
- ⁹⁶ Adams to Gallatin, May 28, 1820. Adams, *Writings*, VII: 35-36.
- ⁹⁷ *National Gazette*, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, May 29, 1820.
- ⁹⁸ Monroe to Gallatin, May 26. Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 141.
- ⁹⁹ *Concord Patriot*, May 30, 1820.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Baltimore Patriot*, May 18, 1820. See also *New York Commercial Advertiser*, quoted in *Baltimore Patriot*, same date; *Essex Register*, May 10; *Boston Centinel*, April 26; *Niles'*, XVII: 421; XVIII: 58, 74, 263, 414-15.
- ¹⁰¹ *National Intelligencer*, July 12, 1820.

CHAPTER 3

Relations with the Restored Bourbons—Later Period

ALTHOUGH in the early years of the Bourbon Restoration relations were officially friendly, and the United States authorities had every reason for considerable gratitude toward the French for their support in the matter of the Florida Treaty, certain questions of a practical nature had not been satisfactorily arranged, and the discussions in regard to them developed considerable acerbity on both sides.

The earliest of these in origin was the American claim for indemnity, based on the damages done to commercial interests in the time of Napoleon.¹ A convention signed in 1803, at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, provided for most of the claims dated before 1800. A few classes not covered by this agreement, and an additional mass of cases dating mostly from 1803 to 1805, had never been adjusted. The questions involved were extremely complex. Various decrees issued by the Emperor in person, without legislative concurrence, could be cited to justify the French action. But how far should such decrees apply to neutrals? And how far, even if they could fairly be applied, could they be recognized as retroactive, or to be applied without due notice? Were vessels judged and condemned by a prize court to be paid for on the same basis as vessels arbitrarily burned at sea? How far did the responsibility of the Bourbon government for Napoleonic misdeeds extend? These questions, and others, formed the basis of innumerable conferences and communications. When Gallatin went to Paris as minister, he was instructed that his first duty was to present the indemnity claims and press for a settlement, or at least for an acknowledgment of their justice. The French declared themselves perfectly willing to discuss, but also perfectly unable to pay. They could scarcely pronounce the claims entirely inadmissible, inasmuch as precisely similar ones had been allowed in the treaties with the European governments; but they made every effort to avoid or postpone any definite recognition of indebtedness. This attitude was favored by the unwillingness of the United States to urge immediate payment from a country whose financial situation was precarious, and which needed time to organize its

resources after the prodigious events of the last two decades. The instability of the French ministries after 1818 also contributed to delay, for whenever a new minister took charge of the portfolio of foreign affairs, he professed to know nothing of the claims and required time to find and study the documents on file, and to consult other authorities, so that before he was prepared to give any reply, there might be another ministerial change, resulting in further delay. Frequently the French simply took refuge in silence, and the only answer given to inquiries of the American minister might be a mere formal acknowledgment of the receipt of his communications.²

Moreover, the French had counter-claims, which they pressed actively. The most important of these was in regard to commerce in Louisiana. They asserted that under the eighth article of the Purchase Treaty they were granted in perpetuity the rights of the "most favored nation," but that the United States, in granting to Great Britain after 1815 the right of entry without the payment of discriminating duties, while French vessels continued to pay a tax, had committed an infraction of this agreement. The United States law of 1815, to which this contention referred, provided that in case any country should consent to receive American vessels on the same terms as those of its own nationals, the United States would grant a like privilege to the vessels of that country. Great Britain, and later some other countries, accepted this offer. France did not, but continued to collect very heavy dues on American vessels in French ports, much to the advantage of French commerce. Therefore, said the United States authorities, Great Britain was in no sense in the position of a "favored nation," but was receiving a privilege for which she had paid, and which France, on making the same payment, might likewise receive, and which would be available in all American ports. Moreover, France could not in any case receive special privileges in the ports of Louisiana without a violation of the Constitutional provision that all duties, imports, and excises, should be uniform throughout the United States.

A further French claim was that of the heirs of Caron de Beaumarchais, for an unpaid balance due him on account of purchases made for the United States government at the time of the Revolutionary War. This case was complicated by an uncertainty regarding a sum paid Beaumarchais by King Louis XVI, for the benefit of the colonies, and unaccounted for. Various minor disputes had also to be considered. As Baron Pasquier expressed it to Mr. Gallatin in 1821, there was a fatality attached to these affairs which tended perpetually to impede an arrangement by throwing in the way incidents of the most irritating nature.³ In 1820, officials of the revenue services seized a French vessel, the *Apollon*, on the Spanish

side of the St. Mary's River, in Florida, on a charge of attempting to evade the tariff regulations of the United States; and an American war ship, the *Alligator*, in carrying out its orders to prevent slave trading on the African coast, captured several French ships, the best known being the *Jeune Eugenie*. Questions of consular rights, of port dues, of traiffs, of deserting seamen, and of pirates, were injected into the discussions of the main issues.

In 1821, after it had become evident that Gallatin, in France, could find no way out of the impasse, it was agreed to transfer the commercial negotiations to Washington, and M. de Neuville was directed to return and conduct them. So great was the French confidence in his skill and his popularity in America, that his instructions provided for a stay of only a few months in the United States, after which he was to proceed to Brazil as minister to that country, and to clear up some difficulties there. He arrived in Washington just at the time that the authorities there received the Spanish ratification of the Florida Treaty, and he was tendered a personal welcome of the most cordial variety. The negotiation of the commercial agreement, however, proved by no means so simple as his government had expected. The Americans absolutely refused to admit the Louisiana claim, or even to discuss it as a part of a tariff convention. They insisted upon the principle of complete reciprocity in the matter of port dues, and in general showed themselves quite immune to diplomatic blandishments, so that it was not until June 24, 1822, that a treaty was finally agreed upon, and even then it was offered merely as a temporary arrangement, intended to break the trade deadlock which had existed since the summer of 1820, when the United States, in an effort to compel the French to abandon the heavy dues they were imposing upon American vessels, had laid prohibitive duties on French ships in American ports. The only result had been to arouse the Gallic obstinacy and pride, and lead to the prompt imposition of even heavier dues. The new treaty proved unexpectedly satisfactory, however, and was allowed to remain in force. It equalized the port dues, and provided for their gradual extinction. It defined standard weights and measures, fixed charges for pilotage, etc., and provided for the arrest of deserting sailors.

The other questions dragged on until 1831, when Jackson's vigorous policy, coupled with the fact that the Revolution of 1830 in France brought into control an element friendly to the United States, made it possible for William C. Rives, then our minister at Paris, to negotiate a treaty under which the indemnity claims on both sides were settled, the United States paying 1,500,000 francs to cover all claims in behalf of French citizens, and receiving 25,000,000 francs, in payment of all damages due from

France. France also relinquished her contention in regard to commerce with Louisiana, in return for some favorable tariff adjustments. This treaty was ratified in 1832, but the French legislature failed to make the appropriations necessary to carry out its provisions, thereby leading to a crisis in 1835.

The official documents bearing on these questions are very full, and these together with the numerous other references to the subject to be found in the writings of Monroe, Gallatin, and Adams, show the great importance which the government attached to the settlements, and manifest also quite clearly the feelings of impatience and irritation which arose in the course of the discussions.⁴ The character and degree of public sentiment may be gauged somewhat by the Presidents' Messages, which regularly reviewed the situation. Those of Monroe were calm and dispassionate, expressing the hope for a satisfactory settlement of disputed points in the near future, but without recommending any active measures.⁵ Personally, Monroe felt rather strongly especially on the question of the *Apollon* case, as is shown in his correspondence with Adams.⁶ Some members of the cabinet, Crawford in particular, differed from the governmental policy, and in conversations with De Neuville helped to strengthen the French position. Crawford wrote to Gallatin in 1822, referring to the capture of the slave-trading ships, that in his opinion a commercial agreement might be made "unless our determination to support every officer in violating the orders, laws, and constitution of the government and nation should oppose an insurmountable obstacle to it." He added, "A disposition to discuss has always characterized our government; but until recently an appearance of moderation has marked our discussions. Now our disposition to discuss seems to have been augmented, and the spirit of conciliation has manifestly been abandoned by our councils. We are determined to say harsher things than are said to us, and to have the last word." Gallatin agreed somewhat with this estimate.⁷

In May, 1824, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Forsyth, reported that the committee had received several petitions, memorials, etc., and had studied with care the correspondence between the United States and France. The report states:

"The committee have seen, with surprise, that although the attention of the present government of France was especially invited to this subject in 1818, and has been repeatedly recalled to it since that time, France has not yet thought proper to enter into a discussion of it [the indemnity question]. The committee are of opinion that measures ought to be taken to impress upon France the necessity of an early and definite adjustment."

The committee would offer such measures if they did not hope that France would take action during the coming summer. The committee felt that France must be careful not to place a neutral in a worse position than an enemy, "unless she intends to instruct other powers that in all future wars in which she may be engaged with a formidable rival, it will be more prudent to be her enemy than her friend."⁸

Monroe's Message the next December might have been expected to reflect somewhat this energetic tone. That it did not, may have been due to the hope it expressed, that Charles X, who had just ascended the French throne, might be more amenable to reason than Louis XVIII. The presence of Lafayette in Washington at the time may also have had its influence.

Adams, who as Secretary of State had been charged with the duty of carrying on the negotiations and knew better than any one else how little success had attended them, included in the first draft of his Presidential Message of December, 1825, the statement that in his judgment the United States would be entirely justified in the use of force to bring about a settlement, but that the Administration did not approve of this, and would persevere in its diplomatic methods. The members of the Cabinet disapproved of this phraseology, saying that it was equivalent to announcing that the United States would under no circumstances resort to force, which would amount to an abandonment of the claims. They suggested that he advise that measures of reprisal be undertaken. The Message finally reads that "several objects of great interest" . . . are left unadjusted, "and particularly a mass of claims . . . for property taken or destroyed under circumstances of the most aggravated and outrageous character. In the long period during which continual and earnest appeals have been made to the equity and magnanimity of France in behalf of these claims, their justice has not been, as it could not be, denied. . . . They have been presented and urged hitherto without effect. The repeated and earnest representations of our minister at the court of France remain as yet even without any answer. . . ." ⁹ The Message of 1826 reported no change in the situation. That of 1827 recalled the fact that our relations with France go back to the first year of our existence. "We do not forget them. . . . We should hail with exultation a moment which should indicate a recollection, equally friendly, on the part of France." In 1828 the matter was still "the subject of earnest representation and remonstrance."¹⁰

Jackson's first Message was characteristically blunt and aggressive. The indemnity was still unsatisfied, "and must therefore continue to furnish a

subject of unpleasant discussion and possible collision between the two governments." The President "cherishes a lively hope that the injurious delays of the past will find redress in the equity of the future," and has instructed the minister of the United States in France to press the claims in a spirit which will win respect. In 1830, he coupled with flattering remarks about the new French government the statement that "the sense of this injury has had and must continue to have a very unfavorable effect" upon the commercial intercourse of the two countries. And in 1831, after the signature of the treaty, he said:

"Should this treaty receive the proper sanction, a source of irritation will be stopped that has for so many years in some degree alienated from each other two nations who from interest as well as the remembrance of early associations, ought to cherish the most friendly relations. . . . An encouragement will be given for perseverance in the demands of justice by this new proof that if steadily pursued they will be listened to, and it will be a warning to other powers to deal justly with the United States." ¹¹

Press comments on these subjects are rather rare. In 1819, November 25, a correspondent of the *Independent Chronicle and Boston Patriot* wrote from Paris a criticism of the French commercial demands, and said, "Such a treaty our government will certainly never listen to." ¹² August 12, 1820, the *National Intelligencer* said:

"Great excitement has been produced in France by the passage of our act imposing new tonnage duties on French vessels. From the friendly feeling of this country to France, that act was passed reluctantly, and will be cheerfully suspended, according to the provision it contains authorizing that course, when the government of France shall think fit to reciprocate with us the liberality of our commercial relations. The measure seems to have produced as much sensation as if it were unexpected. But what else could they have looked for? Our minister to that country had been long enough entreating them to reason and put off by evasive answers. . . . France will not disdain to be as wise as England, and by a relaxation of her system, avail herself of the opportunity now offered to her of placing herself in our ports on the footing of the most favored nation." ¹³

The *Southern Patriot* said:

"France is the aggressor in this war of commercial restriction, and she should be the first to evince a disposition to conclude a treaty of peace in the spirit of peace." ¹⁴

In 1824 the *North American Review* had two long editorials by Edward Everett reviewing the history of the spoliation claims, and declaring that national honor demanded that energetic steps should be taken to ensure their settlement. ¹⁵

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1824, above mentioned, elicited this comment from the *New York American*:

"It is to be borne in mind by Americans, that while every petty potentate in Europe has been able to obtain from the French government complete remuneration for the wrongs inflicted by Napoleon, this government has been left for years without even the civility of an answer to its reclamation of indemnity for spoliation more unjust and unprincipled than has ever before been submitted to by a free and powerful people. . . . The title of Roman citizen was a protection anywhere in the world. Why should the title of American citizen afford less protection to those who bear it, or cause of apprehension to those who set it at naught?"¹⁶

The *National Intelligencer* thought that payment had been "too long withheld, in defiance of every principle of justice and comity."¹⁷ The "favored nation" plea in regard to Louisiana, the *New York American* characterized as "unjustifiable"; and on October 13, 1825, urged stern demands instead of supplication, and added,—“If justice unarmed cannot be heard by European courts, they should see that a sword can at need be supplied, and used, too.”¹⁸ The *New York Gazette* said,—“France is able to pay, and France must pay.”¹⁹ *Niles' Register*, however, deprecated this warlike spirit, and while reporting popular meetings arranged in Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, and other places, by those interested in the claims, took the position that while it was correct to keep the claims alive, and to urge them by all amicable means, it could only create antagonism and delay the settlement, to talk of compelling payment.²⁰

Faith in the good will of "regenerated France" after the Revolution of 1830 was general.²¹ The prompt appointment of a committee to investigate the claims, with George Washington Lafayette, son of the General, as a member, confirmed this belief. There was surprise and disappointment when the committee, reporting in April, 1831, upheld the French claims to Louisiana privileges; justified the imperial aggressions by the actions of Great Britain and the United States; agreed to pay only when the imperial system had been abusively or irregularly applied; and finally, declared 10,000,000 francs the utmost they would pay.²² But an amicable arrangement, representing a compromise of the disputed points, soon followed. The *Annual Register*, reviewing the whole history of the claims and the terms of settlement, said that the delay had resulted chiefly from an unwillingness on the part of the French government to recognize any claims in favor of a government whose liberal institutions were regarded as a standing condemnation of its own principles and policy.²³ The terms of the Treaty were sharply criticised by opponents of Jackson, and by some of the commercial interests, as providing for too small a payment on the part of France, and also as exceeding the treaty rights of the Executive, in that they included an alteration of the tariff, but the agreement was ratified without difficulty.²⁴

These difficulties after all affected comparatively few persons, and contained in their early stages little of the emotional element. Very influential in forming public opinion in regard to France were the international conditions which touched the United States only indirectly or potentially, but out of which developed the Monroe Doctrine. Interest in these events seems to have been at first based largely on an idealistic sympathy with the struggle for liberty, a sympathy which has ever been strongly marked in the American temperament, and easily roused. In all the revolutionary movements of the early nineteenth century, the people in the United States unhesitatingly chose and vigorously supported the side of the revolutionists. This had been the case in regard to the Revolution of 1820 in Spain. It had been hailed with satisfaction and watched with interest. From the first, it had been conjectured that the Bourbon government in France might wish to intervene, and there had been few illusions as to the ultimate purpose of the "cordon sanitaire."²⁵ When in 1822 King Ferdinand appealed to the Holy Alliance for aid in restoring his absolute rule, and at the Congress of Verona the Duke of Montmorency made it evident that France was eager to be the instrument of his "liberation,"²⁶ a storm of criticism swept through the United States, increasing in force as the occupation was undertaken and carried out. If there had existed in any quarter any lurking friendliness for the Bourbons, or confidence in their good behavior, this "unheard-of usurpation" would have sufficed to destroy it. Hopes were widely expressed that the expedition would fail, and that its failure would be the signal for the outbreak of a revolution in France.

A typical editorial on the subject is the following, from the *Providence American*:

"There can be but one opinion respecting the principle on which it is commenced and the purpose which it is intended to accomplish. The canting professions and hypocritical pretences under which France and her allies aim to conceal the iniquity of their unprovoked attempt upon the infant liberties of Spain, will fail to mitigate the deep and pervading sentiment of indignation which must be aroused by their unholy crusade to arrest the progress of free principles in Europe and to revive the existence of an intolerant and odious government. That the Holy Alliance may be defeated in their projects must be the ardent prayer of the friends of freedom throughout the world."²⁷

"A more unjustifiable war was never waged by any nation than this on the part of France. In such a war, the feelings of all just men are upon the side of Spain." Thus says the *Connecticut Courant*.²⁸ The *Richmond Enquirer*, in a scathing review of the war proclamation of King Louis XVIII, described the project as a plan to abolish the Spanish Constitu-

tion, "restore the imbecile Ferdinand to his unlimited powers, crush the germs of rising greatness in that fine country, and quarter upon her bands of foreign troops until her patriots are beheaded or banished and her people disciplined to slavery." ²⁹

The *Trenton Emporium* referred to Louis XVIII as a king "Whose cowardly hands are stained with the blood of Frenchmen and Spaniards"; ³⁰ and the *Windsor (Vt.) Journal* described the war as "one of the most unjustifiable and unrighteous . . . which was ever waged by civilized nations." ³¹ It is to be noted, too, that this judgment remained fixed through the succeeding years. Nowhere was the French intervention in Spain spoken of save in terms of the strongest condemnation. In 1830, long after any emotion of the moment had died out, in such thoughtful journals as the *Annual Register* and the *North American Review* these phrases appeared:—"A palpable interference with the internal affairs of another state for the worst of purposes," and "The invasion of Spain was a measure which can have excited only one feeling in the minds of all lovers of liberty or justice." ³² The message of the Governor of Virginia to the legislature, December 1, 1823, contained a striking phrase reminiscent today of a certain German pronouncement at the opening of the World War. "The people of Old Spain have yielded to superior force, and the parchment of their Constitution has been put aside by the point of the bayonet." ³³ In the utterances of the other leaders of thought at that time appeared the same spirit. John Quincy Adams wrote:

"The situation in Spain is full of terror. . . . It is tasking severely the patience of the human race to hear Louis the Eighteenth of France proclaim in the face of the world that he who had not legs to stand upon will send 100,000 Frenchmen into Spain to ravage the land with fire and sword, to teach them to receive their liberties from the hand of Ferdinand the Seventh. This doctrine cannot be much longer maintained in Europe. It grows too absurd." ³⁴

This was written in April, 1823. In the same month Monroe wrote to Jefferson,—

"When it is recollected that he, his whole family, and all those around him, were twenty-six years in banishment and poverty, and restored more by accident and the folly of a man then at the head of affairs than the gallantry or wisdom of all Europe embodied against him, and when we also see that the position of this King is unsettled and precarious, gaining strength more by habit, and time, taking off gallant spirits to the grave, than by any merit of his own . . . it is difficult to express one's feelings when he declares 'that any rights which the people enjoy are derived from him.'" ³⁵

Jefferson, in a letter to Thomas Leiper, May 31, said:

"I am all alive . . . to the war of Spain and its atrocious invasion by France. I trust it will end in an universal insurrection of continental Europe, and in the establishment of representative government in every country of it. We surely see the finger of Providence in the insanity of France which brings on this great consummation." ³⁶

Calhoun regretted that the resistance of Spain was not equal "to her ancient renown or her noble cause." ³⁷ Perhaps the most striking arraignment of France at the moment, certainly one of the most frequently quoted, was a speech of Clay's, delivered in Philadelphia in March, soon after the news had reached America that the French armies were actually on the march. After praising the Spanish for their moderation in the early days of the constitution, Clay continued,—

"And France comes to check her in her noble and patriotic career. . . . She would restore the absolute sway of the monarch, and, I suppose, all the blessings of the Inquisition! . . . One pleasing effect upon the people of this country, with regard to this war, will be that unlike the late wars of Europe, it will create no divisions of opinion among us. In spite of our partiality to France, in spite of all the grateful recollections with which her name is associated; in spite of our sincere desire to maintain with her especially the most amicable relations, there will be here but one feeling and one hope as to the issue of this wanton and unprovoked contest. We shall, in regard to it, be 'all federalists, all republicans, all Spanish; none, no, not one, French!'" ³⁸

At the close of this address Mr. Clay gave the toast, "Success to the cause of the country under whose auspices the New World was discovered!" And, said the reporters, "This address was received, and the toast drank, with the most fervid expression of deep feeling for the glorious cause of Spain." Some uneasiness was manifested in the United States as to the security of the Florida Treaty, so lately ratified by the Constitutional government of Spain. Might the king, restored to his full powers, attempt to withdraw it? The general feeling was, however, that it could not be disturbed, "and the less, because it had the full approbation of the king of France, the tutor and champion of his cousin of Spain." ³⁹ The action of the French fleet, blockading Cadiz, in stopping the vessel which was carrying the new Minister to Spain, Mr. Nelson, to his post, and compelling it to turn back to Gibraltar was sharply resented. ⁴⁰ Identification of the cause of European liberty with the cause of American liberty was immediate, and it was even rumored that an attempt would be made upon the freedom of the United States. The *National Intelligencer* declared that it was our turn next. We had not returned to a dominating religion, or to legitimacy. "This is a war against Liberty." ⁴¹ It was reported, and even believed, at Buenos Ayres, that France, Spain and England had entered into a coalition "to compel North America to accept of a

king, from some of the reigning dynasties!"⁴² "It may not . . . be required that the American people should engage on the side of the Spanish nation; but her cause is virtually ours . . . since all the doctrines the allies attack we firmly hold."⁴³ The *Detroit Gazette* printed a letter from a correspondent "in a high quarter" in Paris, stating that the Powers were determined to crush Liberty in the United States, as well as in Europe and South America, cost what it might. "Prepare yourselves to see a most formidable attack on the United States within a few years. Spies will soon swarm all over your land."⁴⁴ Calhoun declared that the United States must be vigilant and prudent, since the Holy Alliance "regards our government with jealousy and hatred. . . . So long as we are safe and flourishing, that despotism, which it is their object to support, is in danger."⁴⁵

It may be doubted whether many persons seriously expected such an attack, but these comments are indications of the uneasy and sensitive character of public sentiment at the time, a sentiment which manifested an extreme susceptibility to rumors of all sorts and an especial readiness to credit anything which should link in a suspicious way the policy of France with the fortunes of the Americas. "The royalists are all on tiptoe. . . . They expect the commencement of a new era in the affairs of Spain . . . and the restoration with French aid, of the colonies!" "We wait, with some impatience, to be assured of the fact, whether France, at the instigation of the 'holy alliance' has really dispatched vessels to Mexico, Colombia, La Plata, Chili and Peru, to command the people of these countries to return to unlimited obedience to Spain."⁴⁶ Very persistent was the rumor that Spain had ceded Cuba or Porto Rico, or both, to England as payment for help against France, or to France in payment of the expenses of the occupation.⁴⁷ It was known that France was trying to establish Bourbon princes as rulers in the old Spanish provinces.⁴⁸

The President's Message of December, 1823, must be considered therefore, not only in its character as a reasoned public document, issued after careful study of a delicate international situation, but also as expressing the suspicions and uneasiness of the nation, based it is true more upon intuition than upon a full knowledge of the facts, but keenly sensitive to considerations which touched its sympathies or its interests. It is not proposed to enter here into a discussion of the development and application of the Monroe Doctrine, a topic which has been the subject of much careful research, especially in late years.⁴⁹ It is intended rather, avoiding in this case citations from diplomatic correspondence and public documents and from the opinions of those who were actually concerned in directing the affairs of the nation at this period, to reflect the temper of the press,

and of the people in general, bearing particularly upon the feeling of Americans toward France.

It was recognized that of the members of the Holy Alliance, France was the one who could most effectively interfere in Latin-American affairs. Against such interference the declaration of the President, coupled with the opposition of the British, raised a barrier, and "against these positive manifestations . . . we apprehend that France will not choose to come Quixotting, for the divine right of kings, on this continent, . . . but if she does, she comes at her peril." ⁵⁰ The President's Message "is likely to meet the general wishes of our citizens." ⁵¹ It "has been received throughout the country with a warm and universal burst of applause. We have seen it noticed in a great variety of papers from all the States this side of the Carolinas, and with one solitary exception it has been noted with marked respect and applause." ⁵² "It is the universal sentiment of the American people." ⁵³ "It must be received in Europe as a distinct expression of the firm purpose of the people of this country." ⁵⁴ "The independent governments of Mexico and South America must not, shall not, fall under the grasp of despotism." ⁵⁵ "If the Holy Alliance attempt to control the destinies of South America they will find not only a lion, but an eagle in the way." ⁵⁶ The Maryland Legislature passed a strong resolution of approval and support. They hope it will prove a salutary warning, but "feel a confident assurance that the people of the United States will be prepared to make good the warning, and will feel assured that, in employing their energy, power, and resources in defeating such machinations . . . against the independence of their neighbors, they are most effectually securing their own." ⁵⁷

The report that France was under treaty to aid Spain in recovering the Latin-American provinces, and that she was fitting out war vessels for this purpose, continued to be mentioned in 1824,⁵⁸ however, and was revived with renewed strength in 1825. Early in this year the House requested the President to transmit any information he had on this subject.⁵⁹ There was especial anxiety in regard to the designs of France on Cuba and other West Indian islands. To appreciate this we should recall Daniel Webster's statement. "Cuba," he said, "is placed in the mouth of the Mississippi. Its occupation by a strong maritime power would be felt, in the first moment of hostility, as far up the Mississippi and the Missouri as our population extends. It is the commanding point of the Gulf of Mexico. See, too, how it lies in the very line of our coastwise traffic, interposed in the very highway between New York and New Orleans." ⁶⁰ Many prominent men felt that sooner or later Cuba must be annexed to the United States; and our government had declared that under no cir-

cumstances could it be allowed to pass from the hands of Spain to those of any other European power. For years Great Britain's interest in the island had been known and feared: France was believed to be only a little less eager to acquire it, and to be now, with her superior influence in Spanish affairs, in a most favorable position to do so. Matters were further complicated by the schemes of Mexico and Colombia to assist Cuba in securing her independence, since this promised them the double advantage of freeing themselves from the menace of a Spanish base so near at hand and of adding this island, and perhaps Porto Rico, to their own system of states. Spain would certainly be unable alone to defeat such measures, and might be even more likely than before to consider ceding the islands to France.⁶¹ The transfer of a few United States ships from one station to another brought out the headline "Is it Spain, France, or what is it?"⁶² and when first a few French warships and then a considerable fleet really appeared in the West Indies, conjecture ran riot, and pronounced objection was manifested.

"The course pursued by France is at best equivocal and suspicious, as it regards Mexico and South America," said the *Baltimore Federal Gazette*, in an indignant editorial.

"The United States and England will consider the interference of any government with the independence of what was formerly Spanish America, that of Spain alone excepted, an act of hostility towards them, yet we find France doing everything but what is to be considered an act of open, actual interference. If the navy of France convoys Spanish troops in safety to that point from which they can most effectively operate against the new states, is it not merely one step short of absolute hostility against their independence? . . . Here we see the French navy convoying Spanish troops, and some accounts say in thousands, to Havana, to the very threshold of Colombia and Mexico,—convoying them in safety in face of the Colombian cruisers; convoying them to a port from whence, when their plans are matured, they may slip out in the night and reach the Colombian coast before the patriots can receive intelligence of their movements. And will any man say that this is neutrality?"⁶³

The *New York Evening Post* stated that a treaty had certainly been signed between France and Spain for the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico. Of 16,000 French soldiers then in the West Indies, 3000 were to go to Cuba, 4000 to Porto Rico, a French general was to become governor of Cuba, and both islands were to be held by France till all danger of insurrection was over. The *Baltimore American* said that France had been gradually concentrating forces, both military and naval, in the islands, and probably intended to use the excuse of a temporary occupation to cover her taking possession for all time. This was a very serious matter, and the cabinets of both the United States and Great Britain should in-

investigate it. "France, if this intelligence be correct, will be enabled by the cession of Cuba, to command all ingress and egress from the Gulf of Mexico." ⁶⁴

The *New York Evening Post* for August 4 gave credence to the idea of the occupation of Cuba by French forces, and thought the Spanish flag would be employed to cover the truth.⁶⁵ The *New York Spectator* was also much excited over the news.⁶⁶ The *New York American* said that it had not up to this time believed that the island had actually been ceded, or that the French fleet intended to attack it, but the recent events were "a little calculated to shake our faith," and the country should remember that any change would be distinctly against the interest of the United States.⁶⁷ *The Commercial Advertiser*, while insisting that it did not believe the reports, yet admitted that they gave strong ground for suspicion, and said of the French fleet,—“But suppose the next news we hear of it is that it has peaceably passed the Moro, and is snugly in command of the Havana? . . . France claims an indemnity for sustaining the tottering throne of Ferdinand, and it may be true that that monarch has consented to part with the richest jewels of his crown, for the privilege of wearing the tinsel which remains.” ⁶⁸

Little credit was given to France when she recognized, in the autumn of 1825, the independence of Haiti. The terms of the document were declared to be equivocal, and the sincerity of the French government doubted. The *Richmond Whig* quoted with approval an article from a New York journal running as follows: “That France has at all times, from the earliest period of her history, been distinguished for her perfidy, her disregard for the opinion of the world, and her destitution of principle, is, we think, universally conceded.” ⁶⁹ The *Annual Register* spoke of the “artful treaty” negotiated with Haiti, “nominally a recognition of independence, but substantially an assertion of sovereignty.” ⁷⁰

The possibility of allied intervention in the case of the Greek Revolution was also viewed with extreme disfavor, since it was considered certain that any intervention from this quarter could only bode evil for the Greeks. “We infer this, because the Alliance never met in one instance, but Liberty bled. They never held a conference or a congress, but immediately the dearest rights of man were sacrificed.” ⁷¹ “This band of despots would sooner tear in tatters the banner of the cross, burn their bibles and turn Turks than see a free Republican government established in Europe.” ⁷² “We do not see how this ‘Holy Alliance,’ consistent with their own abominable principles, can further interfere in the contest between the Greeks and the Turks. . . . The Porte is a ‘legitimate sovereign.’ ” ⁷³ The debate in Congress on the Greek question brought out much harsh criticism

of the behavior of the allies, and especially of the invasion of Spain by France. Webster made a strong plea for the cause of liberty, declaring that the acts of the Holy Alliance were condemned by the general sense of justice of the civilized world, and that this must finally have its effect. "It is nothing," said he, "that the troops of France have passed from the Pyrenees to Cadiz; it is nothing that an unhappy and prostrate nation has fallen before them; it is nothing that arrests, and confiscations, and executions, sweep away the little remnant of national resistance. There is an enemy that still exists to check the glory of these triumphs. . . . It follows the conqueror back . . . shows him . . . that . . . his victory is a barren spectre; that it shall confer neither joy nor honor, but shall moulder to dry ashes in his grasp. . . . It wounds him with the sting which belongs to the consciousness of having outraged the opinion of mankind." ⁷⁴ Even when the French did send their army to the Morea to coöperate with the Greeks, opinion in the United States remained scornful, and showed a curiosity as to what the price of the aid would be, and whether France intended to retain the freed districts as her share of the spoils. ⁷⁵

Midway in this decade, during the years 1824 and 1825, Lafayette revisited America for the last time. He came on the invitation of the United States government, and was entertained as the "nation's guest" during his entire stay. His welcome was unique in its warmth, its unanimity, and its sustained enthusiasm. Since the name of Lafayette has ever been one to conjure with, and his personality one of the most secure links between the peoples of France and the United States, the sincerity and generosity of his welcome on this occasion are often cited as proofs of the sympathy existing between the two countries. But, in the light of the actual relations which have been mentioned, the true conception of the significance of this event must be quite different. Far from being a celebration of Franco-American amity, it emphasized most clearly the lack of harmony between the ideals of France and the United States at this time. Lafayette was received as the hero of the Revolution,—as one of the founders of the Republic; and Republic and Revolution were alike anathema in France. Lafayette was the incarnation of the spirit of Liberty and the champion of all oppressed peoples. Liberty was in France a forbidden word, and the French government would crush its expression in other countries wherever possible. A member of a political minority, the old patriot was at the moment excluded from the Chamber of Deputies for the too decided disapproval he had manifested of the reactionary tendencies of the majority, and only for this reason was he willing to be absent from the country which he was forbidden to serve. The festival of Lafayette's coming was to the

Americans in part purely national,—a glorification of the days when against bitter odds the United States had struggled into being, and of the half-century of almost phenomenal progress which had followed,—but it was also in part an opportunity to assert their principles and to give to a reactionary Europe a striking proof of their unswerving devotion to the ideals of Liberty. It is on such a basis that Lafayette's triumph in America may be truly explained.

We have abundant material from which to form a just estimate of this remarkable visit. Aside from formal accounts, such as that of Lafayette's secretary, Levasseur, who accompanied him on the journey, the memoirs and reminiscences of those who shared in the festivities are in existence in numbers, and the newspapers and magazines of the day contain exceedingly full descriptions. Everywhere, throughout the whole country, the leading characteristics of the welcome were the same. Let us look for a moment at the decorations which formed the holiday attire of the cities and towns honored by his presence. Occasionally the tri-color and the fleur-de-lis appeared, but the stars and stripes, the Goddess of Liberty, and the American eagle, dominated the scene. The civic arches along the way bore with the names of Washington and Lafayette those of Revolutionary heroes, and portraits, too, of these men were frequent. Revolutionary mottoes, "Washington,—Lafayette,—Justice,—Liberty," "The rights of man, 1776," "A nation's thanks to freedom's friend"; names of the battles in which Lafayette served, "Brandywine, 11 Sept., 1777," "Yorktown, 19 Oct., 1781," appeared often; and the names and symbols of the original Thirteen States. Army and navy trophies formed part of the decorations, Washington's tent was brought out for Lafayette's use, and Revolutionary relics were exhibited everywhere, while the veterans of the War were guests of honor on all occasions.⁷⁶ Among the gifts with which the General was showered, we find that of the General Assembly of Maryland,—a copy of the Declaration of Independence, of the Bill of Rights, of the Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, and of Washington's Farewell Address.⁷⁷

In the addresses, the toasts, and the press reports, there is observable a note of recognition that the festival of Liberty in America could but be unwelcome to the Europeans. *Niles' Register* makes it evident when the editor says, soon after Lafayette's arrival,—

"The king and priest-ridden population of the European continent, the white slaves of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and the degraded people of France, with the miserable wretches . . . that inhabit Spain . . . cannot have anything more like a just conception of our feelings, as associated with the arrival of General Lafayette, than a Hottentot possesses of algebra!"⁷⁸

Jefferson wrote to Richard Rush that the welcome would have a good effect for Lafayette with the people of Europe, but probably a different one with their sovereigns.⁷⁹ General Harper, speaking at Baltimore, said that the nation was giving its testimony in favor of those principles of government for which Lafayette had fought and suffered. Europe was now divided into two great parties, one striving to uphold and perpetuate absolute power, the other struggling for equal rights and constitutional government. It would encourage the friends of the good cause to see the unanimity of spirit in the United States.⁸⁰ "Proof against the menaces of bloody factions, and against the siren voice of royal and imperial seduction and power, Lafayette stands like a consoling and guiding light in that deep darkness which has overspread the political horizon of Europe."⁸¹ "General Lafayette and the rights of man. May Europe practice the lesson he has taught!"⁸² "The holy alliance between Liberty and Lafayette. May it prove destructive of the unholy alliance of crowned heads against the rights of man!"⁸³ Frequent among the toasts were expressions of sympathy with the Greek, the Spanish, and the South American patriots; and often the names of Washington, Lafayette, and Bolivar, were linked together. Toasts to France are not often found. When they do appear, their implications are not always complimentary. "France: Too beautiful for tyranny, may its shores soon resound with glorious hallelujahs to freedom and independence."⁸⁴ "France: absolute or free, in glory or decay, she is still entitled to our gratitude, for her generous support in the day of difficulty and trial."⁸⁵ "The Liberty of France!"⁸⁶ "We thank France for her son: May America not forget, and Europe feel to good purpose, the influence of his bright example."⁸⁷

Lafayette himself did not hesitate to express his belief in and his love for republican institutions. At the celebration in New Orleans, the French residents begged him to note that they were members of the Union in good standing, with a full measure of liberty, and that the wise and temperate use which they had made of it was a triumphant answer to those who had "proclaimed them unfit for freedom, and stigmatized you for laboring to confer upon them the greatest of blessings." In his reply, Lafayette agreed to this, and referred feelingly to "those deplorable excesses which have hitherto retarded the establishment of freedom in France."⁸⁸ At Hartford he urged that Americans cherish with care their republican principles, as there was such a powerful opposition abroad to our free institutions.⁸⁹ In Philadelphia he said that American Republicanism had "begun the era of the new and only true social order, that founded on the inalienable rights of man."⁹⁰ In Boston, he gave as a toast: "The city of Boston, the cradle of Liberty: may Faneuil Hall ever stand as a monument to teach the

world that resistance to oppression is a duty, and will under true republican institutions become a blessing.”⁹¹ At a dinner in honor of Rush, in Philadelphia, he paid a tribute to Monroe, whose “happy message” had “at once checked the plots of several European powers against the independence and freedom of South America and Mexico.”⁹² When the time for his departure came, President Adams made a formal address of farewell, in which he spoke of France as “the land of brilliant genius, of generous sentiment, of heroic valour,” etc., but included no word which could be construed as praise for France as the Bourbons ruled it; and Lafayette in his reply declared that in his visit he had recognized “a glorious demonstration to the most timid and most prejudiced minds of the superiority over degrading aristocracy or despotism, of popular institutions founded on the plain rights of man, and where the local rights of every section are preserved under a constitutional bond of union.” He held the success of this nation to be a “pledge of the emancipation of the world.”⁹³

Still further light is thrown upon the situation by the attitude of the French government toward Lafayette’s visit, and the way this behavior was commented on in the United States. In September, 1824, the *New York Commercial Advertiser* carried a long editorial, describing the circumstances connected with the General’s departure from France. It stated that a delegation of residents of Havre went out a few miles to meet and escort him into the town. “The American consul, and all the American gentlemen and captains of ships in the harbor, intended also paying that compliment to the General, but the Sous-Prefet noticed to the consul that the Americans must not do so.” When the General arrived the roads were crowded, and a strong body of gendarmes accompanied him in. At the city gates, the police stopped all but Lafayette’s immediate party. After some delay, the others were admitted, but one at a time, the police taking their names. In the morning the police kept away from the boat, and even from the pier, those who wished to bid farewell to the traveller, and they even had the boat’s flag hauled down, and would not allow it to be hoisted while the General was in the boat. “How mean—how contemptibly mean—were the vexations thrown in the way of the old veteran and those who wished to do him honour, by the little tyrants of the police. . . . The patriotic hero is allowed only to quit the country of his birth and for which he has so often bled, amid contumely and insult, because through good and evil report, he has shown himself the firm, consistent, and unwavering friend of national freedom.” This account was widely copied, with indignant comment.⁹⁴

Just at this time, the censorship of the press in France took on new rigor,

chiefly, it was believed in this country, to prevent the journals from publishing the accounts of Lafayette's welcome in the United States.⁹⁵ Certainly it was applied to accomplish this result. "After particular papers had gone to press, these myrmidons of tyranny interfered, and ordered the intelligence respecting Lafayette's arrival to be suppressed."⁹⁶ *Niles' Register* quoted a letter from a correspondent in France, saying,—“We had announced in our paper to-day the arrival of General Lafayette in New York, . . . The censorship struck out this article excepting three lines . . . which doubtless were passed over inadvertently. . . . Be good enough to communicate this fact in America, whence they may be enabled to judge of the absurd tyranny that is exercised here over the newspapers.”⁹⁷ Said the *New York American*:

“The *Courier* (France) of the 29th contains some extracts from the accounts given in our papers of the reception and progress of LaFayette, which it interlards with all sorts of insolent sneers and scoffing jibes. A paper which sees nothing ridiculous or unseemly in the absurd and ostentatious funeral rites of such a corrupt mass of mortality as the late king Louis 18th; which is not at all shocked at the pageants of woe and artificial sorrow that royalist France is made to exhibit on so melancholy a loss . . . such a paper is consistent with itself and its employers in seeking to ridicule these unbought effusions of a people's gratitude and love.”⁹⁸

In the same paper we find this lively bit:

“The censors would not allow the Paris journals to announce the arrival of General Lafayette in the United States, though his departure from Havre was publicly stated in all parts of Europe. The editor of the *Courier Français* having spoken to the Secretary of the commission respecting this suppression the latter observed that ‘General Lafayette was now dead to this world.’ ‘Be it so,’ replied the editor, ‘There can be no objection then to my announcing his arrival in the other!’ ”⁹⁹

Charles X signalized his accession by relaxing the censorship somewhat for a time, and the Liberal journals all seized the opportunity to print accounts of the celebrations in America. The ministerial press tried to counteract the effect of this by continued “insulting criticism.”¹⁰⁰

During the time that Lafayette was being entertained in Washington, the French minister and official circle were in mourning and out of society for three months. This probably prevented some embarrassing incidents, as it was generally understood that the minister had received orders not to extend any civility to the General. The French consul in Boston was reported to have involuntarily returned Lafayette's bow, but to have afterward expressed deep regret for doing so. “When we consider the efforts making by ‘legitimate’ tyrants to check the progress of liberal principles, it no longer surprises us that the members of the Holy Alliance should instruct its minions to show a marked disrespect for the friend of the Rights

of Man. . . . But even this meanness is not without its salutary effects—the darkness of Despotism serves to exhibit by contrast the more glorious and glowing light of Freedom. . . . The intelligence of this nation's gratitude must sound through Europe . . . how pitiful must appear the French government, which ordered its police to insult him when about to embark from Havre!"¹⁰¹ The French squadron lying in Hampton Roads when the enthusiastic celebration at Yorktown took place, "remained coldly aloof from a festival which ought to have been regarded as a family fête of the two nations." "We cannot well conceive of anything more unnatural than an order given by the French ministry to the officers of a squadron of Charles the Tenth to refuse to join the Americans in 1824 in commemorating a victory gained by the coöperation of the armies of his brother . . . in 1781."¹⁰² The master of the mint in Paris struck off medals in honor of the visit of the Dey of Tunis to the establishment, but was said to have refused to strike some with the head of Lafayette on them, "though the minister of the United States proposed to defray the expense of it." A French engraver struck off a Lafayette medal without authorization, and was arrested for it, though he said it was only tin, and merely a proof of a souvenir intended to be sold in America.¹⁰³

Considerable anxiety was expressed from time to time as to the General's safety when he should return to France. "It is not probable," said the *Concord Patriot*, "that the besotted government would suffer him to go at large." It was urged that he would be wise to make his permanent home in the land of freedom, where a grateful people would see that he should want for nothing.¹⁰⁴ Adams recorded in his *Diary* that he gave instructions to the commander of the *Brandywine* as to the course he should pursue in case any difficulty or obstruction should develop when Lafayette was landed in France. It was impossible, he said, to foresee everything, but he advised the captain to be prepared for trouble, and to remember that the President relied upon his firmness and prudence to meet it properly.¹⁰⁵ It was indeed rumored in the United States that the authorities at Havre had orders to prevent any demonstrations in honor of the General when he should arrive, and also that it was very uncertain whether the American frigate would receive the ordinary salute, lest this be construed as a greeting to Lafayette.¹⁰⁶ It was also rumored that the French consul at Washington had refused to sign a bill of health for the frigate, and had thrown other obstacles in the way.¹⁰⁷ "We will not brook the slightest disrespect which may be offered to our flag," said the American papers. They praised highly Lafayette's courage,—“Though returning to a region of aristocracy and despotism he yet dares to denounce their existence,”¹⁰⁸ and said that the rainbow which shone on his departure was a good omen, a symbol of

Liberty, "proclaiming to Lafayette and the friends of freedom, that the same light which has been shed abroad over this western hemisphere, shall ere long extend itself across the wide Atlantic, and illumine even the vine-covered hills of France."¹⁰⁹ Fortunately the *Brandywine* on her arrival at Havre was received with all necessary courtesy, but the American papers were indignant over the attempts of the police to interfere with the popular demonstrations in the hero's favor, and especially over the fact that the crowds, which were well-behaved enough, were several times charged by the gendarmerie with drawn sabres, injuring many people severely.¹¹⁰

The press in the United States continued to follow with interest the fortunes of Lafayette after his return to France, and when the Revolution of 1830 took place it was a source of much gratification to find him recognized as one of the leaders. Jefferson, in 1824, when a gift to the General was under discussion, had foreseen that this would be the case, and had favored it for this reason. "There will be a change in France," he said, "and Lafayette will be at the head of it, and ought to be easy and independent in his circumstances, to be able to act efficiently in conducting the movement."¹¹¹ Adams recorded that he tried to dissuade the old patriot from taking part in revolutionary projects, "but there is fire beneath the cinders."¹¹² "His character has now acquired a moral force which will be felt on the continent," said the *Richmond Enquirer*, "He will be the leader of all liberals."¹¹³ Lafayette's connection with the Revolution thus disposed the Americans to look upon it with favor, although it would have been approved in any case, as a movement in defense of constitutional principles, and as marking the downfall of the "imbecile Bourbons." Criticism of the latter had been steady throughout the decade. Aside from the international matters and affairs of foreign policy already discussed, the domestic policy was the subject of strong disapproval, centering about the censorship of the press, the law of sacrilege, and the interference with the freedom of the individual in general.¹¹⁴

When Louis XVIII died and was succeeded by Charles X, there had been a great deal of scornful comment upon the "mummeries" of the funeral, the exaggerated grief of the royalists, and the "frivolities" and "odious ceremony" of the coronation.¹¹⁵ It was not believed that France would long submit to Bourbon rule, and although it was recognized that the success of the intervention in Spain had strengthened the reactionaries for the moment, the policies of Charles X were clearly seen to be leading to destruction. The news of the July Revolution reached New York September 3, where it was hailed with great enthusiasm, and declared to have been the "almost inevitable consequence of those insane measures," "those

besotted counsels." At the theatre in the evening the *Marseillaise* was loudly called for and was sung both in French and in English, and received with rapturous applause, the audience joining in the chorus. Several public celebrations were held, over one of which ex-President Monroe presided, and in which the students of "Columbia College," with their President and faculty, participated.¹¹⁶ The *New York American* had announced the event in an "Extra" and other newspapers in different parts of the country did the same. Rejoicing was general, and there was especial praise for the moderation and order shown by the revolutionists. There was also an immediate recognition of the fact that the spirit of revolution would probably prove contagious, and that disturbances of greater or less importance must be looked for in other European states. It was considered possible, but not probable, that there would be intervention by the "despots" to restore the rule of Charles X, or the Bourbons, "a proud and imbecile race, hardly reasoning animals"¹¹⁷ "to whom we regard the throne of France as forever lost, by their imbecility or wickedness."¹¹⁸ The *Boston Daily Advertiser* summed up the situation with some sympathy:

"Charles X wished to be a despotic king. . . . He was so for one day, the 26th of July,—the length of time necessary for Paris to read the *ordonnances*. The next day he fell. That fall was just. . . . Unhappy family! which has made itself the elect and the predestined of absolute power, and which perishes with it without redemption! . . . The Bourbons, heirs and martyrs of an idea which reigned a long time in the world but which has now fallen irrevocably! . . . There is a fatality here which constitutes in their wanderings a kind of majesty."¹¹⁹

The *National Intelligencer*, while admitting that the French people would have been "abject slaves" had they failed to resent the unconstitutional practices of the king, said that "the Bourbons are not odious to the United States," and thought that there was a habitual sympathy in the hearts of this people for the people of France, which had been increased by the visit of Lafayette, and that the ministers in this case were more to blame than the king himself.¹²⁰ The plan for a celebration in Richmond this paper criticized as premature, for "If the blood which has flowed shall have been shed in vain, or to no valuable result we should hardly illuminate for it." The only illumination in Washington the editor recalled had been in February, 1815, when the signing of the Treaty of Ghent was celebrated. The Virginians, however, refused to allow their enthusiasm to be dampened. "It challenges all history and all times for a parallel!" cried the *Richmond Whig*.

"Fellow citizens of Richmond! Shall this sublime and immortal achievement of the people against their Tyrants pass by without a public demonstration of our affection for the good old cause, without a word of admiration or of sympathy? Not so was

the dawn of the French Revolution received by our ancestors. Is the spirit dead within us? Have we no longer sympathy for the human race struggling with their tyrants and oppressors?

"Hail, redeemed, regenerated France! Virginia, the mother of Liberty, hails a sister. Hail, Lafayette, Virtue's champion! . . . Light your houses, sing, shout and be merry. Down with the Bourbons, up with the tri-colored flag. Hurrah for old Lafayette and France!"

Who could resist such appeals? The celebration "went off with great *éclat*," with "bushels of tri-colored cockades, French flags everywhere," wonderful illuminations, a long parade, and much oratory embellished with fervid adjectives.¹²¹ A fortnight later, Philadelphia, somewhat more soberly, but with deep feeling, recorded her sympathy. In connection with the celebration, a committee, of which Nicholas Biddle was a member, was appointed to draw up resolutions to be sent to Lafayette with the request that he make them known in France. The resolutions stated that "Whereas France, our first and faithful ally . . . has at last succeeded by an unanimous and heroic effort, in shaking off the yoke of bigotted and tyrannous rulers, and establishing a government of her own choice . . . this meeting cordially participates in the joyful feeling which has been excited throughout the United States. . . ." ¹²² At Baltimore, late in October, there was a "military and civil procession" and an address by William Wirt. A feature of the occasion was the presentation of a French flag to be sent to Lafayette with greetings.¹²³ On the 28th of this month, the Capital staged a brilliant demonstration, which partook of an official character, inasmuch as in the parade appeared not only the citizens of Washington, but military detachments, with the President of the United States, the Vice-President, chiefs of Departments, and several of the foreign ministers, at their head. The French minister and suite appeared in full dress uniforms, wearing the national colors. General Bernard was Marshal, and carried the flag which the French Convention had sent to the American government forty years before. Tri-colored flags, badges, and decorations were much in evidence, and there was a splendid ball in the evening.¹²⁴

The President's Message in December included references of the most friendly nature to the great events in France.

"The important modifications of their government, effected with so much courage and wisdom by the people of France, afford a happy presage of their future course, and have naturally elicited from the kindred feelings of this nation that spontaneous and universal burst of applause in which you have participated. . . . The deepest sympathy was to be expected in a struggle for the sacred principles of Liberty, conducted in a spirit every way worthy of the cause, and crowned by an heroic moderation which has disarmed revolution of its terrors. Notwithstanding the strong assurances which the man whom we so sincerely love and justly admire has given to the world of the high character of the present king of the French, and which

if sustained to the end, will secure to him the proud appellation of the Patriot King, it is not in his success but in that of the great principle which has borne him to the throne,—the paramount authority of the public will—that the American people rejoice.”¹²⁵

It might have been expected that the sentiment in the United States would demand a republican form of government in France. That it did not, seems to have been due partly to the general confidence in Lafayette’s judgment in the matter, and perhaps partly to a feeling that the constitutional monarchy was better suited to the French temperament. Favorable notices of “Louis Philip” are frequent. His democratic habits are praised, and his intelligence and financial skill.¹²⁶ *Niles’ Register* quoted with approval the story that when the king was advised not to entrust artillery to the national guard, because it would place him at the mercy of the citizens, he replied, “I will be a national king or no king. I will reign by the will of the people, or I will not reign at all!”¹²⁷

The Bourbons had been forced on the nation by foreigners, “a reproach which stuck to them like a poisoned garment.” This handicap the new king would not have to fight,¹²⁸ but the *National Gazette* pointed out that the throne of Louis Philippe was nevertheless unstable, since it was a “hybridous government, the offspring of royalism and republicanism” and lacked the security of either.¹²⁹ A consciousness of this weakness is evident in the press notices, as they describe the difficulties, both domestic and foreign, with which the new government had to contend. In Adams’s *Diary* we find a touch of the same feeling, when he records his difficulty in writing a letter to send to Lafayette by General Bernard, who was returning to France. It was somewhat hazardous, he thought, to express at this time opinions upon the recent revolution to Lafayette, who had himself been so conspicuous an actor in it. New and great changes were to be expected in France at no distant time, and while it might be proper to share in the general joy and approbation, it was still prudent not to be dazzled with visions of glory which might never be realized.¹³⁰

But a gleam of friendliness had at last brightened a decade which in the United States had been marked by uncertainty and suspicion.¹³¹ How potent the common enthusiasm for Liberty might prove in creating a permanent harmony, or in overcoming the discordant elements which marred the relations of the two countries, only the test of time could manifest.

NOTES AND SOURCES

¹ For an analysis of these cases, see John Bassett Moore, *A History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party*, V: 4447-4485.

RELATIONS WITH THE RESTORED BOURBONS

² Adams, *Life of Gallatin*, 566–567; Gallatin, *Writings*, 11: 275–282; *American Annual Register*, V: 28–32.

³ Gallatin to Adams, Nov. 16, 1821. Gallatin, *Writings*, 11: 213.

⁴ *Annals of Congress*, 16th Congress, 1st Session, 1820, 11: 2245–6; 2nd Session, 1820–1821, 1263, 1243–44.

American State Papers, V: 23–36, 149–213, 222, 282–483, 640–674.

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⁵ Nov. 14, 1820, *American State Papers*, IV: 644–6; Mar. 5, 1821, Monroe, *Writings*, VI: 169; Dec. 5, *American State Papers*, IV: 736–40; Dec. 2, 1822, *Ib.*, V: 141–5; Dec. 2, 1822, *Ib.*, V: 245–250; Dec. 7, 1824, Benton, *Abridgment*, VII: 94.

⁶ Monroe, *Writings*, VI: 185–191. (July, 1821.)

⁷ Crawford to Gallatin, May 13, 1822. Gallatin, *Writings*: 11: 241.

⁸ Benton, *Abridgment*, VII: 86–87.

⁹ Adams, *Memoirs*, VII: 59–61; *American State Papers*, V: 760.

¹⁰ Dec. 5, 1826, Benton, *Abridgment*, IX: 247; Dec. 4, 1827, *Ib.*, 470; Dec. 1, 1828, X: 200.

¹¹ Benton, *Abridgment*, X: 405; XI: 112–113, 349.

¹² *Independent Chronicle and Boston Patriot*, Feb. 23, 1820.

¹³ *National Intelligencer*, August 12, 1820; Same article, *Nashville Whig*, August 12, and *Cleveland Herald*, August 29.

¹⁴ *Southern Patriot*, quoted in *National Intelligencer*, August 25.

¹⁵ *North American Review*, XXI: 136–162; XXIII: 385–414.

¹⁶ *New York American*, June 2, November 12, 1824.

¹⁷ *National Intelligencer*, August 21, 1824.

¹⁸ *New York American*, March 18, October 13, 1825.

¹⁹ *New York Gazette*, quoted in *Richmond Whig*, October 4, 1825. See also *Whig*, October 11, 14.

²⁰ *Niles'*, XXI (1826): 305–6, 366, 417–418; XXXVI (1829): 162, 182, 203–4, 234, 274; *Knoxville Register*, July 29, 1829.

²¹ *Niles'*, XXXI (1831): 319; XL: 92, quoting *Boston Patriot*; *American Annual Register*, V: (1829–30), 28–32.

²² *Niles'*, XL: 362, quoting *Richmond Enquirer*, 454.

²³ *American Annual Register*, VI (1831): 39–43. Also *Niles'* XL; 24–25, quoting *New York Mercantile Advertiser*, and *National Intelligencer*.

²⁴ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, September 17, 1831; *Washington City Statesman*, November 17, 1830; *New York Journal of Commerce*, quoted in *Connecticut Courant*, September 20, 1831; *Niles'*, XL: 24–25, quoting *Salem Gazette*; 396, quoting *United States Telegraph*.

²⁵ *Petersburg (Va.) Republican*, October 1, 1822; *Niles'*, XXI: 231. December 14, 1822.

²⁶ John H. Latané, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and the Spanish*

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE

American Republics, 69; F. E. Chadwick, *Diplomatic Relations of United States and Spain*, I: 174-178.

²⁷ *Providence American*, March 14, 1823.

²⁸ *Connecticut Courant*, March 18.

²⁹ *Richmond Enquirer*, March 18.

³⁰ *Trenton Emporium*, quoted in *Hartford Mercury*, August 19, 1823.

³¹ *Windsor Journal*, March 24, 1823.

To show the wide extent of this feeling, a representative group of citations is here appended, all of which express substantially the same sentiments, and all of which are from the year 1823.

Niles' Register, January 18, March 15, March 22, June 28, August 9, quoting *New York American*, September 13, September 20, November 15; *Mississippi Republican* (Natchez), Mar. 13; *New York American*, March 15; *Providence Gazette*, March 29, December 3; *Little Rock (Ark.) Gazette*, April 1, quoting *Charleston, (S. C.) Advocate*, April 29, quoting *New York Daily Advertiser*, June 17, July 22, quoting *Federal Gazette*, July 29, quoting *Washington Republican*, September 11, quoting *New York National Advocate*; *Concord Patriot*, April 14; *Richmond Enquirer*, May 27, November 13; *Cheraw Intelligencer*, June 3, June 5, quoting *New York Statesman*, *New York Daily Advertiser*, *Charleston Courier*; *Eastern Argus*, June 24; *Lexington, (Ky.) Gazette*, August 7; *North American Review*, October.

³² *Annual Register*, IV: 242; *North American Review*, XXV: 174.

³³ *Niles'*, December 20, 1823.

³⁴ John Quincy Adams to Daniel Cony (or Corry), April 28, 1823, *Writings*, VII: 368. Courtesy of The Macmillan Company, Publishers, New York.

³⁵ Monroe to Jefferson, April 14, 1823, James Monroe, *Writings*, E. M. Hamilton, ed., VI: 306. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London.

³⁶ Jefferson to Leiper, Jefferson, *Writings*, Ford, ed., X: 254. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, New York and London.

³⁷ Calhoun to J. E. Calhoun, August 24, 1823. *Correspondence*, Jameson, ed., *American Historical Association Report*, 1899, 11: 213.

³⁸ *Richmond Enquirer*, April 8, 1823; *Niles'*, April 12.

³⁹ *Niles'*, Nov. 20, 1823; *Boston Centinel*, quoted in *Richmond Enquirer*, Nov. 23; *Knoxville Register*, Feb. 18, 1825; *Ib.*, quoting *National Journal*, Feb. 25.

⁴⁰ Monroe, *Writings*, VI: 321-2; 330.

⁴¹ *National Intelligencer*, March 20, 1823, Aug. 5, 1824, quoting *National Gazette*.

⁴² *Niles'*, March 20, 1824.

⁴³ *Maine Gazette*, quoting *National Gazette*, March 21, 1823.

⁴⁴ *Detroit Gazette*, April 16, 1824.

⁴⁵ Calhoun to H. A. A. Dearborn, June 8, 1824. *Correspondence*, Jameson, ed., 218-19.

⁴⁶ *Niles'*, XXV (1823): 171, 196.

⁴⁷ *Ib.*, 210 (Dec. 16); *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 5, 1823, quoting *New York Gazette*; *National Advocate*, quoted in *Concord Patriot*, Dec. 8, 1823.

⁴⁸ *Concord Patriot*, Dec. 15, 1823, quoting *Mobile Register*; John Quincy Adams, *Writings*, VII: 426, 432, 447.

⁴⁹ For discussion of the development of the Monroe Doctrine, and its application during this period, see: Albert Bushnell Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine, An Interpretation*, Chs. III, IV, V, VI; James Morton Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations*, Ch. V; William R. Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico*, 89-165; F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain*,

Diplomacy, I: 174-223; J. B. Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, 299-365; W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, Ch. XII; John H. Latané, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America*, 56-104; etc.

⁵⁰ *New York American*, Dec. 31, 1823; also similar phrases, Dec. 9, Dec. 13, Jan. 9, 1824.

⁵¹ *Connecticut Courant*, Dec. 16, 1823.

⁵² *Eastern Argus*, Dec. 16, 1823.

⁵³ *Arkansas Gazette*, Jan. 30, 1824, quoting *Baltimore Federal Gazette*.

⁵⁴ *Ib.*, quoting *Columbian Star*, Jan. 27.

⁵⁵ *Boston Statesman*, quoted in *Hartford American Mercury*, Dec. 16, 1823.

⁵⁶ *Boston Centinel*, quoted in *Hancock Gazette and Penobscot Patriot*, Dec. 31, 1823.

⁵⁷ *Niles'*, Dec. 20, 1823.

⁵⁸ *Niles'*, March 6, March 13, 1824.

⁵⁹ *Concord Patriot*, Jan. 3, 1825.

⁶⁰ Webster, *Works*, Everett, ed., III: 207-8. Speech on the Panama Mission.

⁶¹ *Richmond Whig*, May 10, 1825, quoting *National Journal*, May 27, quoting *New York Daily Advertiser*, April 29; *Richmond Enquirer*, May 17; *New York Evening Post*, Sept. 26.

⁶² *Richmond Enquirer*, March 1, 1825.

⁶³ *Baltimore Federal Gazette*, quoted in *Norfolk Herald*, May 11, 1825.

⁶⁴ *New York Evening Post*, and *Baltimore American*, quoted in *Richmond Whig*, June 3, 1825; also *Ib.*, April 1; *New York American*, *New York Mercantile Advertiser*, *Philadelphia Franklin Gazette*, *Baltimore Federal Gazette*, quoted in *Richmond Enquirer*, March 1, 1825.

⁶⁵ *New York Evening Post*, August 4, 1825.

⁶⁶ *New York Spectator*, August 10, 1825.

⁶⁷ *New York American*, August 11.

⁶⁸ *New York Commercial Advertiser*, quoted in *Cheraw Intelligencer*, August 19. See also *Richmond Enquirer*, August 9. Less sensational treatment, *National Intelligencer*, August 16, and quoting *Boston Centinel*.

⁶⁹ *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 20, 1825. Also critical, *New York National Advocate*, Aug. 15; *New York Daily Advertiser*, Sept. 24, and quoting *National Gazette* and *New York Evening Post*; *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 30, Oct. 7.

⁷⁰ *American Annual Register*, I: 227-238.

⁷¹ *Bridgeton* (N. J.) *Whig*, July 31, 1824.

⁷² *Arkansas Gazette*, September 7, 1824.

⁷³ *Niles'*, October 5, 1825.

⁷⁴ Webster, *Works*, Everett, ed., III: 78-79. *Niles'*, XXV: 344-345, 346, 352.

⁷⁵ *Niles'*, September 27, 1828.

⁷⁶ Philadelphia and Baltimore, *Niles'*, XXVII, 101-112; New York, *Ib.*, XVI: 401-402; Boston and Providence, XXVII: 12-14, 23, New York, XXVII: 41-43; Cincinnati, *Concord Patriot*, Sept. 20, 1824.

⁷⁷ *Richmond Whig*, January 25, 1825.

⁷⁸ *Niles'*, XXVII: 144-147.

⁷⁹ Jefferson to Rush, *Works*, Ford, ed., X: 322.

⁸⁰ *Niles'*, XXVII: 107.

⁸¹ *Niles'*, XXVII: 117-120.

⁸² *Concord Patriot*, Sept. 13, 1824.

⁸³ *Ib.*, June 27, 1825.

- ⁸⁴ *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 6, 1825.
- ⁸⁵ *Ib.*, May 31, 1825.
- ⁸⁶ *New York American*, August 24, 1824.
- ⁸⁷ Oct. 2, 1824, *Niles'*; *Trenton True American*, Oct. 9, 1824.
- ⁸⁸ *Richmond Enquirer*, May 20, 1825.
- ⁸⁹ *American Mercury*, Sept. 7, 1824.
- ⁹⁰ *New York American*, Oct. 1, 1824.
- ⁹¹ *Ib.*, Sept. 1, 1824.
- ⁹² *Niles'*, XXVIII: July 30, 1825.
- ⁹³ *Niles'*, Sept. 17, 1825.
- ⁹⁴ *New York Commercial Advertiser*, quoted in *Nashville (Tenn.) Gazette* Sept. 17, 1824; quoted from *United States Gazette*, in *Natchez (Miss.) Republican*; from *Boston Courier*, in *Concord Patriot*, Sept. 13, Sept. 15.
- ⁹⁵ *National Intelligencer*, Sept. 30, 1824.
- ⁹⁶ *Richmond Whig*, Oct. 22, 1824; *Natchez Republican*, Sept. 15.
- ⁹⁷ *Niles'*, Oct. 23, 1824, quoting *New York American*.
- ⁹⁸ *New York American*, Nov. 3, 1824.
- ⁹⁹ *New York American*, Nov. 12, 1824.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Philadelphia National Gazette*, Nov. 12, 1824; *Detroit Gazette*, Dec. 3; *Niles'*, Jan. 29, 1825, March 26, 1825.
- ¹⁰¹ Seaton, *Biographical Sketch*, 169–170; *Concord Patriot*, Sept. 6, 1824.
- ¹⁰² Edward Everett, in *North American Review*, 30: 216–237, reviewing Levasseur's book on *Lafayette in America*.
- ¹⁰³ *New York American*, Sept. 9, 1825; *Niles'*, Nov. 6, 1824.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Concord Patriot*, Sept. 6, 1824; *New York Statesman*, quoted in *Cahawba Press*, Dec. 24, 1824; *Nashville Gazette*, Sept. 17, 1824.
- ¹⁰⁵ Adams, *Memoirs*, VII: 48.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Niles'*, Oct. 29, 1825.
- ¹⁰⁷ *New York Commercial Advertiser*, quoted in *Richmond Whig*, Oct. 4, 1825.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 6, 1825.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 20, 1825.
- ¹¹⁰ *Niles'*, Nov. 19, 1825; *Detroit Gazette*, Dec. 20, 1825; *Niles'*, Dec. 3; *Annual Register*, 1: 234.
- ¹¹¹ Thomas H. Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, I: 29–31.
- ¹¹² Adams, *Memoirs*, VII: 49.
- ¹¹³ *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 6, 1825.
- ¹¹⁴ Typical criticisms of French policy: *Niles'*, Dec. 21, 1822; Feb. 18, Apr. 26, Aug. 9, Dec. 20, 1823; Apr. 17, May 1, Oct. 9, 1824; Apr. 16, Apr. 29, 1825; Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1829; *Richmond Whig*, Apr. 22; July 15, 1825; *Arkansas Gazette*, Sept. 14, 1824; *Detroit Gazette*, Apr. 16, 1824; *New York American*, Sept. 4, Oct. 18, 1824; *North American Review*, XX: 178–9; *American Register*, I: 227–238; Adams, *Life and Writings of Jared Sparks*, I: 285.
- ¹¹⁵ *Niles'*, Oct. 30, 1824; June 25, July 16, 1825; *Detroit Gazette*, quoting *Portsmouth Journal*, Nov. 26, 1824; *Richmond Whig*, July 19, 1825; *Boston Spectator*, quoted in *Richmond Compiler*, Apr. 7, 1825; *Vermont Journal*, Aug. 1, 1825.
- ¹¹⁶ *New York American*, Sept. 3, 1830; E. N. Curtis, *The French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doctrines*, 94.
- ¹¹⁷ *Providence Journal*, Sept. 4; *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 7.
- ¹¹⁸ *Niles'*, Sept. 4, 1830.

- ¹¹⁹ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Sept. 23, Sept. 7, 1830.
- ¹²⁰ *National Intelligencer*, Sept. 8, Sept. 6, 1830.
- ¹²¹ *National Intelligencer*, Sept. 14, Sept. 17, 1830; *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 7, Sept. 10, Sept. 12; *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 10; *Niles'*, Sept. 18, 1830.
- ¹²² *New York American*, Sept. 30, 1830.
- ¹²³ *Niles'*, Oct. 30, 1830; J. P. Kennedy, *Life of William Wirt*, II: 307-8.
- ¹²⁴ *National Intelligencer*, Oct. 28, Oct. 30, 1830; *National Journal*, Oct. 30; *Niles'*, Nov. 6.
- ¹²⁵ Benton, *Abridgment*, XI: 112-113.
- ¹²⁶ *Burlington Sentinel*, Sept. 24, 1830; *New York Evening Post*, Sept. 6; *Niles'*, XXXIX: 185, August 27, 1831; *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 12, 1830.
- ¹²⁷ *Niles'*, Nov. 27, 1830.
- ¹²⁸ *Natchez Gazette*, Oct. 6, Oct. 13, 1830.
- ¹²⁹ *National Gazette*, quoted in *Mobile Register*, Dec. 16, 1830.
- ¹³⁰ Adams, *Memoirs*, VIII: 253. The New England wing of the Anti-Masonic party, it is said, disapproved of the Revolution on the ground that the destruction of established institutions would be productive of atheism and disorder. Charles McCarthy, *The Anti-Masonic Party*, in *American Historical Association Annual Report*, 1902, I: 546.
- ¹³¹ Friendly notices of the Revolution, representative types:—*Boston Courier*, quoted in *Vermont Journal*, Sept. 11; *Boston Patriot*, quoted *Ib.*, Sept. 18, 1830; *New York American*, Sept. 10, Sept. 15, Sept. 20, and quoting *Albany Daily Advertiser*, Sept. 9, 13, 17, *American Annual Register*, V: 250-394; *Detroit Courier*, Dec. 23, 1830; *Connecticut Courant*, Oct. 5, Sept. 28, 1830; *Concord Patriot*, Sept. 27; *New York Daily Advertiser*, Sept. 20; *Albany Argus*, quoted in *Burlington Sentinel*, Sept. 10; *Arkansas Gazette*, Oct. 6; *Philadelphia Enquirer*, *United States Telegraph*, *New York Courier*, quoted in *Richmond Enquirer*, Sept. 14; *Providence Journal*, Sept. 6, Sept. 9. See also article by Eugene N. Curtis, "American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revolutions," *American Historical Review*, XXIX: 249-254.

CHAPTER 4

The Reign of Louis Philippe

THE relations of the United States with the government of Louis Philippe opened most auspiciously. The Orleans monarchy, constitutional in type, headed by a man whose temperament and previous life seemed to argue a faithfulness to free democratic ideals, and sponsored by Lafayette, who was claimed by Americans as one of their own national heroes, was welcomed in friendly fashion; and France was deemed to have advanced materially toward the status of a self-governing state. It was, moreover, an especial pleasure to the United States that the new French administration showed itself amenable to reason in the long-standing dispute about indemnities, and readily negotiated a treaty which gave on the whole adequate satisfaction for American claims.

But the new monarch was early beset with factional disturbances, and it soon became evident that the Revolution of 1830, if it had brought into being a constitutional state, had not created a harmonious one. The Treaty of 1832, designed to settle the indemnity dispute with the United States, became one of the subjects of popular attack, and was sharply criticised, on the ground that the concessions made by it were unnecessarily great. There was a demand for its revision, and the government dared not press in the Chamber of Deputies the appropriation bill necessary to meet its provisions. The first instalment of the payments came due, and was not met. President Jackson, under whose authority the treaty had been negotiated, felt that his own reputation was bound up with its enforcement. He therefore allowed the Secretary of the Treasury, McLane, to draw upon the French minister of finance for the amount, but since no legal provision existed to meet such a draft, the bill was allowed to be protested, and was returned, unpaid, through the Bank of the United States. This attempt at enforcing payment was deeply resented in France, where dissatisfaction was also caused by the publication of some remarks made by Mr. Rives, who had represented the United States in the treaty parleys, implying somewhat boastfully that he had gotten the better of the French in the bargaining. The opposition thus tended to increase rather than to decrease, and Louis Philippe did not secure the passage of the appropriation bill

during the ensuing year, although he gave to the United States his assurance that he would do all that lay in his power, and that the provisions of the treaty would certainly be fulfilled in time.

Jackson, however, thought the delay unnecessary and unjustifiable, and his Annual Message of December, 1834, was distinctly belligerent in tone. After describing the satisfactory character of the foreign relations of the United States in general, he said: "It becomes my unpleasant duty to inform you that this pacific and highly gratifying picture of our foreign relations does not include those with France at this time." The United States was most desirous, he continued, of conciliating her "ancient ally and friend" and could not see without regret an interruption of friendly relations. If such an event should occur, it was most unfitting that it should be caused by any fault on the part of this country. Therefore "the whole course of this Government has been characterized by a spirit so conciliatory and forbearing as to make it impossible that our justice and moderation should be questioned, whatever may be the consequences of a longer perseverance on the part of the French Government in her omission to satisfy the conceded claims of our citizens." But "near a quarter of a century has been wasted in ineffectual negotiations." The circumstances connected with the arrangement of the treaty were next reviewed, the terms recalled, and the later stages of the dispute described. Then followed the energetic statement that although peace and friendly intercourse with all nations were most desirable, they could not be secured permanently by surrendering the rights of our citizens, or permitting solemn treaties for their indemnity, in cases of flagrant wrong, to be abrogated or set aside.

"It is my conviction that the United States ought to insist on a prompt execution of the treaty, and in case it be refused or longer delayed take redress into their own hands. . . . I recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers. Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to expect anything from her fears and preclude the necessity of a declaration that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us. She ought to look upon it as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the part of the United States to insist on their rights." ¹

In Perley's *Reminiscences* we are told that some members of the Cabinet, thinking this language too strong, had prevailed upon the President's private secretary to modify it somewhat, but that when Jackson discovered this, "he flew into a great excitement, and when Mr. Rives entered the private office to obtain it for printing, he found the old General busily engaged in re-writing it according to the original copy. 'I know them

French,' said he, 'They won't pay unless they're made to.' " ² Whether this tale be true or not, it probably expresses with some accuracy Jackson's view of the matter. The message created much excitement throughout the country, and opinion was sharply divided as to the wisdom or the necessity of the President's action. Gallatin, in whose hands the early stages of the negotiations had rested, and who was thoroughly conversant with all aspects of the matter, discussed the question fully in a letter to Edward Everett. He doubted the efficacy of reprisals, and thought sufficient consideration had not been given to the difficulties under which the French king labored. "The fundamental error, on the part of our Government, consists in not having been sensible that, in the present situation of France, the real power is not with the King, but with the popular branch." "There is no evidence," he added, "that public opinion is such at this time as to compel the representatives of the people to pursue a course so fatal to the general interests of the United States as a war with France would be." He had witnessed various critical periods, and knew how spontaneous public excitement manifested itself. The complete apathy, which prevailed long after the refusal by the French Chamber to comply with the treaty was universally known, was a strong evidence both that public opinion on that subject was unbiased, and that there was nothing in the transaction which affected the honor and character of the nation. ³

Col. Wm. B. Lewis, a prominent Democrat, and close friend of Jackson, wrote,

"The opposition leaders are at a loss what to do in relation to that part of the Message which speaks of our affairs with France. They have the disposition to assail it, but I think they are afraid of the effect it may have both upon our country and France. Besides, many of the leading opposition men are directly or indirectly interested in these claims, and it is believed, if strong opposition is made to the Message, it may encourage France to delay the payment." ⁴

This letter suggests a fact which became evident at once, that with the strong party feeling existing at the moment in the United States, it was inevitable that the Message should become the subject of party recriminations. For this reason it is somewhat difficult at first to be certain of the real feeling of the country on the matter. The *Washington Globe* was the organ of the Administration, and it undertook to support the President's position whole-heartedly and completely. The *Globe* characterized the critics of the Presidential policy as traitors, and declared that their position amounted to "a proffer of support to France in case it should persist in refusing justice." Other influential papers which approved the Message were cited. Among the more important of these are the *New York Times* (Dem.), the *New York Evening Post* (Dem.), the *Albany Argus* (Dem.),

the *Richmond Enquirer* (Dem.), the *Connecticut Times* (Dem.), the *Baltimore Republican*, and the *Louisville Public Advertiser*. This quotation from *Bicknell's Reporter* is fairly typical:

"Public opinion appears to be much divided upon the subject, but we have conversed with no one who has not admitted the propriety of decision and firmness on the part of the American government,—who has not expressed the opinion that the conduct of the French has been anything but high-minded and magnanimous or worthy a great and honorable nation. No matter whether the President is right or wrong in his views . . . he will be sustained by a large majority of the American people." ⁵

A few other papers gave unqualified indorsement, such as the *Arkansas State Gazette* (Dem.), which said,—

"With that nation a rupture seems inevitable, from her unpardonable faithlessness in deferring the payment of the \$5,000,000 . . . unless she promptly renders us that justice which has already been too long delayed. . . . The firm and energetic language used by the President on this subject cannot fail to be received with approbation by any American who feels a proper regard for the honor of his country." ⁶

Chief among the critics of the Message was the influential *National Intelligencer*, then the chief organ of the Whig party.

"We see in this part of the Message, the spirit of the old soldier, resentful of injury, real or supposed, impatient of delay, and reckless of the consequences in pursuit of redress for it. . . . It is now to be ascertained whether our fellow citizens are so enamored of battle and bloodshed as to follow their leader headlong into a war with 'our ancient friend and ally'; or whether they will draw back and survey the width and depth of the gulf."

That France was in the wrong, the *National Intelligencer* agreed, but the case did not yet affect the honor of the United States, the difficulties of the French government should be recognized, and menaces could only do harm. "A disapproval of the measure and mode of redress recommended by the Executive toward France, coupling the expression of that disapproval . . . with the strongest condemnation of the conduct of France" should not be considered as "taking sides with France."

"We only ask the admission that Reprisals by our ships of war, in the broadest extent of that measure, would be war; which, we presume, no man will deny. We say, that Congress is not ready to make war in the present state of the case; nor are the People. That is, they do not so keenly desire a war as to rush into it without necessity. We desire it to be understood by the people that such is the feeling of Congress. We desire it to be understood, in France, that the people in this country do not thirst after the blood of Frenchmen, any more than their Representatives do. . . . Do we desire anything unreasonable, or incompatible with the nation's honor?" ⁷

The *National Intelligencer* made a quite thorough poll of the press, and quoted many expressions substantially in accord with its own. The *New York Journal of Commerce* called the idea of reprisals "cowardly and rapacious." The *New York Evening Star* (Whig), while admitting that an appeal to arms seems at first glance necessary, added,—“But we are a thinking people, and a more considerate and close survey has caused many to pause and hesitate. We should hear both sides; no violent attack or discourtesy is necessary.” “It is not easy to bring a man to reason if you double your fist in his face, nor is it easy to force a brave and powerful nation to do what is demanded by justice, if accompanied by threats of vengeance,” remarked the *Philadelphia Gazette*. The *New York Mercantile Advertiser* (Whig) and several others insisted that while there was much to complain of in the conduct of France, restrictive tariff regulations or a non-intercourse law would represent the utmost degree of retaliation which could be required. “A paltry ground for war,” “injudicious,” “bad taste,” “legalized piracy,” “coarse and offensive,” are phrases which appear. The *Baltimore Chronicle* was outspoken in its condemnation.—“The policy of this country is emphatically pacific, and nothing but necessity should cause her to deviate.”⁸

The editor of *Niles' Register* was also pacifically inclined. He said that the government of France had for years avoided action on our claims, in a manner that was “very reprehensible”; “yet we totally disapprove of the recommendations of the President in this respect,—regarding the dispute as more about a matter of money than as one affecting the national honor.” If this is so, then its amount must be compared to the cost of a war. The Message will stand in the way of action in France, “it being ‘human nature’ to resist the doing of simple justice on compulsion.” France ought to pay, but “something is due to her peculiar situation and the parties or factions, and uncertainties, with which she has been vexed.” There is some dispute about the treaty-making power in France. We think the legislature ought to “have charge of the purse-strings” and be “able to stop the wheels of the government.” Our own conduct in money matters is not above reproach,—the Beaumarchais claim was put off year after year by Congress,—yet in the late treaty it is admitted to be entirely good. Of course this claim had not been admitted by treaty before, but France had pressed it, the President had recommended it, and Congress “in its own proper right, refused an appropriation to quiet it.” Nor have we satisfied the claims of our own citizens for spoliations occurring before 1800. The responsibility for payment of these claims rests entirely upon us, by the terms of the earlier treaty with France, yet they are not paid. We have neglected or refused this justice for more than twenty-four years. Why should we be

so indignant with France for doing the same thing? The cases should be considered in a spirit of forbearance, "if not of self-humiliation." It is unwise for either France or the United States to force a war. Certainly we are not justified in reprisals. If retaliation is to be considered at all, it should be by means of the tariff.⁹

The *National Gazette* (Whig) declared that the United States must insist upon the fulfilment of the treaty. "We have negotiated enough,—more than enough: we are indisputably in the right . . . and the French government in the wrong. . . . The American people will, we doubt not, ratify this sentence of the Message." But the *Gazette* frankly balked at the idea of giving the President the war power implied in the reprisal suggestion.¹⁰

"The great body of the American community will look to the cause, and ask if all honorable means of avoiding this last extremity have been used. Every true American, whose thoughts are sometimes turned to his own glorious Revolution, will especially require this, as an indispensable condition, before he gives his consent to taking up arms against an old friend, the only nation in this wide world who was not afraid to encounter the wrath of the proud British Lion in coming to the aid of a distant confederacy of feeble colonies struggling for freedom. . . . There is no war feeling in this people against France, and the President will find that he is unable to get it up, powerful as he is in the affections of his party. . . . Kentucky is the last state to submit to any indignity put upon us by any foreign power. . . . All that we require before we begin to cut the throats of Frenchmen is that we may feel justified in the sight of men, in our consciences, and in the sight of that great tribunal before which all nations must bow."¹¹

The *New York American* declared:

"We hold that right is on our side throughout, that we have been trifled with by France, that it was the duty of the President to express strongly, as the Message does, the sense entertained by the country of the backwardness of France in fulfilling the treaty, and to indicate a decided purpose not to let the matter linger longer in doubt."

But reprisals were thought "untimely" and "inexpedient." Tariff regulations, or at most non-intercourse, would be quite sufficient.¹²

The *New York Spectator* thought that the French government had shown itself "more faithless than ever," but disapproved of warlike action on the part of America.¹³ The *New York Courier and Enquirer* (Whig) strongly condemned the President's course, though it believed that the treaty should be enforced, and would support the President in any dignified measures. War, and especially with Jackson as President, would be most unfortunate. "But this forms no just plea for Louis Philippe's neglecting to comply with the solemn stipulations of a treaty."¹⁴

The *Boston Evening Gazette* called attention to the fact that while France

had unjustly delayed the payments, she had not refused them. We were not therefore justified in threats or in reprisals.¹⁵ The *Boston Daily Advertiser* (Dem.), after stating that in its opinion the situation did not call for an attitude of menace, gave space to a humorous presentation of the subject, under the title of "A Chapter in the History of Uncle Sam." After describing the troubles that sprang up when "old Lewis Baboon" was kicked out of doors by "an impudent squatter called Napoleon" who then took over the farm and ran the whole concern, we are told how this interloper got into trouble with a neighbor, John Bull, and how in the course of the quarrel some of Uncle Sam's wagons were damaged. Then, when the Baboon family finally succeeded in regaining possession of the place, Uncle Sam began to dun for the value of his property. "Lewis, who was a very polite man, either took no notice of the matter, or bowed and said it was all very well! And so things went on for about twenty years, and no money was forthcoming." At last one Andrew, "a choleric, crusty fellow," was appointed Uncle Sam's major-domo, and he made a settlement with Mr. Baboon. But, very unfortunately for all concerned, Lewis had ventured on this important step without consulting his wife. This old lady was a cross-grained individual, who kept the keys of the strong-box in her pocket. "Lewis, who was mortally afraid of her, thought it best to wait for a little sunshine before he asked her for the money," but when he did finally try it, a hurricane came about his ears. So he wrote to Andrew that his wife had gone on a little trip to the country, but that the moment she returned everything should be done which was in the power of man to do, and doubtless with perfect success. Andrew replied, "Can't you send for the old woman and make her pony up? . . . Send an expatch for her rite away, and let her know that if she is not soon out of her tantrums, by jingo! she'll hear from me. I won't bear it no longer—that's the plain English on't!" He had even made up his mind to take some of Lewis's wagons, and let the Baboon family go to law about it if they liked. "But the more prudent of the tenants were of the opinion that there would be evil to pay when this resolution came to the ears of Mrs. B., and said that you might do something with such an awful temper by coaxing, but the very spirit of evil himself couldn't drive her."¹⁶

Sentiment throughout the country in regard to the President's Message, then, held that the claims of the United States against France were just, and should be maintained. The peculiar difficulties of the French administration received some sympathy, although doubt of the sincerity of the King was expressed in some quarters. Money, not the honor of the United States, appeared the point at issue, and the constitutional right of the French Chambers to the control of finances was recognized, with, however,

the feeling that they were morally bound to support the action of the King in the matter. The language of the Message was thought to be menacing, and it was felt that France might reasonably resent it. It was believed that the resources of negotiation were not exhausted, and pacific measures were decidedly preferred to warlike ones. Almost no strong advocacy of reprisals can be found, and hasty action of any sort was deprecated. Against France there was no popular clamor, though reprobation of her behavior was general. This represents the consensus of opinion of practically all of the opposition papers and even a majority of the Democratic journals.

Attention now centered on Congress. Would this body support the President or not? In the Senate the reply was prompt. Henry Clay, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, reported on January 6th. His report is a carefully-reasoned document, truly statesmanlike in quality. Firm, temperate, dignified and tactful, it was framed for both an American and a European audience, and calculated to express at the same time the unyielding determination of America to see the Treaty fulfilled, and her disposition to pursue her ends by all reasonable pacific means. The arguments do not differ greatly from those generally expressed in the newspapers. The Report concurs entirely with the President as to the justice of the claims, and accepts his judgment that the amount stipulated in the Treaty falls short of the sum which was fairly due, but recalls that the settlement as arranged was considered acceptable. Congress, it is recalled, made immediate provision for fulfilment of the obligations required of the United States in the Treaty, the settlement of the claims of French citizens and the reduction of the tariff on French wines. France must also meet her obligations. If she should finally refuse to do so the United States must compel her to act justly. The President thinks that this point has been reached, and the Committee, in order to clarify their judgment in the matter, have carefully examined all the correspondence relating to the negotiations. The Report then reviews these documents and the events connected with them, manifesting considerable sympathy with the French point of view. The proposal for reprisals is dismissed as a measure leading inevitably to war, and as unwarranted by the circumstances of the case. Moreover, it would be certain to be construed as an attempt at intimidation, which might even serve as "an apology to France for disregarding the obligations of national faith and justice." The Report concludes with an expression of confidence in the sincerity of France, and equal confidence in the ability of the United States to cope with any emergency which might arise, and with resolutions denying to the President the reprisal power for which he had asked.¹⁷

In the debate which followed, Tallmadge (Dem.) of New York dissented from the Report, and tried to have action delayed until the French reaction to the President's Message should be known. Clay replied that if Congress should not determine on reprisals the sooner this fact was known in France the better. James Buchanan made a lengthy speech in defence of the Presidential position.

"France is a brave and chivalrous nation; her whole history proves that she is not to be intimidated, even by Europe in arms; but she is wise as well as warlike. To inform her that our rights must be asserted, is to place her in the serious and solemn position of deciding whether she will resist the payment of a just debt by force. Whenever she is convinced that this result is inevitable, the money will be paid; and although I hope I may be mistaken, I believe there will be no payment until she knows we will assume this attitude. France has never appeared to regard the question in this serious light."¹⁸

Several speakers emphasized the point that it would be unwise so to frame the resolution as to bind Congress not to act, if future developments should make it seem advisable; but with this reservation, Webster and Calhoun, the Whig leaders, Cuthbert (Dem.) of Georgia, King (Dem.) of Alabama, and others of both parties, declared themselves in sympathy with the Committee recommendations and anxious that their views should be endorsed unanimously. Clay made an earnest speech in which he expressed his entire concurrence with the President except in the idea of reprisals.

"But when he declares the confidence which he entertains in the French government; when he expresses his conviction that the executive branch of that government is honest and sincere in its professions, and recites the promise by it of a renewed effort to obtain the passage of a bill of appropriations by the French Chambers, it did appear to the committee inconsistent with these professions of confidence that they should be accompanied by the recommendation of a measure which could only be authorized by the conviction that no confidence, or at least, not entire confidence, could be placed in the declarations and professions of the French government. Confidence and distrust are unnatural allies. If we profess confidence anywhere, especially if that confidence be only for a limited period, it should be unaccompanied with any indication whatever of distrust—a confidence full, free, and frank."¹⁹

A slight amendment was made in the resolution, so that in its final form it read: "Resolved, That it is inexpedient at present to adopt any legislative measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France."²⁰ And in this form it was passed by the Senate, January 14, without a dissenting vote, even from the Democratic members.

In the House, which was more largely Democratic than the Senate, quite different conditions prevailed. December 9, Clayton (Dem.) of Georgia moved to refer this part of the Message to the Foreign Relations Committee

with instructions to report that it was expedient to await the further action of the French Chamber "inasmuch as the delay seems to have proceeded from the complicated character of the claims and their long standing . . . rather than from any desire to impair friendly relations or to evade the performance of justice." A sharp debate at once ensued. Clayton supported his motion in a speech of considerable length, in which he severely condemned the suggestion of reprisals, as amounting to a practical declaration of war, which the country did not desire, especially for this cause. He "felt assured the American people would approve of no such war. Virginia would never do it. Mt. Vernon would never allow it. Yorktown would not consent to it. All the South was opposed to it." Claiborne (Dem.) of Virginia agreed with this. He had no hesitation, he said, in asserting that so far as he had been able to ascertain public opinion it was averse to war, and he would not favor granting war power till it was demanded by dire necessity. The French debt was fairly owed, and should be collected, but we should use the language of friendship. Wayne (Dem.) of Georgia, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, objected to having the Committee instructed. They should be allowed to canvass the case thoroughly, and recommend whatever measures seemed to them wise. He defended the Message, as did also Johnson (Dem.) of Kentucky, and the matter was finally referred, without instructions. In committee, it remained for some time. Wayne was nominated for the Supreme Court Bench, and resigned from the House. Everett (Whig) of Massachusetts, whose name stood next on the committee list, claimed the chairmanship, but was ousted by a vote of the Committee, 4-3, electing Cambreleng (Dem.) of New York. This dispute was threshed out on the floor of the House, with Adams championing the cause of Everett, and as a result of the wrangle, party and individual feeling within the Committee ran high.²¹

Before the withdrawal of Wayne, a vote had been taken in the Foreign Relations Committee, resulting in a decision against the Presidential reprisal plan. Under Cambreleng's leadership, a majority was still against reprisals, and refused to make a report, on the ground that if they were "determined to do nothing, they ought to say nothing."²² On February 7, in answer to a call from the House, the President sent some further portions of the correspondence dealing with French relations, and John Quincy Adams moved that this be referred to the Committee, "with instructions to report forthwith." Cambreleng said it would be impossible to report immediately any measure which would meet the wishes of the Committee or of the House. Then followed the most sensational speech of the whole debate on this subject. Adams, traditionally at enmity with Jackson for

both political and personal reasons, strongly urged that the matter be brought before the House for discussion. The problem was one with which he himself had wrestled, and in which his own feelings were deeply engaged. Adams "did not undertake to say that what the President had recommended would be the wisest and most proper course, but he would say this much, that he believed it was the duty of the House to act upon this subject, and declare whether they would comply with the proposal of the President or that they would do something to sustain the rights, interests, and honor of the nation. . . . Whatever might be said of the Presidential Message, he, for one, would say as once was said of Lafayette, that whoever censured its imprudence must yet admire its spirit. . . . It would go forth to all mankind as the sustainer of the rights, the honor, and the interests of this country." And he begged the House to take action without further delay. Later in the discussion he added that it did not follow that he deemed a war necessary, nor did it follow that reprisals should be made. But the question should be before the House for action.

Cambreng still maintained that the time for action should be left to the discretion of the Committee. He himself would have preferred bolder action, but unanimity was the essential. He felt, however, that they were every moment approaching the period when forbearance would become pusillanimity. Everett favored an immediate report. While not in favor of reprisals he felt the subject to be one of imminent importance, demanding a strong utterance on the part of the House. "Having shown the justice of our claims, we could have expressed our resolute determination to stand upon our rights under the treaty; our firm purpose not to relax one tittle, nor recede one inch; and we could have adduced the reasons,—and reasons there were—in support of the opinion that France would yet do us justice." The report should be "bold, firm and pacific." Clayton said that the Senate had declared action inexpedient. Any hasty action on the part of the House would bring about a collision between the two bodies. He would certainly not favor any warlike measures now. McKinley (Dem.) of Alabama said that the time for forbearance had passed. "There has been nothing but forbearance on the part of the United States and nothing but aggression on the part of France. Can friendship be preserved by such humiliating submission?" Lytle (Dem.) of Ohio, favored action, to "let the world know that that power which attempts to cavil with, to special plead with, to juggle with, the United States of America has made a serious, and, for itself, unfortunate, mistake." Johnson of Kentucky talked of "violation of faith, gross, pointed, and flagrant," of "wilful, premeditated wrong." On the whole, however, the consensus of opinion was not in favor

of immediate and decisive action, and the Adams motion "to report forthwith" was lost, although by a very narrow margin.²³

In Adams' *Diary*, under date of February 22, 1835, we find this entry,—

"The remainder of this day was absorbed in writing upon the present state of our dispute with France—a subject upon which my anxious feelings have outstripped the necessity of the case. My apprehension is not of war, but that the rights of the claimants under the treaty, and the honor of the country, will on this subject be ultimately sacrificed and abandoned. The fear of this has urged me prematurely to press the consideration of it upon the House of Representatives, and now spurs me to renew the call upon them for action. I have failed, and the occasion has been seized successfully to turn the election to the United States Senate against me for what I have said in the House on this occasion. Cautious perseverance, support me!²⁴

The resentment in France caused by the President's Message manifested itself in the failure of the appropriation bill which the Chambers had been considering, the recall of Serrurier, the French representative in the United States, and the offering of passports to the American Minister in Paris, Livingston. But the French Cabinet also announced that it would not allow its just indignation at the American behavior to interfere with its own appreciation of the right, and that it would re-introduce the appropriation bill and press it to a passage. Livingston was instructed by his government to await the result of this action, and to withdraw if the bill was not passed. On February 25 the President sent the correspondence covering these events to Congress, and the following day Cambreleng, at the wish, he said, of a majority of the Committee, brought in a report and resolutions to the effect that it would be incompatible with the rights and honor of the United States further to negotiate with France in relation to the Treaty, and that preparations ought to be made to meet any emergency growing out of the situation. Everett offered a minority report. The discussion which followed was dominated by Adams, in a powerful speech which, as the *Philadelphia Gazette* said, explained all his former course, convinced the House of his sincerity, and won him the confidence of all parties. "The situation of the two countries," he said, "is not such as to make proper a declaration that we will not negotiate. When a nation in a controversy says this, there is nothing left but war. . . . The United States will take nothing but an absolute fulfilment of the treaty. If, together with negotiation, this will not preserve peace, I am for war." He believed that the interest and honor of the country were at stake. The measure suggested by the President was imprudent, but it was not unjust nor unwarranted by the laws of nations. "I approve the spirit of the President and applaud the prudence of the Senate. The compound of both, each tempering the

other, may possibly prevail on the French Chambers to make the appropriations which it is their duty to make." The House, now about to be dissolved, can insist on nothing. It can only express its opinion, and sustain the President in his determination to uphold the rights and the honor of the nation. "Let our rights be maintained to the last drop of our blood, but do not let us say that we will have no negotiation."

Moved by these arguments, the House amended Cambreleng's first resolution to read: "That in the opinion of this House, the Treaty of the Fourth of July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on," and adopted it unanimously.²⁵ The resolution favoring provision for a possible emergency also passed, and Cambreleng promptly introduced a bill appropriating \$3,000,000 "to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance and the increase of the navy: provided such expenditure shall be rendered necessary for the defence of the country prior to the next meeting of Congress." This bill passed the House in spite of the opposition of Adams and other influential members. The Senate had, meanwhile, debated the French relations further, and the Foreign Relations Committee, after considering the President's message of February 25, had again declined to recommend action. The \$3,000,000 Fortifications Bill, when it came to the Senate, therefore, was immediately rejected. The House sent it up again. The Senate adhered to its previous decision. A compromise committee finally reduced the amount to \$300,000 for arming certain fortifications, and \$500,000 for repairing and equipping some warships, which amounts the Senate accepted. Cambreleng, in the House, declared that the amount was "totally inadequate if needed, and more than was necessary if it should not be." The report was returned to the House late in the evening of March 3, when apparently a quorum was not obtainable, and no action on it was taken. Subsequently, the responsibility for the loss of the Fortifications Bill was the subject of much controversy.²⁶

The public had followed with the greatest interest the action of the legislature. Clay's Report of January 6 met with general approval. The *Philadelphia Gazette* characterized it as "ample and luminous." "Its tone is throughout American, and while it does not sustain the suggestion of the Executive, it shows France that Congress will stand by the country, should it be found necessary in the last resort to support our claims to justice by an appeal to arms. But the committee see no necessity for such a course."²⁷ Madison wrote to Clay, congratulating him on his "able document" "laudable in its object of avoiding war without incurring dishonor."²⁸ Adams's action brought down upon him much unpleasant

criticism and was misunderstood and misrepresented. The *New York Spectator* spoke of his speech of February 7 as "warm and animated," and as giving opportunity to many of the "war hawks of the President," but the editor goes on to mention his later "pacific explanation" and adds,—“The unscrupulous friends of the Administration are doubtless ready to plunge the country into a war at any moment, and for any cause. . . . But true friends of the nation should watch them carefully. There is little danger of too forbearing a spirit in the American people. . . . Let France deny us justice unequivocally, and there will be but one sentiment in the nation as to the course we shall pursue.”²⁹ The most noticeable phase of the comment at this period is the marked anxiety of both parties to throw the blame for a war, if one should come, on the other side. The Whig argument was that the ill-judged and ill-advised threat of the Executive was responsible, while the President's friends blamed the opposition for encouraging the French by their criticisms.³⁰

March 18, 1835, the appropriation bill was reported favorably in the French Chambers, and late in April was passed, with, however, a condition attached that actual payment should be withheld until satisfactory explanations of the President's language should be received. Livingston wrote a vigorous note of protest against this clause, and withdrew. In the United States the fact that the bill was actually passed tended at first to obscure the awkwardness of the demand for explanations.³¹ By the end of the year, however, it had become evident that this difficulty would not easily be surmounted. Jackson's Message of December detailed the circumstances, stated that no insult had been intended, and declared that no apology could be given. It also stated that Mr. Barton, the American chargé des affaires in Paris, had been instructed to ask for the payment and if it was refused to return to the United States. Sentiment in the country had remained pacific, and there had been considerable anxiety in regard to the temper of the President's Message. "There are many who hang around the President . . . who . . . are anxious to have the 'old Roman' send in to Congress a flaming war message; but it is believed that the wiles of these bad characters will not avail."³² There was therefore a feeling of relief when the Message was found to be in general pacific, and hope obtained that the explanations offered in the document would be satisfactory to the French.³³

But a special message followed early in January, 1836, stating that Barton had obeyed his instructions and asked for the payment, and had been told that only an official, written, declaration from the United States, to the effect that it regretted the misunderstanding and that it had never intended to call in question the good faith of France, nor to menace her,

would suffice. Barton had then claimed his passports, the French chargé in the United States was being withdrawn, and diplomatic intercourse was entirely suspended between the two countries. Jackson proposed the prohibition of commercial intercourse with France.³⁴ Now indeed the situation became really tense, and hot words were uttered that threatened to lead to deeds. The *Boston Courier* (Whig) may serve as an example of this group of Americans:

“France has robbed us of our commerce, imprisoned our citizens, insulted our flag and set us at defiance; and as a last wrong has refused to carry into effect the conditions of a Treaty concluded five years ago, and even has the temerity to ask us to make a humiliating apology and record ourselves a nation of liars.”³⁵

Livingston's return increased the tension, for he was fully in sympathy with the Executive, and urged that “no apology, no concession” should be made, and that the United States could not “purchase payment by national dishonor.” His presence and his attitude stiffened the Democratic cause.³⁶ The Senate debated a bill making appropriation for armament, and Buchanan made a war speech, ending,—“We must remember that France may yield with honor; we never can without disgrace!”³⁷ Calhoun, on the other hand, fiercely attacked the President, and said that he felt “a deep conviction that neither justice, honor, nor necessity, impel to arms”; and that a war with France at any time, and especially at the present, would be “one of the greatest calamities that could befall the country.”³⁸ In this conviction the mass of public sentiment concurred. Said the *Baltimore Patriot*:

“If it should appear in the end that even one of the parties is truly desirable of an honorable adjustment without a resort to the arbitrament of the sword, there is still room for hope that it may be adjusted. . . . Our hope is that there shall be found enough of justice, good sense, and discretion, in the ruling powers of both countries, to compass an honorable adjustment of the question without resort to arms.”³⁹

The *New York American* (Dem.) declared:

“Our voice is not for war, not for non-intercourse, not for action of any kind by Congress, always provided no aggression be committed by France, until we hear the effect of the President's Message. . . . Delay cannot put us in the wrong, and it may shield us from self-reproach.”⁴⁰

And the *Richmond Whig*,—

“Were ever two nations on the point of hostilities for so silly a cause! France says ‘Say that you regret the differences existing between the two countries—that you do not impugn the good faith of France and did not mean to menace her,—and

the money is ready!" General Jackson says that he will not say so to France. In two separate messages he tells us and all the world precisely that, but will not tell France so—and for this we are to go to war. . . . The most miserable tyro in diplomacy would have no difficulty in settling the whole affair in half an hour!"⁴¹

With this feeling widely prevalent, it was natural that the American public should receive with satisfaction the information that Great Britain, through Charles Bankhead, the British chargé, had proffered mediation, and that the offer had been accepted by both France and the United States. The American acceptance was accompanied by a reasoned review of the case, together with a statement that since the President's message to a Congress is a "consultation" between two branches of the government, it is therefore a private matter, with which no other nation may be concerned; and also with the reservation that the American government would under no circumstances offer to France an explanation or apology. France, however, weakened in her demand, and after a short time signified her willingness to consider as sufficient the explanations presented in the President's Message of December, 1835, and the incident was declared closed.⁴² The first payments were made in May, and the others followed regularly as they fell due. Thus Jackson in his Message at the end of the year was able to announce the ending of a dispute which had served for nearly a quarter of a century to vex and to cloud the relations between France and the United States.⁴³ His party acclaimed it as a triumph of firmness and sagacity. The opposition felt that an unfortunate war had been barely avoided.

Even though the attitude of Americans on the indemnity question was determined largely by party affiliation, the very acrimony of the dispute served to attract attention to France, and encourage among both Democrats and Whigs a critical spirit in regard to French affairs in general. In 1835 the *North American Review* published an article on the Revolution of 1830, which emphasized the idea that this movement offered to the French people an opportunity to establish firmly the principles and practices of liberty, both for France herself and for other nations, but that "these splendid destinies have not been fulfilled."⁴⁴ The *Democratic Review* in 1837 carried a similar article:

"Louis Philippe was called upon to solve one of the most difficult problems in history, and has but deferred its solution. He bade the nation stand still, because he had not the courage to go on with her; and his administration, so far from resting on a firm and popular basis, derives its security only from the weakness of the leader of the opposition. . . . We consider the appearance of Louis Philippe as a mere interlude in the history of France, resembling some of Shakespear's clowns, introduced to relieve the gravity of the drama; a mere pause in the Revolution. . . . He has

taught all the countries that they themselves must be the guardians of their liberties." 45

The *Democratic Review* a few years later carried a series of studies of "France, its King, Court, and Government," written by Lewis Cass, then Minister at the French court. These appeared shortly after in book form, and were widely read. The general tone was friendly to the king, though somewhat patronizing.⁴⁶ Somewhat more light is thrown upon the feeling in America by the *Diary* of M. de Bacourt, who was the representative of France in Washington during the administrations of Van Buren, Harrison, and Tyler. De Bacourt had never been in America before, and his only diplomatic experience had been as Secretary to Talleyrand. Narrow, prejudiced, and credulous, he could scarcely have contributed to the creation of harmony between the two countries. In fact, since the time of De Neuville, France had apparently been singularly unfortunate in her choice of Ministers in this country. Serrurier was connected with the unpleasant memories of the War of 1812. The Count de Menou, who was chargé for eighteen months, was said to have been removed because he did not write to his government once during the entire period. M. Pageot, who served for ten years, partly as chargé, and partly as Minister, won little favor in America, and Pontois, who immediately preceded De Bacourt, left little trace of his influence. De Bacourt said:

"The Yankees are English at heart, in spite of the contempt they profess for them. They go to England to acquire their tastes, their morals, their customs, their fashions, and to encourage their antipathies to France and the French. . . . In the Southern states their sympathies are French; but I am sorry to say it is only our revolutionary ideas they sympathize with. . . . I have already seen that they do not think much of us: notwithstanding their complimentary speeches, they do not feel the slightest gratitude for the aid given them by the French in their War of Independence, and the indemnity of 25 millions given five years ago has finished us in their opinion. They see that we can always be duped. . . . The only fault of Boston in my eyes—but it is a great one—is that the inhabitants of this elegant and charming city hate the French, and what is worse, they despise them. . . . this would make my stay here for any length of time insupportable." Van Buren "is very well disposed toward France, and is very courteous to me. His politeness is perfect; it is the perfect imitation of a gentleman."

He praised the *National Intelligencer*, as having been less hostile to France, especially at the time of the indemnity dispute, than most papers. Calhoun, he said, "is one of the very few who are favorable to us. . . . He is from South Carolina, where the feeling toward France is better than in the other states." Sumner, too, from the same state, is spoken of as friendly. Webster is described as "a great partisan of the English, and consequently anti-French." Clay's "proclivities are very French." He "was particularly

polite to me, probably on account of the reputation his party have for being anti-French. He had told me before that he had been badly received by the elder branch of the Bourbons when he was in Paris in 1814. Is it not delightful to see a democrat who has been badly received by a king nurse this grievance for twenty-six years! He was, however, very anxious to show his high opinion of the present king, praising his great intelligence, his liberal ideas, and finding him 'worthy of governing a republic!'" He described a speech of Clay's in the Senate, denying that he was hostile to France, and eulogizing Louis Philippe as having "the honor of being the elect of the people and not one of those idiot kings, reigning by the absurd right of legitimacy." But Clay disproved his supposed pro-French sympathies by advocating an augmentation of duty on French wines and silks, a measure which was shortly after adopted.⁴⁷

A series of incidents connected with the Monroe Doctrine led to further dissatisfaction with France, on the part of Americans. Early in 1838 the French, in order to enforce the collection of some claims against Mexico, inaugurated a blockade of that country. This might have been expected to evoke some disapproval in the United States, but no protest was made. The explanation of this indifference seems to lie in the fact that we also had claims against Mexico, which we might wish to enforce, and in our sympathy with Texas in the struggle then being carried on for her independence. Mexico's troubles, said the papers in the United States, were brought on by her own imbecility and obstinacy.⁴⁸ With the French blockading fleet the relations of the American squadron in the Gulf of Mexico were friendly.⁴⁹ Some irritation over the strictness of the blockade and its interference with trade was manifested by the commercial interests;⁵⁰ and Caleb Cushing, one of the leading members of the Whig party, introduced in Congress a resolution asking information on the subject. Cushing's resolution was based on the Monroe Doctrine, and Pickens (Dem.), speaking in support of the motion, said that "a question of great importance might arise, in which the south-western states would feel a deep interest, and we could not look to it too soon."⁵¹ Henry Clay wrote to Nicholas Biddle that the French blockade operated most advantageously for Texas, by protecting her against attacks from the Gulf, and by giving her time to strengthen herself against Mexican attack by land, but he feared that out of the situation there might develop some sort of European interference in the affairs of Texas which the United States would not approve.⁵² The *National Intelligencer* showed anxiety lest the complete subjugation of Mexico should be the result of the French action, and suspected the French government of far-reaching designs. The *Intelligencer* also connected the withdrawal by Texas of its proposal for annexation

to the United States with French support, and urged that close attention be paid to these movements.⁵³ In general, however, the French activities produced little criticism or even comment, at this time.

But by 1844 these suspicions had become certainties, and it was known that France, in conjunction with England, was exercising strong pressure on Texas to prevent her annexation to the Republic of the north. The correspondence between Calhoun, who was then Secretary of State, and King, the American Minister in France, on the subject, was published with the President's Message in December, 1844. From this time on, we find the press of the United States watching closely the utterances of foreign political leaders, and reproducing fully articles from English or French papers which might throw light on the situation. February 20, 1845, the *Globe* published a violent attack on France and Great Britain for their attempt to maintain the status quo in Texas, and inquired,—“What is this but asserting a supremacy over the states of this continent?” Buchanan, replacing Calhoun in the State Department, wrote to King that the United States government was painfully disappointed at the behavior of France, since the king had declared in July, 1844, that his government would take no hostile steps, yet the French government was now attempting to paralyze and obstruct the free action of the people of Texas, and this was surely unfriendly to the United States.⁵⁴ In April the *Baltimore American*, referring to the report that England and France had united in a proposition to guarantee the independence of Texas and pay her debt, on condition that she agreed not to be annexed to the United States, said,—

“If Texas, left to her own action, should prefer to remain separate and independent, it would be well. Her freedom of choice would be respected. But every act of interference by an European power—every demonstration by diplomacy, intrigue or any other sort of influence to defeat annexation, whether emanating from desires of aggrandizement on their part or from jealousy of the growing powers of the United States, will have the effect of strengthening and concentrating the determination of this country to carry its point at every hazard. As between Texas and ourselves we could be forbearing; but the interposition of a foreign power presents an adversary to whom nothing will be yielded. Such, we take it, is the temper of our people at this time.”⁵⁵

The editor of *Niles' Register* said that the European backers of Mexico would be called upon to decide whether, if their interference could prevent it, the United States should be arrested in its territorial projects. He thought they might adventure a step too far in sustaining Mexico against annexation, and thereby bring on a general war. “British, French, and Texian agents are all represented as moving heaven and earth to prevent annexation, and induce Texas to remain independent.” He thought it quite natural that England and France should make such endeavors, as the

independence of Texas was distinctly to their interest,—“But now comes the question: annexation will be consummated, unless a war can prevent it—will England and France, or England alone, urge Mexico to a war?” “We have evidently arrived at the crisis. These powers must now immediately decide to allow the United States to steer her own course in relation to annexation, or they must promptly interpose.” When, in July, came the news of Guizot’s speech advocating a balance of power in America, this editor was quick to recognize the importance of the issue, and to say that “this requires the head of every denomination of American statesman and patriot.”⁵⁶

The general disapproval of French interference was reflected in the President’s reference to the subject in his Annual Message. Speaking of the annexation of Texas, he said:

“It is not to be forgotten that this result was achieved in despite of the diplomatic interference of European monarchies. Even France, the country which had been our ancient ally—the country which has a common interest with us in maintaining the freedom of the seas—the country which, by the cession of Louisiana, first opened us access to the Gulf of Mexico, the country with which we have been every year drawing more and more closely the bonds of successful commerce—most unexpectedly, and to our unfeigned regret, took part in an effort to prevent annexation and to impose on Texas, as a condition of the recognition of her independence by Mexico, that she would never join herself to the United States.”⁵⁷

President Polk went on to discuss the balance of power theory, and to deny that it could ever be applied in American affairs.

Early in 1846 a rumor was current that an attempt was to be made to restore the monarchy in Mexico under a Spanish princess who was to be married to one of Louis Philippe’s numerous family.⁵⁸ The *Illinois State Register*, discussing the probabilities of French and English interference between the United States and Mexico, said that it was well known that these countries interfered between Texas and the United States while the annexation negotiations were pending; and referred with strong approval to the Monroe Doctrine and to Polk’s interpretation of it. “This sentiment,” the editor added, “has been universally adopted by the American people, and has now become a permanent, sacred, American principle, in opposition to the odious ‘balance of power’ doctrine of Europe. It is the foundation of American liberty, and must be maintained, if need be, even at the expense of the best blood and richest treasure of the land.”⁵⁹ The *Mobile Register* noted the report that France had ordered a fleet to the Gulf of Mexico, after the war between the United States and Mexico had broken out,—

“This is another matter of some delicacy. It may be a precautionary step for the protection of French commerce in the state of blockade in which the Mexican ports

have been placed by our fleets,—and even in that view, it has an ostentatious air, as if the French were ready for a fight with us at once. If it be a part of Mr. Guizot's machinery for preserving a balance of power on this continent, it has marks of a presumptuous interference, which will soon make, if it do not find too soon, the occasion for a conflict between the fleets. It is by no means certain that this fleet is destined for the Gulf, but such are the probable conjectures. We hope otherwise, not only from a desire that all chances for a breach of the peace between the two countries may be avoided, but because the appearance of a French fleet, however harmless its acts may be, would produce upon the public mind in this country a feeling of sourness and irritation against a presumed attempt to dictate or overawe." ⁶⁰

It should be remarked that Britain was regarded as the chief aggressor, and France as in a large degree only her echo and tool, in Texas and Mexico, and also in the entire Caribbean area. France might act with England. She was considered scarcely likely to undertake any very important operations alone. In regard to Cuba, England was constantly under suspicion, while the apprehension in relation to France was distinctly less. The press in America noticed a French pamphlet urging European intervention to restore order in Haiti, and remarked that when a French writer spoke of the necessity of European intervention he usually meant French intervention. *Niles' Register* thought that the French were giving marked evidences of a desire to resume authority in that island, and that the scheme probably involved French consent to British occupation of Cuba.⁶¹ A plea from certain Cuban planters that America should take Cuba quickly, in order to prevent its seizure by France and England, who would certainly emancipate the slaves, received favorable comment in a Florida paper.⁶²

In 1836 a revolution broke out in Uruguay, which soon led to intervention on the part of the Argentine Republic. The French residents in Montevideo took the part of the revolutionists, and gave them active aid, and as a result of this the French government became involved. The struggle developed into a very bitter one, and before long Great Britain entered it first as a mediator, then as an active participant with the French against Rosas, the Argentine dictator, and the party in Uruguay which he favored. Brazil also joined the contest, in the hope of obtaining a portion of Uruguay as a reward for coöperation with the Anglo-French force. A long-drawn-out contest ensued, lasting until after the Revolution of 1848, at which time the French attention was directed to other and more promising interests. The intervention was complete and undisguised, involving the capture of the Argentine fleet, the blockade of the La Plata, the occupation of forts on the mainland and of large sections of the country, and constant fighting with the Rosas forces. No infraction of the Monroe

Doctrine could have been more pronounced, yet the government of the United States made no real effort to interfere with it. To a degree this indifference may be explained by the absorption of the United States in important questions nearer home. In part also it may be laid to the prevailing lack of stability in the Latin-American states, which produced a doubt of their fitness for self-government, and a corresponding lack of sympathy. As the *American Whig Review* put it, the South American Republics "still present the aspect of nations in their elementary state." They show no stability except under a dictator or when "foreign nations interfere to preserve peace while knowledge can be disseminated among the masses. It is with pleasure we hail the first movement in this latter policy in the union of England, France and Brazil to put an end to the atrocities perpetrated by the contending factions along the banks of the Rio de la Plata." ⁶³

But the *New York Sun* met the issue squarely on the basis of American solidarity.

"The interference of European monarchies in the partizan conflicts of this hemisphere has aroused the people of the South American republics to the importance of union and harmony among the great American republican family of nations. . . . In justice to ourselves we must resist every attempt of European monarchies to dictate to the feebler republics of the South; and we are not without hope of a friendly alliance among all the American republics for mutual protection and encouragement." ⁶⁴

The *Boston Courier*, too, spoke with disapproval of "this extraordinary interference of the European powers" and agreed with the *Buenos Ayres Packet*, which it quoted, that the question at issue was of the greatest importance to all the states of America, in that it would determine whether the Argentine Republic and the other republics of America were free states or whether they were mere fiefs of the crowned heads of Europe.⁶⁵ The *New York American* said that we had allowed the frequency of quarrels in the South American states to blind us to the fact that the European nations were exercising a control which was naturally the duty of the United States. The excuse given for foreign interference is dismissed as flimsy, but "The sore point with us is not that this should be done, but that it should be done by Europeans. It becomes this Republic, the oldest born and the greatest on this side of the Atlantic, to be the peacemaker on our own continent whenever it becomes proper that such an office should be performed." The Monroe Doctrine "is a very good principle, but if we do nothing to maintain our proper position towards our sister republics, nothing to establish a wholesome influence over them,—if we show no sympathy with them in their troubles and manifest no disposition to per-

form friendly offices for them, we need not wonder if other leading nations, more vigilant than ourselves and more prompt to meet their responsibilities, should interpose and reap the advantages of such interposition whenever circumstances seem to require it. . . . our own supineness is to blame that we ourselves did not interfere in such a way at least to show to the nations of Europe that there was need of no other mediator, and that in the affairs of this continent no interposition from the other side of the water was at all requisite.”⁶⁶

The *Union* also published a strong article on the subject.

“It behoves the people of the United States to take these things into seasonable and serious consideration. Shall the people of the United States stand by and see the British-Asiatic policy acted over again among the independent republics of South America? Is Buenos Ayres to become as Madras? . . . If not, then at what point in its progress should this armed European interference in American affairs be made to encounter the deliberate and solemn protest of the people of the United States? . . . It is of high concernment to our most practical national interests that British and French influence and predominance on the banks of the La Plata should find an antagonist and a counterpoise in the public sentiment of this country. Our commercial stake in the region of that river is too great to permit us to see it sacrificed. It is of yet more vital concern to our avowed national policy to keep this continent safe and sacred from aggressive foreign dictation.”⁶⁷

Late in the year 1845 the United States chargé at Buenos Ayres made a formal protest against the blockade, but of course without in the least affecting the situation.⁶⁸ In the following January the matter was under discussion in the United States Senate. As far back as 1840 Caleb Cushing had protested against the blockade, at the same time that he criticised the activities of the French in Mexico.⁶⁹ Now Allen (Dem.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution supporting the utterances of the President’s Message of the preceding December on the subject of the balance of power and the interference of Europeans in American affairs.⁷⁰ Calhoun opposed the motion, and based his objection on the South American situation. He said that he strongly objected to the “improper interference” of the European powers in that quarter. He declared that so far as his information went, the behavior of the two nations, Great Britain and France, was “an outrage, high-handed in its character, and without precedent in the history of nations.” But he did not think it possible that the United States could take under her guardianship the whole family of American States, and pledge herself to extend to them protection against all foreign aggression. No wise man would, by a declaration, he said, engage himself to do that which was beyond his power of execution. Certainly if this resolution passed, the Government should at once intervene in behalf of Buenos Ayres, take her under our protection, and repel

the interference of France in her concerns.⁷¹ Lewis Cass (Dem.) supported the resolution and thought the time most opportune for it, especially because the intervention in South America should be checked. The principle asserted by Guizot was being practically applied upon the La Plata, in the furtherance of designs of commercial and political supremacy over that district. "They seek the establishment of a balance of power which shall establish their own power, and enable them to hold in subjection one of the most magnificent regions upon the face of the earth."⁷² But the Senate refused to take action on the subject, and Allen, probably largely because of this, shortly after resigned from the Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The *American Whig Review*, in February, 1846, published an article by a Mrs. Jenkins, who had lived in the Argentine, attacking the despotism of Rosas, and upholding the English and French intervention. The *Review*, however, accompanied this with an editorial note which while admitting that the character of the rule of Rosas might justify intervention, yet showed little confidence in the quality of the European interference.

"It has been affirmed that France and the Prince de Joinville have the most ambitious designs upon Brazil and as much more of South America as can readily be brought under their influence. . . . We confess that we observe with deep suspicion the proceedings of both these civilized powers, whenever they come in contact with half-civilized or savage nations too weak to keep possession of their country by force, and too 'uncultivated' to diplomatize with skill."⁷³

The *Democratic Review* also showed strong disapproval of the war, and printed an article by Caleb Cushing, in which the question was viewed on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, and attention was called to the fact that European intervention threatened both Americas. The writer wished success to the Argentines who "were fighting in the common cause."⁷⁴ About this time speeches in the British Parliament mentioned the entente between France and Britain which would keep peace throughout the world, and the *Tallahassee Floridian* commented satirically:

"This cordial understanding between France and England which is to keep the world at peace has been the great characteristic of Louis Philippe's government, and during that time France has had a war with Mexico, two wars with the Argentine Confederation and a continual war with Algiers. . . . France and England are certainly peace-loving countries, so bent upon peace that they are ready to fight for it at any moment. What we are to expect from the union of these countries for the express purpose of keeping the peace may be seen by their proceedings on the La Plata. Certain belligerent forts there they proceeded to batter into the most peaceable rubbish—and many men disposed to raise a row in defence of their country were put to entire repose."⁷⁵

It is evident, therefore, that public opinion was far from indifferent to this infraction of the Monroe Doctrine. The strongest official action on the subject we find in the note sent from the State Department March 30, 1846, to Mr. Harris, the representative of the United States in the Argentine. After referring to "the great American doctrine which is opposed to the interference of European governments in American affairs," and to the late Message of the President emphasizing this point, the note continues,—

"That Great Britain and France have flagrantly violated this principle by their armed intervention in the La Plata is manifest to the whole world. Whilst existing circumstances render it impossible for the United States to take part in the present war; yet the President desires that the whole moral influence of this Republic shall be cast into the scale of the injured party. We cordially wish the Argentine Republic success in its struggle against foreign interference."⁷⁶

In June of the following year, Mr. Harris filed a very vigorous protest, and continued to press the matter until the blockade was raised.⁷⁷

Prejudice against the French was manifested also in the discussions of the Oregon question. The French press took the British side in the controversy and this created some ill-will. Moreover a French explorer, M. de Mofras, had visited the Far West, and published a book on the subject which was quoted in support of the British position, and a story was current that Louis Philippe had presented a copy of this book to the King of Sweden, who had been suggested as a mediator, thus endeavoring to bias him against the American cause.⁷⁸

At about this time, too, the operations of the French in the Pacific attracted some attention and criticism in the United States. Tahiti, in the Society Islands, had been Christianized through the efforts of the London Missionary Society, a Protestant organization. Roman Catholic missionaries from France tried to settle there in 1836, and were sent away. As a result the French occupied the islands and forced the admission of the Catholics and the concession of trading privileges. The frigate *L'Artemise*, which was concerned in this, went on to Hawaii and tried to repeat the process there. News of this affair was received with indignation in the United States, especially as the action had been accompanied by discourteous treatment of American missionaries.

"The sentiments expressed by the American officers attached to the *Columbia* and *John Adams* in relation to this affair, are highly honorable to them and to the country. In our judgment, the insult offered to this nation in the person of its citizens by the *Artemise*, demands an explanation from the French government, and we trust our minister in France will be instructed to obtain it."⁷⁹

The *North American Review*, in October, 1840, reviewed the case, strongly condemning the French behavior;⁸⁰ and the *Democratic Review* later

carried a similar article.⁸¹ Continued activities of the French and British in the Sandwich Islands led in 1849 to an official note from Clayton, Secretary of State, to Rives in Paris, to the effect that the United States did not wish to believe that the French intended to pursue in these Islands the policy which they had followed in Tahiti, but that it must be understood that the government of this country could in no case be indifferent to the seizure of the Sandwich Islands by any other power.⁸² Meantime the French had taken the Marquesas Islands, which Admiral Porter had once occupied in the name of the United States. In Tahiti there had been a controversy with the British, caused primarily by the expulsion of the English missionaries, which ended in the deportation of Mr. Pritchard, the chief missionary adviser of the Tahitian Queen Pomare, and the establishment of French sovereignty in the island. Much sympathy was manifested in the United States for the unfortunate Queen, "this distressed but heroic woman, whose . . . sufferings have made her forever known to the American and European public."⁸³

While, therefore, no single incident of great importance embittered the relations between America and France during the reign of Louis Philippe, after the indemnity question was settled, numerous points of friction existed, and prejudices which had been formed were in no way lessened. When the Revolution of 1848 brought to an end the rule of "that great swindle" as Emerson called Louis Philippe, there were few to sympathize with him in the disaster. Instead, there were many who condemned the man himself, his advisers, and his administration. History and experience, it was said, should have protected him against those errors which led to his downfall. He had played the part of a petty tyrant and a bad man. Selfish and despotic, he had richly earned his misfortunes, and his behavior had justified the Revolution.⁸⁴ Popular celebrations, as in the case of the Revolution of 1830, were arranged in various communities, but the French people shared the odium of their ruler, and a certain lack of spontaneity and enthusiasm was to be observed, together with doubt of the ability of the French to establish a wise and stable government in place of that which they had overturned. The German, Irish, Polish, and other foreign elements in the population rejoiced because they thought the revolution in France presaged success for liberal movements in their own countries. A very few newspapers expressed unqualified praise for the action of the French people, the most important of these being the *Washington Union*.⁸⁵

James Russell Lowell wrote an enthusiastic "Ode to France" in which he defended the violence of the Revolution, on the ground that the people had been goaded beyond endurance, and

"They did as they were taught; not theirs the blame
If men who scattered firebrands reaped the flame.

O broker-king, is this thy wisdom's fruit?
A dynasty plucked out as 'twere a weed
Grown rankly in the night, that leaves no seed!
Could eighteen years strike down no deeper root?

Not long can he be ruler who allows
His time to run before him; thou wast naught
Soon as the strip of gold about thy brows
Was no more emblem of the people's thought.

Since first I heard our North-wind blow,
Since first I saw Atlantic throw
On our fierce rocks his thunderous snow,
I loved thee, Freedom.
And surely never did thine altars glance
With purer fires than now in France;
While in their bright white flashes,
Wrong's shadow, backward cast,
Waves cowering o'er the ashes
Of the dead, blaspheming Past." ⁸⁶

A large open-air celebration in New York City, April 3, was presided over by the mayor; and the usual speeches, poems, resolutions, illuminations, and fire-works, are recorded. But "the leading citizens were conspicuous by their absence." A little later, however, a military ball was held, and a "velvet-and-gold liberty cap" was presented to the city of Paris, represented by the French vice-consul, in the name of the city of New York. On this occasion an enthusiastic letter from Martin Van Buren was read. In Washington, both houses of the legislature adjourned their sessions, April 24, in honor of the celebration conducted by the mayor and other officials of the city, and graced by the presence of the Marine Band and the Washington Light Infantry. But President Polk refused to be directly identified with the affair, and public officials in general followed his example.⁸⁷

The Richmond *Southerner* said frankly that French ideas of liberty were not such as to fit them to exercise it, but would lead instead to anarchy and thence to despotism. The lack of education among the masses, the immorality prevalent in society, and the lack of a deep religious sense, would be a bar to successful democracy. "The preservation of Republican government must depend upon virtue and knowledge. There is not enough of either in France."⁸⁸ The *National Intelligencer* feared, as did many

others, a return to the Reign of Terror which followed the establishment of the First Republic. "A Republic in France," said this editor, "has been but a sort of social volcano, rocking and blasting with its convulsions its own foundations, and sending forth streams of lava to desolate abroad all that they reached." The Gallic spirit, he continued, delighted in war, in military glory, and lacked the better and in the true sense braver instincts which founded and supported law, right, and freedom. Any man who promised the French military glory could lead them. Many papers, praising the deposition of Louis Philippe, and the establishment of the Republic, added qualifying phrases, such as "If well followed up—as God grant it may be!" "If the provisional government does not give way to the mere mob" or "There is danger of forgetting how much remains to be done, and how much wisdom and foresight and patriotism are demanded to carry into successful operation the work which has commenced so well."⁸⁹ George Ticknor of Boston, who was in France during the progress of the Revolution, wrote home that he questioned seriously whether the French workman would know how to make good use of his power. He thought little but disappointment and mischief was to be expected from the irresponsible mob which was in control, and that a military dictatorship was sure to be necessary for the restoration of order. There was little real democracy in France, and little constructive ability. No good could come, "as wise men in the United States saw from the first," from the destruction of the institutions of society, which would have to be reconstructed by force. "Republics cannot grow on the soil of Europe."⁹⁰ Emerson, in Paris, wrote that the boulevards had lost their fine trees, cut down to make barricades. "At the end of the year we shall take account and see if the Revolution was worth the trees." (Emerson, *Journals*, VII: 452.) But Bancroft, writing from Paris also, said,—“At home Boston is frightened out of its wits. Mr. Harrison Grey Otis thinks Louis Philippe a deeply injured man; Mr. Webster condemns the Revolution in toto, as the work of communists and anarchists. The *Daily Advertiser* is alarmed.”⁹¹ Evidently Bancroft thought his compatriots overly conservative.

Officially, the sympathy of America was expressed very promptly by Richard Rush, the Minister of the United States in Paris. Mr. Rush received an intimation from the provisional government on Saturday the 26th of February, before any official notices of the change had reached the diplomatic corps, that his personal presence at the Hôtel de Ville, "to cheer and felicitate" the new administration, would be highly appreciated. Without waiting for instructions from home, he answered the appeal on the following Monday, believing, he said, that he was acting in support of a great cause, and "in the spirit of my government and my country."

The other diplomatic representatives criticised Mr. Rush's action as unnecessarily precipitate. His government, however, endorsed his decision, and told him that the American people had hailed "the late glorious revolution" "with one universal burst of enthusiasm." Secretary of State Buchanan also urged Rush to give all possible aid in the period of organization. In Congress Senator Allen introduced a resolution of sympathy, the last of March. But the bill did not meet with immediate approval. Underwood of Kentucky said that his heart was with the French in their struggle for liberty, and he had rejoiced in every advance they had made toward a republican form of government, but he was "admonished to caution by the fact that in all their previous efforts they have signally failed." Calhoun thought the proposal "premature," since there was not yet any assurance or evidence that the Revolution would serve the cause of liberty.

"Much remains to be done. The real task to be performed is yet before them. They have decreed a republic, but it remains for them to establish a republic. If the French people shall succeed in that . . . if they shall really form a constitution which shall on the one hand guard against violence and anarchy and on the other against oppression of the people, they will have achieved, indeed, a great work. . . . But if they fail, what then? . . . Can there be a more important inquiry? If the French fail, under what sort of government will they find themselves? . . . France may find herself in the embrace of a military despotism. Such a result would furnish no ground for congratulation either on our part, or that of the civilized world. . . . A revolution in itself is not a blessing. The revolution accomplished by the French people is indeed a wonderful event, . . . but it may lead to events which will make it a mighty evil."

Other remarks in the same vein were made. Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, however, insisted that sympathy was needed now, rather than after success was assured. President Polk issued a statement in which he said that the assertion by the French of the right of liberty and self-government was an "interesting and sublime spectacle." Senators repeated this sentiment, and argued that France, in the critical period of the American Revolution, had not withheld her sympathy, nor conditioned it upon success. Could the United States be less generous? Full, prompt, and cordial, should be the good wishes of the sister Republic. These arguments prevailed and the resolution was passed. In the House the deliberation on a similar motion was vexed by the attempt of Ashmun of Massachusetts to attach to the resolution a clause congratulating the French on doing away with slavery in all their colonies, as they had announced they were doing. This of course provoked a long-drawn-out and bitter debate on slavery in all its forms and in all countries, by no means excepting the United States, and placed the question on a partisan basis. Finally the objectionable clause was voted

down, and the resolution passed. In both Houses there had been insistence that the phraseology should be so careful as not to commit this country to approval of any future action by the new French Republic, in which even its friends lacked confidence. The final form, therefore, as adopted by both the Senate and House, is of some interest. It runs,—

“tendering the congratulations of the American to the French people upon the success of their recent efforts to consolidate the principles of liberty in a republican form of government.”⁹²

As time went on, the forebodings of the pessimists were felt to be justified, especially by the terrible “June Days” and the dictatorship of Cavaignac which followed. The new republic, said the critics, was proceeding in the track of the old. Excesses were being followed by reaction; liberty must be controlled, for it had degenerated into licentiousness. The press was to be censored, and the government was to be absolute, as the only way to prevent class warfare. “Frenchmen have never consented once to study our system of government,—they have plunged ahead like madmen, with a wild recklessness of consequences.” They need a series of checks and balances. “A Republic of France is utterly impossible, the way the leading men are going on. We could not, even in America, keep one up on their sandy foundation.”⁹³ Can France be a Republic? More and more frequently the question was asked in the United States. The first attempt, it was said, had failed. The Republic could not maintain itself without the help of 250,000 bayonets. “Invoking the popular will in its daily declarations, it is compelled to go into the streets every day, and smite the popular masses with the edge of the sword. . . . The want of practical knowledge is their great defect, and they seem destined to remedy this by studying in a school of disaster.” (*Boston Courier*, July 17, 1848.) The menace of radical socialism threatened on the one side; on the other that of a restoration of the monarchy or even of the Empire. Republican symbols might be retained for a time, but what of the reality? The French Presidential elections approached, and chief of the candidates appeared Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Radicals and conservatives both supported him, the one group looking toward the overthrow of the Republic and the substitution of communism, the other hoping that his election might lead to a royalist revival. Bourbonism, Orleanism, red Socialism, Bonapartism, all joined in his support. Charles A. Dana, writing from France descriptions of the march of events, and strongly sympathetic with the French working-classes, said at once of Napoleon, “He would rather be emperor than president.”⁹⁴ “It is a Republic,” said the United States watchers, “of military traditions and imperial recollections.” “If he is elected and can

get control of the army, the world may again witness in Napoleon II what it witnessed in Napoleon I, all the perils and blood and sacrifice of the revolution made to serve for the aggrandizement of an individual and the establishment of a dynasty." ⁹⁵ "It is not Louis Napoleon who is elected President of France; it is the name of Napoleon. . . . Who can say that the people of France have not voted back the Empire? . . . We speak of the illusion of Napoleonic glory. Is not rather France, as a republic, the illusion?" ⁹⁶ Yet, "No man can rule France without the confidence of the people." ⁹⁷

"Not only General Cavaignac and Dictatorship, but Socialism, Lamartinism, Red Republicanism, Legitimacy, Orleanism, and all that have in succession overthrown each other in France, are for the nonce utterly upset; and in their place, by the most decisive declaration of a people's will ever seen, uprises we know not what—an enormous phantom of imperial power, jumbled with a republican title; of hereditary glory with reputed personal incapacity; of an unprecedented popularity oddly directing itself upon one for whom France cared nothing a few years ago; whose only public attempts had deserved and incurred her derision; whose only merit consists in his being the nephew of a man whom he in no manner resembles; whose only service to the country consists in his having lived out of it . . . and finally, whose sole success is obviously formed out of the failure of others." ⁹⁸

"They have expelled a king as unworthy to govern them," said the *North American Review*, in the course of a careful essay on the causes and the results of the Revolution,—an article which is throughout not at all complimentary to the French,—“and now they learn that they are incapable of governing themselves. Yet this is what France has come to through its perversely exaggerated ideas of liberty and democracy, and from lending too ready an ear to the eloquent demagogues, who as they could not obtain a place in the government have succeeded in overthrowing it. . . . It matters not how long the mere forms of republicanism are preserved in France: it is obvious that the great majority of the people are heartily tired of their second trial of a republic, and would hail nothing more heartily than a restoration of the monarchy.” ⁹⁹ And the *Democratic Review* well summarized the general sentiment thus: “A year ago the French made a Revolution glorious in its birth, and great for its democratic principles; a reaction followed that bloodless insurrection, caused by the wants of the poorer classes, and originated by the amalgamation of different parties. Next came a Dictatorship; and now a Napoleonic Republic, which will end in a constitutional monarchy, or with a new and bloody revolution. France has abjured her institutions and principles.” ¹⁰⁰ And said Emerson, “The old Adams and Jay . . . think as I think about the French, that they have no morale.” ¹⁰¹

NOTES AND SOURCES

- ¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, III: 100-107.
- ² *Perley's Reminiscences*, I: 112-113.
- ³ Gallatin to Everett, January, 1835. Gallatin, *Writings*, II: 478-501.
- ⁴ Col. Wm. B. Lewis to Col. Jas. A. Hamilton, Dec. 10, 1834. Hamilton, *Reminiscences*, 283.
- ⁵ *Washington Globe*, Dec. 5, Dec. 8, Dec. 11, Dec. 18, 1834, Jan. 10, 1835. *The Globe*, *Albany Argus*, and *Richmond Enquirer* were the three leading Democratic papers of the day.
- ⁶ *Arkansas State Gazette*, Dec. 30, 1834.
- ⁷ *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 4, Dec. 6, Dec. 11, Dec. 22, Dec. 29, 1834.
- ⁸ *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 8, Dec. 11, Dec. 17, Dec. 23, Dec. 25, Dec. 30, 1834. Of similar tenor, and also cited in these numbers, are the utterances of the *New York Commercial Advertiser* (Whig), *Albany Daily Advertiser*, *Ulster Co. (N. Y.) Whig*, *Baltimore Patriot*, *Pennsylvania Inquirer*, *Providence Journal*, *Delaware State Journal*, *New England Review*, *Political Arena* (Md.), *Kent (Md.) Bugle*, *Charleston Mercury*, *Kentucky Commentator*, *Georgia Federal Union*, *Recorder* (Ga.), and *Constitutionalist* (Ga.), *Augusta* (Ga.), *Chronicle*, *Augusta Sentinel*, *Washington (Ga.) News*.
- ⁹ *Niles' Register*, Dec. 13, Dec. 20, Dec. 27, 1834, Jan. 3, 1835.
- ¹⁰ *National Gazette*, cited in *Globe*, Dec. 6, 1834.
- ¹¹ *Lexington Observer and Kentucky Reporter*, Dec. 17, 1834.
- ¹² *New York American* (Dem.), Dec. 10, 1834.
- ¹³ *New York Spectator*, Dec. 8, 1834.
- ¹⁴ *New York Courier and Enquirer*, cited in *Globe*, Dec. 5, 1834.
- ¹⁵ *Boston Evening Gazette*, Dec. 6, 1834.
- ¹⁶ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 3, Jan. 7, 1835. See also similar arguments in *Connecticut Courant*, Dec. 8, Dec. 15, 1834; *Litchfield (Conn.) Enquirer*, Dec. 11, Dec. 18, 1834; *Philadelphia Gazette*, Dec. 5, Dec. 10, 1834; *New Haven (Conn.) Columbian Register*; *Portland (Me.) Evening Advertiser*.
- ¹⁷ *Reports of Committee on Foreign Relations, 1789-1901*, VI: 47-68.
- ¹⁸ George Ticknor Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan*, I: 236-237.
- ¹⁹ *Niles' Register*, XLVII: 335-336.
- ²⁰ *Niles'*, XLVII: 318-319; *Congressional Globe*, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 95, 125-127.
- ²¹ *Congressional Globe*, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 22-26.
- ²² *Raleigh Register*, Feb. 5, 1835, and citing *National Intelligencer*.
- ²³ *Congressional Globe*, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 213-219.
- ²⁴ Adams, *Memoirs*, IX: 207-210; *Niles'*, XLVII: 425, 432-433.
- ²⁵ *Congressional Globe*, 2nd Session, 23rd Congress, 298-99, 301-303, 309-314, 318-323. *Niles'*, XLVII: 451, XLVII: 5-12; *Philadelphia Gazette*, Mar. 4, 1835; Adams, *Memoirs*, IX: 210-213.
- ²⁶ *Reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 1789-1901*, VI: 69-71; *Niles'*, XLVII: 26-27; Frederic A. Ogg, *Life of Daniel Webster*, 265-8; *Buchanan, Life*, I: 241-242.
- ²⁷ *Philadelphia Gazette*, Jan. 8, Jan. 12, 1835; *National Intelligencer*, Jan. 7, Jan. 8; *Connecticut Courier*, Jan. 19; *Niles'*, XLVII: 315; 344-52. Unfavorable comment, Jan. 8, Jan. 24, Feb. 2, *Washington Globe*.

²⁸ Madison to Clay, Jan. 31, 1835, Clay, *Works*, Colton, ed., IV: 388-9. Also see N. Biddle to Clay, and Eleuth. Cooke to Clay, *Ib.*, 387-88.

²⁹ *New York Spectator*, Feb. 12, 1835.

³⁰ *New York Courier and Enquirer*, Feb. 19; *New Haven Columbian Register*, Mar. 7; *Connecticut Courant* (Whig), Feb. 23; *New York Evening Star* (Whig), Jan. 11, 1836; Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, I: 590-596.

³¹ Adams, *Memoirs*, IX: 238; *Scioto* (Ohio) *Gazette*, June 3, 1835, *Niles'*, XLVIII: 217, 220, 253, 275-6, 308.

³² *Mobile Mercantile Advertiser* (Whig), Dec. 18, Dec. 22.

³³ *Connecticut Courant*, Dec. 14, *New York Evening Star*, Dec. 29, Dec. 31; *Providence Journal*, Dec. 11; *Georgetown, (D. C.) Metropolitan*, Dec. 9; *Scioto Gazette*, quoting *National Intelligencer* (critical), Dec. 23, 1835; *Boston Gazette*, Dec. 9, Dec. 26; Richardson, *Messages*, III: 152-160; Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, I: 569-590.

³⁴ *Richardson*, III: 188-213.

³⁵ *Boston Courier* (Whig), Jan. 25, Jan. 28, Feb. 1, Feb. 4, 1836.

³⁶ Hunt's *Life of Livingston*, Ch. XVII, contains a detailed and interesting description of Livingston's mission to France and of his action on this question.

³⁷ Buchanan, *Life*, I: 243-280.

³⁸ Calhoun, *Works*, Crallé, ed., III: 15, 27.

³⁹ *Baltimore Patriot*, Jan. 11, 1836.

⁴⁰ *New York American*, cited *Ib.*

⁴¹ *Niles'*, XLIX: 385; See also *Connecticut Courant*, Jan. 25, 1836; *New York Evening Star*, Jan. 12; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 7; Clay, *Works*, Colton, ed., IV: 403-404.

⁴² "Says Richard to Thomas,—'Can your wit solve me soon
Why Old England sends hither the ship Pantaloon?'
Quick Thomas in answer,—'Its very name teaches:
The errand was only—to repair our breaches!'"

Philadelphia American Sentinel, quoted *Niles'*, XLIX: 442.

For comment on the mediation see *Niles'*, XLIX: 405, 442-446; *Boston Courier*, Feb. 8, Feb. 15, 1836; *National Intelligencer*, Jan. 30, Feb. 8; *New York Enquirer*, Jan. 30; *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 24th Congress; Benton, *Thirty Years' View*, I: 600-603; Richardson, *Messages*, III: 215-224.

⁴³ *Richardson*, III: 236. For summaries of the facts in the controversy over the indemnity, in this stage, see Moore, *International Arbitrations*, V: 4460-4485; Moore, *International Law*, VII: 123-129; Sumner, *Jackson*, 402-408; Schurz, *Life of Henry Clay*, II: 52-58; Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, I: 373-376; McMaster, *History of the People of the U. S.*, VI: 236-241, 299-303; Schouler, IV: 239-244 Bassett, 417-419; McDonald, *Jacksonian Democracy* (American Nation Series), XV: 204-209. For a full discussion, quite partial to Jackson, C. G. Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period*, Ch. XIV. This chapter contains some especially interesting citations from the Congressional debates on the subject.

⁴⁴ *North American Review*, XL (1835): 269-298.

⁴⁵ *United States Magazine and Democratic Review*, I (1837): 125-128.

⁴⁶ *Ib.*, IV (1840).

- ⁴⁷ Chevalier de Bacourt, *Souvenirs of a Diplomat* (Translation), 52, 68, 89, 95, 109–110, 133, 150, 171, 181–2, 185, 190, 192–3, 194–5, 218, 248–9.
- ⁴⁸ *Scioto Gazette*, Jan. 10, 1839.
- ⁴⁹ *Niles'*, LIV: 455; *New Orleans Bulletin*, July 6, July 25, April 28, 1838; *New Orleans Bee*, July 6, 1838.
- ⁵⁰ *Boston Courier*, Aug. 15, 1838; *Niles'*, Jan. 19, 1839; *Globe*, Jan. 21, 1839.
- ⁵¹ *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 25th Congress, 82–83; *New York Spectator*, Jan. 7, 1839.
- ⁵² Clay to Biddle, Sept. 14, 1838. *Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle dealing with National Affairs, 1807–1844*, McGrane, ed., 332.
- ⁵³ *National Intelligencer*, cited in *Boston Courier*, Nov. 1, 1838.
- ⁵⁴ Curtis, *Buchanan*, I: 584–5.
- ⁵⁵ *Baltimore American*, cited in *Savannah Georgian*, April 29, 1845. Similar criticism, *Washington Globe*, May 26.
- ⁵⁶ *Niles'*, LXVIII: 193, 225–226, 272, 289. See also *New Orleans Picayune*, cited in *Boston Courier*, May 5; *Washington Union*, May 31; *Globe*, July 7.
- ⁵⁷ *Niles'*, LXIX: 217–219, 221. See also Senator Allen speaking on his resolution in support of this Message, Jan. 26, 1846. *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 24th Congress, 245.
- ⁵⁸ *Ib.*, 336, 403.
- ⁵⁹ *Illinois State Register*, July 3, 1846, Mar. 6, July 10.
- ⁶⁰ *Mobile Register*, June 29, 1846. For statements as to the actual French interference in Texan and Mexican affairs, see such references as: George Lockhart Rives, *The United States and Mexico, 1821–1848*, I: 538–9, 592; II: 81–84, 89–94; Justin H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas*, 261, 382–391, 397–413; Justin H. Smith, *The War with Mexico*, I: 121–122, 324, 325–6, note 8, p. 523, note 11, p. 525–6; II: 295–297, 304–305, notes 12, 13, p. 503, note 22, p. 505, notes 26–29, p. 506, note 30, p. 507; Ephraim D. Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838–1846*, 20–22, 24–5, 123, 158–160, 167–169, 170–171, 178–182, 190–191; Ch. IX, 204–5, 210–11; *Niles'*, LXVII; 247–8; LXVIII; 177, 273; LXX: 25–27.
- ⁶¹ *Niles'*, LXV: 99 (October 14, 1843).
- ⁶² *Jacksonville News*, May 20, 1848.
- ⁶³ *American Whig Review*, I: 327, (Mar., 1845).
- ⁶⁴ *New York Sun*, May 30, 1845.
- ⁶⁵ *Boston Courier*, Sept. 22, 1845.
- ⁶⁶ *New York American*, quoted in *Niles'*, 69: 113.
- ⁶⁷ *Ib.*; *Mobile Register*, Nov. 14, 1845.
- ⁶⁸ *Niles'*, LXIX: 240.
- ⁶⁹ *Ib.*, LVIII: 316.
- ⁷⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 1st. Session, 29th Congress, 197.
- ⁷¹ *Congressional Globe*, 1st. Session, 29th Congress, 197–198.
- ⁷² *Ib.*, 240–241.
- ⁷³ *American Whig Review*, III: 160.
- ⁷⁴ *Democratic Review*, XVIII: 163–184.
- ⁷⁵ *Floridian*, Mar. 14, 1846. Further criticisms, S. F. Streeter in *North American Review*, LXIX: 43–93 (July, 1849); *Mobile Register*, July 17, 1846; *Niles'*, LXX: 33, 36, 144; LXXI: 66.
- ⁷⁶ Herbert Kraus, *Die Monroedoktrin*, 288. Buchanan to Harris.

- ⁷⁷ *North American Review*, cited above.
- ⁷⁸ *New York News*, cited in *Georgia Constitutionalist*, Jan. 3, 1846; *Indiana State Journal*, Feb. 4, 1846.
- ⁷⁹ *New York Journal of Commerce*, in *Niles'*, LVIII: 145.
- ⁸⁰ *North American Review*, LI: 503-515. F. Bowen.
- ⁸¹ *Democratic Review*, XIII: 3-16.
- ⁸² Edmund J. Carpenter, *America in Hawaii*, 94-95.
- ⁸³ *Boston Courier*, Mar. 16, May 1, 1846; *Boston Advertiser*, in *Niles'*, LXV: 66-67; *Niles'*, LXVII: 18, 65; LXVIII: 322-323.
- ⁸⁴ *Boston Courier*, Mar. 23; *Louisville Examiner*, Mar. 25; Apr. 1; *New Orleans Picayune*, Apr. 1; *Arkansas State Gazette*, Apr. 13; *New York Spectator*, Mar. 23; *Alexandria Gazette*, Mar. 24, and citing *New York Commercial Advertiser*.
- ⁸⁵ *Union*, Mar. 29; *Connecticut Courant*, Apr. 1; *Cist's Cincinnati Advertiser*, Mar. 26.
- ⁸⁶ Lowell, *Poetical Works*, 92-94.
- ⁸⁷ *Philadelphia Ledger*, quoted in *Mobile Register*, Mar. 29; *Mobile Register*, Mar. 29; *New York Spectator*, Apr. 6; *Polk's Diary*, III: 425, 432; Curtis, *The French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doctrines*, 94-95.
- ⁸⁸ *Southerner*, Mar. 25, 1848.
- ⁸⁹ *Saco (Me.) Democrat*, Apr. 4; *New York Weekly Herald*, Mar. 25, Apr. 11; *Providence Journal*, Apr. 1; *Kennebec Journal*, Apr. 7; *New York Express*, Mar. 21, Apr. 22; *Arkansas State Gazette*, May 4; *Charleston Evening News*, Mar. 23; *New Orleans Picayune*, Mar. 27; *Baltimore Patriot*; *Harrisburg Democratic Union*, cited in *National Intelligencer*, Mar. 25; *Baltimore Sun*, Mar. 29. Buchanan to Rush, Mar. 31, 1848, *Niles'*, LXXIV: 98-99; Clay to Haight, Clay, *Works*, Colton, ed., IV: 560.
- ⁹⁰ *George Ticknor, Life, Letters, and Journals*, II: 230-236.
- ⁹¹ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, II: 91. (April 22, 1848.)
- ⁹² Calhoun, *Works*, Crallé, ed., IV: 451-4: *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 30th Congress, 568-570, 573-576, 579-580, 590, 599-603, 609-616; Appendix to *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 30th Congress, 458-467, 477-482; Richardson, *Messages*, IV: 605-6; *Saco Democrat*, Apr. 11; *Charleston Courier*, Apr. 7; President Polk's Message, Apr. 3, Richardson, IV: 579-80; Curtis, *The French Assembly of 1848*, 69-96. A later resolution was passed, also, providing for the gift to the new republic of a series of standard weights and measures, copies of American archives, laws, etc., drawings from the Patent Office of new inventions, maps, and other material which it was thought might be useful.
- ⁹³ *New York Express*, July 13, 1848.
- ⁹⁴ J. H. Wilson, *Life of Charles A. Dana*, Chs. IV, V.
- ⁹⁵ *Globe*, Dec. 23, 1848.
- ⁹⁶ *Philadelphia North American*, Jan. 2, 1849.
- ⁹⁷ *Providence Journal*, Jan. 12, 1849.
- ⁹⁸ *National Intelligencer*, Jan. 9, 1849.
- ⁹⁹ F. Bowen, in *North American Review*, LXIX: 277-325, Oct., 1849.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Democratic Review*, XXIV: 566-567, XXV: 90-91 (1849). Other typical criticisms of this period, in general agreeing with those quoted,—
Boston Courier, Dec. 18; *New York Courier and Enquirer* in *Kennebec Journal*, Dec. 21; *Connecticut Courant*, Dec. 16; *New York Herald*, July 8, Dec. 16, 1848; *New York Express*, Jan. 1, Jan. 4, Jan. 13; *New York Tribune*, Jan. 1; *Washington Union*, Jan. 2; *New York Spectator*, Jan. 3; *Saco Democrat*, Jan. 9; *Globe*, Jan. 10, 1849.

THE REIGN OF LOUIS PHILIPPE

American Life in Paris, by M. L. P., written 1851. *Atlantic Monthly*, Jan., Feb., Apr., June, Sept., 1871: 92-101, 232-240, 468-477, 715-725, 276-287. See also citations in Eugene N. Curtis, "American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revolutions," *American Historical Review*, XXIX: 254-262.

¹⁰¹ Emerson, *Journals*, VIII: 249.

CHAPTER 5

France under Napoleon III

THE election of Louis Napoleon as President of the Second French Republic had been regarded in the United States as a step toward the return to a monarchical form of government, and when this view was borne out by the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, and the proclamation a year later of the Empire, little surprise was manifested; but the popular belief that the French character was not suited to democratic principles was strengthened. Officially the United States approved the position of its Minister, Mr. Rives, who after the overthrow of the Constitution, refrained from attendance at the Presidential receptions until the act had been ratified by the vote of the people. "You sympathize, in this respect," wrote Mr. Webster, who was then Secretary of State, "with the great body of your countrymen. If that overthrow had become necessary, its necessity is deeply to be deplored, because, however imperfect its structure, it was the only great republican government existing in Europe, and all Americans wished it success. We feel as if the catastrophe which has befallen it may weaken the faith of mankind in the permanency and solidity of popular institutions." Yet if the popular vote should be favorable, he continued, the only course open to this country would be to recognize the new order, for, since Washington's day, it had been our principle that "every nation possesses a right to govern itself according to its own will, and change its institutions at discretion."¹

In answer to calls for information, President Fillmore, on January 20, 1852, and President Pierce, on March 21, 1853, sent to Congress the official correspondence on this subject, but no Congressional resolutions, either of sympathy or of condemnation, were adopted. In the Senate, January 2, 1852, a memorial from the "Industrial Congress of the City of New York" was presented, asking for the recall of the United States Minister from France, and the suspension of diplomatic intercourse, on the ground that Louis Napoleon had "proved treacherous to the trust imposed in him; violated and trampled underfoot the constitution he had solemnly sworn to support, and in various ways proved recreant to humanity." The United States, the memorial argued, had been the first to recognize the Republic,

and it was fitting that we should enter our "sternest protest against the flagitious tyranny of the usurper." In the discussion which followed, the general feeling seemed to be that no action could be taken, but that the situation clearly showed that the French people were incapable of self-government, and had been demonstrating this for the last half century.²

Newspaper criticism followed the same lines, not at all flattering to the French. The *National Intelligencer* characterized the coup d'état as a very grave event, of deep interest to the whole world, in its bearing upon the whole problem of democratic government. The act was one of the "clearest usurpation" and could in no way be defended. Many Americans would feel it advantageous, as tending to give France the stability and tranquillity which she seemed unable to attain under popular government, but—"We have ourselves, in a life not very long, already witnessed three French Revolutions, and now witness a fourth. They do not appear to us to improve in quality as they increase in number, but the fifth may be better." "While for them we hope all things, we yet fear all things."³ The *New Hampshire Statesman* remarked, "Louis Napoleon, we perceive, . . . 'accepts the Empire'—that is, takes it with the relish a famished wayfarer does a sumptuous dinner," but the French people have tasted most forms of known government, and should be able to judge of what is best for them.⁴ The *Boston Courier* said hotly that "no event to which the present century has given birth has offered so melancholy, mortifying and disheartening a spectacle to the eyes of the friends of liberal and constitutional government as the political change now taking place in France. . . . The French . . . have spent an infinity of blood and treasure, they have blackened the pages of their national history with an infinity of folly and crime, but they have learnt nothing." That the present rule is according to the will of the people is admitted, and they are "sincere in their applause of the usurpation; they worship success, and are ready to legalize any violence or injustice that is crowned with success. . . . They are sincere in blowing hot and cold upon the same thing . . . as sincere as Frenchmen can be."⁵ The *New York Weekly Day Book* declared that the French people had shown that they were devoid of all aspirations for constitutional freedom and incapable of appreciating its blessings or understanding its responsibilities. "Vain, fickle, and drawn away by the glitter of royalty, they would prefer chains and slavery" rather than be deprived of the pomp and splendor of royal courts. "It is fustian to talk about Louis Napoleon smothering the spirit of liberty in France; if there were rational ideas and any love of liberty there, it could not be stifled in such an easy and expeditious manner."⁶ The *New York Herald* said that the rule of

the Emperor would be of distinct advantage to France. He would put down the radicals, protect and develop business, and control a corrupt legislature. Political liberty cannot prosper among a people "whose character does not possess a single element of republicanism." "A press whose only notion of freedom is the right of propagating rank treason, and who summon an excitable mob to arms to increase their own circulation" should be restricted.⁷ A writer in *Harper's Monthly* mentioned the corrupt methods used in the election, but thought that in spite of this, the overwhelming majorities showed that it was the popular choice. "Thus, if the government be a despotism, it is a despotism that has been created by the popular will, and what true believer in the sovereignty of the people will deny them the right to govern themselves, by means even of a despotism, if they see fit so to do?"⁸ The *New York Sun*, on the other hand, emphasized the political manipulations employed, the intimidation of press and of voters, and declared the result a "barefaced imposition on the French people, who did not know the true state of things, while the Prince-President was building a despotic throne through perjury and treason."⁹

Marked hostility to Napoleon III, "this bizarre shadow of the great man, this Napoleon the Little,"¹⁰ continued through his reign. We find the papers delighting in such stories as this, that on the occasion of the Emperor's triumphal progress through France the decorations in a certain little town included an Imperial crown hung beneath an arch, with the device, "He well deserves it!" Before the Emperor arrived, however, a wind had blown away the crown, leaving only the rope by which it had hung, and the inscription!¹¹ Whittier, in his "The Peace of Europe," used the scathing phrase:

"Base gambler for Napoleon's crown,
Barnacle on his dead renown."¹²

James Russell Lowell, who had written in 1848 a most sympathetic "Ode to France," full of hope for a future based on liberty and democracy, wrote in 1859 "Villa Franca," the Fates to Italy saying:

"Wait a little: Do *we* not wait?
Louis Napoleon is not Fate.

.
Wait, we say; our years are long;
Men are weak, but Man is strong;
Since the stars first curved their rings
We have looked on many things;
Great wars come and great wars go,
Wolf tracks light on polar snow;

We shall see him come and gone,
 This second-hand Napoleon.
 Spin, spin, Clotho, spin!
 Lachesis, twist, and Atropos sever!

The Bonapartes, we know their bees
 That wade in honey red to their knees."

In 1862, in the Biglow Papers, he expresses his feeling thus:

"We might ha' ben now jest ez prosp'rous ez France,
 Where politikle enterprise hez a fair chance,
 An' the people is happy and proud at this hour
 Long ez they hev the votes, to let Nap hev the power." ¹³

Charles A. Dana wrote, "No one can predict when the great edifice of fraud, violence, plunder, political pretence, and incapacity which constitutes the Second Empire will come to an end. The result is certain: the time and the mode depend upon accident. But we know that Louis Napoleon has outlived his proper period, and we may at any hour be called upon to witness the closing catastrophe of this strange, eventful, unenviable career." ¹⁴

"Napoleonic Ideas," written by the Emperor in his days of exile, long before he was even President of the Republic, appeared in translation in the United States in 1859. The *Atlantic Monthly*, in reviewing the book, remarked that its publication was timely, as helping to form a true estimate of the writer's intellectual capacity. "Nothing is more unwise than to assume that a man's brain must be limited because his moral sense is small. . . . Napoleon III may play an important part in History, though by no possibility an heroic one. In reading this little volume one cannot fail to be struck with the presence of mind and the absence of heart of which it gives evidence. It is the advertisement of a charlatan, whose sole inheritance is the right to manufacture the Napoleonic pill, and we read with unavoidable distrust the vouchers of its wonderful efficacy." ¹⁵ In the same magazine somewhat later appeared a history of Napoleon III, and an analysis of his character. While not uncomplimentary to his ability and his achievements, the spirit of the article is manifested in the concluding paragraph, in which the author says:

"Considering the good that he has done, and the evil that he might have done and yet has refrained from doing, he will compare advantageously with any living ruler; and mankind can overlook his errors in view of his virtues,—save and except those men whom he vanquished at their own weapons, and whose chief regret it is, that being no better political moralists than was the Prince-President, their immorality was fruitless, while his . . . gave him empire. . . . He is not without sin; but if he

shall not die until he shall be stoned by saints selected from governments and parties, his existence will be prolonged till doomsday." ¹⁶

It is to be noted also that Americans of this period had a very definite idea of the fundamental traits in French character. This idea was largely "made in America" and evolved from the tales of student life and tourist life in Paris with which those who were fortunate enough to travel delighted in shocking and entertaining their friends. A writer in *Appleton's Magazine*, defending the French home life and French morals in general, said that the average opinion on these subjects among Americans was something like this:

"'Why, sir,' says General Andrew Jackson Jenkins of the New York militia, standing in the courtyard of the Grand Hotel, and ejecting at the same time a quid from his left cheek, 'these Frenchmen don't know what home is. They haven't got any, poor devils! They live on the boulevards, eat at the restorants and sleep in the garrets of their own houses, hiring the best apartments to Roosians and Americans who can afford to pay for them. I'll tell you what—Paris is a fine-looking town; but it is like a shirt that's all frill!'" ¹⁷

In "The Education of Henry Adams" we find the idea phrased somewhat differently. Speaking of the months he "squandered" in Paris in 1860, Mr. Adams says:

"From the first he had avoided Paris, and had wanted no French influence in his education. He disapproved of France in the lump. A certain knowledge of the language one must have; enough to order dinner and buy a theatre ticket; but more he did not seek. He disliked the Empire and the Emperor most particularly, but this was a trifle; he disliked most the French mind. To save himself the trouble of drawing up a long list of all that he disliked, he disapproved of the whole, once for all, and shut them figuratively out of his life. France was not serious, and he was not serious in going there.

"He did this in good faith, obeying the lessons his teachers had taught him; but the curious result followed that, being in no way responsible for the French and sincerely disapproving them he felt at liberty to enjoy to the full everything he disapproved. Stated thus crudely, the idea sounds derisive; but as a matter of fact, several thousand Americans passed much of their time there on this understanding." ¹⁸

An excellent summary, apparently, of contemporary opinion in the United States, is a study of French character found in one of the magazines, in which the following points are prominent. The French, in every phase of life, manners, and action, manifest an excellence in detail and process, and a deficiency in practical skill and in consistent moral sentiment. They have "abundance of talent, but no faith; gayety, gallantry, wit, devotion, dreams and epigrams in perfection, without the solid foundation of principles and the efficient development in practice either of

polity, a social system, or religious belief." The redeeming grace of the nation is to be found in its wholesome sense of the enjoyable, in its adaptability to the realities of life without being materialistic. The love of pleasing, the love of posing, the influence of women, and a frivolous temper, characterize them always and everywhere. They are easily satisfied with illusions, fertile in superficial experiments, but lack directness, candor, and a recognition of truth in its broad and deep sense. Their powers are not disciplined; they are childish in their love of amusement and excitement, and they are without self-dependence, courage, or efficiency. They submit easily to authority, partly because it is a trouble to think, and partly because they are unaccustomed to assuming responsibility. In colonization, they adapt themselves to native customs, rather than lift the native to a higher civilization. They do not have a sense of personal duty. "The social evils and kinds of crime in France are referable in no small degree to the absence of great motives, the limited sphere and hopeless routine involved in arbitrary government, unsustained by any elevated sentiment. Such a rule makes literature servile, enterprise mercenary, and manners profligate; all history proves this." It is not rational to infer from the apparent want of ability to take care of national affairs that "a military despotism is justifiable. Such a sway, by indefinitely postponing the chance to acquire the requisite training, keeps down and throws back the national impulse and destiny. The man who thus abuses power is none the less a traitor and a parricide." ¹⁹

With such an impression of the French nature prevalent, it was perhaps not to be expected that the Americans should show any marked friendliness toward their "ancient ally" in political affairs. Nor, on the other hand, since the character and the government of the French were obviously their own affair, was there any cause for an active antagonism, unless in a specific instance the welfare of the United States should be threatened. In the decade running from 1850 to 1860 the international relations of the United States included only occasional contacts or conflicts with the ambitions of the French. Most of these were connected to some degree with the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, which had not as yet, however, been accepted by all American leaders as an article of faith. By far the most important field of contact was the Island of Cuba; but Haiti, Mexico, Central America, and the Sandwich Islands contributed in turn to the popular uneasiness. Cuba had been for some years a sensitive spot in the national consciousness. British interest in the Caribbean was feared, and France also was jealously watched. A strong expansionist tendency was developing, much talk of "manifest destiny" was heard, and many looked eagerly for the detachment of the Island of Cuba from

Spain and its annexation to the United States. Both commercial and strategic reasons were urged in support of this desire. The Southern planters favored annexation because it would extend the area of slaveholding districts, yet feared somewhat lest a prosperous Cuba, with access to the markets of the United States, might prove a dangerous competitor to the South. Northern abolitionists decried the extension of slave territory. The Cubans themselves complicated the situation by periodic revolutions, aimed at independence from Spanish rule. A free Cuba, in which in all probability slavery would immediately cease to exist, was an unpalatable idea to many Americans, yet the weakness of decadent Spain made it unlikely that she would be able much longer to maintain her title, unless she should in some way obtain help from one of the stronger European nations. This would almost certainly involve a lien on her island possessions, and while many in the United States felt it a duty not to interfere with the Spanish ownership, the conviction was strong that no European state could be allowed to become her successor.

In the years 1850–1852, many filibustering expeditions were directed from the United States toward Cuba, some organized by enthusiastic individuals whose sympathy with the Cubans was accompanied by the feeling that if their independence should be accomplished by United States aid, gratitude and necessity would link their fortunes closely with those of the great American Republic; others by adventurous souls who expected to enrich themselves through the possession of estates taken from the Spanish in the island. In spite of strict enforcement of the law against these infractions of neutrality, several such enterprises took shape. The most famous was that led by Narciso Lopez, in the summer of 1851. He had made several previous attempts, all of which had failed, and this trial ended also in disaster, the leader himself and many of his men being captured and executed by the Spanish authorities. When the news of this reached the United States, anti-Spanish riots of some magnitude occurred in New Orleans, where the expedition had been organized, and there was some excitement throughout the country. The Spanish became alarmed, and appealed to Great Britain and France for protection against American designs, receiving prompt support in the form of strengthened squadrons in the West Indies and a notification to the United States that these powers would interfere, by force if necessary, to prevent "the landing of adventurers from any nation in the island of Cuba with hostile intent." The official replies of Crittenden, Acting Secretary of State, and of Webster, the Secretary, deprecated most strongly such action as was indicated by the European powers, and insisted that it could not be carried out without the visitation and search of vessels flying the American flag, which

would be absolutely inadmissible; and would almost certainly lead to abuses and collisions which would threaten the existing peace. The letter to the French pointed out that the difference between the government of America and that of European states is of a type to create mutual suspicion and aversion, and that knowledge of this creates in America a jealousy of European interference. French intervention in this case, then, could not fail to produce some irritation, if not worse consequences. "The French cruisers, sailing up and down the shore of the United States to perform their needless task of protecting Cuba, and their ungracious office of watching the people of this country, as if they were fruitful of piracies, would be regarded with some feelings of resentment, and the flag which they bore . . . would be looked at as casting a shadow of unmerited and dishonoring suspicion upon them and their government." President Fillmore in his annual Message said decisively, "Nor can there be allowed any watch by the vessels of any foreign nation over American vessels on the coast of the United States or the seas adjacent thereto." ²⁰

The French and English assured the United States authorities that there would be no encroachments upon American privileges, and the incident was closed. In the course of the following year, however, the Cuban question was reopened by a proposal from these two powers that the United States should join them in a tripartite agreement that they would under no circumstances take Cuba. Everett, who had become Secretary of State at the death of Webster, declined to become a party to such an arrangement, basing his refusal chiefly upon the inequality of the compact, since Cuba was and must ever be of much greater importance to the United States than it could be to any European state.²¹ He referred frankly also to the "law of American growth and progress" which could not be ultimately arrested by such a convention; and said that no United States Administration could "stand a day under the odium of having stipulated with the great powers of Europe that in no future time, under no change of circumstances . . . should the United States ever make the acquisition of Cuba."

Everett had further based his position upon the Washingtonian theory of the avoidance of entangling alliances. This principle, and the whole doctrine of the inadmissibility of European interference in American affairs, was being at this very moment negatived by the fact that the United States had actually undertaken a joint intervention with Great Britain and France in the affairs of the Island of Haiti. In this turbulent country, a civil war was in progress, between the two republics of Haiti and San Domingo. The Haitians controlled the smaller portion of the

island, but were the better fighters, and the Dominicans were driven to appealing for help to the larger states. They applied first to the United States, then to Great Britain, and finally offered France a protectorate, together with the cession of Samana Bay, their most important port. The French were very willing to accept the offer, and only the protesting watchfulness of the British and American authorities prevented their doing so. In the latter part of 1852 and early in 1853 it was freely rumored in the United States that they had actually taken possession of Samana. Finding, however, that it was improbable that any power would be able to act alone, the Dominicans suggested a joint intervention, to which proposal the French and British promptly agreed, and the United States saw nothing better to do than to follow suit. Webster had designated Robert M. Walsh as Commissioner, and instructed him to coöperate with the representatives of the other powers. The intervention, however, came to nothing, all three of the powers being apparently unwilling to coerce the Haitians, and the mission was withdrawn without any more definite result than a half-promise from the Haitian "Emperor," Soulouque, to refrain temporarily from fighting.²²

In still another field at this moment French aggression was feared. A French adventurer, Raousset de Boulbon, gathered a band of followers in California and Mexico, and settled in the Mexican state of Sonora, close to the boundary of the United States. Shortly afterward he started a revolution, and declared the district annexed to France. The enterprise was shortlived, the Mexican authorities promptly suppressing it, and executing most of the participants, but it was long enough to create a flurry of excitement in the United States and to show how easily suspicion against the French could be aroused, for it was widely rumored that De Boulbon had not been acting on his own initiative, but in connivance with the French authorities.²³ Some suspicion also was caused by French interest in the schemes for an inter-oceanic waterway. In the early days of the exploration of the Americas, French adventurers were among those who looked for a gateway to the West. The first plans for cutting a channel to take the place of the natural opening which they learned did not exist, interested all the western European governments. As early as 1735 the French are known to have sent out scientists, who reported that a canal was feasible. In the 19th century, when interest in the subject had greatly increased, French promoters were active in securing franchises and making plans. The government of Louis Philippe seriously considered undertaking the enterprise, and there was so much discussion in France that Louis Napoleon, in prison in the fortress of Ham, begged to be released to undertake it, and later wrote a pamphlet urging that the canal be built. After

his accession to power the canal scheme was superseded by other interests, but never forgotten, and on several occasions the Napoleonic backing of French adventurers who were interested in the question, or the personal attempts of the Emperor himself to acquire franchises, attracted the attention of the United States government and led to diplomatic warnings.

In studying the effect of these incidents upon American opinion, we must recall that 1852 was a presidential election year, when in this country all issues are likely to be embittered by partisan feeling, and that this particular election involved important problems in domestic affairs, especially those of the extension of slave areas and the growing bitterness between the North and the South. The parties were sharply differentiated, and feeling ran high. The Whig policy, represented by President Fillmore, was in general conservative in foreign matters and disposed toward peace with all nations. It minimized occasions of dispute with other countries, and deprecated an aggressive national policy. It therefore disclaimed any immediate designs on Cuba, treated the stories of the French seizure of Samana and Sonora as improbable, and discouraged filibustering expeditions.²⁴ The Seward wing of the party was more in favor of expansion, and inclined to question whether, as the *American Whig Review* put it, the policy of the party had not been too meek. "Has the imperial usurpation of Louis Napoleon struck a damp into the heart of American as well as European republicans?"²⁵ The Democrats were in favor of a vigorous foreign policy. American expansion was to be given full sway. The "weak," "craven," "pusillanimous" methods of the Fillmore administration were to give place to a glorious and triumphant advance. America should come into her own. No longer might she be bullied by European nations; instead she should dictate the fortunes of the western world.²⁶ The *Newark Daily Advertiser*, a Whig daily, sarcastically described the Democratic platform, after the elections had shown decisively that it was a program that appealed to the electorate:

"How comes it that our Government allows the subjects of Napoleon III to speak French almost within cannon shot of our boundary? Thank heaven, their reign [the Fillmore Administration] will cease in two short months and then we shall see if England will be allowed to sail her ships of war in company with the French in the Caribbean Sea. Long before we had existence as a nation European Powers were masters of the West India Islands; but the United States have at length appeared, and shall any foreign state be suffered to utter a word now about Cuba and San Domingo? The French flag was seen hovering a few days ago around Samana . . . yet the President did not attack it. Will not Senator Cass, or Douglas, or Mason, or Soulé or somebody call for papers? . . . We consider that the people, by their recent suffrages, have decided most unequivocally and intelligently for active par-

icipation of the United States on all these points. . . . We suppose we must concede, though we do it with reluctance, that Great Britain has a title to the possession of Canada at present, as not within the Monroe Doctrine; but we cannot imagine the reason why she and France want little Greytowns and Honduras Islands, Samanas and Sonoras here and there and everywhere. We can never consent to it, for we want them all ourselves." 27

To the Democrats, the proposal for a West Indian patrol after the Lopez incident was "insolent, in the highest degree, to the United States." 28 The Monroe Doctrine should be fully upheld, and this demanded a strong army and a strong navy, and an army of observation on the Rio Grande, to prevent any coup d'état in that region. "The present Congress intends to assume the initiative in supporting the new administration in taking bold and high ground in its relations with the strong powers of Europe and the protection of the weak powers of the earth. . . . It would not at all surprise us to see the appropriation of five or ten millions of dollars, to be placed in the hands of General Pierce, for the preservation of peace and the honor of the republic in the approaching crisis." 29 The *Democratic Review* was especially anxious that the United States should keep a close watch on Louis Napoleon and block his enterprises in the Caribbean and Mexico.³⁰ In the Congressional debates the Democratic leaders expressed with force and frankness their views on expansion and on the Monroe Doctrine. Mason, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, saw in the proposal for a tripartite guarantee of Cuba evidence that France and England were strongly opposed to the possession of the island by the United States, and had chosen this method of announcing their interest and their determination to act in unison in the matter. "And I wish further to declare," he said, ". . . that whenever the hour comes when in good faith and with due regard to national honor, we can incorporate Cuba as one of these United States, it will be done, and Europe may find it best then to hold her peace." 31 Cass, a pronounced imperialist, declared that all the maritime nations of Europe were jealous of American expansion, and determined to block it in any possible way. This gave importance to such an intrigue as that in Sonora. He cited French propaganda, which urged the colonization of northern Mexico, "as the only means of checking the rapid and formidable growth of the United States and preventing forever the acquisition of a railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean" and as the "surest dyke against the usurpation of the American race." As to Cuba, there could be no mistaking the designs of England and of the Napoleonic Empire, and the United States must be prepared to resist their encroachments.³² Soulé of Louisiana was eager that the United States should take Cuba, and in spite of his French birth, correspondingly bitter toward both

nations which interfered with his ambition.³³ Gwin of California thought that Texas and California would be apt to look carefully into the question of French seizure of Sonora, and, if the news proved true, might "go out on a buffalo hunt soon."³⁴

Seward's position in these discussions was somewhat difficult, for he was, and was known to be, in sympathy with expansion. He said that he did not believe that the French government had any official connection with the Sonora affair, and that in Cuba all that she had really done was just what the United States had declared was correct, to uphold the sovereignty of Spain. In fact, we had no proof of any actual aggression, either in the Caribbean or anywhere else. He "would submit to no real wrong, but on the other hand would seek no factious cause of controversy." If we were to outstrip our European rivals, it should be by peaceful means, by the development of our resources, and the increase of our commerce, especially on the Pacific side. He thought it unnecessary to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine at the moment. The ambitions of France and England could not be disregarded, but if they should make an attempt to renew or restore their power in the New World, they would immediately discover that it was impossible, therefore provocative declarations on our part were inexpedient.³⁵ Other Whig leaders, like Underwood, of Kentucky, who explained that the reason why Louis Napoleon was dignified with the title of Emperor was because the people felt safer in the hands of one generous robber than in the hands of forty thieves,³⁶ showed plainly their aversion to Napoleonic aggression.

In fact, throughout the course of the group of incidents which we have been discussing, American opinion was more harmonious in regard to them than a study of the party platforms would indicate. Everett's letter on the proposal for the tripartite action in Cuba was firm in its assertion of American leadership in the destinies of the western world, unhampered by any European interference. The Whigs were delighted with it; and although it emanated from a Whig cabinet, the Democrats found it entirely satisfactory.³⁷ The *National Intelligencer* (Whig), though it insisted that the French had not occupied Samana, yet defended the intervention in Haiti, on the ground that it was necessary to prevent that island's falling into the hands of any European power.³⁸ The *Washington Union*, official organ of the Democratic party, was pleased with the intervention,³⁹ and the criticism that it should have been made alone, instead of with any European power, came from both sides.⁴⁰ The Mexican incident is an even clearer index to the popular sentiment toward France. It is not to be classed with ordinary party squabbles in Mexico, says the *New York Herald*. "It has a deeper meaning, and is pregnant with more important

consequences. For some years past the French government has, for motives to which we now find the clue, encouraged the emigration of a class of the most unruly and adventurous of its citizens to this portion of Mexico." It has given them official support there, and now, "By connecting this annexation movement with that in the Republic of Dominica . . . it will appear beyond all doubt that they form two grand links in the design which the French government are evidently endeavoring to carry out on this continent. . . . We expect that Congress will take immediate measures to frustrate these designs."⁴¹ The *Union* declared that whether directly supported by the French government or not, the recent occurrences in Sonora and at Samana were a strong warning to this government not to shrink from its policy, nor to slumber at its post.⁴² The *Boston Transcript* said, "If, behind all these incidents, there is a purpose of French colonization or conquest, it grows at once into the gravest public question of the day."⁴³ The *New York Times* said it had important documents which proved the plan to be official, and to aim at erecting a barrier to American growth in the direction of the Pacific.⁴⁴ The *Providence Journal* spoke scornfully of American filibustering, but thought that at any rate a similar move on the part of the French in North Mexico would have to be blocked. Our border provinces must not be threatened by a European neighbor.⁴⁵ The *Newark Daily Advertiser* recalled that French colonization in America had always been unlucky, and thought this attempt would be no exception.⁴⁶ In short, it is evident that the spirit of "Young America" demanded an energetic adhesion to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

In the later years of the decade, an attempt was made to carry into effect the expansionist ideas of the Democratic leaders. Every effort was made to obtain for the United States that Bay of Samana which the French had been so unprincipled as to desire, together with such other concessions as would give this country a commanding influence in Santo Domingo. France, Great Britain, and Spain consistently blocked each move.⁴⁷ Unwilling to commit open robbery, and accept the consequences, the United States tried by every means to persuade Spain to sell Cuba, or at least to recognize her independence. Backed steadily by the other powers, Spain as steadily refused; but not until the Civil War broke out were the negotiations even temporarily abandoned.⁴⁸ To describe in detail the progress and the incidents of these attempts would be manifestly out of place here. A few illustrations, however, of the fact that the American public was sufficiently aware of the march of events to resent the interference with American ambitions, and to continue to hold toward France an attitude of criticism and suspicion, may be cited. In the fall of 1854 the French consul at San

Francisco was compelled to go to court to testify in regard to the activities of the raiders who had gone from California to Mexico. He protested that this was an invasion of his rights, and was excused from testimony, but carried his complaint to his home government, which made the matter the subject of representations at Washington. The *National Intelligencer* in its account of the affair declared that the wrong,—“and there was outrageous wrong in this business,”—was on the side of France, since French adventurers, with the connivance of the French consul, had organized a filibustering attack on Sonora, in defiance of our laws, and the consul’s immunity from the witness-stand had made it impossible to convict the culprits.⁴⁹ Early in 1854 Lord Clarendon, speaking in the British Parliament, announced that the alliance made between France and Great Britain for the Crimean War extended to all questions of policy. In such matters, he said, “There is no part of the world, in either hemisphere, in which we are not entirely in accord.”⁵⁰ Somewhat later, Louis Napoleon took occasion to make a similar statement on the part of France. He spoke of the firm bond created by common victories, and by “the same views and the same intentions, animating the two governments in every part of the globe.”⁵¹ American critics seized on these declarations as being specifically directed against this country, in the matter of Cuba. Cass referred to them several times in the Senate, and in a lengthy speech on February 20, 1855, said that France and England had been for some time acting in concert against our foreign policy:

“They seem to have followed us over the world, watching, counteracting, and opposing, from the loading of a cargo of guano to the acquisition of a kingdom. At the Sandwich Islands their influence has been in constant operation, openly used and pertinaciously exerted. In Dominica they tracked us, and frustrated, it is said, a very reasonable arrangement to which there could be no proper objection except that it was useful and acceptable to the United States. . . . At the Gallapagos Islands, where interests far more reasonable than any views of acquisition were struck down by the same interposition, . . .” etc.

Other examples could easily be obtained from the newspapers, Cass said, and he had a profound distrust of the Caribbean operations of the two nations.⁵² Mason followed with an arraignment even more detailed and bitter. A cloud had been gathering, he said, for some time in the relations between these countries and the United States. It had been visible in both seas, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and showed a joint policy of interference in matters with which the American people believed they had no right to interfere. In the Sandwich Islands they had acted to frustrate American negotiations. When the United States was negotiating a guano treaty with Ecuador, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador had been instructed

by his government to give to the United States authorities an account of the remarks of the French chargé, who had said, in referring to the treaty, that he was surprised that the government of Ecuador would seek the protection of a nation whose ambitious views and unscrupulous desire of extending its territories were notorious, which was shown by the annexations of Texas and California, and its designs on the Sandwich Islands and Cuba. He said also "that in so far as France was concerned, the Emperor was resolved to curb that spirit; and although, under present circumstances, it did not suit the policy of his government to undertake anything against the United States; yet, upon the conclusion of the war with Russia, the Emperor would turn his attention to the United States, and that he considered a war between the two countries unavoidable, as it was desired by the French Government." This meant, Mason said, that the French consuls and diplomatic functionaries on the American continent were expected freely to defame this country and to intimidate the powers to which they were accredited, in order to break up American commercial treaties and other connections. He recited the grievances connected with Santo Domingo, and showed how here the diplomatic agents of France and England had undone all the United States had tried to do.⁵³

About this time the *New York Atlas* carried an editorial on the Anglo-French alliance, which "will prove a humbug and do no harm to the Czar." Louis Napoleon, "if he wishes to damn himself to eternal infamy (he cannot help it anyhow)," should join the Czar against England, which would give him a brilliant opportunity to avenge Waterloo. The Czar will probably win anyway, "in which case God help and save Napoleon le Petit, for the French people won't."⁵⁴ Emerson said that Napoleon's policy was bolder than the English would have chosen. "He means to teach them how robbers rob." (*Journals*, VIII: 559.)

Occasional references have been made to the French activities in the Sandwich Islands. It will be recalled that some years earlier, when they took possession of Tahiti, they gave evidence of a desire to extend their influence to the Hawaiian Islands also, to which action the United States objected. The matter remained unsettled, and through the early fifties there was considerable friction in this area, and the idea, emanating from the Hawaiians themselves, of annexing the islands to the United States in order to prevent their occupation by the French or British, was agitated. Webster, in 1851, gave these countries official notice that the United States could not consent to European occupation and would protect the islanders against it.⁵⁵ The general public, however, seems to have taken little interest in the matter, but have felt that the islands were far away, and not of sufficient importance to be of great concern to this country, certainly not

in comparison with the Caribbean interests. Naturally, the Californians showed more interest than anyone else, for they were in a position to know the value of the territory better. In a speech in the House, August 30, 1852, Representative McCorkle of that state made a vigorous plea for the annexation of Hawaii. He spoke of the French aggression, which had driven the natives to ask protection from this country, and emphasized the strategic value to the entire Western coast of such a port as the islands could provide. The Pacific and the Asian trade, too, must benefit largely from its possession. European interference should no more be allowed to hamper American expansion in the Pacific than in the Atlantic or on the continent. To reject such an acquisition because it "might displease France" was craven and dishonorable. The people of California, he concluded, were united in the demand for Hawaii, and their voice should not be disregarded.⁵⁶ Senator Gwin, from the same state, in the debate on the Monroe Doctrine, said that the United States had interests in other islands besides Cuba. "There are a set of islands called the Sandwich Islands, which we in California look upon as our summer residence, and when the Senator from Virginia talks about ripe fruit, it ought to be known that that fruit is ripe also, and ready to fall."⁵⁷ But it must be doubted whether Hawaiian affairs had much influence upon American sentiment in regard to France. More and more indeed as the year 1860 approached, the imperialistic ambitions of Americans were subordinated to the more pressing, more vital question of the survival of the Union. It was impossible to be deeply interested in the acquisition of islands in the Pacific or harbors in the Atlantic when there might before long be no United States of America to which they might be added. Even Cuba, so long the dream of the eager expansionist, could count but little when weighed against Virginia or South Carolina; and in so critical a time it would be little short of madness to be led into a war with any European power for any cause short of necessity. The elections of 1860 came and passed, and the choice of Lincoln was the signal for secession, to be followed quickly by the outbreak of the Civil War. And now we hear no more talk of defiance. Both North and South earnestly desired the friendship of the world, and both did all that in them lay to smooth over causes of friction and so to order their ways as to win the approval of the watching nations, upon whose action much depended. For the North, Seward, the Secretary of State, whose first impulse had been to irritate France and England into an attack which would, he thought, bring an end to dissension and unite the country against the common foe, saw almost immediately the futility of such a hope, and abandoned it in favor of a masterly policy of watchfulness and conciliation. The South sent various commissioners abroad, of whom Mason and Slidell were the

most important, to carry on an active propaganda in the interests of the Confederacy. France and England had promptly recognized the Southern States as a belligerent, and proclaimed their neutrality in the war, but hesitated whether officially to admit the existence of a new and independent nation, though they fully believed that the North could never force the seceded states to return to the Union. Both in England and in France there was a willingness to see the separation accomplished, for it weakened a nation whose swiftly growing power had threatened their ambitions; and the aristocratic government in Britain and the imperial ruler in France were more than willing to see the republican form of government proved a failure. But in neither country was a strong popular sentiment behind the administration in this preference for the success of the South; and without it they hesitated to act. Early in the struggle the two states had agreed to act together in whatever concerned the war, and Britain showed clearly a desire to await a military decision rather than to take action which might prove premature. The Emperor Napoleon III urged recognition of the South and the breaking of the blockade of the Southern ports which prevented the export of cotton. Before long, too, he urged intervention in the form of joint action on the part of England, France, and Russia; but the other two refused. The Southern commissioners were well received and were allowed to make arrangements for the building of the ships so much needed by the Confederacy; and the South was allowed to give its adhesion to the Declaration of Paris with a reservation permitting privateering; but recognition and active aid were postponed.⁵⁸

The feeling of Unionists early in the war in regard to the probable behavior of the French may be illustrated by this excerpt from the *Baltimore Clipper*, (Jan. 18, 1862):—

“The French are naturally the friends of this country but controlled as they are by the present Emperor whose will alone directs the affairs of the nation, there is no security against any sudden whim he may entertain to carry out his ambitious objects. He is in close alliance now with England, but she has no confidence in the stability of his friendship, and her statesmen know that he will suddenly turn against her whenever the favorable moment presents itself. He has been strongly suspected ever since the commencement of our troubles, of being desirous of inducing the English Government to break with the United States, in the hopes of crippling the naval power of the former by a war with us; or by drawing off her attention in this direction he would be left more free to carry out his desired plans in regard to . . . Italy. Prince Napoleon, however, who recently visited this country, appears to be a true and outspoken friend to the United States, and the Paris journal, the *Opinion Nationale*, which is known to be his organ, is almost the only one in Paris which has shown a frank and fair disposition toward us.”

John L. Motley wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes,—“Louis Napoleon is capable of playing us a trick at any moment.” And to Bismarck he said:—

“I suppose there is no doubt whatever that L. N. [sic] has been perpetually, during the last six months, provoking, soliciting, or teasing the English cabinet to unite with him in some kind of intervention. . . . Moreover, L. N. is the Heaven-appointed arbiter of all sublunary affairs, and he doubtless considers it his mission to ‘save civilization’ in our continent, as he has so often been good enough to do in the rest of the world.”⁵⁹

In the South also uncertainty and dissatisfaction prevailed. The *Richmond Examiner* said:—

“The policy of Europe has forced the Confederate States into a line of warfare most injurious to European interests. It behooved those powers . . . that this war should be short, sharp, and decisive. They have pursued a policy, however, to give it the greatest possible duration. They have already lost two cotton crops; and no statesman can predict how many more are likely to slip away from them. They are likely to lose more heavily from the illegal blockade which they have sanctioned than even the Confederacy.”⁶⁰

And the *Mobile Evening News*, speaking of the rumors of intervention, said:—“We have been deceived and suffered too much already by indulging in false hopes of succor from abroad. Confederate victories are the only reliable interveners.”⁶¹

Late in 1862, after the British and Russians had “saved the United States the trouble” of refusing their mediation, Louis Napoleon concluded to attempt this alone. Accordingly, in January, 1863, he sent to Washington a formal proffer of his good offices, an offer which was courteously but firmly refused.⁶² Seward wrote to Dayton, telling him to inform M. Drouyn de l’Huys that the country was firmly determined to preserve the Union, and that the government was steadily advancing toward success. The proposal that “while this country is engaged in suppressing an armed insurrection, with the purpose of maintaining the constitutional national authority and preserving the integrity of the country, it should enter into diplomatic discussion with the insurgents upon the question whether that authority shall not be renounced” was obviously inadmissible, he said. European statesmen were making a grave mistake, he added, in thinking the country demoralized. The government “has not the least thought of relinquishing the trust which has been confided in it by the nation,” and can admit no laxity, no discouragement, in the prosecution of its duty. The Cabinet and the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations concurred in this judgment.⁶³ But the time had not been ill chosen. This was for the North the gloomiest period of the war, when military failures and political dissension threatened to wreck the Administration. Greeley said that the

general opinion in Europe was that the North could never win, and that the attempted mediation simply gave an opportunity to arrange a "just, satisfactory, and conclusive separation." ⁶⁴ The opposition papers jeeringly said that "if we cannot or have not put down the rebellion, we cannot expect nations which suffer much by our quarrel to look on as disinterested spectators forever," and "it is now the government at Washington, more particularly than that at Richmond, that is casting prayerful eyes across the Atlantic for help. . . . They want peace, but lack the moral courage to propose it themselves! They are praying for such a formidable demonstration from abroad as will afford them an excuse." ⁶⁵ The *New York Herald* said the plan was "most significant of an evil intent towards our Union. It is, we fear, the last move before the recognition by France alone of the Davis Government." The *Herald* thought that Louis Napoleon would be driven by the French need for cotton to decisive action, and would soon attempt to raise the blockade. The ironclads then in the Gulf were "not needed for the Mexican expedition." ⁶⁶ The *New York Evening Post* declared the tone of the Emperor's letter insulting, and the plan proposed by him equivalent to giving up the principles for which the war was being prosecuted. The Emperor's motives were analyzed, and the suggestion made that he expected the South to win and wanted to curry favor with the victors. Or he might, knowing the aristocratic tendencies of the South, hope to be in a position to furnish a monarch for the new principality from the Bonapartist stock. It was possible, too, that he hoped his action would so strengthen the opposition in the North as to end the war. In this he was mistaken. "The spirit of our nation will not endure the interference of a foreign power in our domestic affairs." ⁶⁷

On the Confederate side the offer of mediation with its accompanying possibility of intervention, was received with enthusiasm, and the *Charleston Courier* thus discussed the situation:—

"The inhabitants of Yankeedom are greatly disturbed over the apprehension of foreign intervention. . . . The watchful cowards are confident that the Imperial ruler of France meditates evil designs against the United States . . . though with their accustomed bravado they insist that they can whip France and the Confederate States with the greatest ease in the space of 60 or 90 days. What most disgusts their minds, however, is the formidable preparation Napoleon is making for the execution of his designs against Mexico. . . . They think one third of the number could do the work in Mexico, and say that when Napoleon does strike a blow against them, he will strike 'quickly and to the purpose.' We think that the Yankees have good ground for their suspicions as to the intentions of Napoleon toward the United States. . . . Napoleon will not abandon his intention of bringing this terrible strife to an end. The great potentate is sagacious, foresighted and firm beyond all living statesmen. He is not the man to hesitate and falter after determining to pursue a measure. . . . He is powerful enough and courageous enough to carry out the pur-

poses of his own mind in the way that common sense, humanity, and justice unite in commending."

The *Courier* two weeks later showed less confidence in the firmness and wisdom of the Emperor. The editor thought Napoleon might intervene, and that there was a better chance of it than there was of help from any other quarter, but "further than this our past disappointments admonish us not to venture." If France should simply address "a note of a certain kind" to the Secretary of State, the United States would yield, as it did in the Trent case. Later still the *Courier* was frankly pessimistic. "There are few who have not ceased to look for assistance from any nation across the sea. Doubtless there are some who listen with eager ears for good tidings from the Emperor of the French but their hopes are probably vain." Still, when friction between Seward and the French minister was rumored, in another fortnight, the *Courier* remarked hopefully that "the French are not a people who are accustomed to submit to insult, either collectively or individually"; only to drop again into gloom a month later with the statement that "We are no longer subject to the annoyance arising from the expectation of receiving aid from any European power. That expectation has been so often disappointed, and has mortified, angered, and injured us to so great a degree that we are not moved by the most plausible reports concerning the action of foreign nations in regard to our Confederacy." The South must learn to depend on itself and believe that it can win without European aid.⁶⁸ The *North Carolina Standard* took the same position. Quoting a speech of President Davis, in which he said, "We should not look to Europe for aid, for such is not to be expected," the *Standard* said that this was the truth, and begged "the demagogues" to do no more talking about speedy French intervention but to bend every effort toward strengthening the Southern army. "Skulkers and cowards base their hopes on foreign intervention."⁶⁹ The *Richmond Enquirer* agreed, but the *Richmond Whig* longed for a foreign alliance, and was unwilling to offer any commercial advantages to France to obtain it.

"Even if we should win every battle for the next twelve months, the demoralization and waste of life and treasure in one year of war would be cheaply purchased by a stipulation to deliver to France for the next fifty years every bale of cotton and every pound of tobacco raised in the Confederate States. . . . We know it is very much the fashion in official circles to speak with contempt of any assistance, but we . . . shall be glad of substantial help from any quarter. No matter how able we may be to scourge our enemies from our territory, help would enable us to do it easier and quicker and with less damage to ourselves. . . . We would not spare any means, while it is yet time, to procure the aid of that powerful friend."⁷⁰

Napoleon's failure to follow up his offer of mediation by active intervention must have been exceedingly trying to the Confederate leaders.

Judah P. Benjamin, their Secretary of State, writing in March, 1863, to Slidell in Paris, speaks scornfully of the Emperor's allowing himself to be restrained from decisive action by "alternate menaces and assurances uttered with notorious mendacity by the leaders of the frantic mob which now controls the government of the United States." ⁷¹ President Davis, in his study of the War, said that the Confederacy could not complain because France and England declared their neutrality, but he was convinced that the "declared neutrality was delusive, not real; that recognized neutral rights were alternately asserted and waived in such manner as to bear with great severity on us, while conferring signal advantages on our enemy." He spoke with especial bitterness of the recognition of the blockade by the neutral states, claiming that the blockade was so ineffective that it should not have been considered as valid. "Thus, while every energy of our country was evoked in the struggle for maintaining its existence, the neutral nations of Europe pursued a policy which, nominally impartial, was practically most favorable to our enemies and most detrimental to us." President Davis condemns also the agreement by which France and England were to act together in regard to the War, since this "placed it in the power of either France or England to obstruct at pleasure the recognition to which the Confederacy was justly entitled, or even to prolong the continuance of hostilities on this side of the Atlantic, if the policy of either could be promoted by the postponement of peace." ⁷²

The attitude of Napoleon III in regard to recognition of the Confederacy or the maintenance of neutrality was not the only phase of French policy which caused anxiety on this continent. The intervention in Mexico created a problem, most difficult of solution, and under the circumstances intensely inconvenient for the North. As Turkey is the sick man of Europe, so Mexico may not unjustly be considered the confirmed invalid of the Western hemisphere. With unlimited natural resources which she has been unable to develop without foreign aid; with the bulk of her population made up of ignorant, superstitious, and poverty-stricken Indians, Mexico has been at the mercy of corrupt and adventurous chieftains, and her government has been subject to frequent revolutionary changes, in the course of which her own people have suffered cruelly, the interests of foreigners have invariably been damaged, and the country's already heavy burden of debt increased. With good government, Mexico could meet all her obligations and prosper, but she has seemed unable to find a way out of the vicious circle of misgovernment, revolution, debt, more misgovernment, more revolution, more debt. That these conditions should create difficulties with the nations interested in Mexican development was inevitable. We have seen that in 1838 France blockaded the Mexican coast,

and even occupied Vera Cruz in the effort to collect indemnity for some of her injuries, and that the United States, herself suffering from similar grievances against her turbulent neighbor, made no objection. The pressure upon Mexico from one or more of her creditor nations has been almost constant throughout the last century. It is perhaps no wonder that the Mexican temperament has grown somewhat hardened to this condition. The period just preceding the Civil War had been one of extreme disorder in Mexico. There had been much revolutionary activity, and there had been some aggravated cases of insults and injuries to foreigners and damage to their property. The United States had been one of the worst sufferers, and had seriously contemplated intervention to obtain redress. The Constitutionalist leader, Juarez, had been recognized, however, and there was a disposition to give him an opportunity to see if he could develop an orderly government. But Great Britain, France, and Spain had also been injured, and the government of Juarez further antagonized them by declaring all payments to foreign creditors suspended for two years, and by confiscating the huge holdings of the Church. These three states, therefore, prepared to force a settlement of their claims, and agreed to act in unison. Upon such a formidable scheme for intervention the United States looked with apprehension, and bent its energies toward finding a way to prevent it. A plan was devised for lending Mexico the money necessary to satisfy the interest on the European debt, the loan to be secured by a lien on some of the resources of the four northern Mexican states, Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa. But the Mexican state was slow in agreeing so to mortgage its lands, and the United States Senate also thought the undertaking inadvisable, so that the treaty was not even ready for action before the European occupation had become a fact, after which any action of the sort would have been considered an infraction of neutrality. The allies in their agreement, at the suggestion of Great Britain, had bound themselves not to seek to obtain any acquisition of territory or peculiar advantages, or to interfere with the right of the Mexicans to "choose and freely to constitute" their own government. They also recognized that the United States had claims against Mexico, and invited her to join them in the intervention. This invitation was purely formal, as they also agreed not to delay their action by waiting for American coöperation. Seward's reply to the suggestion was a recognition of the right of the three nations to determine the extent of their grievances and the method of exacting reparation. He made it clearly understood, nevertheless, that the United States would strongly disapprove of any permanent occupation or any permanent influence over the affairs of the Mexican nation. For the United States, he referred to the fixed policy of not acting in alliance with

foreign nations, and said that American good will toward Mexico was such that the government did not wish further to embarrass her at a moment when she was already torn by internal dissension and exposed to foreign war. The action of the United States was undoubtedly especially circumspect because the allied proposal came in the height of the excitement about the Trent affair, when the tension between the North and England, with France almost certainly following England's lead, was very great, and any misstep might produce a catastrophe in the form of a declaration of war from these two countries. As a matter of fact, in view of the clearly expressed intention of the allies, the United States had at the opening of the undertaking no real basis for an objection, for mere dislike and suspicion could not serve as ground for action under the circumstances.

The British and Spanish loyally maintained their engagements, and in April, 1862, after making an agreement with the Mexicans, withdrew their forces. The French early gave evidence of an entirely different intention, and entered upon an extensive series of operations in the interior of Mexico, which could be construed only as a movement toward conquest, and in July, 1863, they occupied the capital city, and proceeded to reorganize the government. In their official communications they continued to insist that their intentions were entirely correct, and contemplated nothing more than the establishment of a stable government, with which other nations could treat. Harassed by the pressure of the Civil War, and unwilling to bring about an open break with the Emperor, Seward continued to hold the position that "France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not anticipate, a violation of them."⁷³ The continued activities of the French made this attitude increasingly difficult to maintain, and this was particularly true after the French-controlled Mexican assembly declared for the establishment of an empire, and invited Maximilian of Austria, who had been chosen by Napoleon III, to be the new ruler. Seward's effort, consistently and successfully carried out, even in the face of hostile criticism at home, was to keep the principles of United States objection to foreign dominance clearly before the Emperor, and to reserve the right of future action for this country whenever in our judgment those principles should demand it, but to avoid incurring his active enmity during the critical period of the Civil War. Thurlow Weed wrote from Paris, April, 1862, "Your dispatch on

Mexican matters breaks no eggs. It makes a record, and there, I hope, you are at rest." ⁷⁴

The general feeling that the expedition violated the Monroe Doctrine was combated by a few. The *National Intelligencer*, which had always been anti-expansionist, said in 1861,—“The right of European Powers to wage war with American States, or to acquire their territory by purchase or conquest, was never questioned by Mr. Monroe.” ⁷⁵ Less than a year later, this paper was condemning the behavior of the French, and calling General Forey’s letter promising self-determination to the Mexicans “a specious appeal.” ⁷⁶ As late as the fall of 1863, General Sherman, in a long and confidential letter to General Halleck, wrote:—

“I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family quarrel. Of course, governments founded on a different and it may be an antagonistic principle with ours naturally feel a pleasure at our complications, and, it may be, wish our downfall; but in the end England and France will join with us in jubilation at the triumph of constitutional government over faction. . . . I do not profess to understand Napoleon’s design in Mexico, and I do not see that his taking military possession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory now as we want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a question to what nation she should fall a prey. That is now solved, and I don’t see that we are damaged. We have the finest part of the North American Continent, all we can people and can take care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land, and compose the strife generated by it, we shall have enough people, resources, and wealth, if well combined, to defy interference from any quarter.” ⁷⁷

Such an utterance is quite exceptional. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* more nearly expressed the general feeling when it rejoiced because the Mexicans had issued letters of marque, saying that this was one way in which she could in spite of her weakness injure the “three big bullies” who had attacked her. ⁷⁸ The *Baltimore Clipper* praised Seward’s masterly circular” on the question, and said it would give the nations to understand that although it might seem that we had our hands too full at home to pay much attention to their doings, “our government is wide awake enough in regard to the attempts of foreign despots to introduce their system of government at our very doors.” ⁷⁹ The *Boston Post* (May, 1863), said:—“The tripartite alliance of England, France and Spain for the destruction of the liberties of Mexico is now virtually at an end: but France alone has undertaken the hazardous task of forcing a monarchical government on the unwilling people.” ⁸⁰

The *New York Evening Post* rejoiced in the letter of its Paris correspondent to the effect that the report of the French Minister of finances showed the Mexican expedition to be proving very costly to France:—

“The Empire has gained neither victories nor honor by its incursion into the vast territory of a weak republic, but it has had the comfort,—if it be regarded as a comfort,—of paying out no less a sum than 83 million francs during the year 1862. In American currency this is equivalent to about 16½ million dollars,—so that Napoleon is already paying rather dearly for a whistle that he cannot blow.”⁸¹

The same paper published a clever bit of satire, headed, “Friendly Mediation Needed.” This was at the time when France had just made the offer of mediation between the North and the South. Mediation between France and Mexico should by all means be offered, the editor said, “on the grounds of humanity and to stop the useless effusion of blood. France has undertaken a task which she cannot complete, or which she will be able to complete only at a fearful sacrifice of life and treasure,”—practically the identical reasons Napoleon gave for his offer to the United States. Further, Drouyn de l’Huys, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, “kindly hinted” that “in spite of the superior resources of the federal government the conditions of soil and climate seemed to interpose invincible arguments to the progress of the war.” How much more true this is of Mexico! And while foreign military experts have seen fit to criticise our military reverses, in comparison with the success of the French in Mexico they do not appear so badly. “Will there be any end to the war? . . . Is it not our business as a Christian nation to stop it?” In a final, more serious, paragraph the writer urged that we really ought to intervene, for the sake of our own interests and for the sake of our brother republicans in Mexico.⁸² The *New York Herald* at about the same time commented with severity upon the French policy, saying that at first it had been supposed that France was more friendly than England, but that now it was steadily being proved that she was really inimical:—

“We have the assertion from the Emperor himself, who says that France must stay our progress on this continent, and who chivalrously undertakes the task at a moment when we are hampered by a gigantic rebellion. . . . The French desire to mediate was persisted in with a bad grace, knowing as they do how offensive to loyal Americans would be any foreign intervention or meddling. . . . We would warn our authorities at Washington to exercise the greatest caution and delicacy in handling M. Mercier [the French Minister], and the most untiring expedition in building ironclads, for if we must have a foreign war, let us by all means be prepared for it.”⁸³

Gideon Welles, in his *Diary*, under date of July 27, 1863, commented on the extinguishing of the Mexican Republic and its replacement by an empire. “But for this wicked rebellion this calamity would not have occurred.” He did not rate very high the Mexican ability for self-government, “but I don’t expect an improvement of their condition under

the sway of a ruler imposed on them by Louis Napoleon.”⁸⁴ Charles Sumner, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at this time, delivered a very important address on the foreign relations of the United States, at Cooper Institute, New York, September 10, 1863. In this he spoke with great frankness in regard to the grievances of this country, showing the injuries which England had imposed upon us, and those of France. He characterized the Emperor as desirous of playing in American affairs the part which Maria Theresa played in those of Poland. If he should succeed in his ambition to partition the United States, it would be the greatest crime of the century. “Trampler upon the Republic in France, trampler upon the Republic in Mexico, it remains to be seen if the French Emperor can prevail as trampler upon this Republic.” This speech is said to have had a strong influence in strengthening the hearts of those at home, and, from its semi-official nature, in discouraging unfriendly plans abroad.⁸⁵ The *Atlantic Monthly* carried a strong article on the French struggle for naval and colonial supremacy:—

“In comparison with our national misfortunes all besides seems trifling. Else nothing would so fasten our attention as the French invasions and conquest of Mexico. A dependency of France established at our door! The most restless, ambitious, and warlike nation in Europe our neighbor! Who shall tell what results, momentous and lasting, may follow in the train of such events? . . . This particular enterprise comes close to us. It affronts our pride and tramples upon our political traditions. . . . Louis Napoleon has said,—‘We have an interest, indeed, in the Republic of the United States being prosperous; but not that she should take possession of the whole Gulf of Mexico, thus to command the Antilles as well as South America, and to be the only dispenser of the products of the New World!’ This covers a distinct threat, and explains the Mexican expedition.”⁸⁶

The illustrations which have been given will sufficiently demonstrate the feeling in the North in regard to the intervention in Mexico from its inception through the year 1863. For the feeling on the Southern side there is less evidence available. We know that Slidell, in his conversations with Napoleon in the summer of 1862, offered an alliance offensive and defensive for Mexican affairs. Slidell himself said that he had no definite instructions in regard to this, but that he had large discretion, which is probably true, as he seems to have been authorized to make practically any terms he could with the Emperor as the price of an alliance. Mason is known to have approved of such a plan, but how far this was a matter of preference, and how far it must be regarded as a purely war measure, is difficult to say.⁸⁷ It must be recalled that many of the leaders of the Confederacy had been at no distant day leaders in the Democratic party, with all that is implied in the way of expansionist sympathies at that time. They must

have changed radically if they could sincerely wish to see a French empire established in Mexico. Certainly it is well established that the Confederate government was in the fall of 1863 profoundly suspicious of French intrigues in Texas. A letter from Benjamin to Slidell, dated October 17, was captured by the Federals and published in the Northern papers, and in this Mr. Benjamin described the inquiries of the French consul at Galveston addressed to the Confederate governor of the state, suggesting the advisability of the restoration of Texas as an independent state. Similar inquiries were reported from the French consul at Richmond. The Confederate authorities had inferred, said Benjamin, that the French government had some sort of scheme on foot to detach Texas from the Confederacy and make of it a buffer state between Mexico, which they would conquer and hold, and the Confederate States. The new state would then be dependent on France to a great degree, and would immensely strengthen her hold of the districts she had seized. That the Confederate government must "view with alarm" such an enterprise goes without saying, and Benjamin advised Slidell to bring the matter to the attention of the British, as he was sure they would be unwilling to permit the French to carry out the scheme.⁸⁸

The *Richmond Examiner* in 1863 recognized the value to the Confederacy of anything which created difficulties between the government at Washington and the French:—The blockade of the Mexican ports proclaimed by the French the editor considered unnecessary except to hinder United States action. The action of Mr. Corwin, the representative of the Washington government, in following Juarez when he left Mexico City, proved conclusively that

"the moral force of the United States—their material force being at present fully occupied elsewhere—will be exerted in opposition to the new order of things. Secret assistance of all sorts will be given and intrigues will be used to thwart the purposes of the French Emperor so far as can be done without serious danger. The maintenance of a rigid blockade will close the door to much of this underhand interference and facilitate the quiet adjustment of the machinery necessary to start the young empire fairly on its course. . . . For ourselves, it is clearly our interest that Mexico should speedily pass under her permanent form of government. The movement is calculated to aid us in our own struggle; and the embarrassments which will inevitably beset the Government of Lincoln, from the various questions arising out of it, increase the chances of benefit to the South."⁸⁹

Embarrassments from this cause did certainly beset the Administration. In the winter and spring of 1863–1864 the popular indignation over the Mexican invasion steadily increased as the purpose of the Emperor was made more manifest, and both friends and enemies of the Lincoln régime

joined in declaring that the United States must not allow the occupation to become permanent. Yet the diplomatic difficulties remained. France, on a specious pretence, had allowed the building of some powerful ironclads destined for the Confederate navy. The history of the *Alabama* was a sufficient warning of the consequences if these vessels when completed should actually be turned over to the Confederates, and the State Department was doing everything possible to prevent it. No worse time, in the judgment of Lincoln and Seward, could be chosen for forcing a crisis in the Mexican affair. But the Administration was bitterly assailed because it did not. Congress was very hard to hold. Senator McDougall of California introduced resolutions in which he said that the French intervention was unfriendly to all free institutions everywhere, and "not only unfriendly, but hostile" to this country. He demanded that the United States at once take action to force the withdrawal of the French army. Sumner met the issue frankly. "If these resolutions mean anything, they mean war." "Have we not enough war already on our hands without needlessly and wantonly provoking another?" He urged that the real way to drive out the French was to defeat the rebellion, for after that American influence would be powerful enough to control all matters of importance on the continent. The Senate referred the resolutions to the Foreign Relations Committee and refused to consider them further. In January, 1864, Senator McDougall again forced the issue. He moved that if the French government did not withdraw its troops within a reasonable time after the United States demanded their removal, . . . "on or before the 15th day of March next it will become the duty of the Congress of the United States to declare war against France." The Senate again, on Sumner's initiative, refused to consider this motion.⁹⁰ The House, less tractable, passed unanimously, on April 4, 1864, joint resolutions declaring that the Congress of the United States "are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events transpiring in Mexico, and think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruin of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power."⁹¹ The newspapers in general approved of this action. The *Boston Courier* said,—“The House could act no otherwise, in view of public sentiment throughout this country,” but admitted that the result might be grave.⁹² The *New York Times* said the resolutions expressed “the universal feeling of the people.” The real object of the Mexican expedition, the *Times* continued, was to prevent our expansion. This the Emperor had admitted, and this made it necessary for us to deal with it, though as the Mexican people were all against

the French, the new throne would be a weak one anyway.⁹³ The *Washington Chronicle* said,—“All parties concerned may as well understand that every word of the resolution is pregnant with meaning, and that it is a very mild expression of American sentiment in the premises.”⁹⁴ The *Cheshire Republican* (Keene, N. H.), remarked that it was two years since this scheme, “so derogatory to the interests of this country,” was inaugurated, and this was the first protest which the country had been allowed to hear from any branch of the government.⁹⁵ The *New York World* went farther:—

“It is a direct censure of Secretary Seward and his foreign policy, and probably marks a new era in the political contest. There is a feeling among the more earnest Republicans as well as the Democrats that the country has not had justice done its dignity in Mr. Seward’s foreign policy, and they are of the opinion that the United States is now strong enough to show a bold front to Europe. It may be that upon this foreign-policy question President Lincoln may yet be outgeneraled in the June Baltimore Convention.”⁹⁶

The Monroe Doctrine is “right in principle, right in theory, right in practice, and now that events transpiring in Europe show beyond a doubt that a monarchy is to be established in Mexico . . . it is meet and proper that the United States should speak out the sentiments of its people.”⁹⁷ “As for Frenchmen, who have thrust their hands in every man’s pie all over Europe, it is the height of the ludicrous for them to protest against our deep interest in the maintenance of republicanism on this continent.”⁹⁸

But the Administration was not to be so easily stampeded. On May 23 H. W. Davis of Maryland, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, who had pushed the resolutions of April, read in the House the following excerpt, translated from the *Paris Moniteur*, the official journal:—

“The Emperor’s government has received from that of the United States satisfactory explanations as to the sense and bearing of the resolutions come to by the House of Representatives at Washington relative to Mexico. It is known, besides, that the Senate had indefinitely postponed the examination of that question, to which in any case the Executive would not have given its consent.”

Full of indignation, the House immediately called for the papers to which this passage referred,⁹⁹ and promptly received a group of letters which created a sensation. The first was from Secretary Seward to Dayton, the American Minister in Paris, dated three days after the passage of the resolutions. In this Seward said that the French representative had lost no time in asking him for explanations. “It is hardly necessary,” the letter continued, “after what I have heretofore written with perfect candor for the information of France, to say that this resolution truly interprets the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States in regard to

Mexico. It is, however, another and distinct question whether the United States would think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted by the House of Representatives at this time. This is a practical and purely executive question, and the decision of it belongs constitutionally not to the House of Representatives or even to Congress, but to the President of the United States." The resolution, he explained, was a joint one, which meant that it required the concurrence of the Senate and the President or to be passed over the veto of the latter. "While the President receives the declaration of the House of Representatives with the profound respect to which it is entitled as an exposition of its views on a grave and important subject, he directs that you inform the Government of France that he does not at present contemplate any departure from the policy which this Government has hitherto pursued in regard to the war which exists between France and Mexico . . . and the French Government will be seasonably apprised of any change of policy upon this subject which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt." Next was a letter from Dayton to Seward, dated April 22, before he had received the note quoted above. Dayton here described his interview with Drouyn de l'Huys, immediately after the news of the resolution was received in Paris. The French Minister greeted him with the words,—“Do you bring us peace or bring us war?” explaining that this question was dictated by the tenor of the House resolutions. Dayton told him that he did not think the French need infer that we meant war, since the resolutions contained nothing which had not been told them from the first. “That I had always represented to the Government here that any action on their part interfering with the form of government in Mexico would be looked upon with dissatisfaction in the United States, and they could not expect us to be in haste to acknowledge a monarchical government built upon the foundation of a republic which was our nearest neighbor.” Dayton added that the French Minister seemed to think the resolutions serious, however, and that the Confederate representatives were making all possible use of them to arouse ill feeling. In a later letter he described his presentation of the instructions contained in Seward’s note, and said that “the extreme sensitiveness which was manifested by this Government” when the resolutions were first brought to their notice had to a considerable extent subsided.¹⁰⁰

A storm of criticism followed the publication of these letters. “Seward’s apology,” as it was called, “shows the depth of humility to which this Administration is bringing the nation. . . . The President will manage this affair, and he has concluded to let the Emperor establish as many new monarchies on this continent as he pleases, and let the people help themselves

if they can.”¹⁰¹ The *New York Evening Post* had a hot article on “trucking,” “running after European favor,” and so on. Seward’s letter was written in too much of a hurry. If the French want explanations let them ask for them. The voice of the American people has a right to be heard. It would have been a good thing to let these resolutions make the tour of Europe unaccompanied by any explanations. “It is eminently fit that the world should know what the American people think upon so important a matter as the causeless invasion and overthrow of an American republic by a European despot.”¹⁰² The *New York Herald* said that a good deal of indignation was being expressed, and that the correspondence had placed us in a humiliating position. “With the suppression of the rebellion the United States will assume more than its former position and influence . . . and the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine will be demanded with a unanimity which will sweep from power any party opposing it, as well as the bogus governments which, taking advantage of our domestic difficulties, foreign nations are endeavoring to establish.”¹⁰³ The *Cincinnati Daily Gazette* carried a strong article:—

“In regard to the general question, we will now repeat what we have before declared, that while the very existence of this nation is at stake, it cannot afford to increase the peril by undertaking a war against a great naval and military power to protect another nation; but that does not make it necessary that we should disclaim those national rights and interests in the integrity of a neighboring state; nor that we should encourage its destruction by assuring the aggressor that it is no concern of ours, and that whatever he may do to a neighboring republic, our traditional policy forbids us to protest or interfere. We have no such traditional policy. . . . It was a monstrous falsehood to assert that we have. And to declare it under such circumstances was cowardice and national dishonor. . . . Our policy is known to be exactly the reverse. . . . Since when has it been that Congress, which has power to make war and conclude peace, has no power to declare the opinion of the nation on the destruction of a neighboring state, or on any of our foreign relations? . . . Our rights . . . should not have been disclaimed, whether or not we were prepared to insist on them by war. . . . We could have made our protest, used our moral influence, and reserved our rights, leaving to a more convenient season the asserting of them.”¹⁰⁴

The *National Intelligencer*, however, approved of the Administration’s action,¹⁰⁵ and the *Boston Advertiser* entered upon the defence:—

“There is no term in the English language that precisely corresponds to the French phrase *enfant terrible*, but there are few households, however well ordered, wherein there has not been at some time or other a ridiculous and even unfortunate position of affairs, caused by the indiscretion of a little miscreant, who blurts out some family secret, or reveals the parental comments on a visitor, to the astonishment and confusion of the whole company. Mr. Winter Davis has on more than one oc-

casian assumed the character of the political *enfant terrible*, and having a position on the House Committee of Foreign Relations, his capacity for mischief seems to be limited only by his disposition.

“That the House should have passed its resolution about Mexico, which has caused so much trouble, at this precise moment, instead of hustling it under the table, can only be accounted for by the fact that members, on finding it introduced, felt themselves to be in a dilemma where they must either vote against their convictions, or incur the danger of seriously complicating our relations with France. Many of them doubtless chose the latter alternative in the hope and expectation that the French Emperor ‘did not take the papers’ and might never hear of the resolution; or, if he did, that diplomatic dealing would prevent any real danger. Mr. Seward clearly managed the case as well as anyone could. He told the simple truth, which satisfied the French minister, and the efforts and the hopes of the secessionists in Paris were completely frustrated. . . .

“That sensible legislators should take the present time, when our foreign relations are in so critical a situation . . . to take issue with the State Department and the President on the management of our diplomatic relations with the ablest sovereign in Europe, relating to a matter of great delicacy, and to offensively proclaim what we think among ourselves of his course, and to make threats of future proceedings,—is certainly as poor a specimen of far-reaching prudence and common sense, as could well be exhibited in any government of the least pretension to statesmanship.”¹⁰⁶

This was a Presidential election year, and the party platforms reflect the popular sentiment. The first to appear was that of the “Radicals,” the Republican critics of the Administration, who nominated John C. Fremont as their candidate in a convention held at Cleveland on May 31. Their program included a straight endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine, and a statement that “the establishment of an anti-republican Government on this continent by any foreign power cannot be tolerated.”¹⁰⁷ The next was the “Union” party, meeting at Baltimore, June 7, which renominated Lincoln, and endorsed the Monroe Doctrine in a carefully worded statement which approved the position taken by the Government “that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud” republican institutions on the western continent, and “will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing the peace and independence of their own country” all such efforts. The platform also stated that harmony in national councils was necessary, and that only those who endorsed the principles of the platform were worthy of public confidence and official position.¹⁰⁸ These phrases were hailed as a rebuke to Seward, as they were probably intended to be, and the framers of the platform evidently hoped that a firmer foreign policy would result. The *New York Evening Post* was especially jubilant over this “blow between the eyes” for Secretary Seward,

who had hastened to give explanations to "the French despot and burglar." ¹⁰⁹ Thurlow Weed, in a letter to the *Albany Journal*, replied to this attack:—

"The ultras at the Convention threatened to break out in violent denunciation of the President and Secretary of State on the Mexican question. To prevent such an exhibition, the Committee on resolutions presented the matter in the modified and milder form that appears. But even this concession—or rather the necessity which constrained it—is to be regretted, for in the present aspect of our affairs it is more than folly gratuitously and wantonly to invite foreign hostility. We are in no condition to fight the battles of the Mexican Republic, having our hands full in the effort to preserve our own. Why, then, unnecessarily provoke a war for which we are unprepared? Why does the *Post*, in language and taste unbecoming a decent journal, stigmatize the Emperor of France as a 'burglar'?" ¹¹⁰

Some further efforts were made in Congress to force the hand of the Administration, but to no effect. Lincoln in his letter accepting the nomination had made it quite clear that he intended to retain his freedom of action in the Mexican affair,¹¹¹ and he had sufficient political strength to accomplish this. Henry Winter Davis, in the House, and McDougall, in the Senate, led impassioned discussions and offered resolutions in the summer of 1864, but the only concrete result was the passage in December of a resolution declaring that the House had a constitutional right to express itself with authority in foreign affairs, and that the Executive ought to respect such a deliverance.¹¹² There is abundance of newspaper evidence of the popular feeling, often expressed in a typical American way, as when the *New York Times* headed its description of the arrangements planned by Maximilian for the Mexican throne,—“Good Gracious, Max!” and went on to say that he need not worry about the succession in Mexico,—“there is little chance of his having a throne to leave to anybody!” ¹¹³ Or when the *Folsom Telegraph* told how the French were driven away from Mazatlan by the accurate fire of one gun in the fort, and thought this gun was probably served by some Yankee tar who was giving the Mexicans a little artillery practice and enjoying himself.¹¹⁴

But while all this enthusiasm for the Monroe Doctrine was prevailing among the Federals, and the Napoleonic stock was distinctly below par, what of the situation in the Confederacy, where as we have seen there had been some disposition to support the Mexican enterprise for the sake of the much-needed French aid? A spirit of disappointment and disillusionment, with a touch of bitterness, characterized the Southern newspapers in this later period. Hope that in some way the Mexican imbroglio might turn to the advantage of their cause had not entirely disappeared, but it was fast dying, and the old spirit of national pride was still active. So that it is

clearly to be seen that, save for its possible diplomatic value, the French intervention was really distasteful to the South, and that for the Emperor, who had led them on with fair words, only to fail them again and again, there was an only half-concealed scorn and antagonism. The *Richmond Whig*, in April, 1864, had an article on the Southern Commissioners in France. When they went over, there were cheering indications, said the editor. We hoped much. We believed that Napoleon would seek by recognition to conciliate the Confederacy and bind us to his Mexican plan. Lately we have been hoping that Maximilian would recognize us,—but look at the way Poland has been treated. In the face of this, why should any European nation be supposed to help Freedom, when they stifle it at home? Interest controls them all. Napoleon has successfully “overreached the Confederate States and taken possession of Mexico.” His mediation suggestion was only to find out whether England would fight him. The ruin of America is joy to all Europe.¹¹⁵ “How will Maximilian be received by his American neighbors, and what will be his policy toward them?” asked the *Richmond Sentinel*. European accounts say he intends to be neutral,—“But does this imply a refusal to recognize the Confederation which is his neighbor, and is disposed to be friendly to him, and whose government is older than his own?” The decision may be quickened by the House resolutions. “What they have said—and it is a good deal—they say unanimously. . . . We confess we did not expect so much spirit at Washington. It almost commands respect—for it really reads as if they felt they had something of the dignity of the old United States to maintain.” It is probably only a passing impulse,—but “It is an affront to Napoleon and to his friend and protégé which will necessarily offend both” and may aid the Southern interest.¹¹⁶

Slidell in Paris tried to obtain an interview with Maximilian, but was refused. This news was not particularly palatable to the South. The *Richmond Dispatch* commented on it thus,—

“If true, it is of little moment, but it is very doubtful. The recognition of the Emperor of Mexico is of little moment to us, except as it may involve that of the Emperor of France. Indeed, Maximilian stands more in need of our recognition than we do of his, though a polite bow from either to the other just now could confer no material advantage, and could only give assurance of that sympathy and friendship which we all know must exist by force of circumstances. We all know that that power by whose aid alone Maximilian can become firmly fixed on his throne is decidedly friendly to the Southern Confederacy, and that nothing will grow out of the Franco-Mexican policy that can be prejudicial to us. . . . Even the Yankees cannot chuckle . . . as they know these facts as well as we. Moreover they find enough in their own relations with Mexico to absorb their attention. . . . So the Confederacy is easy,—has nothing to fear from Mexican relations—while the Yankees are neither easy nor inapprehensive.”¹¹⁷

“Who is this Maximilian, and what is his empire, that we should court his notice and invite him to give us so cool a cut? Our government has existed three years; his empire is not quite born. Ours has stood alone, emphatically and gloriously alone,—his cannot walk, and must be carried for many a day in the nurse’s arms. We have sustained, for three years, the shock and tempest of war, so potent and terrible, that the one-tenth part of it, directed against him, would sweep him, crown and all, back into the Atlantic Ocean. . . . It is very much more important to the Empire to be recognized by the Confederacy than for the Confederacy to be recognized by the Empire. . . . The world should not be taught by our own agents to regard the Confederacy as a drowning man catching at straws. . . . On the whole, even should it be true that Mr. Slidell has exposed us to a rebuff, it will do us no harm to be thus taught, once again, that we have no reliance in the world but our own unconquerable will to be free, the blessing of Providence, and the edge of the sword.”¹¹⁸

Discussing the House resolutions of April 4, the *Richmond Dispatch* said that if the North had not driven the South from the Union, the present humiliating situation would never have arisen:—By the aid of Southern troops and Southern generals the Mexican War was won. If the South could be conquered, and the aid of Southern troops secured, it might be done again, but the very existence of the Confederacy protects Maximilian. Napoleon has seen his opportunity in a divided United States. “Had the old Union remained entire, neither he nor any other European nation would have dared to engage in such an enterprise. By forcing the Confederates into war for their own protection, the Yankees threw away forever the only chance they ever had of seizing upon the rich spoils of the Mexican Republic . . . threw away the whole vast continent, from Texas to Cape Horn, which, had they never been checked, they might have occupied in the course of time.” Now, the South will not fight for the Monroe Doctrine. It may make an alliance with Maximilian, “with Yankee Doodle, never!”¹¹⁹ The *Sentinel* was bitter over the ease with which Maximilian had obtained recognition from European powers, compared with the difficulties met by the Confederacy. “Yet this going-to-be-king over a country which he has never seen, and which is at war against him, is recognized without a day’s delay, by the powers of Europe, by the same powers that hold our recognition as inadmissible and improper.”¹²⁰ “As respects the Yankee race,” said the *Whig*, “the Confederate States and Mexico have a common fate. If we should be beaten, the conqueror would strike on southward . . . till Mexico too should yield to his sway. If Maximilian stands aloof from us coldly, it is cowardice. We fight his battles with our own. He is bound by moral obligations, honor, and safety to recognize us at once, and give all the influence he can on European monarchies to the same end. More we do not ask. Less would be impolitic and unmanly.”¹²¹

The *Richmond Examiner* of June 1 in a very able article reviewed the foreign policy of the Confederate States. The *Examiner* spoke of the "hallucination" of French friendship which led to the belief that the vessels built in France would be allowed to sail. "Innocent people in Richmond had kept saying to themselves and to one another, over and over again, that the French Emperor loved us—at any rate that our friendship was necessary to his Mexican scheme of empire, and that the recognition of the Confederacy ought to form, might, could, would, or should form a part of the security of Maximilian's throne." But after Dayton gave his proofs that the shipbuilding was known to the United States, construction was abruptly halted. The Emperor has never been sincere. He has meant simply to alarm the United States into compliance with his plans by threatening them with a formidable Confederate navy, but he does not wish a real break with the North, which might be troublesome,—“So Mr. Dayton is appeased . . . our ships lie moored by head and stern in the Loire and the Garonne;—Maximilian refuses an audience to Mr. Slidell;—and the Emperor Napoleon is enabled to assure the Government of Washington, and with perfect truth too, that he never had any idea of recognizing the Confederacy at all!”¹²² And the *Charleston Courier*, writing in the same strain, ended,—“Our ships there have not been allowed to be finished, and are sold. The *Rappahannock*, so far considered beyond their recognizance, is cooped up in Cherbourg and not allowed to leave. So much for Louis Napoleon's sympathy!”¹²³

In the winter of 1864–5 Francis Blair, one of the well-known political leaders in the North, believed that the Mexican question could be used to bring about the end of the war, by persuading both sides to agree to an armistice, during which a joint expedition into Mexico should be made, to drive out the French. He asked permission of Lincoln to bring this plan to the attention of President Davis, and was given a passport through the lines. Davis heard the scheme with some interest, and it was made the excuse for arranging a conference at Hampton Roads, when Lincoln and Seward met three Southern commissioners and discussed terms of peace. The Mexican scheme, however, was not taken seriously by either side.¹²⁴

The Southern writers judged correctly when they said that the empire of Maximilian would not long outlast their own. As the Civil War drew to an end and men had time to think of other things, the demand for the expulsion of the French became more and more insistent.¹²⁵ The only question was as to the method. The military men—Grant, Sheridan, Schofield,—and many of the people, wished the army to do it, and in spite of Seward's efforts to maintain neutrality, the army did undoubtedly do

much to hasten the departure of the French.¹²⁶ Another favorite idea was that the war veterans should emigrate to Mexico, enlist in the Liberal army, and accomplish the desired end without involving the government in any diplomatic difficulties. It was believed that many Confederates as well as Northerners would be drawn into such a scheme, and recruiting for this purpose was actually under way in several cities before it was stopped by lack of funds and by a government warning that neutrality would be enforced.¹²⁷ Some fear was expressed that escaping Confederates would join the French, but though undoubtedly some did cross the border with this intention, the precarious situation of Maximilian was so evident as to dissuade most from such a plan. The most serious move of the sort was a scheme sponsored by Ex-Senator Gwin, to colonize the district of Sonora under the protection of the French army, and develop the mines in that district. This idea appealed to the French as offering an opportunity to get a permanent interest in this state, and as opening a possibility of improving the financial condition of the Mexican Empire, but it was undertaken too late.¹²⁸ Seward saw very clearly that with patience it would be possible now to dislodge the French by diplomatic means without, by an immediate ultimatum, forcing them into a position in which their pride would make it necessary for them to resist. Many of the soberer citizens were with him,¹²⁹ Congress as before tried to compel immediate action,¹³⁰ but Seward finally had the satisfaction of seeing his course justified by results, and the French withdrawn from Mexico without a diplomatic break with this country.¹³¹ With the details of this long diplomatic contest, which lasted almost from the beginning of the Civil War to the death of Maximilian in the summer of 1867, we are not concerned in this study. But so ended the attempt to reëstablish the French colonial power on the American continent. For Napoleon, the enterprise had been one of his dearest dreams, and its failure was a large factor in his final ruin. To Americans, the Mexican scheme was the climax of a long series of aggressions carried on by an imperial usurper and despot, under whose leadership our "ancient ally" successfully blocked our ambitions in the Caribbean, and made more difficult the preservation of the Union. Americans found it hard to forget that in our darkest hour, France offered us jealousy and intrigue, instead of friendship.

NOTES AND SOURCES

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Document above cited, and *Senate Executive Document* No. 7, 32nd Congress, Special Session.

² *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 32nd Congress, 184-186.

³ *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 22, 1851.

⁴ *New Hampshire Statesman* (Concord), Dec. 11, 1852.

⁵ *Boston Courier*, Dec. 6, 1852.

⁶ *New York Weekly Day Book*, Dec. 11, 1852.

⁷ *New York Herald*, Nov. 27, 1852; see also *Connecticut Courant*, Jan. 8, 1853.

⁸ *Harper's Monthly*, V: 636-645, 1852; *Alexandria Gazette*, Dec. 25, 1852. (Similar); *New York Atlas*, Jan. 18, 1853.

⁹ *New York Sun*, Jan. 8, 1852; also *Newark Daily Advertiser*, Dec. 2, 1852; *Democratic Review*, XXV: 403-405.

¹⁰ *San Francisco Herald*, Jan. 17, 1853.

¹¹ *New York Tribune*, cited in *Arkansas Whig*, Dec. 30, 1852.

¹² John Greenleaf Whittier, *Poetical Works*, 198. "The Peace of Europe." 1852.

¹³ James Russell Lowell, *Poetical Works*, 382, 270. See also his *Political Essays*, 128-9.

¹⁴ Wilson, *Life of Dana*, 398. Courtesy of Harper and Brothers, Publishers, New York.

¹⁵ *Atlantic Monthly*, IV: 384. (Sept., 1859.)

¹⁶ *Ib.*, VII: 682-697. (June, 1861.)

¹⁷ *Appleton's Journal*, I: 114, 245, 277. (1869). Series on "French Morals and Manners" by Edwin Lee Leon.

¹⁸ *The Education of Henry Adams, An Autobiography*, 96.

¹⁹ *Atlantic Monthly*, V: 257-271. March, 1860.

Typical articles on the French are those on "Life in Paris," *Harper's Monthly*, V: 748-763; VI: 195-199, 488-493; VII: 381-89; VIII: 305-315; IX: 671-674. Also those on "Louis Napoleon," *Ib.*, XV: 208-214, and the "Empress Eugénie," XXVII: 409-12.

²⁰ *Senate Executive Documents*, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, No. 1; *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 6, 1851; Richardson, *Messages*, V: 117-118; Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, 369; Latané, *Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America*, 108-113; Callahan, *Cuba*, 224-231; James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, I: 216-222; McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, VIII: 142-144.

²¹ *Senate Executive Documents*, 2nd Session, 32nd Congress, Doc. 13; *National Intelligencer*, Jan. 5, 1853; Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, 370-374; Rhodes, I: 294-296; Latané, 113-116; Callahan, *Cuba*, 231-237; Richardson, *Messages*, V: 165; Hart, *Monroe Doctrine*, 131.

²² Mary Treudley, *The United States and Santo Domingo*, 238-243; F. L. Paxson, *A Tripartite Intervention in Haiti, 1851*. University of Colorado Studies, I: 4, 323-330; Kraus, *Monroedoktrin*, 288-9; *Senate Executive Documents*, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, No. 12; 32nd Congress, 1st Session, No. 112

²³ *Los Angeles Star*, Oct. 30, 1852.

²⁴ *National Intelligencer*, Jan. 1, Jan. 5, Jan. 6, 1853; *Boston Courier*, Dec. 7, 1852; *Alexandria Gazette*, Dec. 15, Dec. 18, 1852; *New York Weekly Day Book*, Jan. 14, 1853. (Whig papers.)

²⁵ *American Whig Review*, Dec., 1852.

²⁶ *Mississippi Free Trader* (Natchez), Dec. 22, 1852, Dec. 29, 1852; *Concord Patriot*, Dec. 1, 1852; Callahan, *Cuba*, 238-259; Rhodes, I: 384-7.

- ²⁷ *Newark Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 7, 1853.
- ²⁸ *New York Herald*, Dec. 6, 1851.
- ²⁹ *Ib.*, Dec. 4, Dec. 18, 1852. See also a strong article in *New York Sun*, quoted with an editorial on the Sonora incident, in *Stiff's Radical Reformer* (Gadsden, Ala.), Feb. 26, 1853. *Mobile Herald and Tribune*, in *Ib.*, Dec. 4, 1852; *Mississippi Free Press* (Natchez), Jan. 8, 1853.
- ³⁰ *Democratic Review*, XXX: 234-252, XXXI: 88-96, 443-456, 624-628.
- ³¹ *Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 140. (Dec. 23, 1852); *New Orleans Picayune*, Jan. 2, 1853.
- ³² *Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 139-140. (Dec. 23, 1852); *National Intelligencer*, Jan. 22, 1853, report of speech of Jan. 15.
- ³³ Speech of Jan. 25, 1853, *National Intelligencer*, Feb. 1.
- ³⁴ *Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 146.
- ³⁵ Speech of Jan. 26, *National Intelligencer*, Feb. 3, 1853; Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, I: 467-469; Seward, *Works*, G. Baker, ed., III: 605-618.
- ³⁶ *Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 143.
- ³⁷ *New York Weekly Mirror*, Jan. 7, 1853; *New York Spectator*, Dec. 7, 1852; *Newark Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 6, 1853; *Providence Journal*, Jan. 7; *Arkansas Whig*, Jan. 27; *New York Atlas*, Dec. 16, 1852; *New York Tribune*, Jan. 7, 1853; *New York Times*, Jan. 7; *New York Express*, Jan. 7; *New York Courier and Enquirer*, Jan. 8; *New York Herald*, Jan. 7, 1853, Dec. 25, 1852; *Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 6, 1853; *Harper's Magazine*, Feb., 1853.
- ³⁸ *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 24; *Connecticut Courant*, Dec. 18; *Republic*, Dec. 18; *Worcester Transcript*, Dec. 16, 1852.
- ³⁹ *Washington Union*, Dec. 17; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Dec. 21, 1852; *San Francisco Herald*, Jan. 23, 1853. This paper dislikes the Mexicans and has no objection to the Sonora raid.
- ⁴⁰ *Congressional Globe*, Appendix, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 73-76; *New York Spectator*, Dec. 30, 1852.
- ⁴¹ *New York Herald*, Dec. 11, 1852.
- ⁴² *Union*, Jan. 5, 1853.
- ⁴³ *Boston Transcript*, Dec. 11, 1852.
- ⁴⁴ *New York Times*, cited in *State Capital Reporter* (Concord), Dec. 24, 1852.
- ⁴⁵ *Providence Journal*, Dec. 14, 1852.
- ⁴⁶ *Newark Daily Advertiser*, cited in *National Intelligencer*, Dec. 14, 1852. Also *Connecticut Courant*, Dec. 18, 1852; *Worcester Transcript*, Dec. 21, 1852; *New York Atlas*, Dec. 12, 1852.
- ⁴⁷ *Treudley*, 243-252.
- ⁴⁸ *Latané*, 117-134; *Callaban*, 256-328.
- ⁴⁹ *National Intelligencer*, Nov. 21, 1854; Richardson, *Messages*, V: 278, 302, 335.
- ⁵⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, 483.
- ⁵¹ *Congressional Globe*, 33rd Congress, 2nd Session, 826.
- ⁵² *Congressional Globe*, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, 484; *Ib.*, 33rd Congress, 2nd Session, 826-8; *Union*, Mar. 18, 1854.
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- ⁵⁴ *New York Atlas*, Dec. 10, 1854.
- ⁵⁵ Carpenter, *Hawaii*, 102-105.
- ⁵⁶ *Congressional Globe*, Appendix, 32nd Congress, 1st Session, 1084-1085.
- ⁵⁷ *Congressional Globe*, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, 146; *National Intelligencer*, Dec.

- 2, 1854. For the Hawaiian question in full, Carpenter, *Hawaii*, 95-105; Moore, *International Arbitrations*, I: 447-483; Richardson, *Messages*, V: 120; Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, 313-314, 517-522; Fish, *American Diplomacy*, 403.
- ⁵⁸ Bassett, 521, 589, 643; Schouler, VI: 114-122, 269-274; T. K. Lothrop, *Life of W. H. Seward*, 290-4, 296-7, 290-300, 313-317, 350-351; Gideon Welles, *Diary*, I: 494-5, 339-40.
- ⁵⁹ Motley, *Correspondence*, II: 53; *Motley and His Friends*, 133-138.
- ⁶⁰ *Richmond Daily Examiner* (Confederate), cited in *Charleston Daily Courier* (Confederate), May 16, 1863.
- ⁶¹ *Mobile Evening News* (Confederate), July 10, 1862.
- ⁶² *National Intelligencer* (Union), Dec. 2, 1862.
- ⁶³ Seward, *Works*, V: 376-381; Welles, *Diary*, I: 235-6; Storey, *Sumner*, 241-242; Lothrop, *Seward*, 353-355; *Reports of Committee of Foreign Relations, 1789-1901*, VI: 219-221.
- ⁶⁴ Horace Greeley, *The American Conflict*, II: 484.
- ⁶⁵ *Philadelphia Evening Journal*, Jan. 2, 1863, and citing *Washington Republican* and *New York Tribune*.
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- ⁶⁹ *North Carolina Standard* (Confederate), Oct. 23, 1863.
- ⁷⁰ *Richmond Whig*, Mar. 5, 1863.
- ⁷¹ Pierce Butler, *Life of Judah P. Benjamin*, 305-307.
- ⁷² Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, II: 369-371.
- ⁷³ *House Executive Documents*, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, No. 54: 530.
- ⁷⁴ Nicolay and Hay, VI: 30-48; VII: 396-405; Lothrop, *Seward*, 388-392; Bancroft, *Seward*, II: 419-442; Schurz, *Reminiscences*, II: 280-283, 288-292; Storey, *Sumner*, 220-221; Schouler, VI: 260-269, 427-429; Latané, 221-247; Henderson, 71; Rhodes, IV: 345-6; McMaster, VIII: 440 ff.; F. H. Seward, *Life of W. H. Seward*, III: 85.
- ⁷⁵ *National Intelligencer*, Nov. 30, 1861.
- ⁷⁶ *Ib.*, June 5, June 19, Oct. 21, Oct. 30, 1862.
- ⁷⁷ *Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman*, I: 369; See also a very flattering article on Maximilian, praising his friendly feeling for the United States, and saying that if a foreign prince is to be imposed on Mexico, "no more conscientious man, no better neighbor, could have been selected," by F. L. Sarmiento in *Harper's Magazine*, 27: 831-834, (1863).
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- ⁸⁰ *Boston Post*, cited in *Maryland Republican*, May 10, 1862.
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- ⁸⁴ Welles, *Diary*, I: 385.
- ⁸⁵ Charles Sumner, *Works*, VII: 367-373. Article by Sumner on Slidell in *Atlantic Monthly*, VIII: 36-38, (1863), also illustrates his attitude toward the French. Storey, *Sumner*, 250-253.
- ⁸⁶ "The French Struggle for Naval and Colonial Power," G. Reynolds, *Atlantic Monthly*, XII: 626-636. *Hastings* (Minnesota) *Independent*, Dec. 3, 1863, against the French in Mexico.

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- ⁸⁸ Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, VIII; 268; Butler, *Benjamin*, 294-299; *New York Herald*, Feb. 13, 1863; *New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1863; Jas. M. Mason, *Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence*, Virginia Mason, ed., 552-560.
- ⁸⁹ *Richmond Examiner*, cited in *Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register*, (Confederate).
- ⁹⁰ Lothrop, *Seward*, 392; Storey, *Sumner*, 238-9; *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, 694-5; Edward McPherson, *Political History of the United States of America during the Great Rebellion*, 348-9; Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, VII: 407-410.
- ⁹¹ Lothrop, *Seward*, 392-395; *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 38th Congress, 1408.
- ⁹² *Boston Courier*, Apr. 7, 1864.
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- ⁹⁵ *Cheshire Republican*, Apr. 13, 1864.
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- ⁹⁸ *New York Evening Post*, May 11, 1864.
- ⁹⁹ *Congressional Globe*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, 2427.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, 2475. The French Government shortly after published the substance of Seward's explanation in a circular which was sent to all French agents in foreign ports. *Richmond Despatch*, June 25, 1864, cited this in full. *McPherson*, 354.
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- ¹⁰⁵ *National Intelligencer*, June 2, 1864.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Boston Advertiser* (Semi-weekly), June 11, 1864.
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- ¹⁰⁸ *Ib.*, 406-7; Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, IX: 69-71.
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- ¹¹⁰ *Albany Evening Journal*, June 18, 1864.
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- ¹¹² *House of Representatives, Reports of Committees*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, II: No. 129; *Senate Executive Documents*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, No. 11; *Congressional Globe*, 38th Congress, 1st Session, 3339-40, 3359-60, 2458, 3499-3500; 38th Congress, 2nd Session, 48, 50, 52, 55, 65-67.
- ¹¹³ *New York Times*, Apr. 30, 1864.
- ¹¹⁴ *Folsom Telegraph* (Cal.), May 7, 1864. Other typical articles, *G. Reynolds*, in *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1864, on Mexico; *New York Times*, Apr. 15, Apr. 22, 1864; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Apr. 4, Apr. 30; *Richmond Sentinel*, Apr. 28, reporting speech of United States Military Governor of Texas; *Philadelphia North American*, June 21; *New York Atlas*, Dec. 17, Dec. 24, 1864.
- ¹¹⁵ *Richmond Whig*, Apr. 6, 1864.
- ¹¹⁶ *Richmond Sentinel*, Apr. 11, 1864.
- ¹¹⁷ *Richmond Dispatch*, Apr. 12, 1864.
- ¹¹⁸ *Richmond Examiner*, cited in *New York Weekly Post*, Apr. 27, 1864.
- ¹¹⁹ *Richmond Dispatch*, Apr. 14, Apr. 16, June 25, 1864.

- ¹²⁰ *Richmond Sentinel*, Apr. 20, 1864.
- ¹²¹ *Richmond Whig*, Apr. 28, 1864.
- ¹²² *Richmond Examiner*, June 1, 1864.
- ¹²³ *Charleston Tri-weekly Courier*, Dec. 13, 1864.
- ¹²⁴ Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, X: 93-100, 164; Alexander H. Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the War between the States*, 11: 601-604, 608, 618; Davis, *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, 11: 612-620; *Daily Confederate* (Raleigh, N. C.), Feb. 13, 1865; *Schouler*, VI: 535-537.
- ¹²⁵ *Philadelphia North American*, Feb. 17, 1865.
- ¹²⁶ Welles, *Diary*, 11: 317, 332-3, 338, 367, 485-6, 622-626, 648; Lieut. Gen. John M. Schofield, *Forty-Six Years in the Army*, 378-393; Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs* 11: 210, 213-228; Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 11: 545-547; *Alexandria Gazette*, May 13, 1865; *Knoxville Whig*, citing *Albany Evening Journal*, May 24, 1865; *New York Evening Post*, Dec. 21, 1865.
- ¹²⁷ *Mobile Evening News*, citing *New York Herald*, May 27, 1865; *St. Louis Democrat*, May 9; *Baltimore Clipper*, May 5, 1865, May 13, citing *Philadelphia Inquirer*; *Philadelphia Press*, May 4; *New York Evening Post*, May 6, 9, 10; *New York Daily News*, May 6; *New York Atlas*, May 13; *Alexandria Gazette*, May 22; Alexander K. McClure, *Recollections of Half a Century*, 75-8.
- ¹²⁸ *National Intelligencer*, May 6, 11; *New York Times*, May 1; *Baltimore Clipper*, Jan. 31, 1865; *New York World*, June 19; *Dr. Gwin's Plan for Colonization*, Evan J. Coleman, *Overland Monthly*, XV11: 497-519, 593-606; XV111: 203-213.
- ¹²⁹ Schurz, *Reminiscences*, 11: 301-302; *National Intelligencer*, May 12, 1865; *New York Times*, May 9, 1865; *California Weekly Alta*, Aug. 19, 1865.
- ¹³⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 17, 19, 22, 70, 77, 106, 170, 811, 1068, 3217-3218, 39th Congress, 2nd Session, 267, 458-459, 487; Richardson, *Messages*, VI: 438, 455-6.
- ¹³¹ Fuller accounts of later stages of French attitude toward the United States and of the Mexican affair, as well as of the American feeling and action in regard to these incidents,—*Rhodes*, VI: 388-390; Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, VII: 405-423; VIII: 266-280; *Schouler*, VI: 429-435; *Latané*, 247-265; Bigelow, *France and the Confederate Navy*; James D. Bulloch, *The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe*; J. M. Callahan, *The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy; Messages and Documents of the Presidents, 1862-3*, Part I: 307-441, "France and the Confederacy"; *Messages and Documents, Department of State, 1864-5*, Part III: 1-254, "France and the Confederacy, Mexico"; *Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863*, Part 11: 689-762, same, continued; *Senate Executive Documents, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, 1: No. 11*; 30th Congress, 1st Session, 1: Nos. 5, 6, 8, 11: Nos. 54, 56; Thurlow Weed, *Memoirs*, 11: 390-399; Lothrop, *Seward*, 394; William Cullen Bryant, *Prose Works*, Parke Godwin, ed., 11: 237-241; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 1, 1867; *Philadelphia North American*, July 4, 1867. Bryant was very bitter in regard to Maximilian, whom he characterized as "Napoleon's hired assassin," and whose tragic death he did not condemn, since it should "serve as a lesson to future invaders of unoffending republics, and teach the monarchs of the Old World to respect the liberties of the New."

CHAPTER 6

The Franco-Prussian War

THE reign of Napoleon III drew toward the end. Observers on the continent and in the United States recognized the insecurity of the Empire,—recognized that the flame of its brilliance flickered. Yet none might guess how soon it would be spent. The Napoleonic tradition shielded absolutism. The material prosperity of France mocked at criticism. Administrative concessions served to placate democratic instincts, and the Imperial rule was endorsed in a plebiscite by an overwhelming majority. American sentiment remained suspicious and critical. John Hay, then Secretary of the American Legation in Paris, wrote in his diary, August, 1865, burning verses expressing his aversion and scorn.

“As Freedom with eyes aglow
Smiled through her childbirth pain
How was the mother to know
That her woe and travail were vain?
.

The treasure of Forty-Eight
A lurking jail-bird stole.
She can but watch and wait
As the swift, sure seasons roll.
.

And when in God’s good hour
Comes the time of the brave and true
Freedom again shall rise
With a blaze in her awful eyes
That shall wither the robber-power
As the sun now dries the dew.”

And again:—

“The Charlatan whom the Frenchmen loathe
And the cockneys all admire.
Afraid to fight and afraid to fly
He cowers in an abject shiver;
—The people will come to their own at last,—
God is not mocked forever!”

His description of Napoleon is singularly vivid.

“Short and stocky, he moves with a queer, sidelong gait, like a gouty crab; a man so wooden-looking that you would expect his voice to come rasping out like a watchman’s rattle. A complexion like candle tallow,—marked for Death, whenever Death wants him. . . . Eyes sleepily watchful,—furtive,—stealthy,—rather ignoble; like servants looking out of dirty windows and saying ‘nobody at home’ and lying as they say it.”

In 1868 he wrote,—

“France still lies in her comatose slumber,—but she talks in her sleep and murmurs the Marseillaise. And God has made her ruler blind drunk, that his Helot antics may disgust the world with despotism.”¹

Shortly after this Hay came home, and in 1870 he joined the staff of the *New York Tribune*, writing editorials on European affairs. He “particularly excelled in the castigation of Napoleon III, for whom he cherished an unquenchable loathing.”²

John L. Motley, then United States Minister at Vienna, wrote in 1866 of the

“Prince of Darkness, who for the time being has thought proper to assume the appearance of a Sovereign of France and to inhabit the Tuileries.”³

Jefferson Davis, released from prison and travelling to regain his health, was invited in 1868 to meet the Emperor and Empress, but refused, feeling that Napoleon had not been sincere with the South. Davis “did not wish to say anything uncivil” but could not meet him with cordiality.⁴

This critical spirit, as always, was extended to include the French people as well as their ruler. Henry James, passing through on his way to Italy, dismissed them briefly as “poco simpatica,”⁵ and Lydia Maria Child justified George Sand by saying that she was too sincere to draw anything but “true pictures of life as she has seen it in that false, corrupted France.”⁶

And yet, more and more Americans were falling under the spell of Paris. Some were tourists or casual visitors; others became for a longer or shorter time members of the “American colony.” The Paris Exposition of 1867 drew many visitors, who spoke with enthusiasm of the cultural and scientific achievements of the French. As the arbiter of taste, the cultural guide, French leadership was becoming noticeable.⁷ One of the kindest of critics was John Sherman, brother of the General. He was at this time Chairman of the Committee on Finance in the House, and a well-known authority on financial matters. He described the French as mercurial, tasteful, and economical, able to live comfortably on half of what an American would need.

“It is impossible,” he says, “for an American to visit Paris without enjoyment and instruction. The people of Paris are always polite, especially to

Americans. The debt of gratitude for the assistance of France in our War of the Revolution is never forgotten by a true American. . . . The Americans are liberal visitors in Paris. They spend their money freely, join heartily in festivities, and sympathize in the success and prosperity of the French republic. If I was not an American I would certainly be a Frenchman. I have visited Paris three times, remaining in it more than a month at each visit, and always have been received with civility and kindness. . . . Science and art have here reached their highest development. We may copy all these, but it will require a century to develop like progress in America.”⁸

When the war between France and Prussia broke out, in July, 1870, it was officially stated at once that the United States would remain neutral. The formal proclamation of neutrality was not, however, issued until August 22.⁹ Unofficial and informal statements emanating from members of the government scarcely conformed to the idea of neutrality. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, was quoted in the newspapers as condemning France.¹⁰ When the declaration of war was announced in the House of Representatives, there was applause, apparently in favor of Prussia.¹¹ President Grant was openly pro-German. At a meeting of the Cabinet on August 5 he instructed Assistant Secretary of State J. C. B. Davis to inform M. Berthemy, the French Minister, that it was the intention of the United States to maintain strict neutrality, but “that he must not be surprised if a strong feeling manifested itself among the people in favor of the Prussians; the people had good memories, and they remembered that while the Germans sympathized with the Union and took its bonds freely during the war, the French people had manifested no sympathy for the Union but had negotiated a loan for the Rebels, and the French Government had sent an expedition into Mexico which had been construed by the people as an act hostile to this country.”¹²

At this same Cabinet meeting news of a French defeat was received. It “did not seem to make anyone less cheerful,” said Mr. Davis.¹³ The influence of George Bancroft, the American Minister at Berlin, was steadily and very actively exerted in favor of the Prussian cause.¹⁴ The government, however, carefully and firmly resisted the attempts by Bancroft and by the German Minister, Baron Gerolt, to bring about a formal alignment on the side of Germany. For example, Secretary Fish did instruct Minister Washburne, in Paris, to use his good offices to get the decree of expulsion of Germans from France revoked or mitigated in the interests of humanity, if possible, but at the same time warned him not to protest formally, as France was entirely within her legal rights. Baron Gerolt was informed of this action, and asked the United States to make a public statement

in regard to it. This was promptly refused, in the interests of neutrality. When the Baron persisted, Assistant Secretary Davis told him that he would not permit any foreign minister to advise as to the management of the Department of State . . . "that it was for this government to judge whether it would or would not make public its acts."¹⁵

Major-General Dix, who was the American Minister to France from 1866 to 1869, had been friendly to Napoleon III, saying that he had always found him liberal and just, and believed him to be patriotic. He thought him a great deal better than the ministers who surrounded him.¹⁶ In this judgment Elihu B. Washburne, the next Minister, concurred. Washburne deprecated the war, and condemned Napoleon's eagerness to maintain his dynasty and to win prestige, but said that if the Emperor had been left to himself war would have been averted. "Courtiers and adventurers brought it on, quite unnecessarily."¹⁷

At the request of Prussia and of other German states, the American legation took over the protection of their interests in France during the war. This was a difficult task, but Mr. Washburne undertook it with such goodwill toward both sides, so much tact and good judgment, that he was able to conduct it to the entire satisfaction of both the Germans and the French.¹⁸

General Phil. Sheridan was attached to the Prussian army as an observer during the war. Sheridan, in his *Memoirs*, said that when he applied to President Grant for permission to go, Grant asked him which side he wished to study. He replied that he wished to be attached to the Germans, "for the reason that I thought more could be seen with the successful side, and the indications pointed to the defeat of the French. My choice evidently pleased him greatly, as he had the greatest contempt for Louis Napoleon and had always denounced him as a usurper and a charlatan."¹⁹ Washburne, however, said that he received instructions from the State Department saying that Sheridan wished to be attached to the French army, and directing him to try to arrange for this; and that not till after this permission was refused by the French government, was Bancroft in Berlin asked to use his good offices to obtain the privilege from the Germans.²⁰ At any rate, Sheridan's reports are all very friendly to the Prussians. At the opening of the war Louis Napoleon was in the opinion of many Americans the perpetrator of a crime, the chief villain in the piece. This was due to a firm conviction in the minds of many that, as Lowell put it, he was "an impudent scoundrel," wantonly selfish, and utterly unscrupulous.²¹ W. Stillman wrote a letter for the *Boston Post* describing his own experiences in diplomatic service in Europe, and declaring that wherever there was an opportunity for intrigue and for despotism, there

had appeared "this devil's deputy," who instigated insurrections, and then abandoned them as soon as his own purpose was served.

"Everywhere an intriguer, a murderer in his own country and a butcher in any other, a breeder of wars and the cause of debts and burdens unknown in all past time . . . our own worst foe in our days of trouble; always the friend of insurrection, but the foe of benevolent insurrection." . . . America should "throw its utmost moral influence against him, and in favor of that Germany which was our honest and unfaltering friend when we had none other sincere . . . not as against the French, but as against the despot who has for nearly twenty years played with the blood of nations and pushed back civilization for the gratification of his personal ambitions." ²²

The *New York Independent* said:—

"His line ought to cease at once and forever. Napoleonism belongs to the past. The future has need for a different type of statesmanship. . . . Icy, sleepless, cruel, tyrannous, he knows no human emotion save ambition. . . . Never in the history of nations did a monarch draw a sword so causelessly, so absolutely without pretext, so manifestly against reason and right, as France in challenging Prussia." ²³

He "hates liberty, has suppressed the press, has frequently forsworn his oaths,"—and the "average American loves justice, and whatever his own shortcomings may be, he has a righteous contempt for deceit and double-dealing in others." He is a crafty, treacherous, insolent ruffian, who has betrayed the republic and bullied other nations. He has secretly cherished this design against Prussia for years. "His whole career has been that of a tyrant." He represents "a past of crime and a future of despotism." His demands on Prussia are "sheer impertinence," "insufferably arrogant", "an audacious example of his unscrupulous and domineering character," ²⁴ "this great intermeddler and international gamecock stands in need of a wholesome lesson from somebody." ²⁵ The war is "the greatest crime of the age." "France should be severely chastised for precipitating it." "The powers should unite to dethrone the criminal who is responsible for it and either exile or cage him." "What is our civilization worth if one man can flood a continent with carnage on a pretext so slight that there is an actual disagreement as to what it is?" ²⁶

Not all critics were content with abuse. Some sought to analyze Napoleon's motives, and give explanations of his "will to war." He had brought on the struggle, many thought, because of the precarious situation of his government, which made the restoration of his prestige through a successful war necessary, both for his own safety and for the maintenance of the succession. One of Thomas Nast's cartoons depicts the French throne with bayonet spikes bristling in the seat and through the back and sides, and

labeled "The Seat of War." The legend runs, "Napoleon trying to seat the Prince Imperial." ²⁷

The desire for war, as the only means by which he might be able to carry out his long-cherished plan to enlarge the Empire through the addition of the Rhine Provinces, was deemed by some an important element in the Emperor's decisions. He had tried to accomplish this expansion by diplomatic negotiations, and had failed.²⁸ Emphasis was laid by others upon his fear and jealousy of the growing unity of Germany, and his anxiety to maintain the balance of power in Europe. "Napoleon," said the *Washington National Republican*, "has always recognized that France has ever profited from the division in Germany. And now that signs of reviving unity are appearing there, he wishes to destroy Prussia, for Prussia is Germany. We apprehend that . . . he is already too late. The Germans are already a unit, and their cause being just and holy, the God of battles will not forsake them." ²⁹

The *San Francisco Monitor* published an article headed "American Ingratitude," and regretting that so many American journals should seem to take the Prussian side. The next day the *Morning Bulletin* of the same city replied with a summary of the situation in which it denied that Americans were ungrateful for the help given us in Revolutionary times, and added,—“But they cannot sympathize with Napoleon, whose selfish ambition overthrew the Republic of 1848, which he had sworn to defend; whose intrigues have kept Europe in a ferment and converted it into an armed camp; who sought to persuade England into a recognition of the Southern Confederacy; who tried to plant Imperialism in our sister republic of Mexico as another menace to the United States; and who is believed to have precipitated the pending war mainly to advance the prestige of his dynasty. They admire his able and astute administration, and some of them think that, with the recent modifications, his government may be better suited to the present conditions of the French than republican forms. Yet they regard him as the author of a war which shocks humanity.” Americans, the *Bulletin* went on to say, feel sympathy with German unity, and for this reason would be glad to see Prussia hold her own, but we are not passionately partizan. We do not credit all that is charged against Napoleon, and do not wish to see the gallant people whom he rules humiliated. We have ourselves too lately known the horrors of war to rejoice in it, and we are bound to both countries by ties of friendship.³⁰

Very few voices were at this time raised in the Emperor's favor. A few, however, did, as the *Bulletin* suggested, praise his success as a ruler of

France, while condemning his character and principles. The *Atlanta Daily New Era* said:—

“He has had one object always in view—himself; he has never scrupled to employ any means, however fraudulent and violent, which enabled him to realize his darling dream of power. When it was popular he was a Republican; when it was necessary he was a liar and a murderer; when policy required it he was a despot, and when the Genius of Progress descended upon his Empire . . . he yielded . . . with the grace of a courtier and the benevolence, almost, of a kind and loving father whose only desire was the welfare of his children. . . .

“He disappointed his people in their political hopes, but he gave to them the best government for France. He knew that a French Republic was a fanciful and flimsy fabric, and so he gave the people an Empire. . . . Amid all the wrong, the treacheries and the inconsistencies of his career, one fact looms up,—he has, in serving his own selfish interests, always advanced the material interests of France. . . . While Napoleon lives, France is a thing of life and power. When he dies, perhaps another reign of terror will follow.”³¹

American sympathy in the war was not, however, based wholly upon the current opinion of Louis Napoleon. Other considerations weighed largely, and some of these are typically American. War without just cause, it was argued, is always to be deplored. In this case France was held to be the aggressor, and she must then necessarily be in the wrong. We sympathized with “the party that tried to avoid the fight,” and “being in a state of war, or getting ready for war, seems, as we run our eyes back over history, to be the normal condition of France.”³²

The German character and German civilization were highly praised, and their harmony with American ideals was urged. James Russell Lowell wrote to Charles Eliot Norton, August 28, 1870,—

“If the Prussians don’t win, then the laws of the great game have changed, for a moral enthusiasm always makes battalions heavier than a courage that rises like an exhalation from heated blood. Moreover, as against the Gaul, I believe in the Teuton. And just now I wish to believe in him, for he represents civilization. Anything that knocks the nonsense out of Johnny Crapaud will be a blessing to the world. . . .”³³

“Whatever government,” said the *Baltimore American*, “secures equal rights to all its citizens, protects them in their lives and property, gives them a common school education . . . is an object of interest and admiration to the people of the United States. Prussia is the very home of free inquiry and free thought. Her scholars and thinkers have startled the world with their bold inquiries and learned speculations. Her system of public schools is a model from which the States of this Union have copied, but have not excelled. Her religion is liberal and tolerant, and her press

is free, able, and vigorous. The only tyranny complained of is the military conscription. . . . But a kingdom which is pressed on all sides by rival powers and has been the battle-ground of Europe must have a large standing army. . . . The Prussian constitution and laws contain some of the best features of Republicanism. She is the friend of Republics.”³⁴

This friendly judgment, it was admitted, was due largely to the presence in the United States of large numbers of German-American citizens, who were loyal to the Union during the Civil War, and gave it valiant service, and whose industry, thrift, and orderliness had made them a most desirable element in the country.³⁵

It was due, too, to the fact that Prussia had been friendly to the Union. “Our representatives at Berlin received a ready sympathy and courtesy which was extended to them in no other European capital save St. Petersburg.” Prussian capital was liberally invested at this time in United States bonds, and “our financial interests abroad would suffer infinitely more in case of a German defeat than from any other result of the war. Germany holds, according to Secretary Boutwell’s estimate, nearly a thousand millions of dollars worth of American bonds, and if Germany were prostrated . . .” these bonds would be thrown on the market, their value would be depreciated, and American interests would suffer. Anything which tended to interfere with our financial security, or to check the regular flow of our European trade, or the steady influx of German immigrants, or to interfere with the safe and rapid transit of our mails, carried in German ships, must concern Americans.³⁶ Certainly the essential aid given in both the military and civil services by German-Americans, during the Civil War, and their assistance in preserving to the Union the State of Missouri and other doubtful districts, could not have failed to influence Americans. As Louisa M. Alcott, caught in Vevay at the outbreak of the war, put it in writing to her mother,—“I side with the Prussians, for they sympathized with us in our war. Hooray for old Pruss!”³⁷

The memory of French enmity during the struggle between North and South was a potent argument in the determining of American sympathies. Frequent references were made to these French activities, from the building of ships intended for Confederate use and the intrigues directed toward the recognition of the independence of the South, and the Maximilian affair, to the purchase of Confederate bonds. “French insincerity” was found in the war censorship of news, it being charged by Americans that war information emanating from French sources was untrustworthy, that it had been manipulated in such a way as to seem favorable to the French cause, or that it was “one universal and long-

continued brag of what France is doing, what she is going to do, what she expects to do, what she feels sure of doing, and what no one need calculate to prevent her doing.”³⁸

Nevertheless it must not be assumed that sentiment was unanimous in favor of the Germans. The very arguments that created friendly feeling toward them in the North, militated against them in the South. Even though French aid had been halting and uncertain, Confederates could not forget the moral support and the active advantage of French sympathy, nor overlook the service of the many German-Americans in the Northern ranks. In August, 1870, Grant wrote to Elihu Washburne, the American Minister in Paris,—

“The war has developed the fact here that every unreconstructed rebel sympathizes with France, without exception, while the loyal element is almost as universally the other way.”³⁹

The *Macon (Ga.) Telegraph*, July 26, said,—“We of the South are a unit in favor of France,” and based this sentiment not only on recent events, but on those of Revolutionary times. It called attention also to the fact that many Southerners were of French descent, and that the Southern temperament resembled that of the French, and concluded;

“True, France did not help us in our late terrible trials, but then, she was polite when declining, and really had not the least objections to seeing us thrash the Yankees. There were no French generals or regiments on the other side. We cannot say so much for the Germans either in 1861 or in 1776.”⁴⁰

The *Charleston Daily Courier* said:—

“Not Napoleon, but France is fighting to-day. She has drawn the sword, as if inspired by an all-wise Providence, to humble, not the German people, but the arrogant Hohenzollern family, who only needed the services of a crafty Bismarck to keep in chains the Germany of 1848 and to maintain . . . the system of European feudalism and the ‘divine right of kings’” . . . “The principles of our time and of civilization march under the banners of the French.”⁴¹

Senator Carl Schurz, who was influential with the Administration, and was very active in Congress and in the country at large in organizing pro-German sentiment, came in for much criticism at the hands of the French sympathizers. The *Courier* called him “that renegade . . . whose head would have been chopped off if he had remained in Prussia in 1848,” . . . “muddlehead,” and “greatest of political scamps.” The *Savannah Morning News* deplored the probability that his membership in the Committee of Foreign Affairs would cause foreign powers to “look on this blatherskite as the mouthpiece of public opinion,” and said that although

Louisiana had a large French population and was strongly in favor of France, demonstrations there had been dignified, and not the "foaming ebullitions" of German-Americans in northern cities, "frothed up by such gaseous compounds as a Schurz or a Siegel." ⁴²

The editor of the *Richmond Whig* said that it was impossible to be neutral when watching any contest.

"One cannot look on at a dog-fight without sympathizing with one or the other of the combatants."

This was the case with the American public, he declared. Both the contestants were despots, but everyone supported one or the other. Yet it was easy, he thought, to see why, quite aside from French aid in the Revolutionary War, American sympathy should be pro-French rather than pro-German.

"Prussia, the most barbarous of all the German principalities, . . . by force or fraud has deprived other states of their liberties. Hanover, Sleswick, Nassau, Frankfort, Saxony, Darmstadt, the Palatinate, and the Free City of Frankfort, have been completely absorbed while Baden, Bavaria, and the rest of the Southern states are threatened with speedy extinction. . . .

And after describing the process of militarization forced by Bismarck and the King without the consent of the legislature, he said, "Such a force in the hands of an ambitious, aggressive, and unscrupulous Power, necessarily created uneasiness in all Europe, and especially in every neighboring state." Prussia failed to keep faith with Austria after the Danish war, and failed to hold the Schleswig plebiscite promised in the Treaty of Prague. "And the dirty intrigue by which it attempted to foist a Prussian colonel on the Spanish throne, is only one of many evidences of its unscrupulous and intermeddling disposition." "The line of the Rhine would satisfy French ambition, for it would render the country secure, and nothing else will; while all Southern Europe would not stay the rapacity of Prussia." The Germans in this country came to "escape from the clutches of the king for whose triumph they are now praying." ⁴³

Since the South was in its political affiliation Democratic, we may expect to find the anti-Administration and Democratic newspapers in the North also pro-French, and this is in fact largely the case. The *Chicago Times* said the "majority of the brains, conservatism, and decency of the country" was in favor of France, and praised French civilization and character as far superior to Prussian despotism, greed, selfishness and aggressive tendencies.⁴⁴ The *Philadelphia Day* said: "We cannot shut our eyes to the truths of history and do not choose to falsify them." France is the more liberal of the two countries, "and the only country in Europe that chooses

its own ruler." Red republicans in this country and in France might prefer a return to the reign of terror, but Louis Napoleon has governed France well, and has been sustained by the people. Only last May they "endorsed his reign of twenty-two years by a majority of nearly 22,000,000 of votes. Will some of our American censors point out to us when and where a vote of the people of Germany was ever cast in favor of any of the rulers of that country?"⁴⁵

The *New York World* said:—

"The government of Prussia under King William has gradually become . . . the most autocratic in Europe. As such it has repeatedly dealt with grave questions in a spirit more nearly akin to that by which the unfortunate Czar Nicholas brought down upon himself and his people the calamities of the Crimean War than the just and deliberate temper in which it is felt by the free nations of our time that public questions should be debated and decided. . . . That a power which has thus behaved . . . should be met at once with the sword when her government repels the legitimate demands of an equal state with autocratic insolence is perfectly natural."⁴⁶

"If Napoleon has shown an ambitious spirit and pursued a tortuous path, are Prussia and her rulers clear of like faults? . . . The whole policy of Bismarck since 1850 has been a cheat and a deception, intended to deceive other nations, while Prussia was preparing to obtain concentrated power. . . . Prussia's plundering propensities rank with any nation in ancient or modern history."⁴⁷

"The power thus gained by Prussia so elevated its views that nothing short of a conceded position as the first nation on the continent would answer its expectations. . . . As Prussia would never have consented to the imposition of a French prince upon a Teutonic throne without consulting its people, so France is justified in resisting a Prussian prince over a Latin country like Spain, France being at the head of the Latin countries as Prussia is of the Teutonic."⁴⁸

Some attempt was made to give a religious aspect to the contest, and to insist that Protestants should support Germany, and Catholics France. This argument, however, seemed to carry little weight with most people, and its flaws were promptly pointed out. "Both countries endow both churches, and in both men of either faith may hold office." "Religion, whether liberal or ultramontane, is about the last thing Louis Napoleon would fight for." "Seventy per cent. of the people in Bavaria are Catholic, and one-third of the Prussians." "Napoleon has steadily opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility." "Baron Gerolt, the Prussian ambassador at Washington, is a Catholic." "It is an error to suppose that religion has anything to do with this war."⁴⁹

M. Berthemy, the French Minister, analyzed the feeling in the country as it appeared to him, and said he thought the Republicans were all pro-German and the Democrats pro-French.⁵⁰ It is true that of the papers cited as pro-German, practically all are Republican, and that most of the

Democratic papers are pro-French.⁵¹ In confirmation of this theory, also, are the acts of various Republican groups, for example, the central Republican Committees of New York, Indiana, California, and Maryland, which adopted resolutions of sympathy with Prussia. The Pittsburgh City Council (Rep.) passed similar resolutions. The Democrats declared vehemently that the Republicans were not sincere in this, but were only playing for the German vote in the coming fall elections. Some Republican papers, like the *New York Times*, took the same view. These critics spoke of "sheer buncombe" "insulting to the administration," which was trying to maintain neutrality, of "political demagoguery" and so on.⁵²

There are to be noted certain exceptions, also, such as the *St. Louis Republican* (Dem.), which had a German foreign editor, and was neutral in policy, the *Milwaukee News* (Dem.), with a solid German constituency, which was pro-German, and the *Boston Traveller* (Rep.), which was out and out for France:—

"France could no more permit the setting up of a Prussian royal family in Madrid than we could afford the setting up of a French royal family in Mexico. . . . The Spanish business was entered upon by Prussia deliberately, and with the purpose and intent to have a diversion on the side of Spain against France. . . . The facts are not all published yet, but . . . we have no doubt they will go far to justify the pertinacity of France. . . . She would not otherwise be safe on her southern border for a month." ⁵³

Of greater significance is the fact, which stands out more and more clearly as one studies the newspapers of the period, that the great majority of Americans were not governed purely by party affiliations in this case, but exercised their judgment independently, on the basis of available information, and condemned now one side, now the other, or both at once. So that it is quite possible to find in a paper on one day a strong pro-German article, and then a few days later, based on some new information, a strong pro-French one. It is not at all unusual to find such a statement as this of the *New York Standard*, that the war is "unnecessary, cruel, selfish,—simply one grasping, unscrupulous power throwing its great strength against another power, whose history is the same." The *Little Rock Daily Republican* quoted approvingly the statement that Spurgeon, in a recent sermon, had said that he wished kings would do their own fighting, instead of getting soldiers to do it, and had added, "It would not be such a bad idea if the King of Prussia and Napoleon would come over to England and fight it out. I am quite sure the police would wink at the matter, and for my part, I would be willing to hold their coats, and I would cheer each one on, and say, 'Hit him hard, I think he deserves it.' "

And this thoughtful article from the *Richmond Whig* is quite typical:— It is headed, “Not a bruise, but an old sore!”

“Let no one deceive us into thinking that this is a war only between monarchs. There are old hatreds behind it, and the war will be national in its scope. . . . Each has inherited a legacy of hate against the other; each has military disgrace to wipe out; each has invasion and spoliation to avenge. The one remembers how the Corsican adventurer encamped in the walls of Berlin; the other has never forgotten how the Landwehr and Kaiserliks destroyed the fields of Alsace and Lorraine, and how Prussia’s marshal fired his cannon down the boulevards of Paris. There is no hate between nations like that which has passed from father to son. Time intensifies it; delay of vengeance embitters it.”⁵⁴

As the war proceeded, too, this independence of judgment became more marked. Many who had been pro-German in July and August did not hesitate in September to welcome with enthusiasm the French Republic and to warn the Prussians that Americans would not sympathize with a continuance of the war, nor with a peace whose terms were too harsh. From Davis’ *Journal* we learn that when the Prussian representative, Baron Gerolt, called at the State Department, August 29, the Assistant Secretary told him that it was his personal opinion that the people of the United States would not look favorably on the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine.⁵⁵ September 6, Secretary Davis told the French Minister, Berthemy, that he did not think the division of the country into pro-German Republicans and pro-French Democrats was correct, and said that while undoubtedly the people had little sympathy with the Napoleonic dynasty, he thought their antagonism was personal to Napoleon and his family, and not against France or the French people.⁵⁶

The United States government was the first to recognize the Third Republic in France, and did so on September 7, only five days after Sedan, and immediately after the news of its proclamation was received in this country. Minister Washburne carried out his share in the ceremony with marked sincerity and cordiality. “It affords me great pleasure,” he wrote to Favre, “to advise you that I have this morning received a telegraphic communication from my Government instructing me to recognize the government of the National Defense as the government of France. . . . In making this communication to your Excellency, I beg to tender to yourself and to the members of the Government of the National Defense the felicitations of the Government and the people of the United States. They will have learned with enthusiasm of the proclamation of a Republic in France, accomplished without the shedding of one drop of blood, and they will associate themselves in heart and sympathy with that great movement, confident in the hope of the most beneficial results to the

French people and to mankind." ⁵⁷ This friendly attitude was much appreciated by the French people and Washburne recorded the visits of various delegations to him to express their gratitude.

President Grant, in his Annual Message, December 5, referred in most sympathetic terms to the change, saying—

"While we adhere to our traditional neutrality in civil contests elsewhere, we cannot be indifferent to the spread of American political ideas in a great and highly civilized country like France." ⁵⁸

The French government asked the United States to mediate, with the aim of bringing about an early peace. Bancroft, our representative in Prussia, was instructed to find out whether the Germans would accept the good offices of the United States if they were offered. He replied in the negative, and made it evident that he himself was anxious that nothing should occur to deprive the Teutons of the fruits of their victory. Bancroft indeed continued to use every effort to persuade the United States to come out openly in favor of Germany. For example, in one of his letters to Assistant Secretary of State Davis, who was his nephew, he said that he hoped that Secretary Fish would issue "some good strong word, not violating neutrality, but perhaps expressing a complaint of a declaration of war so injurious to commerce and without a cause. . . ." He thought the United States ought in some way to "mark strongly a sympathy with the Germans," expressed fear lest neutral states in Europe might exert pressure unfavorable to Germany when peace terms were being made, and urged that our State Department consider "whether we could, and if we can, whether we should, exercise a counter-pressure." Davis' reply to this, (dated September 23, 1870), is most significant:—

"I don't see how Mr. Fish could have done more than he did do to manifest our individual sympathy for the German cause. . . . There was throughout the country a deep-seated feeling in their favor until it was believed they showed a determination to prolong the war for the sake of acquiring territory inhabited by a population that does not wish to come under their sway. When the public got this idea, which may or may not have been correct, they ceased to feel the intense sympathy which they had previously exhibited, and an attempt by the administration to interfere in any way in their favor, or to swerve from a rigid neutrality, would have been resented by the good sense of America. . . . There has been a studied and persistent pressure from the German Legation since the beginning of the war to force us into an attitude toward the French inconsistent with our neutrality. Baron Gerolt has spared no effort to entrap me into improper positions. . . . He grew angry when I told him of open violations of the neutrality laws by his consul in New York, and refused at first to take any warning. . . . In spite of all this, we have always construed and without giving France cause of offence, that the sympathies of the Administration are with Germany. I think I may safely say that the whole country is satisfied with the course Mr. Fish has pursued in this matter." ⁵⁹

The news of the downfall of Napoleon and the establishment of the Republic was received with instant and warm enthusiasm in this country, however. "It is hailed by republics everywhere as a favorable omen," said the *Baltimore Sun*, and added that the general congratulations even from those who favored Prussia because they thought her success would tend to the overthrow of monarchy, "show where the hearts of Americans really are." ⁶⁰

Frank Leslie's Magazine had a generous word for the fallen emperor, "He has done much for France and history will recognize it . . . for ourselves, we will not intentionally be numbered with the asses that kick at the dead lion."—But nevertheless it congratulated the French heartily on being rid of his militarism and ambition, and said they might be depended upon now to "do all that a gallant nation can" to repair the disasters which have come upon them through Napoleon's mistakes. "Now . . . the current of American feeling is very naturally turning actively toward the French millions who are trying to reintroduce the Republic." *Leslie's* printed a full-page cartoon, headed "Out of the Depths," showing the Republic as a rock surrounded by angry waters. France is attempting to climb to safety, and Columbia leans down to lend a helping hand. The accompanying verses run:—

"Across the watery waste, Columbia speaks
Benignant welcome to her sister France!
And calmly, strongly bids her take good heart,
And firmly hold her own against the world!

.

'All hail, new Commonwealth, to thee all hail!
That from the dead monarchic ashes lifts
A proud fair head to look on Freedom once again!
So cries Columbia; her sons do swell the cry!
With Liberty's dear cap on thy young head,
With Liberty's strong sword girt at thy side,
With Liberty's great heart within thy breast,
Thine own, O France, thou shalt regain and keep!
So, o'er the ocean, loudly as itself,
From out her mighty heart Columbia greets thee,
Takes thee unto that heart, and cries, 'God speed!' " ⁶¹

"France," said the *Leavenworth Bulletin*, "instead of standing before the world as a despotism waging an unprovoked and unholy war of conquest, has now assumed the position of a people struggling to throw off the shackles of despotism at home and to resist the invasion of monarchy from abroad. In this attitude the sympathies of the liberty-loving people of all nations are with her."

The *Bulletin* thought that "William has builded better than he knew; the torch that fired his victorious gun at Sedan lighted a conflagration that is already flashing its ominous glare above every crowned head in Europe"; and hoped that the spirit of freedom might reach the court at Berlin, and every other "centre of despotism." ⁶²

The *Providence Journal* said that there were those who argued from previous failures that a republic in France was impossible. "But there is something vital in an institution which after every revolution comes uppermost. . . . In France, in fact, nothing is legitimate but the Republic." ⁶³

The *Richmond Whig* defended Napoleon's rule as at least based on the will of the people, while "Prussia is a despotism, which recognizes no right in any human being below a noble," and America should sympathize with the Republic, unless Americans are "afraid of offending the mighty King William, the champion of feudalism and the Divine right of Kings." ⁶⁴

The *Rocky Mountain News* thought that any doubt of the success of the Republic was "ungenerous and we believe unjust." France is fit for self-government, and "the conduct of the French people in this time of trial and defeat has been most admirable." ⁶⁵

"Out of the humiliation of a military defeat France has now wrought a great political victory," said the *New York Tribune*, "and we congratulate her with all our hearts upon the prospect of happiness and glory which opens before her. . . . We are rejoiced that America has been so prompt and so hearty in extending the hand of fellowship to the new Republic. . . . There is no people in whose welfare we have a warmer interest than in the people of France." ⁶⁶

One very marked element in the new sympathy for France was the feeling that this change should end the war. If the struggle had been forced by Napoleon, and Prussia was fighting only to preserve herself against his ambitions and not for purposes of conquest, the fall of the arch-criminal should be all that was asked or needed.

Longfellow wrote to Charles Eliot Norton,—“Your opinion of France and Prussia is also mine and that of most Americans. Now that the Empire is no more, let there be war no more, and ‘*Vive la Republique!*’ for as Emerson sings, ‘God said, I am tired of kings.’ ” ⁶⁷ Joseph H. Choate, who had thought the slaughter of the earlier fighting “a very dear price to pay for even so good a thing as the overthrow of Napoleon and his gang would be,” wrote at the time of the surrender of Strassburg,—“The French are being pressed now a little beyond reason, and the sympathy of all but the Germans will soon be fully aroused for them.” ⁶⁸ John L. Motley, whose sympathies had been markedly German, wrote to Bismarck, September 9,

expressing his high admiration for the German Emperor, and his interest in the accomplishment of German unity. He emphasized his detestation of Napoleon, and his great satisfaction over the downfall of "that odious personal government which after eighteen years of what fools thought material prosperity, had left the gallant and intellectual French nation naked to your terrible assaults, after so recklessly provoking them" and then he came to what was evidently his purpose in writing the letter:—

. . . "But I implore you, for the sake of humanity, of your own great fame, and the best interests of your government and of Germany, to be moderate, and if possible expeditious. . . . The world is shuddering at the possibility of a siege of Paris, and assault. . . . I cannot bear the thought that the lustre of what is now the pure and brilliant though bloody triumph of Germany should be tarnished by even a breath . . ." France, it is evident, must accept Prussian terms, "but he would be a sincere friend of Germany who should modestly but firmly suggest that the more moderate the terms on the part of the conqueror at this supreme moment, the greater would be the confidence inspired for the future, the more secure the foundations of a durable peace, and the more proud and fortunate the position and character of United Germany."

Bismarck wrote on the margin of this letter,—“Damn confidence!”⁶⁹ The Democratic papers naturally took the lead in welcoming the Republic and demanding a just and early peace. Their position was well expressed by the *Nashville Republican Banner* (Dem.), which said:—

“If Prussia insists on unreasonable and humiliating exactions, and even goes so far as to dictate the sort of government the French people shall have, it is not hard to determine how the sympathy of the world will become enlisted. Forgetting the original cause of the war, the heart of humanity will throb in unison with the struggling Republic as against an Imperial dynasty.”⁷⁰

The *Richmond Whig* thought that Prussian military despotism threatened all other European states, which could find nothing to reassure them in the past history of the Hohenzollern family or in the personal character of the present representatives, who were vain, ambitious, and brutal. The war was now in conflict with all the enlightened principles of the age, and was aimed at the conquest, dominion, and even dismemberment of France. “Can the civilized world look without abhorrence at its continuance?”⁷¹ The *Baltimore Sun*, uncertain as to the success of the Republic under the circumstances, was sympathetic “with every smallest germ of the Republican plant” and had sharp criticism for William for withholding recognition and refusing to treat with the Republic. “In view of his declaration that it was Napoleon and the Empire alone on whom he made war, it is strange enough . . . to hear of the royal hospitality which the King of Prussia bestows daily upon Louis Napoleon, while he has only bayonets with

which to entertain the French Republic, . . . feeding Napoleon with dainties while he feeds the French with bombshells. . . . The king is indifferent to the pleadings of the combined world, and will only permit France to speak when she has fallen upon her back, and then, with his foot upon her breast, he will hear what she has to say." ⁷²

If Prussia attempts to crush the new Republic, said the *New York World*, she will find no sympathy in America, and "we trust the King's presumption will meet the Emperor's fate." ⁷³ King William's behavior is the "pot calling the kettle black," said the *New Orleans Times*,⁷⁴ and the *Chicago Times* thought that even America might be called on to help to "teach those audacious scamps the propriety of good behavior." ⁷⁵ Such utterances from Democratic journals, or those which had from the first favored France are not surprising. More significant are the editorials from papers which were pro-German in the earlier stages of the conflict. The *New York Sun*, heretofore a most outspoken partizan of the Germans "fighting in self-defense," said,—

"Now that Napoleon is utterly destroyed, while France, no longer aiming at foreign conquests, contends simply for her own national existence, and now that she has proclaimed herself a Republic, and put her destinies in the hands of new men, whose devotion to Republican principles cannot be questioned, the whole situation is transformed. Our sympathies are again with France, and our prayers and good wishes are all for her complete success. Her chastisement is more than equal to the fault she has committed, and we desire ardently that she may be able to maintain herself and to beat back the enormous armies that are marching upon her capital." ⁷⁶

The *New York Herald*, also warmly pro-Prussian up to this time, said hotly:—

"We have no sympathy with a German monarchy warring against a French republic. Our German fellow-citizens, if they were truly in heart and soul citizens of this republic, would to-day feel themselves nearer to that republic in Paris than to the semi-despotic Power that is in the field against it, and to escape from which Power so many of them first came to this country." ⁷⁷

The *Providence Journal* declared that the new Republic would receive cordial support from the Republican party in the United States, and its best wishes that no "needless humiliation may be imposed upon a gallant people." The *Journal* flatly disapproved of the occupation of Paris and the "dismemberment of France." Such action it called revengeful and wrong, and tending to destroy faith in Germany.⁷⁸ The *Nation* urged that Prussia, taking precautions against French militarism, should be satisfied and withdraw. Napoleon was dethroned, "not for making war, but for not having made it successfully. But in the interests of future peace, Germany

should show moderation. All absorption of territory whose inhabitants are not German in feeling as well as origin, will not only lay Prussia open to a charge of rapacity in carrying on the war, but furnish France with a good excuse for renewing it." Germany should exact the cost of the war, and might hold Strassburg and Metz for a term of years, but no more. And "to capture Paris would be a paltry act."⁷⁹ The *Nation*, however, feared the radical tendencies of Rochefort and Gambetta, and was skeptical of the success of the Republic. In this, and in urging Prussia to offer a fair peace at once, the *Pittsburgh Gazette* agreed. "We have sympathized with Prussia and the Germans in this war. . . . But there is an end to sympathy whenever a cause, no matter how high and holy it may have been at the outset, becomes converted into an unreasonable measure of oppression and extermination."⁸⁰

The *Cincinnati Daily Chronicle* said strongly that Germany might well ask indemnity, but not land. When Bismarck speaks of taking Alsace and Lorraine he "shows his claws." When he refuses to recognize the Republic, and talks of restoring Napoleon III or the Bourbons, he is interfering unwarrantably with French rights. Alsace and Lorraine, if given a plebiscite, would show clearly that they wished to remain French; France will resist to the last rather than submit to Prussian conquest, and all the world will be with her in spirit; Prussian behavior in occupied territory is brutal in the extreme;—"Possibly it is good policy, but not for those who have not lost all hope in the principles of humanity and honesty, and who believe that a certain respect for the feelings of decency is not a superfluity."⁸¹ The *Philadelphia Ledger*, doubtful at first of the success of the Republic, yet showed no hesitation in condemning a continuance of the war and the forced cession of Alsace and Lorraine, and by September 20, after Favre's circular had reached this country, came out strongly in favor of France. The *New York Tribune* insisted that while Germany might demand reasonable guarantees against another French attack and perhaps compensation for the costs of the war, "she has no right to make France her vassal, nor to subject its capital and all its provinces to the devastation inseparable from war." . . . If she does this . . . "the names of Bismarck and of William will be exposed to the just execration of mankind."⁸²

The *Detroit Free Press* said that William would not recognize the Republic because such recognition of the right of the people to a voice in their government would make a bad precedent for the Germans. He would prefer to restore the Bourbons, since they were rulers by divine right. But to accomplish this he must of course hold military possession of France till the spirit of the people should be quite broken. The *Free Press* added:—

"Such a crusade against a republican form of government is of course a direct insult to the United States, and though it may not be resented by a declaration of war, it cannot but give rise to an embittered state of feeling between the two countries . . . and it will leave France no alternative but to banish all idea of submission or peace and enter on a desperate struggle for national existence." ⁸³

The trend toward friendliness for France was made stronger by the activities of the large element in the United States which desired universal peace and disarmament. The Civil War with all its suffering and its sorrow was yet fresh in the minds of Americans. They knew, as the people of this country had not known since the Revolutionary War, what such conflicts must involve. With a full appreciation of the evils of war, they earnestly desired peace, for themselves and for the world at large. This deep personal consciousness was reflected in their early condemnation of France as responsible for beginning the war, and in the sharpness of the criticism in regard to this responsibility. It helps, too, to explain why the blame was so readily transferred to Germany when it appeared that she was needlessly prolonging the struggle and intensifying its severity. Among the leaders in the peace movement was Julia Ward Howe. High and clear had been her vision in the testing days of her own country, and eager now was her conviction that the present war was cruel and unnecessary. She had bitterly disliked and distrusted Louis Napoleon, and could not regret his downfall, but she "loved France and the French people; the overwhelming defeat, the bitter humiliation suffered by them filled her with sorrow and indignation." She sent out a call for a World's Congress of women in behalf of international peace. William Cullen Bryant and other influential persons encouraged the undertaking. A mass meeting was held December 23, at which Lucretia Mott was one of the speakers, and an organized peace movement, promoted largely among women, and led by Mrs. Howe, developed and continued to exercise considerable influence. ⁸⁴

Charles Sumner, too, threw his influence in the same direction. Sumner was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1869 to 1871. He was by no means a "peace at any price" man, as his record clearly shows, but he did believe in the settlement of international disputes by arbitration, and did look forward with hope to a day when the war system should be discarded and the nations should disarm. He had aided Lincoln and Seward to avoid war at the time of the Maximilian affair. Now he used the Franco-Prussian war as an argument in favor of the international methods he desired to see in use, and as an example of the wrongness and failure of the war method. His speech in Boston, October 26, 1870, has been widely quoted, and it is worth quoting once

more, as a clear illustration of the way in which many thinking Americans judged the conflict.

“The Duel Between France and Germany, with its lesson to civilization,” is the title which he used. He blamed the French government for the initiation of the war, although he gave credit to the republicans and moderates who sought to avert it. Napoleon had no real grievance against Prussia. He had no right to interfere in the matter of the Hohenzollern candidacy, and the English efforts to mediate should have been accepted,—

“Such a war stands forth terrific in wrong, making the soul rise indignant against it. . . . It is a war of pretexts, the real object being the humiliation and dismemberment of Germany, in the vain hope of exalting the French Empire and perpetuating a bawble crown on the head of a boy, . . . to overthrow parliamentary government, . . . and reestablish personal government . . . thus making triumph over Germany the means of another triumph over the French people.”

Sumner reviewed with full and bitter condemnation the career of Napoleon III. But “a great hour for Humanity sounded when the Republic was proclaimed. And this I say, even should it fail again; for every attempt contributes to the final triumph.” The fall of the Emperor was just retribution, continued Sumner, for “they that take the sword shall perish by the sword,” but “with the capitulation of the Emperor the dynastic question was closed. There was no longer pretension nor pretext, nor was there occasion for war.” Let Napoleon fall, “but not the people of France. Cruelly already have they expiated their offence in accepting such a ruler.” “Why march on Paris? Why beleaguer Paris? To what end? If for the humiliation of France, then must it be condemned.” The peace conditions should give Germany security for the future, but should not wound needlessly the sentiments of the French people, nor offend public law. A moderate indemnity would be just, but Germany would be wrong to claim Alsace and Lorraine. Europe would not be protected by disabling France; if the object is retaliation, it is barbarous; it can contribute nothing to the defence of Germany, since it will keep France in chronic irritation, and the provinces would be “strongholds of disaffection rather than defence, to be held always at the cannon’s mouth.” This is not the way to lasting peace for Germany. It is, rather, a “brutal policy belonging to another age.” Such a transfer could not be legal or lasting in any event, since the people are unwilling to be transferred. “National unity is not less the right of France than of Germany, and these provinces, though in former centuries German, and still preserving the German speech, belong to the existing unity of France.” Disarmament should be required of

France, and the other nations should disarm also, for the benefit of civilization. German philosophers and German workingmen had been in favor of peace, but William, with his belief in divine right, was no friend to modern Reform. "The venerable system of war and prerogative is part of his inheritance handed down from fighting despots, and he evidently believes in it." Bismarck, too, is a devotee of militarism. He has intellect, courage, and will, but "is naturally hard, and little affected by human sympathy." The address closed with a firm declaration of faith in democracy and of love for humanity, and the expression of a warm desire for international comprehension and harmony.⁸⁵

Among the many newspaper comments on the Sumner address possibly one of those worth noticing is that of the *New Orleans Commercial Bulletin*, which criticised the speaker for proposing to force the disarmament of France, but not of Germany. This would leave the latter, said the *Bulletin*, "doubly armed for the accomplishment of her well-known purpose to acquire the whole sea-front, from the Baltic to the English Channel, including Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. Than such an arrangement there could scarcely be conceived a more effective guarantee of future war."⁸⁶

Some Americans, naturally, despite the general interest in the establishment of the Republic, continued to rejoice in Prussian victories. Francis Ticknor, with warm memory of pleasant days in the diplomatic circles of Central Europe, wrote cordial congratulations to his friend the King of Saxony.⁸⁷ Emerson, who had written in his Journal in the early days of German success,—“Montesquieu's prediction is fulfilled, 'La France se perdre par les gens de guerre'” wrote in January to his good friend Grimm:—

“I give you joy, the New Year, on these great days of Prussia. You will have seen that our people have taken your part from the first, and have a right to admire the immense exhibition of Prussian power. Of course, we are impatient for peace, were it only to secure Prussia at this height of well-being.”⁸⁸

Thomas Nast continued his caricatures of the war, with such sketches as the one entitled “Dead Men's Clothes soon wear out,” showing the defeated Louis Napoleon clad in a very tattered uniform once belonging to the first Napoleon.⁸⁹ A few newspapers, in the fall of 1870, retained a strong pro-German bias. *Leslie's*, indeed, was much more German in sentiment than it had been, for Mr. Leslie returned from an absence of some months in Europe, and took over in person the editorship of the paper, whose policy shortly before had been sharply changed, presumably upon his orders, to a more marked friendliness toward Germany. *Leslie's*

denied the possibility of any of the atrocities attributed to the Germans, blamed the new French government for being too militaristic and not making peace promptly on German terms, thought Alsace and Lorraine German by race and by right, and their cession necessary to assure German security; and bitterly assailed French character and behavior. When the surrender of Metz came, *Leslie's* said:—

“This seals the fate of Paris. . . . She will fret and fume and brag and lie a little longer. but . . . before the first of December the City of Folly will be in German occupation. The Roman Empire, in its rottenness, was something vital and strong as compared with the debauched and debilitated empire of the Third Napoleon. We cannot deny our pity to France, but our sympathies must go with our judgment. . . .”

The plea that we should be grateful to France for Revolutionary aid should have no weight, the editor thought, because the early intervention was really for selfish reasons, or else it was the work of a few sentimentalists who counted little. The total of French assistance “contributed as much to our success as the celebrated fly on the coach-wheel toward raising the dust of the village” and certainly does not make it necessary for us, “after the lapse of a century, to hug the whole French nation to our bosom as friends and brothers.” The simple truth is that the French people are “profoundly ignorant and profoundly selfish” and now divided with faction and without any firm foundation in principle. France is “neither a republic nor a nation. It is a punctured windbag.” Its leaders are “impostors, incapable of telling the truth; only a little less flagrant than the Imperial debauchees and sensualists they have displaced.”⁹⁰

The *Trenton Gazette* thought the German demands not unreasonable, and saw no reason for changing its early attitude of condemnation of France:—

“They have never shown any regret for commencing the war, nor disclaimed or apologized for the motives that caused it. We thought this attack upon Prussia unjust, uncalled-for and wrong. We think so still. . . . We are not bound to sympathize with all contests waged by Republics. That would be to establish the dogma that Republics can do no wrong, a principle that is obnoxious and dangerous. . . . And the so-called Republic is one only in name. . . . A more pitiable burlesque of representative government has never existed. It was not established by a vote of the people and has never been ratified by them. . . . It is in the hands of a few men, who wield almost absolute power, and who hold position by virtue of that power. They dare not submit the question to a vote of the people, and they maintain the war as the only means of their retention in authority.”⁹¹

The *Hartford Courant*, too, had only the harshest criticism for the Republic in its early days. The *Courant* thought the French too volatile

and uncertain in temperament to maintain a democratic government. Granting the brilliance of French military and intellectual achievement, this editor thought German education far more thorough and intelligent, and believed that only a few Frenchmen were capable of doing more than wishing for a Republic and thinking that it could be obtained by "proclaiming it from the Hôtel de Ville." So, too, J. G. Holland declared that "there is not enough of intelligence, virtue, and principle in France to sustain a republic." The people are irreligious and fickle, with "no faith in God or man."⁹²

Yet the *New York Times* furnished an example of the way in which anti-French prejudice was being undermined. This paper had usually expressed strong approval of the Prussians and equally strong disapproval of the French:—

"A Teutonic instead of a Latin race leads Europe, and nationalism instead of Cæsarism, parliamentary institutions instead of personal government, peaceful development under constitutional forms, rather than military glory and Imperial rule, will now be the models presented to the world. Teutonic seriousness, Teutonic love of liberty in Church and State, and the Teuton's disposition for peace (unless he feels his rights trampled on) will be the qualities of the ruling race. The Latin races have done their part,—and not always an inglorious one—in the world's history. Now more earnest and moral and free races must guide the helm of progress."

Another article in the same tenor was found in the issue of September 12, in which, concluding a recapitulation of the reasons why many Americans had sided with Germany, the *Times* said:—

"As between a people devoted to plodding industry, thrifty and intelligent, earnest and wise in their aspirations after liberty, seeking no further territorial aggrandizement, but simply the quiet consolidation of minor states which the selfishness of petty sovereigns had kept divided . . . and a people destitute of practical ideas of freedom, with no national purpose but the glory of France, incapable of the self-government which is at the root of popular government . . . it was impossible long to pause."

Yet the *Times* now called upon our government to help in bringing about peace, declaring that a reasonable gratitude for Revolutionary aid from France made such action imperative. No one could now suppose that German unity was threatened, or that German soil need fear invasion. The ends of the war were gained, and hostilities should stop at once. It was earnestly to be hoped that the moderation of King William would prevail over the extremist counsels of his advisers."⁹³

The *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, another strong pro-German paper, on September 7 carried a most sarcastic article on the founding of the new Republic, crediting it wholly to mob activity, and denying that it was

characterized by any high ideals or real or intelligent patriotism. "Certainly the scaliest origin that any French Republic ever had." But on September 9 the same paper heartily approved Favre's circular, and declared that it proved the new government to be actuated by a sense of justice and uprightness and ready to make peace on "any conditions that are consistent with the integrity of the territory of France and with the continuance of her national independence." The declaration does refuse, and rightly, cessions of French territory, and if Germany refuses to make peace on such conditions she alone is responsible for the continuance of the war, and it will be evident that she is fighting for the purpose of conquering French territory and increasing the already threatening military preponderance of Prussia, and at the same time destroying the free republican government of France.⁹⁴ Similarly various other periodicals expressed their doubts of the success of the Republic, and their continued sympathy for Germany. They questioned the quality of the French leaders, distrusted their motives, called them "greedy notoriety seekers" and feared that they lacked prudence, executive ability, and honesty. "The French must if they are to succeed be under the guidance of men capable of knowing the truth, telling the truth, and living the truth." The people of France are vain and self-confident, "a nation of balloonatics." They are fickle and worship only success. It was not magnanimous, but it was natural to them to reject the Emperor the moment he failed. At any rate, they are beaten now, and must pay the bills. The lesson was needed, and may be salutary. They should make peace at once, no matter what the terms, for a continuance of the war could only identify them with the Emperor's crimes, and would be suicidal. But almost without exception even the most unfriendly of these critics urged Germany to magnanimity, and warned her positively not to interfere with the internal affairs of France.⁹⁵ Just as Americans after Elba became pro-French, believing that the Coalition meant to partition France or to impose a government which was not the choice of the people, so now even those who had most love for Germany and least faith in France were on guard when the principles of liberty and self-determination seemed threatened, and when the militarism which they had feared and detested in France before the war now appeared to dominate the counsels of the conqueror. Taken all together, the evidence shows clearly that from the time of the proclamation of the Republic, a change came over the spirit of the American public, and that in the fall of 1870 a strong and wide-spread sentiment was developing in favor of the new order of things in France and against the continuance of the war in an aggressive spirit by Germany. Most particularly was there an unwillingness to see the cession of Alsace and Lorraine or any other

French territory, or any dictation by Germany in the domestic affairs of France. And the charge of militarism and of absolutism was applied less frequently to France and more frequently to Germany.

It has been asserted that this change was only temporary, and that the balance swung back toward Germany as the war progressed.⁹⁶ But this conclusion does not seem to be borne out by a careful study of the facts. On the contrary, the siege of Paris demonstrated the good qualities of the French, and compelled some Americans who had hitherto remained unmoved, to concede to the suffering inhabitants a heroism, a steadiness of purpose, and a high patriotism, which had not previously been admitted.

It is not claimed that sentiment in the United States ever became unanimous in this regard, nor that a universal chorus of praise of the French rose from all parts of the country. There always have been and always will be differences of opinion and different points of view on any subject. International relations particularly have always given good ground for argument. But we are attempting to ascertain the general trend of American opinion over a century of time, and it is undeniable that during this period of little more than a year, occurred a noticeable change. The reasons for this are evident. They are inherent in the character and the mental habits of the American people. The importance of this change must be judged in the light of later events.

It is improbable that such a variation was realized to any very great degree by those who shared in it. Certainly it must be, like any slow drift of the sort, much more clearly visible from a distance than it could have been at the time. It is easy to find those whose fixed and settled opinions showed no wavering. Lowell, for instance, wrote to Thomas Hughes, February 7, 1871:—

“As for the war in Europe, I am a Prussian, and believe it to be in the interest of civilization that a public bully (as France had become) should be roundly thrashed. The French will never be good neighbors till the taint of Louis XIV is drawn out of their blood. If the Prussian lancet shall effect this I shall rejoice. The misery I feel as keenly as anybody, but I remember that it might have been, but for German energy and courage, even worse on the other side of the Rhine. The Gaul has never been an amiable conqueror.”⁹⁷

A group of newspapers, chiefly made up of those which had been previously unfriendly, expressed no regret at German severity, and most of them reminded the public that the terms of peace were no worse than those given by France in previous wars when she had been victorious.⁹⁸

President Grant sent a special message to Congress, February 7, in which he referred in most friendly terms to the consolidation of the Empire of

Germany, spoke of the "intimate and cordial relations" and the common interests of the two countries, and praised the constitution of the new state as "an attempt to reproduce in Europe some of the best features of our own constitution."⁹⁹

At about the same time, a joint resolution was introduced in Congress to provide for the sending of a relief ship from the United States to Europe for the benefit of the sufferers from the war. The bill as offered by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas (Rep.) was framed to include both French and Germans. Senator Howard of Michigan (Rep.) moved to strike out "and Germans," saying that he did not understand that Germany needed any help, but that the French were now little more than a conquered people,—“our old allies in distress for bread as well as for arms and soldiers.” Senator Pomeroy replied with a defence of the Germans, who had been modern allies, during the Civil War, quite as truly as the French had been allies in our early days. Senator Howard said that his own sympathies during the war had been with Germany, but that under the present circumstances he felt that it was France which needed aid. Senator Morton (Rep.) of Indiana said that although he too felt that the French were responsible for inaugurating the war, he could now sympathize with the French people, who were in no way responsible for it. Senator Fowler (Rep.) of Tennessee thought that it was unjust to deny to France the gratitude which was certainly due her, and added that he could not see that Germany had ever been our ally. Certainly during the Revolutionary War, German soldiers fought with the British. In the recent struggle large numbers of American citizens of German birth aided the North, but there was no particular assistance from the German government, and “so far as their government is concerned, in its raid upon the people of France since the battle of Sedan, I have no sympathy with it.” Senator Stewart (Rep.) of Nevada reminded him of the large numbers of United States bonds taken by Germans during the Civil War, when our credit was not good in either England or France. Senator Fowler retorted that this simply showed that the Germans were good business men. He had never seen any effort on the part of Germans to establish free and independent governments anywhere. On the contrary they had moved “toward a concentration of despotic power.” “The French are the finest people on the continent to-day, and have been the only people on the continent that have been struggling for free institutions.” Sumner brought the discussion to a close with a very tactful expression of gratitude and friendliness for both countries. “If I were compelled to determine the question of comparative obligation to France and Germany on the part of the United States, I should hesitate, and what American

could do otherwise? . . . France contributed to our national independence, Germany to our national strength and life." But this question was simply one of charity, he reminded them, and should not be clouded by political controversy.¹⁰⁰

In the House, Mr. Sherman offered an amendment running:—

"And be it further resolved that the President of the United States is hereby requested to communicate to the French Government the profound sympathy of the people of the United States for the people of France, now suffering under unexampled misfortune; and he is hereby requested to extend to them every aid, assistance, encouragement and support consistent with the laws of nations and our treaties with other Powers, in establishing upon a firm basis a Republican Government."¹⁰¹

After some discussion, in the course of which Mr. Sherman said that he supposed sympathy in this country had been largely pro-German till after Sedan, the amendment was declared too political in tenor to be attached to a relief bill; and here, as a day or two later in the Senate, the resolution passed without amendment. It is unnecessary to say that the relief plan received the generous support which Americans have always given to such undertakings.

As the siege of Paris progressed and the final catastrophe of surrender and a harsh peace were recognized as inevitable, the great mass of the newspapers steadily became more friendly. *Appleton's Magazine*, for example, which said on January 21 that France had fallen because her entire social system was rotten, on February 11 carried a wholehearted defence of the French character. This article declared that current American notions of France were superficial, based on a slight knowledge of Paris and of a few French authors such as Voltaire and Rousseau. Generalizations representing the Frenchman as a giddy, extravagant, immoral being are quite fallacious. France must not be judged wholly by the gay life of Paris. She has produced great men of quite a different type from the boulevardier and the sensational novelist. "Calvin, the root of a vast and sturdy religious democracy, Descartes, the great reformer and liberator of European intellect; . . . Pascal, than whom no English moralist is more pure, more grave, precise, and searching." "The truth is, the great renown of France is the result of the variety and keenness, the gravity and depth, the vast and multiform genius, she has engendered on her soil and nourished by her civilization."¹⁰²

The *Hartford Courant*, February 1, expressed faith in the future of the Republic, led by the men who had served it so well in the last trying months. "Our old conceptions of French character must be revised," said the *Courant*. "We had not dreamed of such steadfastness and such ability

to endure; and the presence of these qualities goes a good way in demonstrating a capacity for self-government.”¹⁰³

“France has made heroic exertions, which, though ineffectual for defence, have redeemed her character,” said the *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*. “All that honor can require a people to do in struggling against superior forces and overpowering calamities has been done.” Such a nation must win the respect of the world. It can never be permanently subjugated or humiliated. Let them but wait in patience, and German arrogance will give them an opportunity to regain their position.¹⁰⁴

“In the very face of their enemies, almost within sound of cannon and musketry, they reared on the ruins of a prostrate Empire the fabric of a republic, flung away the ensigns of Imperialism . . . and raised the emblems of Liberty.” “That it may result in the firm establishment of free institutions, a wise and liberal policy, and bring with it peace and prosperity, is the wish of all who appreciate the worth of France to the world and who have witnessed with regret the events that threatened her very existence.”¹⁰⁵ Surely this article from the *Trenton Gazette*, dated January 31, represents a change of heart:—

“France falls with arms in her hands and with her face to the foe. There is no disgrace or taint of dishonor in her failure, and she will come out of this fiery ordeal purified from the dross of reckless ambition and vainglorious arrogance. . . . Humbled and made wiser . . . she will now be able to devote those vast energies and capabilities which have been wasted on the tinsel and useless magnificence of Imperial display to the cultivation of the arts of peace. . . . Rightly directed, the great mental, moral, and physical forces of France will produce one of the mightiest and happiest nations in the world.”¹⁰⁶

A steady indignation in regard to the cession of Alsace and Lorraine must be chronicled. “The fair fame of the great German nation is tarnished,” said the *Philadelphia Ledger*. The cession admits the principle that a conquest of this kind is a legitimate object of war in modern times, said the *Boston Daily Advertiser*. This is a pernicious doctrine, and, with all that it connotes in this case, makes Germany a menace to Europe. “Cruel and impolitic,” said the *Pittsburgh Commercial*,—“humiliating to the French people,” “unjust to the inhabitants of the ceded districts,” and “will lead inevitably to further wars.” The *Richmond Whig* thought that perhaps it would be after all a benefit to France, for the recovery of the provinces would become an absorbing object to all French hearts. This would prevent factional disputes, consolidate the nation, and animate it with a single will. The *Philadelphia North American* regretted the transfer because the people were French in feeling, in habits, and to a large extent in lan-

guage, and "the institutions of France allowed them a liberty that they cannot look for under the iron rule of Prussia." ¹⁰⁷

Accompanying the protests over the alienation of territory from France were strictures on Prussian militarism. The *Cincinnati Enquirer* declared that all nations in Europe would have to arm in self-defense, since their safety was endangered by the "aggrandizement of Prussia, directed by an unscrupulous and ambitious man of talent like Bismarck." "An iron-handed, despotic power . . . forging the bonds of her own people and taking the best blood of the only nation in Europe which is striving for free government." The *Washington National Republican* said that the king who was trying to build his Empire on a conquered and humiliated France was not likely to be the ruler of a democratic Germany. There is in the events of these days "a deep and ominous significance to all liberty-loving Germans." The *Philadelphia North American* warned the small states of Europe to look well to their defenses, for their turn would come next, and said that although French folly and ambition precipitated the war, it was evident now that Germany had been making incessant and thorough preparation for such a contingency, and now constituted a standing menace to all Europe. The *Mobile Register* thought the synopsis of the new German constitution would make sorry reading for those honest German democrats in this country who hoped that German unity meant free institutions. "The constitution of the French empire just overthrown was much more liberal than the provisions of this document" which only "forges new links to the chains which bind them to a reactionary dynasty." ¹⁰⁸

As a final example of the trend of public opinion let us return to *Leslie's Magazine*, which has been cited as one of the bitterest critics of France and the French. As late as February 18, *Leslie's* was still being sarcastic at France's expense. The journal for this number carried a cartoon called "The Fifth Act," with this dialogue:—

"Noble (but Temporary) Dictator. 'What! Paris capitulate? Then I'll kill myself to-night and issue a proclamation to-morrow.' Stabs himself and falls (temporarily).

"Grand (but Impersonal) General in Paris. 'I don't know precisely whether I am Ducrot or Trochu but I may as well shoot myself beside Gambetta.' Falls (vaguely).

"Bourbaki. 'I kill myself at the head of my army, and I hope to dine comfortably in Switzerland to-morrow.' (Falls into Switzerland precipitately and avalanchically.)

"Voice of Prevost-Paradol (Behind the Scenes). 'I killed myself too far back on the stage. Nobody is looking at me. I've a mind to come forward and have another great death at the footlights!'"

"Tableau. Curtain."

This number criticised the Pomeroy resolution for relief and called it "silly sentimentality" and generally revamped all the various types of vituperation which had been applied to the French from any source since the opening of the war. Yet on March 4 even *Leslie's* had a different attitude, with this poem,—"*Call off the Dogs!*"

"Had royal hunter e'er more royal game
Than this that these trained war-dogs have pulled down
While his hosts crowned their master, by the name
Of Kaiser, with the Reich's Imperial Crown?
Was e'er great hart more stanchly run to death
After long agony of hopeless fight
Than this, that now draws agonizing breath
With draggled skin and eyes of tearful light?

.
There have been hunters, famous ones of old,
Rent by their own dogs, by a master rash
Roused to strange wrath under too tight hold
Of leash, too savage smarting of the lash.
Kaiser for King thou art; but they that gave
Imperial robe and crown can take away;
Strength based on fraud or force still finds its grave
Dug by the hands that vied its base to lay."

And on March 18, the cartoon of the week showed a court scene, with Bismarck presenting France as a criminal at the bar. Justice, sitting as magistrate to hear the plea, was represented as saying,—"*I sit here to-day, Herr Bismarck, but I hope to vacate soon, in favor of Mercy.*"¹⁰⁹

NOTES AND SOURCES

- ¹ William Roscoe Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay*, "Sunrise on the Place de la Concorde"; "The Sphinx of the Tuileries." I: 225-228, 235-244, 313, (Hay to Bigelow, Vienna, Apr. 27, 1868).
- ² Royal Cortissoz, *Life of Whitelaw Reid*, I: 164; Thayer, *John Hay*.
- ³ John Lothrop Motley, *Correspondence*. G. W. Curtis, ed., I: 225, 231-232.
- ⁴ Mrs. Varina Davis, *Life of Jefferson Davis*, II: 809.
- ⁵ Henry James, *A Little Tour in France*, 211.
- ⁶ *Letters of Lydia Maria Child*, 205.
- ⁷ Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, II: 116-117; Horace Greeley, *Essays Designed to Elucidate the Science of Political Economy*, 152; Eugene Benson, "French and English Illustrated Magazines," *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1870; Elihu B. Washburne, *Recollections of an American Minister to France*, 1869-1877.
- ⁸ John Sherman, *Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and Cabinet*. I: 402-406.
- ⁹ *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, Vol. I: 45-47.
- ¹⁰ *Philadelphia Evening Star*, July 16, 1870.

¹¹ *Washington Daily Globe*, July 17, 1870; *Philadelphia North American*, July 16; *Wilmington Daily Commercial*, July 16.

¹² Jeannette Keim, *Forty Years of German-American Political Relations*, 8, citing Davis MS; Andrew D. White, *Autobiography*, I: 154; *New York Standard*, August 6, 1870.

¹³ Keim, 8.

¹⁴ *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, Vol. I: 197-198, Bancroft to Fish, July 16, 1870, on the declaration of war; 198-199, 200-202, Bancroft to Fish on the secret treaties regarding Belgium and Luxemburg; Keim, 7 ff.; Howe, *Life and Letters of George Bancroft*, 252 ff.; Clara Eve Schieber, *American Sentiment Toward Germany* 11-12.

¹⁵ Keim, 18-20, citing Davis *Journal*, August 13, 1870.

¹⁶ Washburne, *Recollections*, I: 34; General John A. Dix, *Memoirs*, Morgan Dix, ed., II: 156-157.

¹⁷ Washburne, *Recollections*, I: 34.

¹⁸ Washburne, *Recollections*; *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, Vol. I.; Correspondence of E. B. Washburne, *Franco-Prussian War and Insurrection of the Commune*, No. 44; Adolf Hepner, *America's Aid to Germany in 1870-1871*; Keim, 8; Col. Wm. H. Crook, *Through Five Administrations*, 171.

¹⁹ Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, II: 358-359.

²⁰ Washburne, *Recollections*, I: 56-57.

²¹ Lowell to Th. Hughes, June 11, 1870; July 18, 1870. *Letters of James Russell Lowell*, Charles Eliot Norton, ed., II: 59, 60.

²² W. Stillman, in *Evening Post*, cited in *Cincinnati Daily Chronicle*, July 22, 1870.

²³ *Independent*, cited in *Baltimore American*, August 12, 1870.

²⁴ *Bridgeport Daily Standard*, July 16, 1870; *Baltimore Daily American*, July 20; *Trenton Daily Gazette*, July 23; *Hartford Courant*, July 16; *Rocky Mt. News* (Denver, Col.), July 20; *Worcester (Mass.) Daily Spy*, July 15; *Philadelphia Evening Star*, July 12; *New York Herald*, *New York Post*, *New York Commercial*, cited in *Washington Evening Star*, July 16; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 20; *Cincinnati Gazette*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 25; *Providence Journal*, July 18.

²⁵ *Philadelphia North American*, July 16.

²⁶ *Raleigh Daily Standard*, July 18; *Boston Evening Journal*, July 16; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, July 19; *New York Sun*, cited in *Baltimore American*, July 26.

²⁷ Albert Bigelow Paine, *Thomas Nast, His Period and His Pictures*, 147-148; similar, *Worcester Spy*, July 30; *Leslie's Magazine*, March 19, July 30.

²⁸ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, July 23; *Rocky Mt. News*, July 20; Springfield, (Ill.), *Daily State Journal*, July 16; *Philadelphia Age*, July 16; *Washington Evening Star*, July 14; *Chicago Tribune*, July 14, July 16.

²⁹ *Richmond Dispatch*, July 16; *Washington National Republican*, July 18; *Philadelphia Ledger*, July 8; *New York Tribune*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 25; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 14, July 28, 1870. *The Philadelphia North American*, July 23, emphasizes the German struggle for unity for "German" districts held by neighboring states.

³⁰ *San Francisco Morning Bulletin*, August 1.

³¹ *Atlanta Daily New Era*, August 3; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, July 16.

For other criticisms of Louis Napoleon, compare Schieber, *American Sentiment Toward Germany*. Ch. I.

³² *Kansas Tribune*, July 16; *Baltimore American*, July 16, 19, 20, 21, *New York Trib-*

- une, cited in *Washington Evening Star*, July 16; *Philadelphia Ledger*, July 14; *Cincinnati Chronicle*, July 16; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 22.
- ³³ Lowell to Norton. James Russell Lowell, *Letters*, C. E. Norton, ed., 11: 62-63.
- ³⁴ *Baltimore American*, July 21; *The Nation*, July 21; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 22; Pottsville, Pa. *Miners' Journal*, July 23.
- ³⁵ Resolutions of Pittsburgh City Council, July 25, *Pittsburgh Post*, July 27; *Kansas Tribune*, July 16; *Baltimore American*, July 19, July 29; *Frank Leslie's Magazine*, Aug. 6; *Hartford Courant*, July 22; Schieber, 1-2, citing Faust, *The German Element in the United States*.
- ³⁶ *New York Tribune*, cited in *Baltimore American*, July 28; *Baltimore American*, July 19, July 20; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 22; *Trenton Gazette*, July 13.
- ³⁷ L. M. Alcott, *Letters and Journals*, Ednah B. Cheney, ed., 244; *Hartford Courant*, July 22; *Bridgeport Daily Standard*, Aug. 15; *Pittsburgh Gazette*; *Baltimore American*, July 19.
- ³⁸ *Philadelphia North American*, July 20; L. M. Alcott, *Letters and Journals*, loc. cit. Compare Keim, 7. See also summary in Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, 197.
- ³⁹ General Grant's *Letters to a Friend*, 68.
- ⁴⁰ *Macon Telegraph*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 26. Strong article, similar tenor, *Richmond Whig*, July 19.
- ⁴¹ *Charleston Daily Courier*, July 26.
- ⁴² *Ib.*, *Savannah Morning News*, July 25.
- ⁴³ *Richmond Whig*, August 6.
- ⁴⁴ *Chicago Times*, cited in *Milwaukee Sentinel*, August 24, Sept. 1.
- ⁴⁵ *Philadelphia Day*, cited in *Pittsburgh Post*, July 26; *New York Commercial Advertiser*, cited in *Richmond Whig*, August 23.
- ⁴⁶ *New York World*, cited in *Pittsburgh Post*, July 19.
- ⁴⁷ *Philadelphia Age*, July 21.
- ⁴⁸ *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, July 16.
- Other strong pro-French utterances: *Hartford Times*, cited in *Savannah Morning News*, July 26; *Mobile Register*, July 13; *Rocky Mt. News*, July 20; *Boston Post*, July 13, July 18; *New York Express*, cited in *Washington National Republican*, Aug. 1; *Pittsburgh Post*, July 27; Aug. 20; *Philadelphia Press*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 21; *Louisville Courier-Journal*; *St. Louis Times*. See also Schieber, 18, 19.
- ⁴⁹ *Washington National Republican*, July 25, Sept. 5; *Baltimore American*, July 29, August 2, August 16, citing *New York Tablet*; *Cincinnati Chronicle*, July 23, citing *New York Evening Post*; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, July 23.
- ⁵⁰ *Davis Journal*, Sept. 6, cited in Keim, 8.
- ⁵¹ *Cincinnati Chronicle*, July 22, citing *Chicago Post*; *Cincinnati Enquirer*, July 23; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, citing *Washington Chronicle*, July 23, July 26, citing *Chicago Republican*; August 26; *Miners' Journal*, Sept. 3. (Statements asserting this division of sentiment.)
- ⁵² *New York Times*, July 22; *New York World*, Aug. 12; *Baltimore Evening Bulletin*, July 20; *Savannah Morning News*, July 27; *Richmond Dispatch*, July 28; *Rocky Mt. News*, Aug. 17; *Baltimore American*, Aug. 12, July 19, 20; *Pittsburgh Post*, July 22, 25, 27; *Richmond Whig*, July 26.
- ⁵³ *Boston Daily Traveller*, cited in *Cincinnati Daily Chronicle*, July 20.
- ⁵⁴ *New York Standard*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 23; *Little Rock Daily Republican*, Aug. 31; *Richmond Whig*, Aug. 4.

Other examples of this type, blaming both sides, or illustrating how the journals varied their criticisms at will, and without paying attention to party alignment:—(All these in July or early August)

Nashville Republican Banner, July 16; *Baltimore Sun*, July 19; *Springfield (Ill.), State Journal*, July 19; *Detroit Free Press*, July 17, July 28, *Philadelphia Ledger*, July 16, 21, Aug. 1; *Washington Evening Star*, July 15; *Savannah Republican*, July 16, July 19, *New York Sun*, July 22; *Charleston Daily Courier*, July 25; *Mobile Register*, July 19; *New York Times*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 23; *Cincinnati Daily Gazette* July 21; *Pittsburgh Post*, July 20; *California Daily Alta*, July 12, 28; *New York Commercial Advertiser*, July 22; *Chicago Tribune*, cited in *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 25; *Harper's Weekly*, cited in *Cincinnati Enquirer*, July 27; *St. Paul Dispatch*, July 16; *Philadelphia North American*, July 12, July 28; *Washington National Republican*, July 27; *Cincinnati Daily Chronicle*, July 27; *Providence Journal*, July 22.

⁵⁵ *Davis Journal*, Aug. 29, 1870, cited in *Keim*, 16.

⁵⁶ Davis to Washburne, Sept. 7, 1870, *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, I: 67-68; *Davis Journal: Keim*, 9.

⁵⁷ Washburne, *Recollections*, I: 120-124; *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, I: 67; III: 116-118; Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, II: 118; Joseph B. Foraker, *Notes of a Busy Life*, II: 192-3.

⁵⁸ Richardson, *Messages*, VII: 96-97.

⁵⁹ Citations from *Davis Journal* and from the correspondence of Bancroft, *Keim*, 11-17, 25, 26-29; *Schieber*, 11; *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, I: 207-208, 210-211, 214.

⁶⁰ *Baltimore Sun*, Sept. 9; John Spencer Clark, *Life and Letters of John Fiske*, I: 379.

⁶¹ *Frank Leslie's Magazine*, Aug. 27, Sept. 24, Oct. 1.

⁶² *Leavenworth Bulletin*, Sept. 7.

⁶³ *Providence Journal*, Sept. 7.

⁶⁴ *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 9.

⁶⁵ *Rocky Mt. News*, Sept. 14, Sept. 28.

⁶⁶ *New York Tribune*, cited in *Baltimore American*, Sept. 12.

Other very friendly utterances, *San Francisco Bulletin*, Sept. 8; *Washington National Republican*, Sept. 7; *Cincinnati Daily Chronicle*, Sept. 6; *Detroit Free Press*, Sept. 6, Sept. 9; *Illinois State Journal*, Sept. 6, Sept. 7.; *Philadelphia Age*, Sept. 10; and citations from *New York Independent*, *Nation*, *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, *New York World*, and *Boston Post*, in *Schieber*, 23-4. See also the *Letters* of Mary Corinna Putnam (Dr. Mary Putnam Jacobi), in the *American Historical Review*, XXII: 836-841, and Eugene N. Curtis, "American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revolutions." *American Historical Review*, XXIX: 263-270.

⁶⁷ Longfellow to Norton, *Life of H. W. Longfellow*, Sam'l Longfellow, ed. III: 155.

⁶⁸ *Life of Joseph Hodges Choate*, Edward Sanford Martin, ed., I: 292, 294.

⁶⁹ *John L. Motley and his Family*, Susan and St. John Mildmay, ed., 288-293. Courtesy of Dodd, Mead and Co., Publishers, New York.

⁷⁰ *Nashville Republican Banner*, Sept. 8, Sept. 10, 13, 24.

⁷¹ *Richmond Whig* (Dem.), Sept. 6, 19.

⁷² *Baltimore Sun*, Sept. 7, 15, 16.

⁷³ *New York World*, cited in *Trenton Gazette*, Sept. 7, and *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 15.

⁷⁴ *New Orleans Times*, cited in *Philadelphia North American*, Sept. 14.

⁷⁵ *Chicago Times*, cited in *Philadelphia North American*, Sept. 14. Other Democratic

- papers, similar in tenor: *Philadelphia Age*, Sept. 7, and cited in *Philadelphia North American*, Sept. 14; *Boston Post*, cited *Ib.*; *Pittsburg Post*, Sept. 5, Sept. 12.
- ⁷⁶ *Nashville Republican Banner*, Sept. 10.
- ⁷⁷ *New York Herald*, cited in *Pittsburg Post*, Sept. 10.
- ⁷⁸ *Providence Journal*, Sept. 8, Sept. 28.
- ⁷⁹ *Nation*, Sept. 13, Sept. 15, Sept. 27.
- ⁸⁰ *Pittsburgh Gazette*, Sept. 5, Sept. 8, Sept. 9.
- ⁸¹ *Cincinnati Daily Chronicle*, Sept. 10, 15, 16, 20, 26, Dec. 17, 18, 21.
- ⁸² *Philadelphia Ledger*, Sept. 5, 8, 20; *New York Tribune*, Sept. 29; and cited in *Richmond Whig*, Sept. 15.
- ⁸³ *Detroit Free Press*, Sept. 15, Sept. 19. Other articles at about this time showing friendly feeling toward France, condemning Germany for militarism and undue harshness in prosecuting the war and in the proposed peace terms:—*Boston Courier*, cited in *Pittsburgh Post*, Oct. 12; *Washington Daily Patriot*, Dec. 10, Dec. 15; *Kansas Tribune*, Sept. 9; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Sept. 13; *San Francisco Bulletin*, Sept. 13; *Leslie's Magazine*, Sept. 3; *Wilmington Daily Commercial*, Sept. 8, *New York Standard*, cited in *Detroit Free Press*, Sept. 8.
- ⁸⁴ Laura E. Richards and Maud Howe Elliott, *Julia Ward Howe*, II: 301–306.
- ⁸⁵ Charles Sumner, *Addresses on War*, Edwin D. Mead, ed., 250–319.
- ⁸⁶ *New Orleans Commercial Bulletin*, Oct. 5.
- ⁸⁷ Francis Ticknor, *Life and Letters*, Sept. 29, 1870. II: 489–90.
- ⁸⁸ Emerson, *Journals*, X: 329. To Grimm, Jan. 5, 1871, 85–86.
- ⁸⁹ Paine, *Thomas Nast*, 147–8; 202.
- ⁹⁰ *Frank Leslie's Magazine*, Oct. 1, Nov. 5, Nov. 12, Nov. 19, 1870. Somewhat similar, *Chicago Tribune*, Jan. 30, 1871.
- ⁹¹ *Trenton Daily Gazette*, Sept. 5, 6, 7, 10.
- ⁹² *Hartford Courant*, Sept. 5, 8, 10; *Scribner's*, I: 106–7, 342, 450, II: 206–7.
- ⁹³ *New York Times*, cited in *Little Rock Republican*, Aug. 31, Sept. 12; cited in *Baltimore American*, Sept. 12.
- ⁹⁴ *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, Sept. 5, Sept. 7, Sept. 9.
- ⁹⁵ *Boston Evening Journal*, Aug. 6, Sept. 7, 8, 9; *St. Paul Dispatch*, Sept. 8, Sept. 12; *Baltimore American*, Aug. 30, Sept. 5, 9, 10, 14, 17; *Washington Evening Star*, Sept. 6; *Bridgeport Daily Standard*, Sept. 5, 7, 8, Dec. 12, 17; *Worcester Spy*, Sept. 8, 12, 15; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Sept. 6, 7, 9; *Little Rock Daily Republican*, Sept. 16, Nov. 18; *California Daily Alta*, Sept. 16, Oct. 3; *Appleton's Magazine*, Sept. 24, Oct. 8, Nov. 26; *Pottsville Miners' Journal*, Sept. 17, Dec. 31; and others cited in *Schieber*, Ch. I.
- ⁹⁶ *Schieber*, 14. Miss Schieber throughout her chapter appears to have exaggerated the pro-German bias in America.
- ⁹⁷ James Russell Lowell, *Letters*, C. E. Norton, ed., Lowell to Hughes, Feb. 7, 1871. II: 71.
- ⁹⁸ *Worcester Spy*, Jan. 31, 1871; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Feb. 28; *Nation*, Feb. 2; *Knoxville Daily Chronicle*, Jan. 28; *Richmond Enquirer*, Mar. 4; *Detroit Free Press*, Jan. 31; *Louisville Daily Commercial*, Jan. 31; *Springfield Daily State Journal*, Jan. 30; *San Antonio Express*, Jan. 31. Others cited in *Schieber*; 32–33.
- ⁹⁹ *Keim*: 29–34; *House Miscellaneous Documents* No. 210, Pt. 7, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session; Richardson, *Messages and Documents*, VIII: 120.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 41st Congress, 3rd Session, Pt. 2, 1870–71, 954 ff.
- ¹⁰¹ *Congressional Globe*, 41st. Congress, 3rd Session, Pt. 2, 1870–71, 869–870.

¹⁰² *Appleton's*, Jan. 21, 1871; Feb. 11, 1871.

¹⁰³ *Hartford Daily Courant*, Feb. 1, 1871.

¹⁰⁴ *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, Jan. 30.

¹⁰⁵ *California Daily Morning Bulletin*, Jan. 30.

¹⁰⁶ *Trenton Gazette*, Jan. 31, 1871.

¹⁰⁷ *Philadelphia Ledger*, Feb. 9; *Boston Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 31; *Pittsburgh Commercial*, Feb. 6; *Richmond Whig*, Jan. 31; *Philadelphia North American*, Feb. 25; *Washington Evening Star*, Jan. 30; *Leavenworth Bulletin*, Mar. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *Cincinnati Enquirer*, Feb. 1, 6, 13; *Washington Daily National Republican*, Jan. 2, 27, Feb. 3; *Philadelphia North American*, Jan. 28, 30, Feb. 25; *Mobile Register*, Jan. 7; Also *Pittsburgh Post*, Jan. 20, Mar. 3; *Philadelphia Age*, Jan. 30, 31, Mar. 3; *Philadelphia Ledger*, Jan. 11, 17, 23, 30. Other papers similar in tenor to those quoted—generally more friendly in tone, though not without criticism:—*Pittsburgh Commercial*, Feb. 21, 22, Mar. 10; *Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 27, Feb. 1; *Mobile Register*, Jan. 31; *Atlanta New Era*, Jan. 10; *Baltimore American*, Jan. 30; *Nashville Republican Banner*, Jan. 28; *Arkansas Gazette*, Feb. 2; *Mississippi Pilot*, Jan. 25, Feb. 10; *Santa Fe Post*, Jan. 28; *Richmond Dispatch*, Jan. 31; *New Orleans Commercial Advertiser*, Jan. 31; *Savannah Republican*, Jan. 31; and others cited in *Schieber*, 24. Praise for Germany, *Little Rock Republican*, Jan. 30; *Knoxville Daily Chronicle*, Mar. 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Leslie's Magazine*, Feb. 18, Mar. 4, Mar. 18, 1871.

CHAPTER 7

The Third Republic

THE outbreak of the Commune early in 1871, before the peace terms with Germany had been definitively settled, reacted unfavorably upon the judgment of the American observers. The United States Government instructed Minister Washburne to continue to recognize as the legal authority the organization of which Thiers had been chosen the chief executive. When this government was driven from Paris by the insurrectionary movement, it was necessary that the diplomatic corps should accompany it, in order to continue proper official relations; and, like his colleagues, the American minister secured a room at Versailles for use as temporary headquarters. Unlike the others, however, he resolved, and so informed his government, that he would return to Paris each day, and continue to occupy the actual legation. He was thus the only foreign minister who remained in Paris during the days of the Commune,—he had also been in the city during the siege and bombardment by the Germans,—and he had an unequalled opportunity to see and to know all the sinister details of the struggle. His reports to the government, and his later published *Recollections*, could not fail to impress Americans.¹

A few individuals of vision, like Wendell Phillips and Julia Ward Howe, and a few friendly papers, recognized that behind the revolution were some sincere and worthy impulses: the earnest wish to maintain the Republic; the desire to save France from dismemberment; the distrust of the great monarchist majority in the Assembly and the conviction that it had made a dishonorable peace; and even the principle of decentralization, of local self-government, as against the absolutism of a central power. But even these expressed regret that there had been recourse to force, and were horrified by the excesses committed. As the *California Daily Alta* impatiently put it, "Nothing, apparently, can be done in France without force. . . . No one thinks of solving the problem by free discussion in the press and public meetings."²

Many persons saw only the mob element, and allowed it to confirm or revive their former prejudices. The number of advanced Socialists and Anarchists among the leaders of the Commune increased the distrust. There

was little, if any, comprehension of the economic situation and of the difficulty of reconstruction in the stricken city.³

Said the *Trenton Gazette*, virtuously,—

“No greater curse could fall upon a dissolute and wicked city like Paris than to abandon it to its own evil passions.”⁴

A continued occupation of Paris by the Germans, according to the *St. Paul Dispatch* and the *Providence Journal*, would be the best thing for the city, for it would guarantee order and protection from demagogues. The *Journal* added:—

“It is this irrepressible passion for insurrection and for street barricades that makes the Parisian populace the worst possible foe both of liberty and of public security. On the slightest disaffection . . . they rush to their Hôtel de Ville and set up a new government, and to make their proceeding as vicious as possible they always call it a republic. The very name becomes hateful, from its continual prostitution by this Parisian mob. They proclaim themselves the people and everybody else is a tyrant, and an aristocrat, and an enemy to the people’s cause. Republican liberty has suffered more from the hands of these mobocrats than from all other foes put together.”⁵

These papers, except the *Providence Journal*, which was pro-French, had been unfriendly during the war, changing to greater friendliness after the establishment of the Republic.

The harsh measures taken by the government for the final suppression of the Commune brought criticism also, together with doubt of the permanence of a success won by such means.⁶ And there were scattered instances of the old spirit of invective, best illustrated by the following excerpt from the *Richmond Dispatch* (Dem.):—

“The malady which has fastened upon the Latin races seems to be incurable. . . . France alone upheld the glory of the Latin name. . . . This splendid military power of yesterday is now torn asunder territorially, rent with factions among her own citizens, her world-famous capital made a byword and a hissing. . . . The empire has failed; the republic has failed; and she is reduced to such straits that she looks back to the Bourbons for a ruler. The problem of France seems to be incapable of solution. . . . What else could they expect? They gave themselves up to their appetites, philosophized (as they called it) away everything that restrained them, abolished God, Christianity, Home, and the Family institution, custom, law, everything. They undertook . . . to find out something better than Revelation, a higher humanity; and they ended by shooting or starving Archbishop Darboy, by destroying the Tuileries and the Hôtel de Ville, by firing the Louvre, by burning one-fourth of Paris, by planning to burn all the great cities of Europe. It is not strange that France is added to the list of departed empires. She defied the cause of Religion and good morals with more boldness than any nation of modern if not of ancient times. . . . The civilization of northern Europe is bound to sweep over the south. The organization, the practical common sense, the wealth, the culture, the progressive spirit

of England, Germany, and Russia are bound to extend their ideas over France, Spain, and Italy. There is a common element of weakness in all the Latin races. They do not seem adapted to modern times. The English-speaking races, the German-speaking races, and the Slavic races only remain to dispute the sovereignty." 7

John L. Motley wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes, August 13, 1872, that he had just visited Bismarck at Varzin, and had a very great admiration for him and his achievements. He added that he thought it very advantageous to substitute the "solid, healthy, Teutonic influence for the Latinized Celtic" in the control of Central Europe. Far better to have things in the hands of a "united nation of deep thinkers and straightforward honest strikers for liberty and Fatherland" than in those of a race devoted to "la Gloire" and avowing that their grandeur must necessarily be built on "the destruction and disintegration of other nations." 8

These specimens deserve especial attention because they embody the idea, never abandoned by many Americans, that, largely for the reasons therein stated, France was incapable of ever again becoming one of the great powers, and that her place would be taken by Germany.

Over against them, however, must be set the judgment, freely expressed even in the dark days of reconstruction, that France had learned her lesson, and was now setting her feet firmly in the paths that lead to safety. The *Wilmington Daily Commercial*, for example, declared that having conquered the turbulent Paris mob the Republic had little to fear, even though there would certainly be factional troubles.

"Gay, volatile, fickle Paris is dead, let us hope, with the destruction and desolation of the war. Since she no longer is the imperial city of Luxury, Wealth, and Pleasure, we may trust that from among her ruins will issue a purer and a steadier, a higher and nobler life. A nation that produced Fénelon and Calvin ought not to be deficient in religious self-control, and one that has had among her sons Lafayette and Montesquieu should not be found wanting in sound patriotism and truly republican principles." 9

Appleton's Magazine spoke of the steady democracy of the French peasant, thought that the elections gave proof of "chastened moderation and promise of regeneration, and believed that the "old, false glare of imperialism" no longer dazzled. France "may astonish the world with a self-conquest more glorious than the victory of the Germans, which, with the genius of her people, will enable her speedily to recover her place among the leaders of civilization." Germany must not allow herself to be led by the ideas she now has of "French levity, French ignorance, French vanity, and the special French passion for 'la Gloire'" into underestimating the calibre of her neighbor. A constitutional monarchy, *Appleton's* thought, under a king from the Orleanist branch, was more probable than the permanence of the

republic, but there was no danger of a Bonapartist return. Warm appreciation was also manifested for the self-sacrifice and devotion which the French were showing in their efforts to reorganize the government and to pay the indemnity.¹⁰

The *Milwaukee Sentinel* after analyzing with care the faults and the virtues of France declared its full faith in the future of the Republic. "The nation has a vitality that cannot be destroyed." "The evils will be remedied and means found to meet the exigencies."¹¹ Herbert Tuttle, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for May, 1872, insisted that "democracy is a true passion in French nature." It explains the revolutions, and many of the sufferings of the country are due to the attempt to suppress it. So far it has lacked organization and has made many errors, but,— "The Republic alone can abolish general ignorance." It "must be established, because there is no safe alternative."¹² Charles Eliot Norton wrote, "Her troubles are not hers alone: they are but symptomatic of the evils that exist everywhere in modern society."¹³

The chronicle of William H. Seward's visit to Paris in the summer of 1871 is interesting. He believed that France was to blame for beginning the war, but this did not prevent his being keenly interested in her after-war recovery. He visited the French Assembly and thought the debates disorderly. He took dinner with Thiers on the day on which the Assembly had designated him as President of the Republic, and considered it an especially good sign that the choice had been made of a civilian and a statesman rather than a soldier or one under the influence of the militarists. He liked Thiers and thought him fully worthy of respect. He recognized the seriousness of the factional struggles, and the difficulty of paying "indemnities as great as the most rapacious of French armies ever extorted from foreign states," but came away with "a stronger hope than ever" of the country's future, and a sigh of thankfulness that since it seemed to be necessary for nations to change their rulers now and then the people of the United States had found a legal and orderly means for doing it,— "Every four years they can turn him out!"¹⁴

James Russell Lowell spent the winter and spring of the year 1872-3 in France, and wrote that "the French are the most wonderful creatures for talking wisely and acting foolishly that I ever saw." But he had "at least pretty well shaken himself clear of one of his pet antipathies." He had "even learned to like the French after a fashion." But he added:—

"I feel . . . that they are a different breed, for whom I am in no way responsible. . . . I watch these people as Mr. Darwin might his distant relations in a menagerie. Their tricks amuse me. . . . I don't believe they will make their *République* (a very different thing from a republic, by the way) march, for every one of them wants to

squat on the upper bar and to snatch the nuts from their fellows. *Esprit* is their ruin, and an epigram has twice the force of an argument. However, I have learned to like them, which is a great comfort, and to see that they have some qualities we might borrow to advantage.”¹⁵

During the war there had been much criticism from German-Americans and German sympathizers concerning the sale of arms to France. These were surplus stores left after the Civil War. Congress had authorized their sale, without restrictions, and the government had been selling them off wherever it could find a purchaser. French agents acquired a considerable quantity of them, though after a time sales to persons known to be representatives of France were ordered discontinued. In February, 1872, Sumner introduced in the Senate a resolution demanding an investigation of these sales, the immediate cause being charges of fraud emanating from French sources, to the effect that the United States had not delivered all the arms that the French had paid for. The Sumner resolution gave opportunity for a good deal of discussion and for expression of opinion as to the relative merits of French and Germans, but nothing new was brought out, and the speeches were so evidently made for purely political purposes that they are of little value for this study except perhaps to show how thoroughly domestic affairs had displaced matters of European politics in the public interest.¹⁶

The *San Antonio Express* in 1870 printed an anecdote which may also serve to illustrate the trend of American thought at this later time. Two countrymen met a third, and asked him what he thought about the war. “War? What war?” said he. “Why, the war in Europe. They are fighting there fearfully.” “There, by gum, I said it! I always said it! I always said that if we sot the nigger free we’d have another war, and I knowed it would be so!”¹⁷

Since our international relations were on the whole sufficiently smooth, an amiable indifference was manifested toward foreign questions in general, and in the case of France in particular this indifference developed into a habit, prevalent throughout the succeeding decades. It was usually friendly, often touched with contempt, and only occasionally roused to active condemnation or praise by some event which loomed large enough to attract our attention. Reasons for this attitude are not far to seek. Our own interests grew apace. In the development of great industries, in problems of trade, of transportation, of tariffs, of monetary standards, of labor difficulties, in all the manifold ramifications of great business and national enterprises, we found enough to absorb our energies and our minds. We were building a great educational system, working out a great series of schemes for social welfare; and in

a haphazard fumbling way creating a colonial empire and a tangle of imperialistic interests. Busy, eager, intense, proud of our accomplishments, confident of our future, fearing no one, sufficient unto ourselves, we had not grown into realization of the close interrelation which binds together the interests of the whole world and makes the problems of one country the problems of all.

There were no important points at which the interests of the United States and France clashed. Such differences as arose were either negligible in importance, or were capable of easy settlement, both sides showing a desire to bring about friendly adjustment. This in itself indicates a certain improvement in relations, inasmuch as if feeling on either side had been actively unfriendly, governments and peoples would have had a tendency to magnify injuries or place obstacles in the way of adjustment. In matters concerning the Monroe Doctrine, a far sharper tone had to be employed with both England and Germany than with France, and in Pacific affairs, France was not an obstacle to our policy to any serious degree, nor had we occasion to view her with the suspicion which we had for Japan, Russia, or Germany.

France herself was not, moreover, involved in any international difficulties on a large scale which challenged criticism or invited partisanship in this country. The diplomacy of the Third Republic has been of vital importance to world peace, but the development was so gradual and the significance of each step so imperfectly realized at the moment, that there were few occasions when the United States was tempted to take a definite stand. On these rare occasions, this country showed a friendliness which was in some contrast to previous years. This is largely to be explained by the feeling that Germany had become, not only the energetic, efficient business rival of the United States, whose activities must be respected if not always praised, but also the great military power of Europe, showing a tendency to rule with a strong hand. As between the two, France and Germany, it came to be true that American sympathy would be directed toward France, for militarism, wherever it appears, never fails to evoke the disapproval of the great mass of American citizens.

In regard to French internal politics, we had a certain impatience, a sort of annoyance because the French did not, according to our ideas, settle down and behave themselves. We could not see why a republic should continue to be so unstable, and for explanation fell back on our old ideas of French fickleness and French immorality. In this field of domestic affairs our old prejudices were most likely to reappear. Fixed ideas remain fixed unless some one has a definite interest in changing them, and even the French themselves made for some time no especial effort to do this. On

the whole, however, American opinion was more tolerant because better informed. Many international prejudices are based upon misunderstanding, and the increase of international contacts due to improved means of communication led to more intelligent, and therefore more just judgments.

Before turning to a brief discussion of some of the questions which affected the mutual interests of the two countries, a word may be said in regard to the French spoliation claims. A number of United States citizens had claims against France for damages incurred before 1800. In 1801 a treaty was ratified which extinguished all outstanding claims between the two countries. It was understood on both sides, and the United States so stated, both then and later, that there was no intention to deny the justice of the claims, but that they were merely to be cancelled as against France by counterclaims put forward on behalf of French citizens against the United States. It was correspondingly understood that each country would then investigate and attend to the claims of its own citizens. But in the United States the matter became involved in congressional debates, and although again and again it was up for discussion, and pages of speeches on the subject adorn the Congressional Record, nothing was done till 1885, when a bill was passed providing for investigation of the claims, though without any assurance that they would be paid. The matter was finally cleared up only a few years ago, but the payments then made were without interest.

Large sums were involved, and many persons were affected. Claims eighty years dormant were difficult or impossible to prove. Some had lapsed because no representative of the injured party was available to press them. France was in no way responsible for this delay and injustice, but because the claims were known as the "French spoliation claims," and because every time they were under discussion the story of the original injuries was repeated, it is not unnatural that some of the resentment and irritation which were connected with them should have passed to France rather than to the rightful culprit, the United States Government itself.¹⁸

Among the matters in which France was concerned at this time one which attracted considerable attention was the question of Liberia. This little negro state on the west coast of Africa had been colonized by freedmen from the United States, with much aid from individuals and from state and federal authorities. The United States had disclaimed any protectorate over the colony, however, and in 1847 it had been recognized by most of the European countries as independent. The formal act of recognition was delayed in this country until 1862, apparently because of unwillingness to

receive colored envoys. Liberia lies between the British possession of Sierra Leone and the French Ivory Coast, and was early subjected to pressure from both sides, since both France and Great Britain desired to extend their African holdings as far as possible. The boundaries of the Liberian state were not clearly delimited, and this fact, together with the inability of the Liberians to keep the native tribes in order, provided excuse for constant encroachments. Large foreign loans and bad financial conditions also encouraged foreign interference.

In 1879 rumors that France had suggested a protectorate were brought to the attention of the State Department, which promptly took up the matter through Mr. E. F. Noyes, the American Minister at Paris. In asking Mr. Noyes to find out the facts, the acting Secretary of State said that as the United States had "founded and fostered" the little native state, it was evident that this government must feel a peculiar interest in its continued independence.¹⁹ Mr. Evarts, the Secretary of State, wrote in the spring of 1880 to Mr. Noyes that the Government had included in the volume on Foreign Relations for the year a large amount of the correspondence bearing upon Liberia, because it was suitable that the great powers should know that America recognized her peculiar relations with the little state and was prepared to take every proper step to maintain them.²⁰

In 1884, while Great Britain and Liberia were in dispute over the boundary line along the Mannah River, it was said that the French had occupied an island in the river. This led to energetic representations on the part of Frelinghuysen, who was then Secretary of State, to the effect that the United States would consider such an act as threatening "the integrity and tranquillity" of Liberia; that the United States would claim the right to use its good offices in settling any disputed boundaries; and that denial of this right "could not but produce an unfavorable impression in the minds of the government and people of the United States."²¹ France disavowed this act, as she had previously disavowed the attempt at a protectorate.

During the succeeding years, nevertheless, France and Great Britain did gradually seize large portions of Liberian territory, paying little attention to the reiterated protests made by the American government. Cleveland's Annual Message, in 1886, took note of these encroachments, reviewed the circumstances of the organization of Liberia, and the reasons for special interest on the part of America, and said further,—

"Although a formal protectorate over Liberia is contrary to our traditional policy, the moral right and duty of the United States to assist in all proper ways in the maintenance of its integrity is obvious, and has been consistently announced during nearly half a century."²²

Popular interest is reflected in this sentence from the *History of Liberia*, by J. H. T. McPherson, brought out as one of the Johns Hopkins University Studies in 1891:—

“The United States might well exercise some protecting care, might now and then extend a helping hand, and let the aggressive powers of Europe see that Liberia is not friendless and that encroachment upon her territory will not be tolerated.”²³

Matters came to a crisis in 1909. The Liberians the previous year, after a particularly flagrant seizure of land by the French, had decided to send a commission to the United States to implore aid. President Roosevelt and Secretary Root received the envoys in a most friendly manner, and asked Congress to provide funds to send a committee to Liberia to investigate the situation thoroughly, and make recommendations as to the best way in which the United States could give assistance. Both declared that it was imperatively necessary to meet the emergency. Plans for sending the commission were completed by the incoming President, Mr. Taft, and by Secretary Knox, both of whom expressed themselves as being in full sympathy with the move.²⁴

Popular interest had been growing²⁵ and much sympathy with Liberia was now expressed.²⁶ It is fair to note, however, that England's aggressions were considered quite as reprehensible as those of France. The commission went over to Africa in the summer of 1909, and the report published after its return was most favorable to Liberia. The report stated that the country was not bankrupt, as some European sources had tried to insinuate, but could without great difficulty be placed upon its feet financially, and urged that the United States should undertake this responsibility, thus relieving the Liberians of the pressure brought by foreign creditors. They advised a reorganization of the army under United States direction, so that the charge that the government could not keep order could not be employed as an excuse for outside interference; and recommended American assistance in settling boundary disputes. Active steps were at once taken to carry out these recommendations and others looking toward the improvement of the country industrially and educationally. There is abundant evidence that this was satisfactory to Americans. As the *World's Work* put it,—

“This means, in effect, that Liberia remains on the map of Africa, and there are at least two European governments who will not welcome the information.”²⁸

At one time during this same period another African affair created some

interest in the United States. After the French occupation of Madagascar, John L. Waller, an American consul, remained on the island at the expiration of his official term, and undertook to develop some business concessions. He got into trouble with the French authorities, was arrested, and sentenced to a twenty-four year term in prison. He appealed to the United States government, which took up the case. The matter dragged on for some time, and President Cleveland was criticised for not handling it with more energy, his "spirit of indifference" being "at variance with the spirited traditions of the State Department when in Republican hands." It was asserted that the charges brought against Mr. Waller were devised simply to oust him from concessions which were desired by French promoters. Mr. Cleveland, apparently, saw no cause for excitement, and proceeded to obtain his release in an entirely pacific spirit.²⁸

If we turn to matters nearer home, we find some questions involving the Monroe Doctrine. The first of these, a real infraction of the sacred tenet, attracted no attention at all in the United States. France bought from Sweden the little island of St. Barthélemi, in the West Indies, in 1878.²⁹ As negative evidence, this has some value. In the early decades of the century, or in recent years, such transaction could not easily have been completed.

A quarrel between Venezuela and France, beginning in 1880, engaged the attention of our government to some extent until 1883, when through the good offices of the United States a settlement was arranged. The matter concerned a debt due France, and several times there appeared to be danger that a blockade would be instituted and custom-houses seized, in order to force payment. The United States was most anxious that this should not occur, and Secretary Evarts and his successors, Blaine and Frelinghuysen, earnestly urged moderation upon the French.³⁰

It is interesting to note that in 1906, when France again had trouble with Venezuela, the sympathy of the press in the United States was definitely pro-French, and the fullest confidence was expressed that "whatever steps France felt obliged to take in support of her rights and her dignity, her government would use the greatest care to avoid giving any grounds of offence to the United States and would not in any way violate the principles and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine."³¹

Among the most important of the questions which might have led to serious trouble between the United States and France was the project for building a trans-oceanic waterway at some point in Central America. It will be recalled that the canal scheme appeared very soon after the Spanish discovery of the Pacific, and that interest in the plan and in-

vestigation of possible routes had been continuing steadily, not without considerable friction between the United States and the other countries whose attention had been attracted to the same field.

After Napoleon III had made several attempts to gain a foothold in Central America,³² President Grant went on record with a decisive statement that in his judgment it was of very great importance that no European government should be in a position to control an inter-oceanic canal in this district.³³ He also appointed an Inter-oceanic Canal Commission, and through it undertook thorough surveys of the various routes which had been proposed. The reports of these surveys favored a Nicaraguan route, and steps toward acquiring the necessary rights were begun. It was realized also that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, negotiated in 1850, in which both countries agreed not to try to obtain exclusive control of any canal, but to maintain the absolute neutrality of any work which should be constructed, was a barrier to any undertaking of the kind on the part of the United States government, and that it must be modified or annulled before the growing desire of Americans to see such a work carried out through American initiative and under American management could possibly be realized. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty then became an object of increased attack on the part of the State Department. It had never been popular. We had never accepted the British interpretation, and the treaty now became so definitely obnoxious that successive efforts to do away with it were continued until it was at last, in 1901, replaced by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.³⁴

The anxiety to dispose of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was distinctly intensified by the renewed French interest in the Isthmian question. Between 1875 and 1878 various adventurers obtained concessions or announced schemes. The *Société Géographique* of Paris undertook a study of the various routes; and finally an influential group of Frenchmen belonging to the Bonapartist party undertook to revive the idea of imperial greatness by this means, and obtained concessions for several routes, notably one from Colombia for a canal anywhere on the Isthmus of Panama. Lieutenant Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse was the chief of this group, and General Türr was another important member. But more important still was the veteran engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal. After some investigation, De Lesseps decided to try to develop the Panama route, as marked out by Wyse and another French engineer, Reclus. In order to get popular backing for his undertaking, he called an "International Engineering Congress" at Paris, to consider the whole question of canal routes. While the Congress was called "Scientific," the majority of the members, chosen by De Lesseps himself, were not scientists at all, but

politicians, capitalists, and speculators. Official representatives of other countries had been asked, and the United States sent a group of men well informed on the subject. One of these, Lieut. Menocal, reported that out of the seventy-two votes cast in the end for the Panama route, only nineteen were those of engineers, nine of these being connected with the Suez organization, five others not practicing engineers, and only one of the whole number had ever seen the Isthmus. "Of the five delegates from the French society of Civil Engineers, every one either voted 'nay' or stayed away at the time the vote was taken." However, the vote was acclaimed as a decisive endorsement of the plan already decided upon, and a company was at once formed to take over the Wyse concessions and begin the work.³⁵

The news of this definite action aroused a prompt resentment in the United States. Resolutions were introduced in Congress, protesting against the scheme as a clear infraction of the Monroe Doctrine, and declaring that it would represent "an obtrusive interference with our home affairs . . . which the citizens of the United States would never tolerate"; that "whenever, however, or by whomsoever" such a canal was constructed, the American government should insist that the right of the United States to possess and control it would be asserted and maintained; and that a refusal by any Power to recognize such a right, through the acquisition of any part of any state on the American continent would be regarded and treated as "dangerous to our peace, prosperity and safety."³⁶

Secretary Evarts made a declaration which has since been recognized as a very important part of the Monroe Doctrine, when he said that the "paramount interest" of the United States in inter-oceanic communications had been recognized by European states, and implied that they must always do so. And President Hayes took a step in advance of this position, and a very important one, when he stated that the policy of the United States was a canal under American control, and that the country could not surrender this control to any European power, for such a channel would be "virtually a part of the coast line of the United States."³⁷

President Garfield and Secretary Blaine in the following year took substantially the same position, and Blaine was most energetic in his attempts to dispose of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in order to clear the ground for American action.³⁸

Another reaction to be noted was the revival or inauguration in the United States of rival canal schemes. To these the De Lesseps plan gave a decided impetus. In connection with one of them, a Nicaraguan project sponsored by Lieut. Menocal and Rear-Admiral Ammen, (both of whom had assisted in government surveys and had attended the Congress at Paris), General George B. McClellan, Levi P. Morton, and other well-

known and well-informed men, Ex-President Grant, in an article in the *North American Review*, declared that "practically considered" the Panama plan had but little to recommend it, "either as a commercial convenience or as a financial success." The engineering difficulties were so great that the cost would be prohibitive, and "no American capitalist would be likely to look for dividends on an investment like this." But the Nicaragua concession was practically and economically sound, and:—

"The concession is made to Americans, . . . the corporators are Americans, and the act of incorporation is asked of an American congress. Every step of this project recognizes the right of the United States to guard with jealous care the American continent against the encroachment of foreign powers."

He declared that the French government would never have allowed an American company to build the Suez, even if it had maintained a branch office in France, as De Lesseps was then doing in America, and he thought our policy should be the same. The Monroe Doctrine had been maintained, and should be maintained, and he wished to emphasize to Congress and to the American people the high value of this work of building a Canal, and to remind them that if not accomplished by Americans, it would certainly be carried out by some rival nation.³⁹

The *Nation*, July 31, 1879, said:—

"Whenever and wherever it [the Canal] is constructed, it will become the most sensitive and vital part of our interstate and international communication system, and we must be prepared to protect it from the evil of local revolutions and foreign aggressions, to seize it when necessary, and successfully defend it against the two greatest naval powers in the world."

And, again, Feb. 5, 1880, the *Nation* argued that the French denial of official concern in the scheme counted for nothing, for "nobody ever supposed that the present government of France would unnecessarily incur the ill-will of the United States by avowedly espousing it." But it must protect a company of its citizens working under its laws, and it would be very easy to make excuses for action at any time. The Canal Company would certainly dominate the weak state in which it operated. "A great power like ours, with two long coasts and with complex commercial interests on both oceans, is bound to see that these advantages are not put in peril of any kind." Moreover, the United States, bound by treaty with both Nicaragua and Colombia to guarantee the nationality and neutrality of the Isthmus, would merely make that duty more costly and burdensome if it allowed the establishment of an enterprise which must almost inevitably lead to infractions of neutrality. Instead, America should "find a way" to exert the "preponderating influence to which nationally, geographi-

cally, and commercially we are entitled." And, quoting Senator Bayard, we should "seize the day" and "act promptly and efficaciously" to the end that "neither the French nation nor any other power shall acquire a dangerous foothold at our doors." ⁴⁰

The Canal, if constructed, said the *North American Review*, in a strong editorial, would vitally affect the relations of the Pacific and the Atlantic territories of the American Union, and would inevitably require the protection of some great power. No other power has the right to divide this responsibility with us. "If the principles of the Monroe Doctrine . . . do not directly and forcibly apply to the question of an Isthmian Canal as that question has of late been brought before us by M. de Lesseps, to what conceivable question connected with American affairs can those principles ever so apply?" ⁴¹

The *Pittsburgh Post*, strongly in sympathy with the attitude of the Government, referred to the De Lesseps cable, in which the engineer tried to minimize the effect of the Hayes pronouncement by saying, "The message of the President assures the political security of the Canal" and adds,—

"That's so. It secures American control, or no canal. Dog in the manger policy it may be, but not unnatural under the circumstances." ⁴²

It is not surprising that this feeling should have been manifested. What is more surprising, in view of the really great importance of the questions involved, is that there was so little of it. The public in general showed a surprising indifference to the whole affair. The vigorous Congressional resolutions failed to pass, and did not even arouse active discussion. Whatever popular excitement had arisen died down very promptly. President Hayes was even criticised for being "needlessly agitated," and the House resolutions called "buncombe," "windy pronouncements," "inexpressibly silly." The *New York Tribune* carried an article by Professor Woolsey, an authority on international law, showing that the De Lesseps plan was in no sense a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, since it was wholly a private enterprise, and until the French government tried, through the Canal, to dominate the people of Colombia in their choice of a government, the Doctrine "should not even be referred to in connection with it," and arguing the improbability of any French intervention which would be obnoxious. ⁴³

No real obstacle was placed in the way of the French company, and work on the Canal was actually begun in February, 1881.

The apathy shown by Americans is variously to be explained. Undoubtedly one cause of it was the propaganda carried on by De Lesseps in this country. He came over with the definite purpose of conciliating America. While he was unable to change the opinion of the Executive, his social position

and international prestige carried weight in many quarters, and he made clever use of all his resources. He persuaded the Secretary of the Navy to resign from the Cabinet to take charge of the American branch of his company, and placed its financial affairs in the hands of influential bankers. Moreover, as the accounts of the company later showed, large sums were spent in this country for lobbying, for subsidizing the press, for influencing public opinion in every way possible.⁴⁴

But more weighty with Americans in general was the wide-spread lack of faith in the success of the enterprise. Why worry over a scheme which was doomed to disaster? The leading American engineers were convinced that the Panama route was impracticable. They continued to emphasize the engineering difficulties and the huge cost involved; the more, because the delegates who had attended the Paris conference all testified that the decision there taken was based on inadequate or unsound data, manipulated for the interests of the clique which already held the concession. From the first, American accounts spoke of the "ludicrous assurance," "conceit" and "lack of appreciation of the magnitude of the work" manifested by De Lesseps and his friends, and their "bewilderment on economic as well as engineering" problems.⁴⁵

As the work progressed, this contempt did not lessen. American observers visited the Canal and reported the slowness of its progress, the inability of the engineers to cope with the Chagres River or the slides at Culebra, and the great loss of life due to unsanitary conditions. The reports, bulletins, and advertising matter issued by the company were carefully scrutinized, and the flaws pointed out. The fraud, inefficiency, extravagance, and impending bankruptcy were apparently fully realized in the United States earlier than in France. "Whatever can be tested, in the bulletins, fails to stand the test." The plan was classed as "conceived in vanity and prosecuted without seriousness and without intelligence," and pity was expressed for the small investors who had been swindled. "They, and not he [De Lesseps] will suffer by the failure of the canal, for his cheerful spirit is not to be quelled by the misfortunes of others."⁴⁶

The *Nation* came to take the position that the failure of the Canal might lead to the overturn of the French government, which would be a great calamity. The belief was generally held, according to this paper, that "De Lesseps will never finish the canal, that no private company will ever finish it, that the present company will become utterly bankrupt," which would be "the greatest financial disaster of modern times," and would shake the French state to its foundations. It was to the interest of America to see the plan completed, and by no means to her interest to see the French Republic fall. There should be no real objection to the use of French

capital. "If we are strong enough to hold that of Nicaragua and keep it open, we shall be strong enough to seize that of Panama" in time of need. This was in 1886 and 1887. In 1889, "the thought of reviving the Panama plan may seem laughable in the United States," but the scheme, in spite of its difficulties, seemed not impossible of completion, and the French word was that America was crying it down only to be able to buy it in for a song. When the crash finally came, and the French company admitted its bankruptcy, Congress seized the opportunity to prevent future enterprises of a similar nature, and the Senate passed a resolution expressing American disapproval "of any connection of any European government with any canal across any American isthmus." This declaration received an almost unanimous vote. A few weeks later, Congress went further, adopted a definite protest against French control in Panama, and appropriated \$250,000 to be used by the President in protecting American rights and interests on the Isthmus.⁴⁷

As we look back upon the period, it seems probable that the intensity of the partisan politics of the day had much to do with the American attitude. Hayes was the strongest champion of the "American control" idea, and Hayes was President only by a compromise which had left unusually hard feelings in its wake. Moreover, by his policy in appointments and in administration he had practically split the Republican party, and had at least alienated many of its influential members. De Lesseps could have chosen no more fortunate moment, for it was well-nigh impossible at that time to gain united popular support for any executive action. At any rate, whatever crisis there was or might have been, passed, and it does not seem that the French attempt left any appreciable or lasting bitterness in the United States.

Turning from the Monroe Doctrine to a matter which touched American interests in a somewhat different way, we should mention, although briefly, the tariff difficulties with France, covering a period of some twenty years, beginning about 1881. The first phase, and the only one which created any serious feeling in the United States, concerned what M. Ribot, then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, called "l'affaire des petits cochons," when France and Germany prohibited the importation into their countries of American pork. The reason assigned was the alleged presence of trichinæ, making the product a menace to the health of the consumer. It developed that a far more weighty reason was the desire to protect the native agricultural industries against American competition. But, as the American Ambassador to France remarked, there is a difference between protection and prohibition, and after some argument the French recognized this, and substituted for the obnoxious laws high tariffs based to some extent upon

the principle of reciprocity. The controversy was handled throughout in a friendly spirit, quite different from the acrimonious tone which the government was compelled to employ in the negotiations with Germany upon the same subject. For example, Whitelaw Reid, who later secured the withdrawal of the undesirable French laws, called attention in his first official address as American Ambassador in Paris, (1889), to the fact that both countries were then celebrating anniversaries, France the centenary of her Revolution, America that of the Constitution and the inauguration of Washington. These anniversaries, he said, revived old memories of friendliness, and—"I am instructed that there is not the shadow of a question in dispute between the two great Republics to cloud the historic friendship which has endured for a century." ⁴⁸

Ten years later, however, the "historic friendship" was somewhat clouded by the French disapproval of American intervention in Cuba and the strong pro-Spanish feeling manifested by France in the war which followed. Americans were not pleased by the criticisms in the French journals, nor by the cartoons such as that in *La Silhouette*, which pictured the United States as the wolf in the fable, and Spain as the lamb, with the legend "Will might be right yet again?" ⁴⁹

Most Americans were nevertheless tolerant enough to admit that both sentimental and economic reasons would naturally impel the French to side with Spain. Politically and strategically the relations between the two countries had been close for years, too, and for the safety of France must continue to be so. Both were Catholic in religion, and both of the Latin race. France was the largest holder of Spanish bonds and a Spanish defeat would therefore be reflected by a business depression in France. The *Nation*, reviewing these points, added that both countries attached greater importance to good manners than did the United States, which was prone to think that formalities mean affectation. The *Outlook* called attention to the fact that some portions of the French press did not represent the people any more than did the yellow journals in the United States, but were controlled by financial interests. "Sooner or later," it added, "that keen intelligence which is sometimes obscured but never wholly destroyed in France must discern the facts in the Cuban situation and our motives in attempting to change the situation." The *New York Sun* deplored the rumors of American retaliation by a refusal to participate in the Paris Exposition planned for 1900, and said such action could only harm the United States. The *Philadelphia Ledger* agreed and regretted that any unfriendliness should appear, when Americans had "for more than a century had only the warmest and most cordial feeling" for France, "a feeling which has been strengthened

by her adoption in 1871 of a Republican form of government, so much like our own." ⁵⁰

American journals were quick to note the improvement in the French attitude as the war progressed. "We have no cause for serious complaint," said the *Review of Reviews*. The French were "humbugged by their mercenary newspapers" but are "rapidly seeing their mistake." Probably, as Madame de Hegermann-Lindencrone reported, the tact and cleverness of General Horace Porter, the new Ambassador to France, had much to do with the change. ⁵¹

Commendation was given, also, to the French government for the irreproachable neutrality and friendliness maintained in spite of the pro-Spanish predilections of the people; and it was partly in recognition of this fact that the good offices of the French, exerted most tactfully through M. Cambon, the Ambassador at Washington, were accepted for the opening of peace negotiations. Finally, it was the French capital which was selected as the place for concluding the peace treaty. In his Annual Message for 1899 President McKinley spoke of the very full participation planned by Americans in the Paris Exposition of the following year, and of the enthusiasm of the preparations. ⁵²

After the acquisition of the Philippines and Guam American interest in Pacific affairs grew apace. At the opening of the Spanish-American war we had accepted the Hawaiian Islands, which had long hung like ripe fruit ready to drop into our hands, and were now recognized as providing an essential naval base. We revised the Samoan agreement, and made our interests there independent of international control. Looking eagerly beyond, to the almost untouched riches of the Far East, we revived and strengthened the "open door" policy; and we built the Panama Canal at last, as a gateway between our eastern and our western shores and as the strategic guard for our oriental holdings and desires. In all these undertakings there was remarkably little friction with France, who did not appear as rival or as antagonist. In fact, as Francis Regal, the editor of the *Springfield Republican*, suggests, France was to some degree "out of focus," and our attention was directed instead toward England as the great sea power; or, with more antagonism, toward Germany's rising imperialism; or even toward Japan, as a new and formidable factor in world politics. ⁵³

We praised French behavior at the Hague Conferences, and we signed various peace and arbitration agreements with her without demur. ⁵⁴ When the Hay treaties of 1904 were before the Senate, the *New York Evening Mail* remarked that it would be hard to imagine a disagreement between France and America which would really menace the vital interests, the in-

dependence or the honor of either, and the *Literary Digest* in making its poll of the press on the subject declared that feeling was so cordial that most of the newspapers had to branch out into generalities to find any special significance or real worth in such a treaty between France and America.⁵⁵ And in 1910 Archibald Cary Coolidge, summarizing America's relations with France, declared that never during the last century had the relations between the two countries been on so satisfactory a basis, "and so far as we can judge, there is no good reason why they should not continue to be excellent."⁵⁶

On frequent occasions opportunity was found for manifestation of this cordial feeling between the two countries. Together they celebrated several anniversaries. There was a revival of interest in the heroes of the Revolutionary times, and there was an exchange of gifts and memorials based upon these common interests, such as could not have occurred between countries whose relations were other than friendly.

In 1881, the very year when De Lesseps' canal scheme was taking definite shape, and the year, too, when the French had prohibited the entrance of American pork, the United States celebrated the centenary of the Battle of Yorktown, having as guests of the nation a distinguished delegation of foreigners representing the countries and the families which had sympathized and helped on the occasion of the battle. President Arthur, in his address, expressed warmest appreciation of their generous aid, and at the dinner in their honor in New York, Secretary Evarts responded to the toast of "The French Alliance." "The amicable relations between our two countries, founded in 1778 by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce . . . cemented in blood in 1781, renewed by this visit of our distinguished guests, will we trust be perpetuated through all time." He made humorous reference to those manifestations of the spirit of amity which consisted in shutting out as many as possible of each other's products, but said that an exchange of goods was necessary,—“and we both know it.” He declared that the friendship of the United States with France was closer even than that with England. It represented “two Republics united against the world. . . . Nothing can limit it; nothing can disturb it; nothing shall disparage it.”⁵⁷ A striking contrast, this, to that other celebration of the Yorktown victory when Lafayette was in America in 1824 and the feeling was so unfriendly that French warships lying in the harbor ignored the occasion, and officers and members of the crew were forbidden to share in the rejoicings.

One of the best-known examples of international courtesy is the statue of "Liberty Enlightening the World," which stands in New York Harbor. The idea for this is said to date back to a time before the Franco-

Prussian War, when among a group of friends at the home of Laboulaye, the host suggested that because of the common interest and the sympathy between France and the United States, it would be fitting if they should join in building a memorial to the War of Independence. The sculptor Bartholdi was present, and was interested in the thought. He was an Alsatian, and after the war, unwilling to return to his home, he decided to go to America for a temporary stay. Visiting Laboulaye before he left, Bartholdi referred to American sympathy with Prussia, and Laboulaye declared his faith that this did not represent the true feeling of the Americans, who, he was sure, had real gratitude and friendliness for France. "Propose to our friends over there," he said, "to make with us a monument, in remembrance of the ancient friendship of France and the United States. We will take up a subscription in France. If you find a happy idea . . . we are convinced that it will be successful on both continents, and have a far-reaching moral effect." Bartholdi sailed with this in mind, and the plan for the statue came to him as he entered New York Harbor on his arrival. He was in the country six months, and made many friends among prominent Americans. On his return to France, a Franco-American committee was organized, the understanding being that the French would secure the money for the statue, and the Americans would provide the site and the pedestal. Washburne, the American Minister, took a keen interest in the plan. The French committee included descendants of Lafayette and Rochambeau, and prominent Republicans like Laboulaye. Wm. M. Evarts was chairman of the American group, and John Jay and other leading Americans were interested. Enthusiasm was increased by the fact that the United States was preparing to celebrate in Philadelphia the hundredth anniversary of its independence.

A memorial was sent to Congress asking for approval and support and President Grant sent a special message recommending such action. February 22, 1877, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to accept the statue, to choose a suitable site on Bedloe's Island, and to make arrangements for its installation with "such ceremonies as shall serve to testify the gratitude of our people for this expressive and felicitous memorial of the sympathy of the citizens of our sister republic." ⁵⁸

The work, said Chas. de Kay in *Scribner's Magazine*, is "designed to draw closer the natural bonds of sympathy between Frenchmen and Americans, and . . . to remind all men of the early alliance between the two peoples, as well as the political action and reaction they have at various times exerted upon each other." ⁵⁹

The money for the statue was raised in France by popular subscriptions from all classes of people, 100,000 different individuals contributing, and

on October 24, 1881, the anniversary of the victory at Yorktown, Levi P. Morton, the United States Minister to France, drove the first rivet in the statue. On July 4, 1884, M. de Lesseps, as Chairman of the French Committee, formally presented the work to Mr. Morton for the United States. Meantime, in this country, the money for the base and pedestal was being raised, rather slowly, so that the *New York World* finally undertook a campaign through which a fairly large proportion of the whole amount was collected. The base was completed in 1884, and in his Annual Message of that year President Arthur called attention to the expected arrival of the "generous gift of the people of France" and suggested Congressional action in recognition of it and in aid of the completion of the pedestal.⁶⁰

In June, 1885, the Bartholdi Statue arrived at New York. It was sent over from France in a warship, the *Isère*. As the boat came up the harbor it was escorted by the North Atlantic Squadron, the *Despatch*, with the Secretary of the Navy on board, leading. The Mayor, with the Pedestal Committee, the French consuls of New York and Chicago, and many guests, went out to meet it, and numbers of excursion boats, crowded with passengers, followed. All the vessels in the harbor were decorated with bunting and with French and American flags. Salutes were fired from the forts at the Narrows,—Fort Columbus, Castle William, and Fort Wood. The committee and the French representatives landed on Bedloe's Island where choral societies sang the "Marseillaise" and "Hail Columbia." Then they crossed to the Battery and paraded through crowded streets, gay with flags, and with roofs and windows filled with onlookers, to the City Hall. Three regiments of the New York State Guards led the procession, and delegations from various organizations were in line. A banquet, in the Governor's Room, in the City Hall, followed, with speeches and compliments of the warmest. Evarts made a felicitous address, and was followed by General Horace Porter, who spoke to the toast,—

"The French Alliance; initiated by noble and sympathetic Frenchmen; grandly maintained by the blood and treasure of France; now newly cemented by the spontaneous action of the French people; may it be perpetuated through all time."

When America lay prostrate, France aided her, said General Porter, "and now that America has risen in her strength and stands erect before the nations of the world . . . she always stands with arms outstretched toward France in token of the great gratitude she bears."⁶¹

On October 28 of the following year, 1886, the formal unveiling of the statue took place. No effort was spared by the United States Government to emphasize the international character of the ceremony and to give it

all fitting dignity and importance. President Cleveland and the Cabinet occupied the reviewing stand at Madison Square, while a large and imposing parade passed. There was a naval demonstration, with some 300 ships in line, led by French and American warships. At the hour of the unveiling of the statue by Bartholdi, cannon salutes were fired at every military post in the States and Territories, by order of the Federal Government. A distinguished delegation of French guests had come over, including the Premier, the Minister of Public Instruction, and members of the French legislature and of the Paris municipal council. Addresses were made, as usual, De Lesseps speaking for France, and President Cleveland responding. Among the other speakers was Chauncey M. Depew. That night there was an illumination of the harbor craft, but the drizzling rain which had fallen all day spoiled the display of fireworks which had been planned.⁶²

The poll of the press reported by *Public Opinion* showed without exception the greatest cordiality and appreciation. All the comments exhibited the kindest feeling toward France.⁶³ President Cleveland in his Annual Message in December, took pains to comment upon the gift and the friendship which it symbolized.⁶⁴

In 1889 the American colony in Paris presented to the city a reduced replica of the Bartholdi statue, Whitelaw Reid, then Ambassador, acting as spokesman at the presentation, which was made on July 4.⁶⁵ In 1900, on the Fourth of July, a statue of Lafayette, the gift of American school children, aided by an appropriation from Congress, was unveiled at Paris.⁶⁶ In 1902 a distinguished group of Frenchmen came to Washington to share in the ceremonies connected with the unveiling of the statue of Rochambeau, also a gift from France, and placed by the United States in a position of honor, directly across from the White House. Again the tone of the press was very friendly. The *World's Work* spoke of the service rendered by M. Cambon at the close of the Spanish-American War, and said that in view of this, American friendship could not be merely negative. We are in the debt of France, continued this article, intellectually and æsthetically, as well. "It is she that brings us into contact with Latin habits of thought and clearness of vision." The *Literary Digest*, citing appreciative remarks from American sources, cited also the French newspapers on the topic, including a phrase from the *Journal des Debats* to the effect that "even Senator Lodge spoke of gratitude."⁶⁷

In the fall of 1902 M. Cambon was replaced as French Ambassador, and Elihu Root in his farewell address spoke not only of the gratitude of this country for M. Cambon's kind offices, but of "the new republic,

whose footsteps we have all followed with hopes and prayers for its success and its permanency as during these thirty years it was proving itself a most important, most significant stronghold of popular rights, of popular sovereignty and of hopes for the future of the peoples of the earth, of the plain peoples of the earth in Europe. Through all the long course of the centuries, the French people have been doing, with pain, with travail, with infinite labor and sacrifice, the work of civilization and liberty.”⁶⁸

In 1904, the Congress of the United States voted that the Secretary of State should cause to be struck a medal to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, and that one single impression should be made in gold and presented to the Republic of France. The medal was designed by Louis and Augustus St. Gaudens, and the formal presentation to Ambassador Jusserand for France was made in Philadelphia, April 20, 1906, under the auspices of the American Philosophical Society, before a representative audience of Americans. Secretary Root again made the address. He said:—

“Take it for your country as a token that with all the changing manners of the passing years, . . . Americans have not forgotten their fathers and their fathers’ friends.

“Know by it that we have in America a sentiment for France; and a sentiment, enduring among a people, is a great and substantial fact to be reckoned with. . . . We feel a little closer to you of France for what you were to Franklin. Before the resplendence and charm of your country’s history—when all the world does homage to your literature, your art, your exact science, your philosophic thought—we smile with pleasure, for we feel, if we do not say: Yes, these are old friends of ours; they were very fond of our Ben Franklin and he of them.

“Made more appreciative, perhaps, by what France did for us when this old philosopher came to you, a stranger, bearing the burdens of our early poverty and distress, we feel that the enormous value of France to civilization should lead every lover of mankind, in whatever land, earnestly to desire the peace, the prosperity, the permanence, and the unchecked development of your national life.

“We, at least, cannot feel otherwise; for what you were to Franklin we would be—we are—to you; always true and loyal friends.”⁶⁹

At about this same time the return from France to America of the body of John Paul Jones furnished an occasion for the expression of very cordial feeling, both in Paris, where French and American sailors paraded together for the first time, and in Annapolis, where the body was interred. President Roosevelt, Ambassador Jusserand, Governor Warfield of Maryland, and General Horace Porter, through whose efforts the body was discovered and returned, were among the speakers on the occasion.⁷⁰

In 1909, in return for the compliment of the Franklin medal, the French struck one for San Francisco, rebuilt after the earthquake. In 1910, the State of Virginia presented the French Republic with a bronze duplicate

of the famous Houdin statue of Washington which stands in the State House at Richmond. In this year the French celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Third Republic, and received friendly congratulations from this country. In 1911 the Sons of the Revolution erected at Annapolis a granite shaft in honor of the French soldiers and sailors who were killed in that war.⁷¹

Finally, in 1912, the tercentenary of Champlain's explorations was celebrated in the United States. The states of New York and Vermont united in making and carrying out the plans, which included the Champlain Memorial Lighthouse at Crown Point, and a statue of the explorer at Plattsburg. France expressed a desire to share in the ceremonies through the presentation of a sculptured figure of "La France," the work of Rodin. This beautiful piece was brought to America by a committee led by Gabriel Hanotaux, and was received with the warmest appreciation. Typical of the comment is the editorial in the *New York Sun* which calls attention to the fact that this celebration follows closely Anglo-French ceremonies on the Riviera:—

"The American celebration will thus have the character of the recognition by the other half of the Anglo-Saxon world of the large and growing friendship between two of the world's great races. . . . The friendship with France is the oldest of American international relationships. It no longer has the character of an alliance or an agreement intended for warlike uses. But its value as an agent for peace has gained rather than lost thereby, and each celebration such as the present must serve a useful as well as a sentimental purpose, useful because it demonstrates the possibility of permanent international amity, sentimental because it recalls an ancient association in an honorable triumph."⁷²

NOTES AND SOURCES

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² *Nation*, July 13, 1871; Richards and Elliott, *Julia Ward Howe*, II: 308-9; *California Daily Morning Bulletin*, May 23, 1871; *Philadelphia North American*, May 13, 1871; *Leslie's*, May 6; *California Daily Alta*, Mar. 11, 1871.

³ *Leslie's*, Apr. 8, Apr. 29, July 1, 1871.

⁴ *Trenton Gazette*, Mar. 12, 1871.

⁵ *Providence Journal*, Mar. 4, 1871; *St. Paul Dispatch*, same date. *Pittsburgh Post*, Mar. 22; *Philadelphia Ledger*, Apr. 7, 1871.

⁶ *Boston Daily Advertiser*, May 30; *Washington Evening Star*, May 30; *Hartford Courant*, May 30; *Washington Daily National Republican*, June 6, 1871.

⁷ *Richmond Dispatch* (strongly pro-French, before this), May 23, June 10, 1871; *Washington Daily Patriot*, May 29; T. G. Appleton, "The Flowering of a Nation," *Atlantic Monthly*, Sept., 1871.

⁸ J. L. Motley, *Correspondence*, G. W. Curtis, ed., II: 349-52.

- ⁹ *Wilmington Daily Commercial*, May 27, 1871.
- ¹⁰ *Appleton's*, August 12, Oct. 21, 1871; Apr. 20, 1872.
- ¹¹ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, June 7, 1871.
- ¹² Herbert Tuttle, "French Democracy," *Atlantic*, XXIX: 560-565.
- ¹³ C. E. Norton to Frederick Harrison, Dec. 24, 1872. C. E. Norton, *Letters*, ed., S. Norton and M. A. deWolfe Howe. 1: 446.
- ¹⁴ *W. H. Seward's Travels around the World*, Olive Risley Seward, ed., 750-768.
- ¹⁵ James Russell Lowell, *Letters*. II: 87. Lowell to Geo. Putnam, Dec. 12, 1872; 91, Lowell to Miss Norton, Mar. 4, 1873; 96, Lowell to Leslie Stephen, Apr. 29; and 101, 102, 104.
- ¹⁶ *Savannah Republican*, Jan. 22, Feb. 4, 1872; *Keim*, 20-23; *Leslie's*, Mar. 30, 1872; Sumner, *Memoirs and Letters*, IV: 504-514; Wm. Dudley Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, II: 227-253; *Congressional Globe*, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. 2. 1871-2.
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- ³⁹ *North American Review*, CXXXII: 107-116. Feb., 1881; *Sparks*, 211-12; Johnson, *Panama Canal*, 80, 85-6.
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- ⁴³ *Philadelphia Times*, Mar. 1, citing *New York Tribune*; *Philadelphia Times*, Feb. 1, 1881; *Philadelphia North American*, Mar. 10, 1880; Feb. 9, 1881.
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- ⁵⁴ *Review of Reviews*, XIX: 149; *Ib.* XXXVI: *Ib.* XXXVII: 279; *America*,

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- ⁶⁴ Richardson, VIII: 498.
- ⁶⁵ Cortissoz, *Reid*, II: 130-31.
- ⁶⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1900, 456, 468, 471, (Rochambeau monument, Vendôme).
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- ⁷⁰ April 24, 1906.
- ⁷¹ Jusserand, 315-6; *America*, Aug. 27, 1910; *Outlook*, Oct. 1, 1910; *America*, Apr. 18, 1911.
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CHAPTER 8

Signs and Portents

IF the actual relations between two countries consisted solely in those which are official and are thus governed to a greater or less degree by the existence or non-existence of possible causes of conflict, this study might well have been concluded with the summary of official relations, in the last chapter. But for a clear understanding of the disposition of Americans toward France during this period it will be necessary to consider also some less tangible but equally potent factors.

The current of opinion in any country is determined largely by the trend of thought in intellectual circles. In the early years of American history French educational systems exercised a great influence upon our schools and French intellectual achievement was highly respected.¹ In the last forty years of the nineteenth century German influence in this field had to a very great degree become predominant and the Germans were generally spoken of as the originators and leaders in science and learning.²

This tendency could not be wholly justified by the genuine and undoubted progress made by Germany since the Franco-Prussian War. Other European nations had been progressing too, and each could present undeniable evidence of achievement. The explanation is largely to be found in the fact that practically everyone who was trained abroad during this time studied in Germany, under professors who believed and enthusiastically maintained that in all intellectual matters Germany's place in the sun was an accomplished fact, and that no other nation could hope to compete. The returned students, leaders in American intellectual circles, consciously or unconsciously spread this propaganda.

The flow of students to German universities is in its turn to be explained in part by the fact that in American academic circles advanced degrees had become important factors in success, and the German schools placed by far the fewest restrictions and difficulties in the way of foreign students who wished to obtain such degrees. In France in particular the regulations until within the last few years were practically prohibitive, inasmuch as to be eligible for a higher degree one should hold the lower one from a French institution. Degrees from standard American colleges and uni-

versities were not acceptable. Americans naturally did not care to spend years of foreign study without being able to show for them something tangible and something which would advance them professionally in their own country.

In making the restrictions the French had in mind the fact that their educational institutions were practically a part of their civil service system, since they fitted their graduates to hold state offices, and it was desired that government officials should be trained from the beginning under French auspices. The value of attracting foreign students was not realized and foreigners came to feel that it was difficult, almost impossible, to obtain academic recognition in a French institution. It was therefore entirely natural that Americans should flock to German universities, where they were welcomed and honored, and that they should carry away with them a feeling of gratitude and loyalty, should condemn the rigidity of the French regulations, and conclude that the country was not so far advanced intellectually as Germany.

Moreover, this meant that French works, in the original or in translation, were not assigned for study in American universities, nor cited so frequently as they should have been; French scholars and scientists of high rank were not adequately known, and French researches not justly considered. And the thinking and writing of American professional men in all fields reflected this inequality.³

A change, however, was on the way. In spite of the strong ties which bound them to German leadership, American investigators could not allow their field of thought to be held permanently within such narrow limits. Instead they wished to develop along international lines, searching for the best wherever it was to be found, and according without bias or prejudice due honor to good work no matter where or by whom it was produced. Achievement, rather than nationality, was to become the accepted test.

An American lawyer, Mr. Harry J. Furber, made an investigation in 1895 of the Sorbonne, the Collège de France, the École des hautes études, and of other schools in Paris. He found in the art schools more Americans than in any other European center, but the number in general cultural courses or in the various fields of science was extremely small, and in view of the quality of training offered, he thought this regrettable. The reason seemed to lie in the hampering governmental regulations above mentioned. He promptly took up the matter with the French authorities, through M. Poincaré who was then minister of public instruction. Several prominent Frenchmen became interested and undertook to coöperate. In America a group of leading educators joined in the movement. Among them were

Presidents Angell of the University of Michigan, Dwight of Yale, Eliot of Harvard, Gilman of Johns Hopkins, G. Stanley Hall of Clark, and Schurman of Cornell; also Carroll D. Wright, W. T. Harris, United States Commissioner of Education, S. P. Langley of the Smithsonian Institution, Andrew D. White, Simon Newcomb, and Seth Low. Their purpose was declared to be "to facilitate closer educational affiliation" between French and American schools. As a result the vexatious French regulations were changed.⁴

Interest, in the United States, was at once much stimulated. It is worth while in this connection to compare the brief and superficial account of French schools of history and politics written in 1887 by Andrew D. White with the thorough, thoughtful, and in the main favorable study of the same subject offered in 1897 by Charles Homer Haskins.⁵

American observers criticised the close government supervision of the schools and their linking with politics. This was thought to interfere with the development of individual initiative and likely to react unfavorably upon national progress. They found the organization of the educational system unnecessarily complex, and characterized to some degree by a lack of coördination between related subjects. The unrivalled material, especially the manuscript collections, in the French libraries was not well catalogued nor readily enough accessible. Some doubted whether life in Paris could be morally healthy for the immature student. The French schools seemed lacking in the qualities of human sympathy and comradeship and in the love for an alma mater which characterize American ones, but this was attributed to the fact that learning, with the French, "is not an accomplishment," but an honorable and arduous profession." But, said Barrett Wendell,—

"Could our graduate students who propose to devote their lives to learning come more frequently under the influence of the combined industry and intelligence of modern scholarship in France, the American universities of years to come might be at once more solid and more stimulating in their atmosphere than now seems quite likely."

And Frederic E. Farrington, in his study of the French secondary school system (1910), declared that the progress made in France since the Franco-Prussian War was "quite without a parallel within the same length of time in the educational history of the world."

The qualities most praised were the seriousness, precision, and devotion of French scholars and students, the "directness, simplicity, and clarity" with which they presented their results, either in lectures or in written work; their steadily increasing accuracy and thoroughness, combined with a very just sense of proportion and a "certain originality and freshness

of view." The exceptionally high standard required for the Doctor's dissertation was emphasized.⁶

After 1898 a system of exchange professorships grew up which has greatly aided in bringing about a better understanding. In 1897 Ferdinand Brunetière gave a course of lectures in French on French poetry and drama at Johns Hopkins University. The lectures were notable in quality and attracted considerable attention.⁷ He spoke also at Harvard. Partly as a result of this and partly because of the enthusiasm for French literature which Professor Ferdinand Bôcher was able to arouse in his students, the Cercle Française at Harvard, which had been founded in 1886, and had been giving annual presentations of French classic dramas, established the custom of inviting each year a distinguished French man of letters to lecture at the University. This undertaking was due largely to the initiative of James Hazen Hyde (Harvard, '98), and was made possible through his generous aid. Mr. Hyde in 1904 arranged to send American lecturers to French universities, first to Paris, and later to the provincial schools. In 1909 the lectures under the Hyde foundation became regular university courses, and in 1911 the exchange professorships were taken over by the Harvard authorities and the French department of public instruction. The lecturers when in this country of course addressed general as well as university audiences, in most cases, and their success encouraged other French persons of note to undertake a similar personal contact with the American public.

The idea of exchange professorships found favor in several American institutions. The lectures of Professor Henri Bergson at Columbia attracted especial attention. The Alliance Française, founded in 1902, again largely through the influence of Mr. Hyde, who has found much pleasure in acting as an informal liaison officer between France and America, has been especially active in bringing to this country French lecturers of distinction. About 1903 Baron Pierre de Coubertin provided foundations for the study of French literature in Princeton, Tulane, the University of California, and Leland Stanford University. French students were encouraged to study in American universities, and various fellowships for Americans in French schools were established.⁸ There was a steady increase in the number of academic honors exchanged, as in the admission of the nationals of one country to membership in the learned societies of the other. William James called his election to the French Institute "the greatest honor to which I could have aspired."⁹

The importance and the influence of such intellectual contacts must be obvious. From the exchange professorships have resulted, too, such valuable and widely-read books as Barrett Wendell's *France of To-Day*,

Archibald Cary Coolidge's *The United States as a World Power*, Henry Van Dyke's *The Spirit of America*, John H. Finley's *The French in the Heart of America*, and André Tardieu's *France and the Alliances*.

American periodicals show an increasing recognition of French accomplishment, and an increasing number of articles, in English or in translation, by French writers. It would have been impossible under any circumstances to ignore the work of the Curies, of Pasteur, of Fabre. At the St. Louis Exposition in 1904 a "World's Congress of Arts and Sciences" was held. It had been announced that so far as possible the addresses would be prepared by "the highest living authorities in each and every branch." In the list of foreign speakers the French divided honors quite evenly with the Germans, and among the French names were to be found such authorities as M. J. G. Darboux, who was honorary vice-president of the Congress, Professors Émile Picard, Henri Poincaré, Charles Eulart, Pierre Langevin, and Pierre Janet.

Perhaps the most striking single example of the change in the American point of view is to be found in the book, "Science and Learning in France," edited by Dean John H. Wigmore of Northwestern University. This was planned in 1915 and sent to the printer just before the United States entered the World War. It was frankly intended to influence American public opinion in favor of France, not, however, by making an attack upon Germany, but by the expression of a sincere and matured judgment in regard to the achievement of France in all the varied fields of science and scholarship. Nearly a hundred American authorities in the various fields contributed to the statements it contains, and they are men whose intellectual honesty cannot be questioned and whose judgment must be respected. The name of Dean Wigmore as editor would itself be a guarantee of the value of the work, and we find him supported by Ex-President Eliot of Harvard, who writes the preface, and by such men as Professor George C. Hale in the field of astronomy, Professors Charles Homer Haskins, J. T. Shotwell, and Dana C. Munro in the history group, John Dewey in that of education, Dr. T. C. Janeway and Dr. Morton Prince in medicine, etc. Some nine hundred other educational and professional leaders allowed their names to appear as "sponsors" of the work.

Appreciation of French literature in this country has been retarded in no small degree because Americans have condemned its quality of extreme realism and its emphasis upon questions of sex. Many have believed that these characteristics reflected a fundamental corruption and degeneracy in the French people. The charge is not new, nor is it confined to any single period. It has always recurred when there was occasion for criticism of French behavior. In preceding chapters various examples of this attitude

have been given. The feeling was strongly marked at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, it will be recalled. Julia Ward Howe said,—

“French literature has done much to corrupt American women. Unhappy France has corrupted the world. She is now swept from the face of the earth.”¹⁰

The same idea continued to be voiced throughout succeeding years, even by critics in many ways most friendly. Thomas Sergeant Perry, in an article in the *Atlantic*, in 1879, said casually,—

“There has been so complete a lack of French novels that could be recommended to any but a hardened class of readers— . . .”

and, in a later number of the same magazine,—

“Imagination and decency are two things that will probably survive even M. Zola’s prolonged and repeated attacks.”¹¹

Theodore Child, in *Harper’s*, spoke of

“the malady of style . . . artists of admirable talent who . . . do not deign to think what results their writings may have, or what germs of corruption their stories may disseminate . . . heedless of purity, of honesty, and of justice. . . . French artistic superiority does not condescend to work deliberately for good and to fight against evil.”¹²

Public Opinion (Aug. 30, 1886), quoted from the *Theatre Magazine* a scathing article on French drama:—

“. . . Firstly, a subject as revolting as possible to a wholesome moral sentiment . . . a heroine in every respect everything that a woman ought to strive and pray not to be,—but she is, nevertheless, the most charming of creatures. . . . A few amiable weaknesses she has to be sure. The ten commandments she habitually uses as curl-papers. This may seem irreverent, but then it shows *esprit*. She lies, she steals, she forges—but dear, dear, how divinely she plays on the piano! . . . Doubtless this played its part among the causes that brought France to her knees before the feet of Germany. Woe be to any land that adopts such poison for its drama.”¹³

George McLean Harper spoke of the “preoccupation” of French novelists with sexual relations, “preferably immoral.”¹⁴

When Hugues LeRoux lectured in America he proposed to establish a depot for the distribution of the best French literature, in order to vindicate its character. He said,—

“The American public has come to regard modern French novels as immoral productions of the worst kind. . . . The result is to check the influence of French thought in the United States and to create a prejudice against France and French ideas.”

American periodicals, commenting on this, took pains to say that Americans understand the difference between the French traditions and their own, and that they do appreciate the fine qualities of the best French work and have confidence in the sound moral basis of French character as a whole.¹⁵

James Hazen Hyde, in his lecture on "French Literature in the United States" brings out the same idea.¹⁶

Americans have, in fact, been steadily broadening their acquaintance with French literature, and their criticisms have been growing more discriminating and more just. The increasing ease of communication between the two countries has of course contributed to this; and much credit is due to the departments of literature and of language in our educational institutions. Members of these departments have carried out and published extensive literary studies, have translated and edited French texts, and have in general done much to make possible criticism which is based upon knowledge, and which avoids sweeping generalizations which mislead because they are only partly true. Professor Bôcher of Harvard, already mentioned, was one of the pioneers in this field. His collection of books on Molière and other 17th century dramatists is now a valued part of the Harvard Library. Professor Adolphe Cohn, formerly of Harvard, and later of Columbia, Professor Raymond Weeks of Columbia, Professors T. F. Crane of Cornell University, Albert Schinz of Smith College, H. P. Thieme of Ann Arbor, C. H. C. Wright of Harvard, Brander Matthews of Columbia, and many others, have helped in this way to build up American culture.

An excellent example may be found in Professor Wright's *History of French Literature*, in the preface of which occurs the statement that the author considers each historian entitled to his individual judgment, and that he himself prefers the classicists and rationalists of the 17th and 18th centuries to some of the romantics or emotionalists of the 19th, and believes that the "modern eccentrics" are not characteristic of "French common-sense" "any more than the false convention of adultery in the novels and plays, or the revelations of certain 'dionysiac' women writers, are typical of French morals and manners." He goes on to say that in spite of certain unfavorable criticisms which he must make, it is his opinion that "French literature, taken as a whole, overtops in richness, artistic quality, and historical influence, all literatures since those of Greece and Rome."¹⁷

The writings of Henry James, of Brander Matthews, of Huneker, of Santayana, represent a wide variety in viewpoint and expression, but a common recognition and appreciation of the salient qualities of French

work,—its beauty of diction, its brilliance of form, its clarity of thought, and delicacy of distinction. Its insight and sincerity, its vitality and power, and the universality of its appeal, are generally conceded. Brander Matthews says,—“French is still the second language of every educated man, whatever his native speech . . . French literature has won its way all over the world.”¹⁸

French music, like French literature, had to contend in America with certain fixed ideas. The French were popularly declared to be amusing, but not serious, possessed of mental agility, but not of depth. The *opéra comique* was typically French, and French music was expected to be charming, harmonious, vivacious, sometimes brilliant, but light. Where more lasting qualities appeared, these were credited to the influence of the Germans. Many French composers, said our critics, lacked sincerity and courage. They tried only to please “a grossly ignorant French public.” Henderson, in his *Story of Music*, published in 1897, emphasized this point. Criticising Gounod, he said,—

“There are passages in Faust, unhappily too few . . . which seem to me to come nearer to the ideal music drama than anything outside of the last scenes in Wagner’s works . . . it seems to me that the work fails to reach real greatness and a permanent influence on operatic art only because of Gounod’s concessions to the tawdry sentimentality and uneducated musical demands of the masses.”¹⁹

While individual composers, then, were often highly praised, much French music was deemed to be “pleasing, rather than deep,” or even “meaningless ravings” of “harmony-jugglers,” and to call for “some musical Rosstand” “beside whose simple force the unclear utterances of the present school will lose their factitious importance.”²⁰

For great music Americans looked to Germany, and only in the last decade before the war did they begin to understand and truly appreciate the intellectual quality, the originality, and the richness represented in the compositions of Cesar Franck, of Debussy, and the others of the modern French school.²¹

In the fields of painting, of sculpture, of architecture, and of the decorative arts, French achievement has long been appreciated in America, and French influence has helped largely to determine the form and content of American accomplishment. It is true that some have identified a love of beauty with weakness, and have been prone to declare that a nation which knew so well the laws of taste and of grace could not deal seriously with matters of material importance. It is true, too, that French realism, in art as in literature, sometimes has shocked the conservatives, and that

the Latin Quarter, with its gayeties and its freedom, provided ground for unfavorable criticism.²²

Americans did not react at first in friendly fashion to the experiments of the newer schools of French art, with their "flinging paint-pots in the sacred features of tradition." But they came in time to realize that the work of the artist who turns his face only to the past will never be more than an echo of that past and to accept the sincerity, the vision, and the color possibilities which the best of the impressionists offered.²³

There was full realization, too, of the fact that in France was to be found the best opportunity for artistic training, since "there is no thought-wave in modern art that does not emanate from Paris or finally reach Paris,"²⁴ and for the past fifty years practically all the leaders in the field of art in America have drawn knowledge and inspiration from this source. The genius of the great French masters of line, of color, of design, has struck an answering fire in America, and the realization of their common love for these finer things of life has helped the two peoples to comprehend and to respect one another.²⁵

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the number of Americans who travelled or who sojourned for a time in Europe continued to increase. The American tourist, a type well-known on both sides of the water, was a source of much misinformation, sometimes, but was usually keenly observant, interested, and appreciative. There were numerous well-informed representatives of good American families, who had maintained and enlarged upon the old tradition that European travel was a necessary "finish" to an education; there were cultured individuals who loved the flavor and the picturesqueness of the older civilization; and there were many business men who sought new outlets for their capital or new openings for their trade. Newly-rich families went abroad to win social prestige, and many an earnest school teacher spent her summers following the lure of ancient song and story. Tourist and diplomat, artist and capitalist, teacher and student, and all the other diverse types who wandered through town and countryside in France reflected each in his own way what he saw, and the sum of their experience broadened American understanding.

One result of this was that instead of turning our ridicule always upon the foreigner, the "mounseer," whose manners and whose ways appeared always absurd and mistaken, we caught some glimpses of our own narrownesses and crudities, and occasionally could laugh at ourselves. For instance, the *Century* for June, 1885, had a cartoon entitled "Mr. Newrich in Paris" and showing four Americans seated at a café table.

"Mr. Newrich (who does not trust himself to the pitfalls of the Gallic tongue):
'Waiter, sandwiches!'

"Waiter: 'Bien, m'sieur, quatre?'

"Mr. Newrich: 'Oh! yes, I suppose *cat* is as good as anything we'll get in this forsaken country!'"

Other examples in this vein abound. Charles Battell Loomis wrote a series called "Some Americans Abroad" for the *Century*, (1901). In it he satirized several of the good old mental habits of Americans. Says one of his travelers, whose favorite slogan is, "There's only one Noo York,"—

"I can tell by their looks that what they are saying to each other isn't fit to print. . . . Oh, it's the language that does it. No one can get away from the English language and expect to be anything as a man. . . . I don't believe he actually said anything. He chattered like a crow in a cornfield, but no one *could* talk as fast as he pretended to. He just wobbled his tongue at me, but I'd shown him that Americans can't be imposed upon, and I came away. . . . I give France three years and six weeks to get to perdition."²⁶

The Moulin Rouge and the Rat Mort might continue to represent Paris to a certain class of Americans,²⁷ but more and more in books and magazines appeared just, sincere, and informing accounts of French life and customs. For example, we have Henry James' *Portraits of Places* and his *A Little Tour in France*, sympathetic, appreciative, confident that everyone must feel the charm of France, of the capital city, which "we are accused of being too apt to think the celestial city," of "that perfect tongue," the French language, and of the "completeness of French life, and the lightness and brightness of the social air." Edith Wharton describes pleasantly her "Motor-Flight Through France"; Clifton Johnson pictures his rambles "Along French Byways," which gave him "an increased respect for the French people. There is a good deal of humbug in this talk about 'decadent nations'"; Ida M. Tarbell tells us of "The Charm of Paris," with its "beauty of harmonious colors and outlines" and its "perfection of municipal housekeeping"; Mary King Waddington and Frances Wilson Huard give intimate and friendly reminiscences of château and country life, of "sleepy little cities," of weddings and Christmas festivities, of all sorts of homely details.

Thomas A. Janvier tells of "Honfleur the Sedate" and of the Château Gaillard; Harold and Madeline Howland describe their wanderings through "The Pleasant Land of France"; Ernest Peixotto paints intriguing pictures of the Château Country, of Albi and of Carcassonne, and of the honest, generous, gay and kindly folk he meets; Joseph N. Pennell and Elizabeth Robins Pennell journey with pen and pencil along the Marne, across to Toulouse, in and out of old cathedrals, with many a good word for French

ways and people. André Castaigne, Jules Guerin, and many another painter in color or in words help to lay the magic touch upon blind eyes.²⁸

Others gave special attention to French character, to conditions affecting the general social welfare, and to methods of administration. Of some importance is W. C. Brownell's study of "French Traits," which appeared first in *Scribner's Magazine*, and later in book form. He discusses with some care such topics as "The Social Instinct," "Sense and Sentiment," "Manners," "Intelligence," "French Women," and "The Art Instinct." Mr. Brownell's interpretation is friendly and on the whole favorable. He holds that France has always had a strong interest in community welfare, and has accomplished much in this field; that "measure," in speech, demeanor, taste, and habits, "is a French passion"; that the French are the "least poetic and the sanest of modern peoples." Their politeness is not, as Americans frequently suppose, excessive, but is due to the idea that "there is greater pleasure to be got out of the lubrication than the friction of points of contact between individuals." Manners therefore are carefully systematized and artistic, but the French are "as sincere as any other people." "A compliment is taken seriously only by the savage." "They are frank; they are gay and gentle, but they are above all else impersonal." As to their intelligence, "nowhere does action follow thought so swiftly, and nowhere is so much thinking done." Precision, truth, order, harmony, clearness, these are the traits which seem to this writer most characteristic.²⁹

The excellent chapters on French universities and on French literature in Barrett Wendell's *The France of To-Day*, have already been mentioned. This book, the result of thoughtful observation, combines sympathetic appreciation with well-balanced criticism. Professor Wendell's study of family life is especially informing, with its explanation of the differences between French and American ideals, and its conclusion that to the Frenchman the family "has a dominant, supreme claim to devotion for its own sake," which compels the individual to think of society before he thinks of self.

The extremes in dress which under the Empire accented the impression of frivolity have disappeared, he declares, and "the vivacious, erratic Frenchman of traditional fancy is . . . obsolete." The Frenchman of to-day is frank and open in manner, but possesses a high degree of personal reticence and of self-control. He is ardent, intense, emotional, loving system and fact so passionately that any deviation from ordered harmony becomes a crime, and the younger generation in particular is austerely in earnest and deeply serious.³⁰

Among magazine articles in this field may be mentioned Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant's description of the "Standards of a Bourgeois Family." The roots of this family, considered an average one, "were nourished, in this sup-

posedly inconstant Paris too, by the rich soil of a consistent and nobly serious theory of life." Monsieur thought that American girls lived in "une idée colossale de pique-nique." Madame found excuses for them—they had not been taught as French girls are from early childhood, to consider every day as a link to be carefully wrought into the chain of the years. One of her favorite stories was of an American delegate to a scientific congress, who had desired her father to take him to Maxim's. "Pensez donc, mon ami. Papa at Maxim's! Papa, who had to be dragged from his test-tubes to his meals, and resented even the time he had to give to his lectures at the Collège de France!"³¹

Thomas A. Edison, after a vacation in France, gave also friendly judgment. The formula of French thrift "is as simple as sunlight. Be industrious, be frugal, give and enjoy in proportion to your means, and always lay by a fifth of your income for capital. Result, a whole nation prosperous, contented, and happy."³²

Studies of yet another type deal with French institutions, with the interesting coöperative experiment among the iron workers at Guise, the industrial art schools, the municipal laboratory at Paris. Frederic A. Ogg, in his study of social progress in contemporary Europe (1912), gives careful attention to the agricultural progress of France, to industrial conditions, to progress in matters of social welfare, such as insurance against sickness and against occupational accidents, and to old-age pensions. He describes, too, the development and significance of socialism in France. On the subject of socialism, also, Richard T. Ely wrote with considerable fullness. Among magazine articles one notices such discussions as Walter B. Scaife's remarks on work, wages, and labor legislation in France, and Charles Mulford Robinson's contribution on municipal art in Paris. Albert Shaw wrote on Paris as the "Typical Modern City," and praised the pioneer work done in transforming "the labyrinthine tangle of narrow, dark and foul medieval alleys" into modern thoroughfares, saying,—“French public authorities, architects, and engineers were the first to conceive effectually the ideas of symmetry and spaciousness, of order and convenience, of wholesomeness and cleanliness, in urban arrangements.” The art of city planning, the organization of city administration, with attention to all the varied needs of the people of a great city,—in these fields all countries are indebted to French enterprise.³³

Serious and impartial studies of the government of France have steadily been added to our sources of genuine information. We have, for example, such a careful delineation as appears in President Lowell's *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*. Here the criticism falls largely upon the lack of a stable executive, and the difficulties brought about by the

frequent cabinet changes and the lack of a firm sense of responsibility on the part of the individual citizen. Frederic A. Ogg, in his *Social Progress in Contemporary Europe* and in his *Government of Europe*, gives a thorough and just analysis of the process through which representative government in France was developed and of the characteristics of government under the Republic. His incisive summary is representative of thoughtful American judgment in this field:—

“Once having cut loose from her ancient moorings, the nation became through many decades the plaything of every current that swept the political sea. It is only within our own generation that she appears definitely to have righted herself for a prolonged and steady voyage. The constitution of the Third Republic is a product, not of orderly evolution, but of disruption, experimentation, compromise. It represents a precarious balance which has been struck between those forces of radicalism and conservatism, of progress and reaction, for whose eternal conflict France preëminently has furnished a theatre since 1789.”³⁴

In the field of politics, since 1873, we have offered to France both praise and censure. We began to speak once more of “our ancient ally,”³⁵ but this did not in the least inhibit our condemnation of anything which seemed to us intolerant, irreligious, unstable, or militaristic. It will be recalled that at the close of the Franco-Prussian War much sympathy for the new Republic was being expressed, while there were also many who doubted the political courage or the sincerity of its leaders. Herbert Tuttle, in the *Atlantic*, commented upon the “fierceness” and “indiscipline” of French democracy. French patriotism, he said, while brave, loyal, and optimistic, must always “mix politics with passion,” is permeated with the spirit of the “revanche” and is characterized by an extravagant and unreasoning chauvinism.³⁶ Albert Rhodes, describing a day in the French Assembly, while expressing appreciation of the quality of some of the French leaders, recognized the menace of the monarchist intrigues, and criticized sharply the interference with the press intended by the royalists to weaken the republic, and the tendency to the “abuse of power” which was, he thought, “the bane of the nation, for the authorities hunt down opposition till they drive it into open revolt.”³⁷

George William Curtis emphasized substantially the same criticism in one of his addresses in which he cited France as the example of a country where party spirit was carried to an extreme, where it “Denies the patriotism of its opponents” and regards them “as public enemies,” “as a conspiracy plotting the overthrow of the government itself” instead of recognizing them as legitimate critics, exercising a constitutional right to differ. “History is lurid with the wasting fires of this madness.” To Curtis, France was also an example of militarism. Addressing the New England Society on

the Puritan principle as the master principle in American development, he turned aside to recall that many nationalities are represented in American history. " 'I remember, surely, the lily,—too often the tiger-lily—of France' (laughter and applause)." ³⁸

The personality and the accomplishment of Thiers, Gambetta, and other republican leaders received in time a full meed of praise. Especially well did Americans understand the devotion and skill shown in the financial rehabilitation of France after the war with Prussia. This achievement James A. Garfield called a "brilliant example" which should be an inspiration to the United States.³⁹ France, "impoverished by war," said Russell Sturgis, "but newly enriched by industry," is "strong and growing stronger, prosperous and happy perhaps beyond any nation in Europe; as much surprised and gratified by her success in self-government" as she was in 1870 "surprised and shocked by her failure in arms."⁴⁰

Factionalism, clericalism, or radicalism; or, on the other hand, a too great centralization, or intolerance and irreligion on the part of the anti-clericalists, met ready criticism. Some thought the expulsion of the Jesuits wise, others condemned it as intolerant.⁴¹ An example of extreme criticism in the period running up to 1890 may be taken from the writings of Andrew D. White, whose judgment may in some degree have been colored by his known predilection for things German. After praising some eminent Frenchmen whom he had met, he went on to say:—

"It is a thousand pities that a country possessing such men is so widely known to the world, not by these, but by novelists and dramatists widely retailing filth, journalists largely given to the invention of sensational lies, politicians obeying either atheistic demagogues or clerical intrigues; and all together acting like a swarm of obscene, tricky, mangy monkeys chattering, squealing, and tweaking one another's tails in a cage . . . it saddened me to see the nobler element . . . thwarted by such feather-brained creatures."⁴²

Far more characteristic of the average American comment for the same period, however, is the article by George Merrill, just cited, which analyzes very carefully the changes since the Second Empire, brings out the same points of doubt already illustrated, but recognizes the government's necessity to resist clericalism, and gives friendly warning that republican leaders must accept the responsibility of the situation, must educate the people wisely for intelligent progress, must not unnecessarily alienate conservatives, but instead must by word and deed conciliate all the reasonable and patriotic, of whatever party. Mr. Merrill's conclusion follows:—

"The chiefs of the existing government certainly combine to a remarkable degree great dignity and integrity of character, a thorough knowledge of men and affairs, moral courage, largeness of view, and a desire for progress, energy, tact.

and eloquence, while the ability displayed by the French ministers of finance since the close of the Franco-German war has been the wonder of the world." 43

An unusual tribute is recorded in the *Life of Joseph H. Choate*. In a letter to his wife Mr. Choate speaks of having attended a dinner at General Sherman's, to meet the Comte de Paris and the Duc d'Orleans, but he says that Chauncey M. Depew and Levi P. Morton declined to be present, "because of the hostile attitude of the Count to the French Republic." 44

All of the preceding comments on French political questions date between 1873 and 1890. The decade between 1890 and 1900 provided events which accentuated and brought out into clearer relief the American point of view. In 1891 the Franco-Russian entente took shape; in 1893 the Panama Scandal was made public; in 1894 President Carnot was assassinated by an anarchist; in 1898 and 1899 the Dreyfus Case held the center of the stage.

The first reports of the Russian alliance revived sharply the tradition of French militarism. The Boulanger case had of course also contributed to this. The *Review of Reviews* said:—

"Everyone is delighted that France should be humored. She has sulked so long in the corner, eating her heart out in sullen discontent. . . . As she can never again have the reality of the power which she so misused in the past, we are all only too glad to allow her the semblance of consolation. But of course it is only a semblance. The French Foreign Office, whatever amicable arrangement it may have effected for mutual support in China, is under no mistake as to the absurdity of the popular delusion that France has an ally in Russia for the furtherance of her aggressive designs on Germany. . . . France is tranquil, and professes to desire peace, therefore the Czar extends a cordial greeting to his effusive visitors. But let France propose to make war, and she will be very rudely awakened." 45

The French excitement over the new understanding apparently gave color to these suspicions. It was reported that one thousand one hundred men had to be arrested in Paris before a performance of Lohengrin could be given, this indicating "feverish hopes of an early realization of their aggressive designs." The Boulanger attempt would never have had a chance of success "if the French had not been a little bored with the republic which seemed to produce only taxes, jobs, and worthless wars." But Alexander may be depended upon to be the "peace-keeper." The Republicans are torn by faction; there is a strong radical minority; the reactionists are still undiscouraged; anti-clericalism has made many enemies for the republic; the financial policy has produced a deficit together with increasing taxation; too much pomp and ceremony has crept into the administration; and the military element is "dangerous and pernicious." The French are . . . "fooling themselves with the delusion that Russia means war," the tempta-

tion to use the army, which is in perfect condition, "would probably be overwhelming were their only ally less cautious, prudent, and resolute for peace than Alexander III." ⁴⁶

The Panama Scandal, said the *Nation*, was not the only reason for the fall of the Loubet ministry and the great disorder in French political circles. It "simply brought to the boiling point the public indignation over the long series of weaknesses and failures on the part of the ministry" and especially their inability to handle the Socialists and anarchists effectively, due to their fear of a Conservative and Radical combination to overturn the republic.⁴⁷ The whole story of the Panama enterprise was retold, as a "wild speculation that developed into a systematic swindle."⁴⁸ Said the *Review of Reviews* scornfully:—

"It is impossible to conceal from the world that a large portion of French society, financial, legislative, and diplomatic, has for years past been wallowing in a cess-pool of corruption. . . . The result is an object lesson in the consequence of repudiating the moral law." But, "when the evil is being exposed, it is in process of cure."⁴⁹

The assassination of President Carnot was made known to the United States Congress by President Cleveland, in a special and most sympathetic message. Both the Senate and the House passed resolutions of condolence, to be sent to Madame Carnot. In the President's Message of December 3, 1894, Mr. Cleveland spoke of the friendly relations existing between the two countries "so long bound together by friendly sympathy and similarity in their forms of government," and added that "the recent cruel assassination of the President of this sister Republic called forth such universal expressions of sorrow and condolence from our people and Government as to leave no doubt of the depth and sincerity of our attachment."⁵⁰

New York State was holding a constitutional convention when the news of Carnot's death arrived. A resolution of sympathy was at once introduced, and Elihu Root made an eloquent speech in favor of it. After drawing attention to the fact that in both countries constitutional government offered the only guarantee of individual liberty and safety, he declared that it was therefore more than fitting that an American constitutional convention should express warmly and sincerely its abhorrence of this crime of violence. He spoke of the aid of France in Revolutionary times, and added that

"under difficulties and surrounded by evils of which we know nothing; surmounting almost insurmountable obstacles, triumphing in the midst of successive and apparently irretrievable defeats for twenty years, the republic of France has stood erect, unshaken, consolidating and making perpetual the foundations of free constitutional government."⁵¹

The *Review of Reviews* praised the "calmness and unanimity" with which France had met the crisis, and said:—

"The murder created a perfect explosion of sympathy throughout the world, and France, for the first time in this generation, found herself overwhelmed with demonstrations of sincere sympathy." ⁵²

This friendly attitude was maintained also in 1895, when Casimir-Perier resigned from the presidency and was replaced by Felix Faure. The "splendid civil service," said the papers, might be relied on to provide the necessary stability in administration, and the prompt choice of a new president "of probity and patriotism" was declared to be an "object-lesson to captious critics." ⁵³

One quite "captious critic" at this time, however, was Mark Twain. Paul Bourget had just been lecturing in America, and Mr. Clemens wrote on "What Paul Bourget Thinks of Us." The article is, of course, witty, but it carries a sting which is rare in Mark Twain's writings. He says Americans seemed to expect the French writer to teach us something. But what had a man educated in France to give to Americans? Certainly nothing in the field of mechanical skill or scientific invention.

"Religion? No, not variegated enough for our climate. Morals? No, we cannot rob the poor to enrich ourselves. Novel-writing? No, M. Bourget and the others know only one plan, and when that is expurgated there is nothing left of the book."

The prospect for American improvement through French instrumentality appeared, he thought, "dark; almost Egyptian, in fact." ⁵⁴

The famous Dreyfus case furnishes the best index to the trend of American opinion at this period, for it brought French affairs into the foreground, and called forth both criticism and defense. The question of the guilt of this Alsatian Jew, convicted by a court-martial in 1894 of selling French military secrets to Germany, was a burning one in France for twelve years, and its political and moral influence lasted even longer. The main lines of the story are familiar to most persons. It was generally believed at first that the prisoner's guilt had been proved, and that his military degradation and sentence to life imprisonment on a tropic island was a just, if severe, penalty. But in 1896 Colonel Picquart, who was attached to the Intelligence Department, declared that the evidence in the possession of the Department pointed in the direction of a certain Major Esterhazy, as the criminal, instead of Dreyfus. From this time on until the Court of Cassation, the highest civil court, in 1906 declared Dreyfus innocent, popular excitement and partisanship in France ran high. High officials in

the army and in the government were concerned in the affair, and monarchists, clericalists, radicals, and militarists joined in declaring that "for the honor of the army" no further investigation must be made and the judgment against Dreyfus must stand. Only a few devoted and earnest souls with larger vision and higher courage continued to fight for a thorough sifting of the affair and for absolute justice, until in the end they succeeded.⁵⁵

Sympathy in America became strongly pro-Dreyfus. The political complexion which the affair took on, the repeated refusals of the government to reopen the case, the hasty acquittal of Esterhazy, the attempts to suppress the evidence found by Picquart, his persecution, Zola's conviction "for defamation of the government" after the publication of his letter "J'accuse," the revelations of the sinister power of the army and of corruption in high places,—all helped to convince America that a great injustice was being done. The wave of anti-Semitic agitation which swept France, the indications of mob spirit, the suppression of freedom of speech, and the evidence of the spirit of revenge toward Germany, increased the disfavor in which France was held. In 1897 Hon. J. B. Eustis, late United States ambassador to France, had deprecated the Franco-Russian alliance, on the ground that France was "too liberal, free, and enlightened, to be a good working partner of Russia."⁵⁶ Now France appeared militaristic, bigoted, intolerant, unjust.⁵⁷

The press throughout the United States was practically unanimous in condemnation. The *Independent* spoke of the case as the "most disgraceful episode of modern political and military life," and declared that France had "pursued honor and disdained justice."⁵⁸ *Scribner's* spoke of the Anglo-American understanding which had grown out of the Spanish war as meaning, not an alliance, but an emphasis of identity of understanding about public affairs. . . . "For example, the Dreyfus case is regarded in London and in Chicago with the same incredulity, bordering upon stupefaction."⁵⁹

A typical article in the *Political Science Quarterly* declared that the French judicial procedure, with its absence of a *habeas corpus* act, its permission of domiciliary visits and of secret evidence, was entirely foreign to the American conception of democratic justice.

"Every English-speaking person finds it revolting that a man, however base, can, after a secret trial, be consigned to a living death on evidence he had no chance to answer. We cannot understand how a people can be sane and tolerate a system where there is a possibility that an individual may suffer horrible injustice 'for reasons of state' or because his case is a '*chose jugée*.' . . . When the state is merged

in the army, there can be no guaranty of civil liberty. . . . The government of France . . . is indeed called a republic; but after we have read of the Dreyfus case and the Zola trial, it can kindle no spark of fraternal sympathy in the heart of any genuine American." ⁶⁰

Finley Peter Dunne, writing in the *Chicago Journal* under the name of "Mr. Dooley," interpreted well the popular feeling:—

"The Frrinch are a tumulchuse people . . . not steady ayether in their politics or their morals. . . . The throuble is . . . that it ain't been Cap Dhryfuss that's been on thrile, but the honor of the nation and the honor of the army. . . . Because some la-ad on the gin'ral staff got caught lyin' and had to lie some more to make the first wan stick, and the other gin'rals had to jine him f'r fear he might compromise thim . . . and they was la-ads rrunnin' newspapers in Paris that needed to make a little money out of the popylation, ye said 'Th' honor iv th' Frrinch people an' th' honor iv th' Frrinch army is on thrile.' . . . Th' honor iv Frrance an' th' honor iv th' army'll come out all right, . . . but it wouldn't do anny harrm f'r to sind th' honor iv th' Frrinch gin'rals to th' laundry. . . . So long as ivry man looks out f'r his own honor, th' honor iv th' counthry'll look out f'r itsilf. . . . Ye're afraid. That's th' thruth iv th' matther. Ye're like a lot iv ol' women that thinks ivry time the shutter creaks burglars is goin' to break into th' house. Ye're afraid iv Rothschild, an' th' Imperor iv Germany, and th' Dook d'Orleans, Vik Bonaparte, an' Joe Chamberlain, and Bill McKinley . . . an' ye're afraid iv each other." ⁶¹

The decision for the retrial at Rennes in 1899 brought approval. The *Outlook*, for example, which thought that "nearly the whole world" believed Dreyfus the victim of injustice, hailed it as a proof that the French were learning the lessons of self-government, and that "there are always courageous and able men to resist popular pressure and stand for right action." The *Outlook* published, too, a careful and friendly editorial on "The Elements of Stability in France," warning Americans not to be so absorbed by the alarming manifestations of the moment as to forget the counteracting forces such as the splendid development of common-school and higher education, the fine quality and moral value of the best French literature and art, the philanthropic activity of the people, the loyalty and independence of the majority of the bench and bar, the faithfulness of many officials. "A nation which is left undisturbed by so many ministerial and presidential changes must have within itself forces of intelligence and stability which English and American observers have not adequately recognized." ⁶²

The *Review of Reviews* declared that France was entering upon the new year "with the increased strength that comes from a hard-won moral victory." ⁶³ The *Nation* said:—

"Never was there a more notable demonstration of the truth that there is a power in human society which makes for righteousness. . . . Slow and faltering human justice has at last caught up with the divine judgments which are 'true and righteous altogether.'" ⁶⁴

These utterances were predicated on the belief that the retrial would certainly result in the vindication of Dreyfus. Robert Underwood Johnson struck a somewhat different note in his fine poem, "The Keeper of the Sword."

"Hail to that Breton law by which a lord,
Fate-hounded—he whose sires had sought the Grail,—
Left with the State his sword, as Honor's bail,
While on a western isle he won reward
Of his brave patience, in a golden hoard;—
Speeding from exile (the wide sea a jail
If but the wrong wind filled his yearning sail!)
To claim once more his heritage and sword.

France, dost thou heed the omen? 'Twas at Rennes!—
Where one who loved thee, cruel,—loved thee, blind,—
Now fronts thee proudly with the old demand.
Oh! . . . thou hast broke it! . . . Haste! the fragments find,
And in the forge of Justice weld again
That undishonored blade for his forgiving hand." ⁶⁵

But the new trial resulted in the disappointing verdict of "guilty, with mitigating circumstances," and this brought forth more criticism. The *Independent* published a strong series of articles.⁶⁶ The *Nation*, while conceding that the Court of Cassation had shown itself upright, that the government had done and risked everything to secure revision, and that the "mind and conscience" of the country had come nobly to the support of Dreyfus, yet spoke of the "flaming passion of the misled populace, the malice of wicked journalism, and the frenzied fear lest anything be done to impair the prestige of the army." The verdict was characterized as "French military justice, which the world now understands to be the grossest injustice under the forms of law."

"France stands disgraced before the world by this terrible denial of justice. . . . That the mass of the people hail the verdict; that royalist and Catholic newspapers acclaim it as the judgment of God; that the army is frantic with joy . . . that the populace . . . have only scoffs and hisses for the sufferer at Rennes, strong in his own innocence, these are the things which look black for France, and which will make men look askance at her for many a day." ⁶⁷

"Mr. Dooley," with keen sarcasm, described the trial at Rennes:

"Th' coort . . . was followed be th' gin'ral in the Frrinch army, stalwart, fearless men, with coarse, disagreeable faces. Each gin'ral was attinded be his private bodyguard iv thried and thrusted perjurers, an' was followed be a wagon-load iv forgeries, bogus affidavies, an' other statements iv Major Esterhazy. After this come th' former ministers iv th' Frrinch governmint, makin' an imposin' line, which took three hours passin' a given point." . . . After th' coort had kissed th' witnesses, th' procedin's opined."⁶⁸

It is significant, however; that in spite of the "storm of indignation over the unrighteous verdict" there were not wanting those who had a good word for France. John T. Morse, Jr., writing in the *Atlantic*, had already called upon Americans not to be too pharisaical in their satisfaction "that we are not as the Frenchmen are," but instead to be thankful that America had no Semitic problem, and that we lacked the dangerous neighbors which were an excuse for the French desire for a strong army.⁶⁹ The same magazine now published a pertinent article on "French Open-mindedness," by Alvan F. Sanborn, calling attention to the willingness of the average Frenchman to admit his own defects, and to the teachableness and generosity which accompanied this frankness and modesty. France, he said, had been willing, for example, to learn from Germany scientific accuracy, and had then achieved thoroughness without the German uncouthness, "without the sacrifice of a single iota of French clearness, luminousness, neatness and perfection of literary form."

"France does not now merit the word chauvinist, and has not for a quarter-century. . . . If ever a country has been given over to self-examination, self-blame, and the search within and without for the wherewithal to remedy her defects, . . . France is that country to-day."⁷⁰

Jacob Schoenhof, in the *Forum*, said,—

"If we accept the contents of the American and English papers, including the letters addressed to the editors, the resolutions of societies, and the utterances of public men—as indications of the views of the people as a whole, then we are led to believe that Anglo-Saxondom has resolved itself into one great areopagus, with the self-imposed mission of passing judgment on France."

It is wise, therefore, he continued, to recall what we owe to France in democratic ideals and in intellectual fields; and to remember that all countries are likely to be subject to waves of anti-Semitism, while France is ordinarily entirely just to her Jewish citizens, even in the army. "France has two hundred eighty commissioned officers and more than one thousand non-commissioned officers of Jewish descent, while Germany has none." "Dreyfus, in another country, might never have been cleared, while France had a Zola, a Scheurer-Kestner, an Yves Guyot, a Labori, a Picquart . . ." to rise in his defence.⁷¹

An editorial in the *Century*, after a temperate review of the case, concluded,—

“But are we always so good ourselves? We blame France for resenting the flood of foreign criticism. Would *we* like it? Public opinion in America is not always calm, correct, unprejudiced, our courts not always correct in judgment. We have had cases where groups of men, moved by misinformation, or touched by pride or false notions of honor, have stood on the side of falsehood and worked sad injustice.”⁷²

In 1904 Dreyfus, who had been pardoned and released, but was still officially guilty, asked to have the case reopened, on the ground that new evidence in his possession was strong enough to prove his innocence. The government acceded to this request, and Americans commented on the fact that “generous France” was permitting a man who had been twice convicted to present a new fact and to prove his guiltlessness if he could, while American law would never go so far.⁷³

Two years later the Court of Cassation revised the case, finally affirmed the innocence of Dreyfus, and restored him to full military and civil standing, and thus ended the long struggle. Said the *Review of Reviews*:—

“When France does things well, there is always an instinctive feeling of satisfaction in America. The French mind recognizes justice in the ideal and in the abstract, and however far short in practice French institutions have come of meeting the ideals, there is always the effort to bring life into harmony with truth and justice.

“For nearly twelve years this terrible miscarriage of justice has held France up to dishonor in the eyes of the world. . . . It is not Dreyfus alone who has been vindicated,—it is France herself. . . . Out of the agitation over Dreyfus and the bitterness of the religious prejudice that was aroused has come the church separation law and a new, tolerant, regenerated France. Another Dreyfus case would be impossible. It is not likely that in the future the French army will ever claim to be anything but the servant of the republic.”⁷⁴

And Robert Underwood Johnson expressed the thought of the many Americans who loved justice and had watched with sympathy the soldier “in the darkness fighting leagued wrong,”—

“Soldier of Justice,—fighting with her sword
Since thine was broken! Who need now despair
To lead a hope forlorn against the throng!”⁷⁵

That the Dreyfus case led to any active ill-will against France in America would be too much to say, but that it made a very bad impression and led to a good deal of patronizing disparagement is undeniable.

In France, one of the most important effects of the case was the formation

of a strong group of republicans and socialists, pledged to reduce the political power of the army, which had so nearly succeeded in dominating the civil power, and of the Roman Catholic Church, which had supported the militarists.

Since the organization of the Republic there had been hostility between the government and the clericals. The Church saw in the Republic the enemy of authority, of the established order, of faith. It wished to restore the monarchy, and had allied itself with certain elements of the army to this end. The government, on the other hand, became bitter against the Catholic leaders, whose teaching was felt to be injurious to the Republic, and took measures to remove the menace. Members of religious orders were forbidden by law to teach in the public schools; then, through the Associations Act (1901), the authorities sought to suppress religious orders deemed obnoxious, together with the various educational and philanthropic activities under their control. The enforcement of this law by Premier Combes was rigorous, and much friction arose. Further measures aimed at complete separation of Church and State, and contained provisions which though liberal from the standpoint of the government, were extremely distasteful to the church authorities.⁷⁶

The Roman Catholics naturally were warm in espousing the cause of their church. They had early been prejudiced to some degree against France by the excesses of the First Republic. This prejudice now became more marked, and undoubtedly contributed largely to the widespread American belief in French irreligion and immorality.

Examples of this reaction on the part of Catholics may be found in the *Literary Digest* "Poll of the Press," for August 16, 1902. The *Pittsburgh Observer* (Roman Catholic) hotly condemned the turning of nuns out of their convents for failure to observe the provisions of the Associations Act, characterizing the procedure as a

"crime that cries to heaven for vengeance. We hear of it as a piece of news in the newspapers, along with the heartless and sinister comment that this is but the means which the French Republic takes to protect itself against its arch-enemy, Clericalism. Have done with the lie.—It is simply religious persecution, the out and out malice haters of the Church . . . vindictive and diabolic."

The *Milwaukee Catholic Citizen* praised the riots led by Paris Catholics, as a "sign of vitality." The *Boston Pilot* (R. C.) trusted that

"the French Catholics, awakened at last, will resist the decrees to blood and death if need be . . . all sorts of infidel secret societies are free to meet and conspire against religious and civil authority while good men and women may not join together in the name of God to feed the hungry and clothe the naked and in-

struct the ignorant except under the most arbitrary conditions . . . France alone, of all the civilized nations of the earth, licenses the abandoned woman and expels the Sister of Charity."

The *Register* (Catholic weekly, New York), proposed that all Catholics in the United States and Canada boycott French goods, on the ground that greed for church property had led to the attacks, so that "touching their pockets" would be a proper punishment.⁷⁷

America, also a Catholic periodical, was especially bitter, missing few opportunities for harsh criticism of the French government, not only in regard to its management of religious affairs, but in any field of activity. This "unchristian horde" can do nothing well. A typical article is the summary, January 6, 1912, of French policy for the preceding year.

"A record of tyrannical government, graft, and perjury . . . the courts are gagged, religion is persecuted, the army is swayed by politics, the population is declining, the accidents in the navy are causing consternation everywhere, the host of office-holders is assuming alarming proportions, the leaders in the government are shamefully incompetent, the country's external policy is a mockery, the railroads are in a state of collapse. . . ." ⁷⁸

Harper's Weekly showed such strong sympathy with the Catholic position that it called forth criticism from a correspondent, coupled with a sharp defense of the French authorities, and the comment that "there is at this time sharp competition among periodicals as to which can do the most to conciliate Roman Catholic readers."⁷⁹

Alvan F. Sanborn, summing up "The Year in France" in the *Atlantic* (1904), declared that "concrete liberties are violated in the name of liberty in the abstract," and "tolerance is abrogated in the name of the modern spirit," but "persecution is no less persecution when practiced in the name of Infallible Reason than when practiced in the name of Infallible Church." "The sentiments of a vast majority of the people are outraged, and their wishes overruled, by the vigorous and united action of a per-fervid minority." He suggested that if M. Combes, after his retirement, should publish his autobiography, a suitable title would be:—

"M. Combes, The Perfect Tyrant.
or
The Curious Apathy of a Great People.
An Autobiographical Study
Treating of the
Tyranny of Democracy
by an
Ex-Tyrant."⁸⁰

The St. Louis *Christian Evangelist* thought the law "not unreasonably rigorous," but the method of enforcement calculated to alienate even those who might approve of the government's general position. The *Outlook* said that many of the schools closed were "not only dear to the church, but dear to the people," and "are said to be among the best in France." The *Outlook* could understand the government's laying its hand on priests who had carried on propaganda against the Republic, but not its punishing the children and the people at large.⁸¹

Frank A. Vanderlip, in an article published in *Scribner's*, reviewed the situation dispassionately, blaming both sides in the controversy. He thought it

"undoubtedly true that the traditional attitude of the church and of the clerical party has been reactionary and generally unfriendly to the Republic, that the character of the teaching by the orders has been open to the most reasonable and vigorous objection . . . that the church has been active in public affairs, . . . and perhaps a menace to the tranquillity of the state."

He thought that the great wealth of the Church, the withdrawal of this wealth from taxation, and its use for political purposes, opened the way for valid criticism. The government was fighting a strong, well-organized, wealthy group, backed by tradition and religion. But "a great and responsible minority" disbelieved sincerely in the wisdom of the restrictive legislation.

"There has seemed to be undue haste and needless harshness. . . . The government . . . has met intolerance with intolerance . . . has come dangerously near violating fundamental rights and liberties."⁸²

Most understanding and sympathetic is the chapter on the "Question of Religion" in Barrett Wendell's *France of To-Day*, with its call for tolerance and mutual forbearance and its admission that "as yet there is little sign that the French are willing to learn this lesson. Until they do, the question of religion in France must remain one of action and reaction—of recurrent intolerance, as one side or another chances to possess national power."⁸³

The non-Catholic religious papers showed a tendency to support the action of the French government, on the ground that the clerical authorities had shown in regard to the Dreyfus case a harmful intolerance, and that their political activity had been culpable. These papers argued that no schools which conformed to the law need be closed, and that the law was reasonable. Few Americans would deny, they thought, that the Church's educational and philanthropic agencies should submit to regulation and inspection by the state.⁸⁴

The *New York Times*, *New York Mail*, and most of the secular journals, having both Catholic and Protestant readers, endeavored to remain neutral. The *New York Tribune*, however, stoutly defended the French government, and (1906) declared it to be "as resolute as it has been tactful and conciliatory, and it unquestionably is supported by the overwhelming majority of the people."⁸⁵ The *Independent* and the *Nation* also favored the separation movement.⁸⁶ The *North American Review* printed a discriminating article by Walter Littlefield, showing sympathy with the Catholic position, but ending:—

"The truth of the matter is that the Dreyfus case revealed to intelligent Frenchmen a monstrous Politico-Religious Trust, which, while monopolizing public education, threatened the existence of all democratic government. They have crushed this trust in the most effective manner."⁸⁷

The *Review of Reviews* also supported the Associations Act warmly, and thought the separation of Church and State an indication of revived faith and religious progress, and to be defended since it would "free the State from undue ecclesiastical influence and liberate the Church from financial dependence on the State."⁸⁸

In the last decade before the Great War, a counterpoise to any criticism engendered by France's domestic policy was found in the growing American distrust of Germany. Miss Clara Eve Schieber in her *American Sentiment Toward Germany* has shown clearly that from 1885 or thereabouts, when trouble over the Samoan question first developed, the United States drifted steadily into disapproval of German manners and methods. We disapproved of her behavior in China, almost came to blows with her in the Philippines, feared her in the Caribbean and in South America, disliked her general policy, and refused to be soothed by the various German attempts to gain our friendship. This situation reacted quite definitely upon our relations with France, Germany's neighbor and rival. In previous years comparisons between the two countries, usually unfavorable to France, had been frequent. The growing comprehension and appreciation of French character and achievement had lessened such comparisons, and they were now definitely brought to an end. In their place, to emphasize our disapproval of German militarism and imperialism, we showed a marked approval of French policy, especially in foreign affairs.

The Morocco question is a case in point. Had France been disputing this district with England or with Italy, it is conceivable that American sympathy might have been pro-British or pro-Italian, and we might have accused France of militaristic ambitions. Since the dispute was with Germany, our sympathies were whole-heartedly French. In her discussion

of this case Miss Schieber has brought out very clearly our antagonism to Germany, and the very great importance to France of the American friendship.⁸⁹ We not only refused to share in the Algeciras Conference unless we were assured that it was satisfactory to France⁹⁰ but President Roosevelt, to a far greater degree than was generally known at the time, exercised pressure upon the Kaiser in favor of the French contentions. Said Roosevelt:—

“I desired to do anything I legitimately could for France; because I like France, and I thought her in this instance to be in the right.”⁹¹

Henry Cabot Lodge, writing at this time to President Roosevelt upon the subject of Morocco, remarked that he was very anxious that we should do all that was possible to encourage amity with the French. France, he thought, should be “with us and England,—in our zone and our combination.” Such an alignment would, he thought, be sound economically and politically. “It would be an evil day for us if Germany were to crush France,” he concluded.

Abundant evidence from the press is available to show that friendliness in this case was not confined to official quarters. Andrew Carnegie, writing on “An Anglo-French-American Understanding” spoke in warm terms of the rapprochement which appeared to be developing among the three, thought the separation of Church and State in France would better relations with America, and declared

“America owes so much to France that there is not a request France is ever likely to make that America would not deem it her duty to meet.”⁹²

The *Philadelphia Public Ledger* praised Delcassé’s management of French foreign affairs, saying that it was due to him that France had “again taken her place in the world’s councils to which her history, her wealth and her position entitle her.” France, this paper thought, had behaved “with great reserve and dignity” in the face of the Kaiser’s “rough intervention” at Tangier.⁹³

The *Nation* thought that M. Rouvier had evinced in his handling of the Moroccan Conference question “an admirable example of straightforward, considerate, and enlightened diplomacy.”⁹⁴ The *Review of Reviews* said:—

“With all the Mediterranean powers, including Great Britain and the United States, approving her position, France has little to fear from an international conference.”

The “moderation” and “justice” of France were approved, together with her “great work for civilization” in her colonial ventures.

"While Germany is far outstepping France in population and in magnitude of industrial development, France stands higher now than at any time in her history in the world's admiration and regard."⁹⁵

Harper's Weekly, at first inclined to be pleased to have the Kaiser prevent "any Tunisification of Northwest Africa," swung over to entire willingness for French control in Morocco, sharply criticised German aggressiveness, and after the 1911 settlement wrote:—

"The clear gain of prestige that France has made is very acceptable . . . the heightened respect France has won by her firmness and dignity. She has proved again the strength of the Third Republic. She has proved that she is not incapable of recovery after humiliation comparable even to Germany's own glorious victory at Jena and Auerstadt. In contemplating it we are sufficiently old-fashioned to remember the ancient friendship between Lafayette's country and Washington's."⁹⁶

Such a friendly note, such a revival of old kindly feeling, formed a hopeful conclusion to the first hundred years of direct relations between the two countries, and it contributed much to the readiness with which Americans, in the decades immediately following, accepted the close association brought about by the World War.

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- ⁷³ *Review of Reviews*, XXIX: 366, citing Richard Walden Hale, in the *Green Bag*.
- ⁷⁴ *Review of Reviews*, XXXIV: 134, 147
- ⁷⁵ Robert Underwood Johnson, *Poems*, op. cit. "To Dreyfus Vindicated." Mr. Johnson sent a copy of this poem to Picquart, and received a very appreciative reply from him. (R. U. Johnson to the writer, July 12, 1922.) Edmund Clarence Stedman wrote to Mr. Johnson in regard to the ode that it seemed to him that "Justice herself had been bound and gagged by mailed hands" "when Dreyfus was crucified." E. C. Stedman, *Life and Letters*, II: 396-7.
- ⁷⁶ A contemporary account of this religious struggle in France may be found in J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *Development of Modern Europe*, II: 166-172. This may be accepted as a typical description of the situation as it appeared to informed and impartial Americans.
- ⁷⁷ Cited in *Literary Digest*, Dec. 22, 1906.
- ⁷⁸ *America*, VI: 296, Jan. 6, 1912. Other typical utterances in regard to France, in this periodical, IV: 52, 76, 171, 219, 243, 267, 315, 399, 508; V: 207, 278-9, 533-535; VII: 183, 320, 350. Compare also Mrs. Bellamy Storer, "The Decadence of France," *North American Review*, CXXI: 168-84.
- ⁷⁹ *Harper's*, Aug. 22, 1903.
- ⁸⁰ *Atlantic*, XC: 652-663.
- ⁸¹ *Literary Digest*, XXXIII: 923-4. *The Outlook*, however, supported the separation of Church and State. There were frequent editorials to this effect in 1905. See also Goldwin Smith, "The Church Question in France," *Outlook*, Feb. 2, 1907.
- ⁸² Frank A. Vanderlip, "Political Problems of Europe as they Interest Americans," *Scribner's*, XXXVII: 1-18.
- ⁸³ *Barrett Wendell*, op. cit., Ch. VI and pp. 350-4.
- ⁸⁴ *Literary Digest*, Aug. 16, 1902.
- ⁸⁵ *Ib.*, Dec. 22, 1906.
- ⁸⁶ *Independent*, Oct. 11, 1906; *Nation*, Jan. 3, 1907.
- ⁸⁷ *North American Review*, CLXXV: 533.
- ⁸⁸ *Review of Reviews*, XXIV: 137; XXVI: 272; XXXII: 378; XXXIII: 20; XXXIV: 134, 147.
- ⁸⁹ *Schieber*, 198-203.
- ⁹⁰ Cortissoz, *Life of Whitelaw Reid*, II: 325-333.
- ⁹¹ Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, I: 468-505; *Schieber*, 198, 200.
- ⁹² *North American Review*, CLXXXI: 510-517.
- ⁹³ April 23, Sept. 30, 1905.
- ⁹⁴ April 5, 1906.

SIGNS AND PORTENTS

⁹⁵ *Review of Reviews*, XXII: 17; XXXIII: 271; XXXIV: 135, 532-3; XXXVIII: 665-6; XLI: 8; XLIV: 155-6. Especially striking pro-French cartoons, from *Detroit News*, *Baltimore American*, *New York World*, *New York Press*, etc., in *Review of Reviews*, XXXIII: 286; XLIV: 292 and ff.

⁹⁶ *Harper's Weekly*, Apr. 7, 1906, Aug. 24, 1907, Nov. 14, 1908, Aug. 5, Aug. 12, Dec. 30, 1911.

CHAPTER 9

France in Arms

PROTECTED by their ocean barriers from the apprehensions and disturbances which have for centuries troubled the peace of Europe; directly concerned in none of the alliances which marked the fears or the ambitions of continental powers, the people of the United States received without serious forebodings the news of the murder of Franz Ferdinand. They saw in it no menace to themselves, nor did they clearly envisage an immediate or a general European war. It is true that they were not unaware of the significance of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. They knew something of the complex interests centering in the Balkans, and understood in a measure the imperialistic competition upon which the great Powers had entered. They had observed with deep disapprobation the ever more threatening military and naval equipment which characterized the clash of interests. Yet they catalogued the Sarajevo incident as another Balkan murder, and few prophesied serious results from it. By the time the Austrian ultimatum was issued, press comment upon the affair had almost ceased. That Administration circles were somewhat more sensitive than the general public to the tenseness of the European atmosphere in the summer of 1914 is evidenced by Colonel House's peace mission abroad, undertaken before the Balkan crisis had developed. And even he reported a general disposition to coöperate, and was sure that in France in particular the leaders had abandoned all idea of aggression or of revenge.¹

The ultimatum startled us into fuller realization. The *Philadelphia North American* spoke caustically of Secretary Bryan's faith that his arbitration treaties "ought to make war impossible," and added that only a sublime and unthinking optimism could fail to be shaken by the European situation. The *New York Tribune* pinned its hopes for peace on Russia, "powerful enough to prevent further spoliation in the Balkans by Austria-Hungary" and the unwillingness of all the powers to face the financial crash which would inevitably follow a great war. Said the *Chicago Daily Tribune*:—

"The appalling consequences of a general war not only warrant but compel the belief that no power will rashly or lightly cross the line that separates a limited reprisal from a ruinous and discreditable war." ²

When the early days of August found the great struggle fairly under way, our reaction was one of sharp condemnation of "militarism" and all its works. The war is "amazing, almost incredible." We "read with loathing and a sense of shame" of such a "breakdown of civilization." The European alliances "are laying a hand of death upon all Europe,"—"Their bonds are called safety, but are really a peril and a curse." "No great principle of justice involved, . . . warring powers that fight for greed, for pride, for revenge, for hate, for the inextinguishable lust of national aggrandizement." "Every European nation has for a generation been heading straight for war or national bankruptcy, due to excessive military preparations." ³ In view of the later insistence upon the righteousness of the Allied cause it is interesting to note how very few there were who felt, as Senator Lodge later declared he did, that "nothing less was at stake . . . than the freedom and civilization of the Western World," or that, as the *Outlook* suggested, the contest was "in its fundamental analysis, between liberalism and monarchical imperialism." ⁴

Generalizations did not long content us. The ambitions and intrigues of all nations had contributed to the war. But its flaming forth at this particular moment could not have been the result of spontaneous combustion. Someone had touched a match to the tinder. Who was to blame? "The nation that unsheathes the sword is put instantly upon the defensive in the court of public opinion." ⁵ Russia's interest in the Balkans was recognized as dangerous, but this was overshadowed by Austria's apparently provocative behavior. "Austria-Hungary has manuevred deliberately to set Europe by the ears." ⁶ Germany's militarism had for some time antagonized us, and we were prepared to believe her guilty. Moreover, we recognized her strength, and paid her the compliment of believing that she could dictate the policy of her weaker ally. The American judgment was "that this at least is quite clear, that if Emperor William did not directly cause and desire the war, he at least failed to prevent it when it would have been easy for him to do so." ⁷ Of very great importance, too, appeared the fact that

. . . "in each crisis Germany has taken the aggressive. . . . In making the case upon which she will be judged, she has been outmanuevred by the deliberation of Russia, the forbearance of France, and the patience of Great Britain. She has assumed the rôle of international autocrat, while giving her foes the advantage of prosecuting a patriotic war of defense." ⁸

David Starr Jordan declared:—

"When the war began it had very little meaning, . . . brought on by intrigues of rival despotisms. . . . Belgium alone could fight with clean hands. . . . But the invasion of Belgium changed the whole face of affairs. As by a lightning-flash the issue was made plain: the issue of the sacredness of law; the rule of the soldier or the rule of the citizen; the rule of fear or the rule of law." ⁹

Granting, said the *Nation*, that England and France had consulted what to do if Belgium were invaded,—“What does it all boil down to? That Germany violated a law because some one else was going to. If anybody was going to murder Belgian neutrality, she was going to be first on the job.” ¹⁰ Richard Harding Davis’ account of the burning of Louvain, Brand Whitlock’s description of the Belgian situation, and the many stories of vandalism and cruelty that reached this country helped to injure Germany’s cause. When Rheims Cathedral was first bombarded, the papers were full of indignant protest, and Robert Underwood Johnson wrote,—

“Though they should boast a thousand victories,
This is their dire defeat.” ¹¹

The public judgment absolved France definitely from war guilt. “This is not France’s war. She has been necessarily involved in it, but she did not want it.” “France, . . . throughout the diplomatic controversy, sincerely worked for peace . . . and made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.” “For the last forty years, France has sought only peace and security.” “Alsace-Lorraine . . . has been more of a national political fetish than anything else, and the idea of a war for revenge has never seriously entered into her politics.” Her preparations “have been determined by the most elementary principles of self-preservation.” ¹² Or, as Theodore Roosevelt put it:—

“It is utterly impossible to see how France could have acted otherwise than as she did act. She had done nothing to provoke the crisis, even though it be admitted that in the end she was certain to side with Russia. War was not declared by her, but against her, and she could not have escaped it save by having pursued in the past, and by willingness to pursue in the future, a course which would have left her as helpless as Luxemburg, and Luxemburg’s fate shows that helplessness does not offer the smallest guarantee of peace.” ¹³

In the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, while recognizing its bearing upon the system of alliances and upon the persistence of hard feeling between France and Germany, most critics were not inclined to blame France for her action in regard to it. Rather, it was felt that Germany should have shown wisdom and tact in adjusting the difficulty. The German seizure of the provinces “led to a natural desire of France to unite with Russia in attacking Germany in case of a general war,” and was “an incurable blunder.” “The most serious weakness of all” in Germany’s foreign policy,

wrote William A. Sloane, "is Germany's tenure and treatment of Alsace-Lorraine." Bismarck's work was "flawless," said Leon Dominian, "so long as he added only Germans to the Empire." But he "erred grievously" in adding Frenchmen in Alsace-Lorraine, for he thus created the bitterness which led to the Russian alliance. The *Review of Reviews* asserted that Germany, in her own interests, should have reopened the question in a spirit of generosity and common sense, and redrawn the map so as to throw the French-speaking districts back into France. This might have saved the peace of Europe for generations, for without it "the whole French nation has unitedly, without wavering, clung to the purpose at some time to rectify that frontier."¹⁴ Only a few leaned toward Germany. Albert Bushnell Hart, soon to become one of France's most uncompromising advocates, remarked that the French had been ready for war with Germany for the last forty years, and accepted the opportunity when it came without hesitation and with very little effort to avert it, and Louis E. Van Norman wrote,—“To protect her investments in Russia, and to consummate her revenge on Germany for the humiliation of 1870, France cannot break with the Muscovite.” Ernest F. Henderson defended Germany against the charge of militarism, and declared that France had meddled in a conflict that did not concern her.¹⁵ But the great mass of popular sympathy stood squarely with France on the question of responsibility.

Nor did sympathy stop here. French culture and French character came in for their share of praise. Edward S. Martin, editor of *Life*, in a series of editorials later published as *The Diary of a Nation*, wrote:—

“This time France must be finished, so that she will make us no more trouble’ say the German managers. . . . But . . . all the rest of us prefer France in the unfinished French state as heretofore. . . . It is not popular, this idea of ‘finishing’ France. France is too valuable to be ‘finished.’ For one thing, she is charming. For another, she is a laboratory of civilization. . . . The American mind records and discloses with hardly appreciable dissent, the impression that the English, French and Russians are fighting in this war in behalf of the liberties of all the world.”¹⁶

“We had doubted,” said Frank H. Simonds in the *New York Evening Sun*, “whether France, so long deemed decadent by those who knew least and spoke most about her, . . . could endure the strain of another terrible struggle in which defeat was the initial circumstance on every field. . . . We now know . . . that the nation which could endure adversity with calmness, as the French did in August, may be defeated, but that the France that the whole world loves . . . will not die.”¹⁷ “Indomitable spirit,” “fine resilience,” “an addition to the moral assets of the world,” came the ringing phrases.¹⁸ Without underestimating the importance of the

German-American, Scandinavian, and Irish sympathy for the Central Powers, it can easily be demonstrated that the weight of American sentiment was in the early months of the war decidedly pro-Entente, and with enthusiasm for France far greater than for England or for Russia.¹⁹ Aside, however, from a few impulsive persons such as Charles W. Eliot, who on August 6 sent to President Wilson a letter proposing intervention "to rebuke and punish Austria-Hungary and Germany" (a letter, be it said, which he withdrew almost immediately, on cooler thought, although he continued to be an earnest champion of the Allied cause) and various Americans who were in France or Belgium and so had sympathy stirred by seeing the distress of invaded districts, the people of the United States showed at this time no desire to depart from the neutrality proclaimed by the President.²⁰

Discussion of war responsibility in 1915 showed sharp differences of opinion in regard to the behavior of Great Britain and Germany, but the French continued to hold popular sympathy.²¹ Among the more thoughtful analyses may be mentioned an article in the *American Political Science Review*, by E. R. Turner, which concluded with the statement that the causes of the cataclysm "must be sought in the curse of militarism, the spoliation and resentment of France, the envy and apprehension of England, the arrogance and prosperity of Germany, the weakness of Austria, the rise of the Balkan states, and the glowering menace of Russia."²² Ellery C. Stowell's *Diplomacy of the War of 1914* condemned the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine as "a constant irritant in the body politic of Europe," said that the formation of the Dual Alliance "tended to restore the balance of power and prevent any further French 'bleeding,'" declared that France had no active intention of revenge, knowing that an attempt could not succeed, and added:—

"It is very possible that the French and English statesmen might have hit upon some plan to prevent the outbreak of the war, but my thorough examination of the documents and my study of European politics has not made it possible for me to discover wherein that possibility lay."

For the outbreak of trouble, he blamed "first, Austria, second, Germany, and to some slight degree, Russia."²³

Agnes Repplier well expressed the consensus of popular opinion, when she wrote:—

"The plain truth remains that England did not violate Belgium's neutrality, and Germany did; that France did not march her armies across Belgium's frontier, and Germany did; that France promised to respect the treaty she had signed, and Germany refused to give such a promise. How can we argue on the basis of what might have happened, instead of what has happened?"²⁴

It will be recalled that our Ambassador in London, Mr. Page, advised that the *Dacia*, transferred from German to American registry, should be seized by the French rather than by the English, on the ground that our good-will toward France was such that "Americans will stand even outrages from France without getting excited." The result showed him quite correct in his analysis of our reaction. The *Review of Reviews* remarked casually that France had violated international law, but it was "a fair case for later settlement by friendly arbitration, and will involve no trouble." ²⁵

The *Outlook* for May 12, 1915, carried an article entitled "Plain Words from America to Sister Nations in Europe," by "Civis Americanus." To France, the writer said:—

"We shall never forget your friendship and help in the days when we won our freedom. . . . We cannot see that this war is in any way one of your choosing or of your making. No threat of yours, no claim of yours, entered into the witches' caldron." . . .

France showed, he said, respect for Belgian neutrality, and willingness to work for a peaceful settlement, and,—

"You have not talked much, but you have fought well. You have suffered enormously, but you have not lost your nerve. . . . Your silent General, your silent soldiers, your sober, self-sacrificing people, have made a splendid record."

Wayne MacVeigh, in the *North American Review*, July, 1915, said,—

"I know nothing more sublime in all history than the passion for liberty which animates to-day the children of France in their combat for their country and for the world against the crushing forces of Attila's Huns."

France was praised frequently for not carrying on the campaign of propaganda that Britain and Germany had undertaken; she was praised as sharing American ideals of democracy; she was praised because her actions had disproved notions current in America of her decadence, corruption, and instability. We were frankly surprised to find her so "quiet and stubborn." ²⁶ We expected enthusiasm and audacity,—

. . . "the stirring thing is that France the frivolous, France the debonair, France the carefree and laughter-loving, has met the supreme ordeal of her existence in a manner to teach the whole world lessons of steadiness, of sobriety, of dogged courage, of concentrated efficiency, and of uncomplaining sacrifice." ²⁷

The studies of the war published in 1916 show marked partisanship in most cases. C. E. Seymour, in his *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914*, accepted casually enough the thesis that Germany forced the war upon France. Arthur Bullard, describing the *Diplomacy of the*

Great War, presented a thoughtful and reasonable analysis, distinctly more sympathetic toward France than toward any other nation of which he wrote. C. H. C. Wright, in *The Third French Republic*, absolved France of any aggressive action,—

“So far as the outbreak of the war in 1914 is concerned, France stands with a clear conscience. She had nothing to do with the disputes between Austria and Serbia, or between Austria, Germany, and Russia. Once war proved inevitable France faithfully accepted the responsibility of the Russian alliance. Against France Germany was an open aggressor.”²⁸

James M. Beck’s “arguments” in favor of the Allies, especially France, were fulsome in their enthusiasm. Samuel P. Orth’s *The Imperial Impulse* was better balanced. He analyzed the character and the motives of each of the warring nations, bringing out both good and bad points in each. He did not wish German “brute force” to overwhelm France, but her motive in the war, he said, was “revenge, a very childish, but a very human motive.”²⁹ Frederic C. Howe, *Why War?* blaming privilege as the cause of the war, and imperialism as the policy interpreting it, indicted all nations alike, and as to France, said that colonial expansion was a national, rather than a purely administrative policy, since French peasants were accustomed to invest their savings in overseas enterprises; and in France imperialism was

“a slumbering desire for the recapture of Alsace-Lorraine, for the humbling of Germany, the protection of billions invested in Russian bonds, the maintenance of concessions in the Balkans and the Near East, and the preservation of the colonies on the Mediterranean.”³⁰

A unique example, for this period, is the pro-German argument of Roland Hugins, who declared that he had “no German blood, and, incidentally, no Irish,” “American since 1690.” His book, *Germany Misjudged*, brought together many of the charges that since have become more common. France

“is living in a dream, wrapped in illusion. Because she suffers much, she thinks her cause is just, and because her soul is high she imagines her deed is good. Every nation at war tends to idealize its motives, and this is particularly true of this world war,—possibly just for the reason that most of its causes were selfish.”

It is gratifying to vaunt the glory of France, he said, and to talk of wicked Germany,—

“not so gratifying to talk of secret treaties, of Russian securities held by French investors, of the subjugation of Morocco, or of the intrigues of the colonial party . . . the whole question simmers down to this: why were you in alliance with Russia?”

It could not have been, he thought, because of sympathy with the Russian government. It could not have been fear. Germany would not have attacked. It could only have been for revenge, and France is "the most pitiable figure in the world, because you suffer so much and with the least need," "lent, body and soul, to the designs of the Russian autocracy." ³¹

That this was far from being the view of the general public is borne out by such articles as that of George Harvey in the *North American Review* for April, 1916; by Roosevelt's "France has shown a heroism and a loftiness of soul worthy of Joan of Arc herself"; by Allen Tucker's enthusiastic declaration,—“France carries the civilization of the world in her hands, . . . and knows that she is fighting to save it.” We should let France understand, said Tucker,

“that we, as a people, give her our respect, our admiration, and more than all, our love, . . . in spite of luxury and materialism, there is an America still, and that America understands that France is carrying the hope of the world.” ³²

Arthur Bullard suggested that France was our best ally. Britain was too imperialistic. France was our first friend. We had from her a wealth of ideas, more valuable even than her military aid. She was the most democratic of peoples, with ideals similar to ours.³³ There were stirring poems, too, to France. One of the most widely known is Henry Van Dyke's *The Name of France*.

“Give us a name to fill the mind
 With the stirring thoughts that lead mankind.

 A name like a star, a name of light.
 I give you, France!” ³⁴

It is to be borne in mind that since the opening of the war relations between the United States and Germany had been steadily growing embittered. By virtue of this irritation against Germany there was a tendency on the part of many to account her enemies our friends. Yet Great Britain had committed many infractions of our neutrality, and comparatively few were willing to go as far as Ambassador Page in condoning these offences. France, however, without a powerful navy, and needing every ounce of energy for the struggle on land, left most naval questions in Britain's hands, and the diplomatic correspondence shows that her interferences with our mails and our commerce, with the life and happiness of our citizens, were negligible as compared with those of Germany and Britain. Moreover, she had been invaded: her sufferings were very real, her courage and sacrifice undeniable. She furnished a satisfactory outlet for our emotions and our sympathies. Since the very first days of the war, American volun-

teers had been serving with the Allied forces, principally the French and the Canadians. Alan Seeger and some fifty others joined the Foreign Legion before the war was three weeks old, and many more, representing often the best-known families in America, followed. The Lafayette Flying Corps, all Americans, was organized in the French aviation service as early as March, 1915. These enlistments may have been largely for love of adventure, but the young soldiers soon came to look upon their enterprise as a crusade, and their burning devotion communicated itself to those at home. Said the *Chicago Herald*, April 16, 1915,—

“The volunteers fighting for France . . . We never hear of volunteers fighting for Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Austria. . . . It is always for France that the strangers fight. Why? There is only one answer. Because she is France. . . . Of all the nations, France is the only one which has no need of arguments, of affirmations, of proofs to make an impression on the stranger. It is enough for her to exist.”

There were casualties, too, among these young zealots,—Kiffin Rockwell, who wrote, “I pay my part for Lafayette and Rochambeau”;—Norman Prince;—Victor Chapman;—Alan Seeger, at first only impulsively loyal to the Paris which he loved; later, “doing my share for the side I think right,” declaring that there should be no neutrals, and calling upon America to forget her selfishness and join to serve the world.³⁵

Nor were these all whose stories tore at our hearts. Americans had thrown themselves heart and soul into relief work, not only through the Red Cross, always ready to aid, but through innumerable services designed especially to meet the emergency in Belgium and France. The American Ambulance Service, which Robert Bacon, former Ambassador to France, was organizing efficiently, and in which some five thousand Americans served, from first to last, many of them young students from Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and other eastern colleges, was early in the field. Edith Wharton was building up the American Hostels for Refugees and Children. The American Relief Clearing House, the American Fund for French Wounded, and many others, were in active operation. And these workers, too, were not merely offering charity. They were offering themselves and often all they had, as

“a concrete expression of our sympathy with the French people, our belief in the justice of their cause, our hope in its ultimate triumph. . . . In this war France has committed no moral blunders, has laid herself open to no criticisms, has violated no treaties, has trespassed upon none of the established conventions of warfare. . . . The whole world to-day does reverence to France and recognizes her as a combatant without fear and also without reproach.”³⁶

This effort “expresses not sympathy alone, but a sense of the majesty of France and the sublimity of her effort for the highest ideals of civiliza-

tion." ³⁷ Many aspects of the attitude of our government "toward the great struggle between absolutism and democracy" are humiliating to Americans, said the *Outlook*, "but there is nothing to regret in the devotion to France in her hour of need of many young Americans, nor in the finely conceived and finely organized service of American women to the sufferings and sorrow of France." ³⁸

With such a background, and with the submarine menace daily more threatening, it is not strange that there should have been many who felt with Elihu Root,—

"No man has fought for liberty during this century and a half, in all this world, who has not been cheered and strengthened by the example and the spirit of our free America; and if that spirit is not dead, as I know it is not, that spirit is with the Allies who are fighting our battles." ³⁹

And then, suddenly, we were with them in fact and deed. The President's message had called for war; Congress had sanctioned it; and we were receiving in America an Allied mission to arrange for coöperation. The British delegation was received with friendliness and decorum, the French with surpassing enthusiasm. April 26 was officially designated as "France Day" by the Governor of New York State. It was the anniversary of Lafayette's departure from France in 1777. From one end of New York City to the other the Tri-color floated. In the schools, in public gatherings, on the streets, one heard the Marseillaise. Brooklyn dedicated with dignified ceremony a new Lafayette memorial. Wreaths were piled high about the Lafayette statue in Union Square. Enthusiastic speeches recalled the days of the "First Alliance," and promised to repay the debt, a debt doubled by the fact that for two long years, while we slept, the soldiers of Britain and France had fought to protect our constitution and our liberties. Country-wide spread the contagion. The Senate received the French envoys with a demonstration unequalled since the days of Lafayette's return in 1822. The House shared the excitement. Staid Philadelphia gave to Joffre a marshal's baton with a piece of one of the rafters of Independence Hall inset. In Boston and Springfield, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas, wherever the envoys went, they received ovations. "No mission of this kind," said the papers, "could have been more successful in winning the confidence and respect of an entire nation." Viviani gave "a vivid impression of his own earnestness and the indomitable spirit of his people." And as for Joffre,—

"Perhaps never before in our history has a foreign visitor appealed so directly to the innate American love of human strength, bigness, and courage as exemplified in the individual man."

"The victor of the Marne and thus the savior of civilization."

"In that modest, massive, indomitable personality we shall see France."

It was more than a personal tribute to these men, said the observers. It was an offering to the spirit of France—a glorified, canonized France—a France which had shown almost superhuman resilience and endurance, and a marvellous appreciation of the supreme values in life; a France for whom American affection was instinctive and spontaneous. This was the nation, said enthusiasts, which rallied from disaster and defeat to save the cause of international faith and democracy.

“There was a splendor, there was a glory, about the French resistance at the Marne unlike all else in modern history.”⁴⁰

“It was the time of our despair,

.

When lo! as down from heaven let
There came—the sword of Lafayette!

.

Thank Heaven our naked blade is set
Beside the sword of Lafayette!

.

’Tis for the holiness of life
The Spirit calls us to the Cross.
Forget us, God, if we forget
The sacred sword of Lafayette!”⁴¹

Franklin K. Lane declared that we fought Germany, not only for our own injuries, but because of Belgium, because of France,—

“invaded, desecrated France, a million of whose heroic sons have died to save the land of Lafayette. Glorious golden France, the preserver of the arts, the land of noble spirit, the first land to follow our lead into republican liberty.”⁴²

Brand Whitlock, speaking at the Lafayette tomb on July 4, said:—

“To-day, as we stand here by the tomb of him who in his youth went forth alone to join his colors across the seas, we hear the tread of a million youths of America, sons of his spirit, marching to the ships that bear them hither to join their colors on this new front of Liberty.”⁴³

“The reunion of hearts is complete, but the reuniting of hands cannot be complete until the American army places the Stars and Stripes in the forefront of France’s far-flung battle line.”⁴⁴

Thus we come to the climax of American enthusiasm for France. Never before in our history had there been so glowing an ardor for another nation. It is true that this emotion was predicated upon a variety of circumstances. Some of it may have been unconscious self-glorification, since the vindication of French motives and action now appeared to vindicate our own. Some of it may have been quite unjustified by the facts. Nevertheless, it existed. It was wide-spread. It owed very little to French propa-

ganda, and was entirely genuine on the part of the mass of the American public.⁴⁵ Unfortunately it blinded us somewhat to actual conditions, and thus led to expectations which, failing of realization, created disappointment and bitterness. We assumed far too easily that our Allies, having a common enemy, sought identical ends with ourselves; that our ideas of justice and security would in the final settlement be theirs.

Here and there, however, appeared a suggestion that idyllic harmony had not quite been attained. The *New Republic* in a summary of the situation said that we might quite reasonably subordinate our ideas as to men and supplies to the greater knowledge of facts possessed by the Allies, but that we must be careful not to allow political subordination. We could not be the vassals of European diplomats, and the peace for which we fought must be a just and final one.⁴⁶ Lothrop Stoddard, writing on "*Present-Day Europe*," devoted a chapter to French war and pre-war psychology, and used not infrequently the phrase "neo-imperialism."⁴⁷ Senator Borah, in a characteristic speech, announced that he did not vote for war out of sympathy with France,—“much as I sympathize with and greatly as I admire that brave and chivalrous people.” In his view, we were fighting, not for anyone else's interests or colonies, but for the United States alone, because we must protect the lives and rights of our citizens. “It is,” he said, “an American war, to be carried on, prolonged, or ended, according to American interests, and to be adjusted upon American principles.” Since we had entered, it could no longer be considered a European war to settle European affairs.⁴⁸

Another phase is brought out by the hints of Herbert Adams Gibbons, Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, and others who wrote from Paris suggesting that Americans in France would be wise not to criticise too much, not to boast of things American and patronize their Allies, not to spend so lavishly as to encourage French overcharging and then complain that they were robbed, but to really try to understand French traditions and habits.⁴⁹ From the first, it had been recognized that one of the French war aims was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. On this point, in spite of general condemnation of Germany's original seizure, American opinion was not a unit. Charles Downer Hazen, in *Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule* declared for unconditional restoration. “The twentieth century must redress the greatest iniquity of the nineteenth.” By far the greater number of writers on the subject took the position that some sort of a compromise settlement, based upon racial and strategic lines, and giving due recognition to the wishes of the inhabitants, should be worked out, in the interests of permanent peace. As the *Review of Reviews* put it, the question could no longer be considered as involving France and Germany alone. The peace

of the world was dependent upon the finding of a permanent settlement. "The world cannot tolerate the continuance of feuds that endanger the general peace." "If French intelligence is not blinded by passion it will be seen that this permanent basis of peace is what France is really fighting for."⁵⁰

After President Wilson in the "Fourteen Points" committed the Administration to the return of the disputed districts, the bulk of press comment swung over to this point of view. H. H. Powers even went farther, and declared for annexing the Rhineland provinces, including the Palatinate as well, on the ground of economic unity. Senator Lodge's argument on the point touched on the same consideration, from another angle. Alsace and Lorraine must be returned, without conditions and without deduction, not only because it was just and right, "but because it is essential to our own self-protection that the iron mines of Lorraine, which are said to contain five-sevenths of the German iron, must be taken from Germany forever. Without these mines she would have found it difficult to prepare for this war. She must never have control of them again."⁵¹

America in 1918 was largely occupied with her own share in the war. There was much general discussion of possible peace terms, and especially of devices to prevent future wars. There was less direct discussion of individual countries than before our own efforts so largely absorbed our interest; more interest in the A. E. F. than in the French army; more to be said about American sacrifices and plans than about anything else. Public speakers now and then made courteous and friendly references to France: we celebrated Bastille Day as an opportunity to show our "spiritual solidarity," and celebrated it, be it said, with all due enthusiasm, and all due protestations of undying loyalty to France, and pledges to restore the lost provinces; but, on the whole, the spontaneity and ardor of a twelvemonth earlier were lacking. And this was natural enough under the circumstances, and proved no lack of real appreciation of "suffering, unyielding, towering France" as she still appeared to us.⁵² Most histories of the war were now dominated largely by government propaganda material, and were wholly favorable to the Allies.⁵³

The most interesting and significant utterances are those bearing upon certain aspects of the probable after-war settlements, which indicate the gradual development of some new points of view. We begin to find references to the secret treaties, which were considered reprehensible and tending to neutralize the possibility of a just peace.⁵⁴ We find the war characterized not as a contest between the Central Powers representing imperialism and the Allies standing for democracy, but as a contest between progressive and reactionary forces everywhere, so that we must be

on our guard lest the Entente use a victory to carry out their own imperialistic plans. America gives notice that she fights in Europe

“solely on the understanding that we are to have henceforth a world safe for small peoples; a league of democratic self-governing nations; the principle of trusteeship over backward regions, rather than that of possession and exploitation.”⁵⁵

Ambassador Page's suggestion in March, 1917, that “a gift of a billion dollars to France” would “fix Franco-American history all right for several centuries” had not met with favor, but generous credits and large loans to all the Allies by the United States had created a problem whose adjustment was beginning to attract attention. H. H. Powers, after saying that “only with a blush” could America accept payment of the French debt to us “while unable to pay our debt to her” naïvely suggested that the French colonies in the Pacific be transferred to us, thus lightening the French burden and saving French pride!⁵⁶ The *New Republic* (Sept. 7, 1918), boldly declared for cancellation, in view of the Allies', and especially France's “gallantly sustaining month after month, year after year, the tremendous weight of German aggression.” It will not be enough to drive the Germans from French soil, break their militarism, and restore Alsace-Lorraine. The burden of debt and of reconstruction will be too heavy. It will surely be the American will to “wipe out the French debt” and we should allocate the costs of war in such a way as to give France justice. Her loss has been far greater than that of any other nation. She has been acting for the common good, and should be set even with her partners when peace comes. The *Nation*, on the other hand, urged that France would not wish to be an object of charity, nor would she be so exhausted as to make it necessary.⁵⁷ As to reparations, a question always so closely connected with that of financial rehabilitation and interallied debts, the *New Republic* insisted that while they be made to cover “the things that no nation cherishing its honor” would do in war, as “launching invasion through neutral soil, wanton destruction of civil property and enslavement of civil population, thrusting aside the poor safeguard thrown by conventional laws of war around life and property at sea,” the payments be not made to cover plans for revenge, nor set so high as to create desperation in Germany.⁵⁸

As the time for the Peace Conference approached, it became increasingly evident that American ideas as to a just peace would not correspond with those of European leaders. Both the British and the French administrations were publicly declaring that Germany must pay the entire costs of the war. Advices from Paris indicated that France would maintain the validity of the secret treaties made during the war; that she would call for concerted action against the Russian Soviet government, and would en-

deavor to establish a strong and militaristic Poland and a chain of armed succession states to curb both Russia and Germany. She would call for the confiscation of all German colonies and their allocation among the victors; and for herself she would not be satisfied with the return of Alsace-Lorraine, but would demand the annexation of the Saar Valley and the extension of the French frontier to the Rhine. On December 30, 1918, Clemenceau, in the French Senate, declared that the first requirement of France was security, and that in his judgment "an old system . . . known as the balance of power" worked out through firm alliances, offered the best guarantee of safety. "Certainties," not dreams, France demanded. To Americans who had seen in the pre-war system of ententes and alliances the source of much of the distrust and the militarism that brought on the war, such a programme and such statements were ominous, and a wave of dissatisfaction swept over the country. "The balance of power was an organized immorality," declared the *New York Times* (January 1, 1919), "It looks like a head-on collision between France and America," said the *Literary Digest* (January 11, 1919). Americans might concede something of their independence to a general league, thought the *Seattle Times*, but they "will concede nothing to an alliance."⁵⁹ "Concerning Tigers in Peace Times," remarked the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, this policy of nationalism does not march with "the eminently fair rule of mutual concessions." "The American army . . . will never be used to defend a Rhine frontier purchased by the future subordination of millions of Germans to French military law." "American soldiers will not go to France in order to protect French occupation of the Saar Valley." The temper of France "seems transformed." It seems now "narrow, self-centred, grasping, and, toward the Germans, vindictive." Our feeling toward France will undergo a revulsion "if we come to think that she has eyes and ears for nothing but her own national safety and aggrandizement."⁶⁰ If the French want certainties, said the *Baltimore Sun*, here are a few:—It is certain

. . . "that the balance of power is an ineffective instrument for maintaining the peace . . . that the seizure and holding by any nation of territory containing a hostile population is a constant source of trouble and danger to that nation . . . that you cannot exact indemnities from a defeated nation unless the latter has the money or is allowed to make the money wherewith to pay the indemnities."⁶¹

The feeling against the "Hun" was very strong in the United States, however, and majority opinion clearly favored a "strong peace" and the exaction of the fullest possible penalties from Germany. Frank Simonds defended the French policy as directed toward safety only, and not imperialism. He thought cession of the Saar to France just compensation for the destruction of the Lens mines. Senator Lodge advocated "ample and com-

plete" indemnities for France,—“compensation to the utmost limit.” She should have Alsace-Lorraine, and “other barriers if necessary to make her impregnable to German assault” for our sake as well as hers, for “on the strength of France more than anything else, because she is the neighbor of Germany, rests the future peace of the world.” Simeon Strunsky, in the *New York Evening Post*, reminded us that France could hardly in four months have changed from the “nation that bared its breast for the defence of humanity” to “a profiteer and a menace to peace.” In view of French suffering and French danger, by no means ended, it is manifestly unfair, he continued, to treat France as if she were suffering from self-induced shell-shock, “a neurotic woman giving herself up to the delights and profits of hysteria.” France has deserved sympathy and support from us.⁶² When the Versailles Treaty was completed and signed, the situation was complicated by a bitter political struggle, and especially by the feud between President Wilson and the Senate. The President had also many personal enemies, and numerous critics of all political complexions. The League of Nations, his especially favored device, to establish which he had sacrificed many of his most cherished beliefs, became the principal focus of attack by his opponents. The fight over ratification of the Treaty in the Senate was made almost entirely against the Covenant, and, save for a few special provisions like the Shantung question, hardly touched upon the Treaty proper, although, as they were inseparable, failure to ratify the one automatically killed the other. Public discussion followed the same lines, with the general trend favoring acceptance of the Treaty, though sharply critical, in some quarters, of the League plan. The *Outlook* poll of the press was said to indicate that “only pro-Germans and radicals of the academic type,” objected to the peace terms. This is probably a fling at the *Nation* and the *New Republic*, both of which did object, vigorously, along the lines of their previous criticisms of French policy. The *Literary Digest* also reported general approval. Typical comment is:—

“The Germans don't like the peace terms, but they ought to remember that if they did nobody else would.”⁶³

A better criterion of the American attitude toward France is found in the reaction to the proposed guarantee treaty, in which the United States was to agree to aid France in case of unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. This it will be recalled was one of the important compromises of the Peace Congress, growing out of the French insistence upon the Rhine frontier as a strategic necessity and the unwillingness of Great Britain and the United States to create such a new and dangerous Alsace-Lorraine. British and American guarantee treaties were offered and accepted as a substitute. President Wilson favored the French alliance

strongly, did not see it as entangling, thought it justified by circumstances, and said it "would be one of the handsomest acts of our history" to enter into it. The treaty was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, and never taken up and never reported out. Senator Lodge, the Chairman of that Committee, said later that it would have been quite useless to do so, as even if the Committee had favored it, the Senate would never have voted to accept it. Senators of neither party would have been willing "to bind the United States irrevocably with agreements to go to war again under certain prescribed conditions."⁶⁴ Popular opinion was divided apparently quite evenly on the subject. Approval was based upon the belief that the treaty was necessary for the safety of France and therefore for world safety; that by assisting in stabilizing the situation it would give opportunity for the League to become established; or that, whether actually necessary or not for the safety of France, she had thought protection necessary, and we were under so great a debt of gratitude for ancient and recent aid that as Hamilton Holt of the *Independent* said,—

"Surely the American people can grant pretty nearly anything that France would ask of us."⁶⁵

The arguments of the opposition were more varied. Friends of the League disliked it because it implied that the League was not strong enough to keep the peace, and because setting up another agency to share in this duty would make it still weaker. Moreover, based on the old principle of the balance of power, it was a negation, said the critics, of all for which the League was intended to stand and for which American lovers of peace had been striving. Borah said it was "based on the theory of war, made in the expectation of war, and, like all such alliances, a war alliance." Opponents of the League decried the fact that it must be approved by the League Council to be effective, and might be ended when the League thought itself competent to prevent aggression. It took from Congress its constitutional right to declare war, and was clearly precisely "the kind of entangling alliance against which every American statesman from Washington to Wilson had repeatedly warned us." It was "an effort to prop up a wobbly League with a reactionary alliance." "Who is to determine when aggression is 'unprovoked?'" We know too well how diplomats can justify themselves. In short, as the *Baltimore Sun* put it,

"The President unquestionably has got to do a lot of talking before he convinces the American people of the wisdom of this alliance."⁶⁶

This, however, is to be noticed throughout the discussion. In spite of the caution shown, in spite of the suspicion of old-world diplomacy in general, the feeling toward France is almost without exception kindly, and

again and again we find the assurance that actual need for aid on the part of France would meet with a sure response in America. Even that most captious of critics, the *New Republic*, which was almost alone in reading into the treaty the erection of a military dictatorship for France upon the Continent, remarked half-apologetically that it put us in an awkward position, inasmuch as "nobody much wants the alliance and few wish to say no to France, or know how to say it." ⁶⁷

Closely connected with the ingrained American unwillingness to be bound in an entangling alliance was the fact that the A. E. F., which had gone to France under the impression that "the French wore wings and the Germans horns," had experienced a considerable disillusionment in that fair land. They had received an enthusiastic welcome, but the French were too busy with matters of life and death to provide a continuous ovation. Too busy, also, to endow life in their country with any of the graces and courtesies for which they were famed. The doughboy by the time of the armistice had his own idea of the French, and it was not flattering. He thought the French had rudimentary knowledge of sanitation (he particularly disliked the manure heaps in front of the thrifty cottager's door): he thought them inefficient, immoral, and exceedingly extortionate. Overcharging was in fact the worst count against them. And, anyway, they weren't like himself, and everything they did and said was "queer." They called water "lo," and were themselves called "frogs," plus, frequently, an uncomplimentary adjective. Friction between the officers of the Allied armies existed, too. The French tendency to instruct too much and too patronizingly, and above all their desire to use the American troops as replacements rather than as a separate and respected entity, caused much irritation, and any number of other annoyances, avoidable or not, were recognizable. After the armistice, the American army wanted to go home, was sick and tired of rain, dirt, and "cooties," and had plenty of time to find fault. Moreover, the troops sent to Luxemburg and to Germany found themselves in clean, comfortable billets, were well treated, and often decided that they really liked the Germans better than the French. The returned soldier was wont to state with firmness that he would never fight in France or for France again.

In the spring of 1920 a situation developed which focused American attention sharply upon France. Germany, which had been unable since the war to establish a stable government, was disturbed by a Communist outbreak centering in the industrial district of the Ruhr. Under the Versailles Treaty this section was demilitarized. The German government requested from the Allies permission to send troops in to quell the trouble. The French took alarm, insisted that the permission be refused, and declared that the

whole disturbance was a device of Germany to bring about concentration of troops near the frontier for a renewal of the war. Without waiting for concerted action, moreover, as soon as it became evident that the German government was sending soldiers under the guise of special police into the Ruhr, France herself entered Germany and occupied Frankfort, Darmstadt, and other important towns, giving notice that she would remain until German troops had evacuated the Ruhr. Public opinion on the continent and in the United States was much stirred. The general belief in this country appeared to be that France was justified. The Germans were showing every disposition to evade the Treaty. France had received neither the Rhine frontier nor the Anglo-American guarantee for her safety, and she could permit no infractions of the Treaty in general, and in particular could risk no German military movements along the Rhine frontier.⁶⁸

Administration circles, however, showed anxiety. The State Department sent a vigorous protest and administration newspapers all characterized French action as "questionable," "tactless," or "militaristic." President Wilson allowed himself the indiscretion of writing to Senator Hitchcock a statement, promptly made public, to the effect that throughout the Peace Conference a militarist party, under influential leadership, had endeavored to dominate French policy, but without success. Now, however, they were in control, and—"I am as intolerant," he said, "of imperialistic designs on the part of other nations as I was of such designs on the part of Germany."⁶⁹ "France has frankly returned to militarism," said others. She is determined to obtain "by hook or by crook" the Rhine frontier, and if possible the Ruhr and Essen. Perhaps she is even attempting to accomplish the break-up of Germany, a thing which she would gladly bring about. It is in any case a dangerous move, this invasion of German territory. It "puts in jeopardy the peace of Europe." If serious trouble grows out of it "the burden of responsibility will be upon France for having again drawn the sword."⁷⁰ The argument was ended, but not the effect of the incident, when France was persuaded by the British to withdraw, and did so on May 18, the German troops having most of them been recalled prior to this time.

Thoughtful observers had come to see much cause for disquiet in the whole European situation, and without of course blaming France wholly for it, held her largely responsible. Bernard Baruch, in his account of the making of the reparation and economic sections of the Treaty, showed how bitterness and fear had dominated the French will, and how they had imposed their determination "*Que l'Allemagne paye d'abord*" upon all discussion of this phase of the peace terms. He thought the resulting provisions unsatisfactory in many ways, but hoped that the Reparations

Commission might be able to serve as an instrument for correction. Charles Homer Haskins and Robert E. Lord, in their *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, discussed some of the more serious difficulties of the political provisions of the peace settlements. These men, like Mr. Baruch, knew well their ground, having been among the American experts who were called to Paris to assist in framing the Treaty. They emphasized the honest effort which they believed had been made to secure a just and durable settlement, thought the arrangements in the main satisfactory, and considered that the League offered an adequate medium for the correction of errors and imperfections. But the evidence of dangerously conflicting national aims and of the instability of the attempted settlements was impressive, and no one could fail to note how much the successful working of many important provisions depended upon the behavior of France. John Foster Bass, writing on *The Peace Tangle*, reviewed the war aims of the Allied powers, and stressed the importance of the secret treaties, as revealing how far their plans and ambitions differed from the ideals of justice, liberty, and the freedom of small peoples, which they so earnestly professed. He blamed the Germans more than the French for the pre-war jealousies and fears, and for the actual outbreak of the war, and sympathized with the French feeling of isolation and frustration when in the Peace Conference they found themselves unable to obtain what they thought were adequate guarantees for their future safety and adequate reparations for their losses. But he also condemned their leaders at the Conference as lacking in a spirit of international coöperation and conciliation, and for the employment of underhanded methods to defeat the idealism of President Wilson. Of the Treaty as finally drawn he said that it "almost compels France to seek its enforcement with arms if she is to obtain the benefits which should accrue to her under it and of which she is in pressing need." He thought that in enforcing the Treaty France was alienating her friends, since the policy of keeping Germany weak, destroying her economic prosperity, and surrounding her by a cordon of hostile nations, did not suit the needs of the other countries who would be better served by a revival of German prosperity, and would find more wisdom in a policy of coöperation than in one of continuing antagonism. He touched too upon the fact that France was pursuing a course of doubtful sagacity in the Near East, and was in particular continuing her old imperialism by the costly and insecure Syrian venture.⁷¹

Ray Stannard Baker, defending President Wilson's actions at Paris, laid the blame for an unsatisfactory peace squarely upon "the wearing struggle, chiefly with the French," which characterized the discussions, and especially upon Clemenceau, who "had no illusions left, nothing but a kind of

burning flame of passion for France," and was "against the President on every real issue that arose." He declared that only the President's threat to leave the Conference blocked the French insistence upon annexation of the Saar and the Rhineland, and he spoke with bitterness of the campaign of attack and abuse which filled French newspapers after it became evident that Mr. Wilson would not lend himself to French ambitions.⁷² Said the *Springfield Republican*:—

"The Treaty was dictated in a paroxysm of hate. In trying to enforce it strictly, France will increasingly as time passes find herself in opposition to those great moral forces through which the Allies won the war."⁷³

An editorial in the *Nation*, on "The Other France" says that the word "France" has been "an inspiration, a symbol of high idealism, of international achievement, of generous emotion, in past years," but to-day France is

"the inheritor of the Prussian mantle. It is the hearthstone of reaction in Europe, the nursery of counter-revolutionary conspiracies among exiled dukes and financiers, the hope of the Hungarian dictator Horthy, of the Cossack bandit-chief Wrangel, and of the Polish imperialist Dmowski; the great obstacle to European reconstruction."⁷⁴

Authors of historical works published between 1918 and 1921 do not in general, however, show a disposition to depart from the accepted canons, whether they are writing syllabi for use in educational institutions, formal histories, brief or detailed, of the war, or studies of general European history. Arthur Pearson Scott, in his *Introduction to the Peace Treaties*, published in 1920, began with a summary of war causes and war aims. His position was more extreme than that of most of the group.

"It is important therefore to remember that the war which began the last week in July, 1914, was directly, deliberately, and solely forced by Austria-Hungary and Germany on nations which made every possible effort to avoid it." . . . They could have "secured the redress of every legitimate grievance, and the satisfaction of every reasonable ambition by accepting the offers of the Entente. Instead they chose to strike for everything. They lost. And now they are held to accountability. In estimating the peace settlement this fact should never be overlooked."

Graham H. Stuart's *French Foreign Policy* is warmly pro-French throughout. He is convinced that France's desire for peace in 1914 was genuine, and that her foreign policy, in spite of an occasional flaw, "is rooted in right and faces the stars." Raymond L. Buell's *Contemporary French Politics* is dispassionate and balanced, sympathetic, but impartial.⁷⁵

One of the most original and challenging productions of the year was Professor Sidney B. Fay's series of articles on the "Origins of the War"

published in the *American Historical Review* (July, 1920–January, 1921). From the appearance of these articles dates the active “revisionist” movement, which in the light of documentary evidence not available at the opening of the war, has undertaken a reallocation of the war-guilt. In this series, the discussion concerns chiefly the Central Powers and Russia. His conclusions as to France will however illustrate the new note:—

“As to France, however much she may have encouraged the Russian militarists, in the months preceding the crisis, by her adoption of the three-year term of military service, by her exchange of military and diplomatic visits (Joffre, Grand Duke Nicholas, Poincaré), by her naval convention, by her jingo press, and by her close relations with England, and however much by these same measures she may have aroused the suspicions of Germany, there can be no doubt that when the crisis came she sincerely did her best to avert it.”⁷⁶

Popular discussion of the Peace Conference continued to be lively, with opinion sharply divided upon the League and upon Mr. Wilson’s share in the negotiations, and a growing disapprobation of the Treaty. Fuel for arguments was furnished by the publication in 1921 of Ex-Secretary Lansing’s apologia, House and Seymour’s *What Really Happened at Paris*. Tumulty’s personal narrative, and other books of more or less partisan nature. None of them helped the French case.⁷⁷

The question of payment of interallied debts began to come to the foreground. Up to this time there had been quite general agreement that France should be allowed to recover her financial equilibrium before she was asked to pay even the interest upon her indebtedness.⁷⁸ But in the United States the afterwar industrial depression had made itself felt. Taxes, rents, and living expenses in general were high, and inquiry was heard as to when we might hope to receive some portion of the large European debt which was due. The general disposition, however, so far as France was concerned, continued to be one of patience, and even of generosity. More arguments for cancellation than for collection appeared.

Pierrepont B. Noyes, for over a year American member of the Rhineland Commission, published after his resignation a pessimistic study of the post-war European conditions. He emphasized the “desperate economic outlook” in France, declared that although military occupation of a country was probably seen at its best in the Rhineland, at its best “it is brutal; it is provocative; it is continuing war.” France, he asserted, was instigating separatist movements in the Rhine area, and with the aid of other poor or deluded states, endeavoring to build up a military domination of Europe, with the obvious danger of hostile repercussions in Germany and Russia. America, he thought, was the only power that could prevent disaster. We should ratify the Treaty and the Covenant, and bring

American leadership to the task of building a vital League of Nations. We should relieve the fears of France and assist in keeping down the influences working for militarism and for revenge. We should assume financial leadership and assist in working out a plan for the financial salvation of Europe. Finally,—

“If we must in the interest of world restoration join Great Britain in advising France to accept a smaller indemnity from Germany, we will be hypocrites indeed if we permit the full burden of this self-abnegation to fall upon the most sorely-wounded of our allies. We cannot do less than accept cancellation of the Franco-American loans as our share of the Allied war burden. . . . France spent it for us, and in addition sent to their death during that year a full half million of her young men in place of an equal number of American boys who would now be buried in foreign soil. I have yet to meet an American in close touch with the details of the French and European financial situation who has not agreed” with this judgment.⁷⁹

This position is interpretive of the feeling of large numbers of Americans who felt that criticism of European conditions should be tempered by an admission that the United States had failed in its full duty, and that both gratitude and wisdom should counsel us to moderation. Opposition, where it was voiced, was based chiefly upon feeling that failure to collect only financed militarism.⁸⁰

The question of reparations approached a critical stage. Little, apparently, could be collected in proportion to the amounts needed for reconstruction. The provisions of the Treaty were not being fulfilled. Prominent Germans were quoted as saying that Germany would never pay, but that if they had been victors, they would have known how to collect from the Allies. Frequent Allied conferences brought no solution. American sympathy swung in the direction of France and Britain.

“The opinion that Germany can pay all that is required of her is growing in America. The belief that she should pay all she can is, in the light of her unchastened attitude, already firmly established.”
(Washington Star)

“If Germany doesn’t pay for the devastation she methodically wrought, her victims must.”
(Philadelphia North American)

“We will know that Germany is as broke as she says she is when we read that any of the Hohenzollern boys have gone to work.”
(New York World)

“France keeps her army on the theory that although Germany lost the war she still knows where to find it.”
(Pueblo Star-Journal)

“Germany appears to have thought of everything except a plea of general insanity.”
(New London Day)

“With all notion of enslaving or perpetually impoverishing Germany ruled out, it is preposterous to pretend that she cannot pay in indemnity at least half as much as the war has cost France.”
(New York Times)

And then, on March 8, 1921, the Allies carried out the threat first made at the Spa Conference in July, 1920, and renewed at London in December, and after formally declaring Germany wilfully in default, employed the sanctions provided in the Treaty, and occupied Duisberg, Dusseldorf, and Ruhrort, setting up in these towns a customs barrier against the rest of Germany.⁸¹ Naturally this action brought criticism, and the brunt of it fell on France, since it was evident that the occupation, even if undertaken by the Allies acting in concert, was brought about by French demands and French insistence. Moreover, when no immediate result followed, the French openly threatened to advance further into Germany and to seize the whole Ruhr district, an event which the British, quite as openly, did not wish to occur. The main charges do not differ from the earlier ones, except perhaps in bitterness and definiteness. France is accused of deliberately provoking German default, by preventing the fixing of a definite and possible amount for the reparations claim, in order to have an excuse for annexations, and is declared to be wilfully and dangerously militaristic.⁸² Public opinion, however, continued on the whole to reject these theories, and to maintain that even though the occupation might not prove in the end wise or productive, German attempts at repudiation and blackmail justified France in using any necessary means to put an end to duplicity and evasion and compel an honest attempt to fulfil the Treaty terms and bring about the much-needed payments. Secretary Hughes' reply to the German appeal for American pressure upon the Allies to moderate their demands was widely approved. Mr. Hughes said, it will be recalled:—

“This Government stands with the governments of the Allies in holding Germany responsible for the war, and therefore bound to make reparations, so far as possible,”

concluding with advice to the Germans to offer promptly terms for settlement which were likely to be approved. “We have not forgotten,” said the *New York Evening Mail*, “which side we fought on.”⁸³

Representative of the sincere and thoughtful interest which many Americans were taking in the situation was *America and the Balance Sheet of Europe*, by John Foster Bass and Harold G. Moulton, with its careful analysis of the economic situation in Europe, and its comprehensive proposals for improvement, which involved not only economy, balanced budgets, cessation of trade wars, the reduction of reparation demands and the cancellation of inter-allied debts on the part of European countries, but full coöperation in financial and tariff readjustments on the part of the United States, together with a cancellation of the debt owed us by the Allies. The program called definitely for a general reduction of armament, and for the League of Nations or some other system of international co-

operation, to be accepted by all, as essentials of successful rehabilitation.⁸⁴ In harmony with this portion of the plan, and as an American contribution to constructive settlements, was the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, called by the United States to meet in Washington in the latter part of the year 1921. Representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, together with several of the smaller powers, were present, and Secretary Hughes' speech at the opening session, with its drastic and specific proposals for naval reduction, and its indication of plans for land disarmament, made a profound impression both in this country and abroad. The British, though undoubtedly surprised at the scope of the proposals, rose gallantly to the occasion, and heartily seconded them. But to the disappointment, though not wholly to the surprise, of everyone, M. Briand, then French Premier, declared flatly that without the removal of the German menace, which he held as imminent, and without protection other than she herself could devise—referring to the never-ratified Anglo-American guarantee—France could not disarm. The French delegates, Foch especially, had been received with unbounded enthusiasm. Briand's speech, so out of harmony, it appeared, with the pacific impulses generously expressed by the other powers, was chilling and unwelcome. Yet the response was on the whole temperate and friendly. The *Literary Digest* sent out a widely-distributed questionnaire, asking what the United States would do if France should again be attacked. Out of a total of 273 replies, 228 were in favor of financial and military aid in case of unprovoked aggression. 66 were willing to sign a guarantee alliance. 123 would give aid, but were unwilling to accept such a treaty. 48 thought the League would give adequate protection. 45 believed that there was no real danger from Germany and no likelihood of need for protection. Only 36 were definitely against giving aid, and these alleged French militarism chiefly as their reason. Numerous unfeignedly warm and generous expressions of gratitude and friendliness characterized the replies.⁸⁵

And then the French representatives threw another bombshell. When the proposed naval ratios were announced, the French rejected theirs, demanded a much larger number of capital ships, and added that light cruisers and submarines, as chiefly defensive in value, should not be subject to any limitation at all. Observers, aghast, said the conference was wrecked. The British took the submarine demand as a threat against themselves. Militant articles on the use of the submarine, with a provocative thrust against Britain, published in a semi-official French journal, were quoted. Mr. Hughes cabled to the French Premier, now returned to Paris, appealing to him to accept the naval ratio, and declaring that the success or failure of the Conference depended upon his decision. The French repre-

sentatives promptly and definitely disavowed the criticised articles by Captain Castex, and disavowed, too, any ulterior motive in asking for an enlarged naval ratio or for submarines. Their government accepted the proposed ratio as to capital ships. But their attitude had made a very unfavorable impression, and it proved impossible to undo it. American sentiment is sensitive upon the subject of submarines and was horrified that anyone should dare defend their use. "An execrated weapon,—hated as no other instrument of sea warfare has ever been hated." The chorus of criticism was unanimous in saying that this time France "is wrong, dead wrong." Even granting that her occasion for land armament was as great as French authorities asserted, nothing in the German menace appeared to justify a French demand for a big navy, and in particular one heavily equipped with a weapon "sneaking, covert, accursed." This, in the judgment of many, could mean nothing but unadulterated militarism, a challenge to Britain, to the Mediterranean powers, perhaps in time to ourselves, and it had its influence upon opinion in regard to the whole European situation, creating doubt as to French sincerity, diverting sympathy from her admitted needs, and in general arousing a feeling of "suspicion and apprehension," in spite of the declaration in favor of retention of submarines made by our own government.

Friendly sources took care to assert that American leaders had been wanting in understanding of French psychology, that tact and wisdom and practical friendliness on our part might have obviated many phases of the present perturbed situation, and that the French feeling of isolation and fear was by no means unjustified, and not unreasonably affected their behavior. They called attention to the fact that the French naval program had been entirely halted by the war, while the British and ourselves had built more actively than ever before. They recalled French heroism and French suffering, and declared that "if any nation deserves something more than fair treatment, it is France. She is getting something less." The fact remained that, in the opinion of many, France had "estranged American sympathy," "lost in power, in prestige, in reputation, and in good will," "suffered a manifest diminution of popularity"; and "an extraordinary reversal of feeling towards France" had swept the country. Said the *Milwaukee Leader*,—

"Well, suppose France does lose the sympathy of the world. If her present plans work out, she won't need it."

In Congress, a bill was introduced, aimed directly at France, providing that any European nation that had announced its intention of increasing its navy should be called upon for immediate repayment of any sums owed the United States. The *World's Work*, in its January issue exceed-

ingly friendly in its comments upon Briand's speech, in the February one thought the French attitude "unfortunate," and added,—

"American public opinion will not support a plan to reduce French payments of debt or interest if it seems likely that France will spend the money thus saved for a new kind of military preparation." ⁸⁶

Throughout the year 1922 the tone of discussion continued to reflect a certain mistrust and disapproval of French behavior. For example, one of the important books of the season was Frank A. Vanderlip's *What Next in Europe?* After a critical discussion of "the poison treaties of Paris," as he called them, he said that France at peace was different from France at war.

"On the battle-field she presented a stubborn resistance against what seemed to be overwhelming forces, a gallant courage in the face of any odds, that won for her the ringing applause of the whole world. Contrasted with that indomitable courage in war is a state of chattering terror in peace. She seems so beset with fear of the future that her mental processes do not register logically." . . .

France was demanding, he went on to say, an impossible indemnity, and creating conditions which made payment doubly impossible.

"No matter how much one may admire France . . . one cannot remain blind to the harm that France is doing herself, all Europe, and the world." ⁸⁷

A particularly striking demonstration of this trend in American thinking was furnished when, in the late fall, Clemenceau visited this country, in an effort to check the tide of anti-French comment and restore the American confidence in his country. He met "for Clemenceau, a tremendous outpouring of admiration and applause, despite certain critical voices in the Senate. For France, an almost universal expression of sympathy and affection on the part of editorial writers," but these encouraging symptoms were accompanied by frank warning that permanent friendship or close association must be based on unity of ideals and interests. He was told that not a dozen Senators would vote for the treaty of alliance with his country, and as for supporting in full the French continental policy, as he urged,—"That is something America cannot do." The French may attribute American coolness "to the indefensibility of their own cause." French mismanagement of the Near Eastern situation, and especially the rapprochement with the Turk, came in for especial criticism. The Syrian adventure was never popular in this country. An editorial in the *Nation*, direct and caustic, summed up the points at issue.

"You say you want more than America's money. You want our hearts and souls. But, M. Clemenceau, France had our hearts and souls, and more than that. It is not easy to give again that which has been offered once and tossed aside with con-

tempt. You accepted our money and our men, but our ideals, our hopes, our dreams and visions, the things of heart and soul, you refused . . . our people believed in these things, and they are left with a sense of bruised disillusionment."

The secret treaties, defying the ideals France had seemed to accept, secret conferences, with the old bargaining, the failure to disarm, even to ratify the Washington Treaties, militarism in the Rhineland, in Africa, on the European continent at large, the building up of the hostile cordon of middle-European states, mishandling of the reparations problem, "saber-rattling,"—

"these things have cut so deeply into the American heart and soul that a resumption of the old warm and unquestioning affection is to-day impossible." ⁸⁸

Another evidence of shifting sentiment is the accession of further "revisionist" literature. Judge Bausman, in his *Let France Explain*, declared that "the present French government drives Europe to desperation by claims based upon injured innocence."

"France is a spoiled child, and a dangerously spoiled child. She must be reminded of her Delcassés, her Millerands, and her Poincarés. . . . The world must be reminded of the extent to which France armed Russia, of the immense simultaneous preparation of both, and of the reckless offensive conduct of French public men toward Germany during a whole decade preceding the war." ⁸⁹

Faith in France had, however, been too deeply ingrained to be easily shattered, and proof of this appeared within a very short time after the Clemenceau visit. The allied occupation of German towns which had been undertaken in March, 1921, had failed to produce definite results. During all of that year and throughout 1922 the reparations impasse had remained unbroken. Conferences and notes had left Germany sullen, defiant, obstructionist, making the most out of allied dissensions. French public opinion had urged an occupation of the entire Ruhr Valley, administered with sufficient severity to compel German submission. The British flatly balked at such an undertaking. On December 26, 1922, the French, Italian, and Belgian members of the Reparations Commission voted Germany in default on timber deliveries. On January 23, 1923, they voted similarly on the coal payments. In the face of British disapproval, the French and Belgians declared that they held these decisions as legal ground, under the Versailles Treaty, for further occupation of German territory, and on January 10 they occupied the Ruhr Valley in force. In February they extended and tightened their hold, thus practically severing this entire industrial district from the rest of Germany.

As in 1921, Washington disapproved of this action. The majority of economists and financiers took the same position. But the general public sur-

prisingly and decisively rallied again to the French cause. The occupation might not be wise, said the man in the street, but it was plucky. It was straightforward and direct, freed from all diplomatic quibbling and bargaining. It commanded respect. Ex-service men all over the United States, led by such well-known men as Commander A. M. Owsley of the American Legion, Major-Generals John F. O'Ryan and Clarence R. Edwards, defended the occupation. College presidents and governors, lawyers and poets, were quoted to the same effect. Motion picture crowds cheered and stamped as they watched the *poilus* marching into Essen, and wished the French luck. There was little expectation that reparation payments would be directly increased. It was evident that they would probably be temporarily decreased. But Germany had "stalled and whined and dodged and lied to avoid paying." Force was the only argument she knew, and it was fit and just that she should have it. If the invasion could be carried out successfully, the Germans would realize that they had lost the war, and the French might win to a sense of security and break away from the fear complex that had obsessed them. Even if it failed of complete success, it might do good and aid a permanent settlement, by demonstrating what was and what was not possible. Moreover, it was well known that the German industrialists had been foremost in urging resistance to the reparation demands. This, and this only, many thought, would bring them to terms.⁹⁰

Senator Borah led the opposition.

"The act of France is, in my judgment, without authority under the Versailles Treaty. It is a defiance of international order and peace. It is an offense against humanity. What she is doing will not bring compensation, but it will bring supreme suffering, not only to the Germans, but to the people throughout Europe, and incalculable loss to our own people."

Not a few concurred in this judgment. Some added that France was playing into the hands of her own industrialists, or that she was aiming at the ruin of Germany rather than at reparations, at annexation rather than occupation. As to security, said they, it cannot be attained by this method. Such acts of force will but create bitterness and a spirit of revenge. Many called upon the United States to find some way of friendly intervention, some means of solving the vexed question of reparations.⁹¹

In this connection it is to be observed that there was no disposition at this time to press France for a settlement of her indebtedness to the United States. Her financial difficulties at home and abroad were recognized as sufficient justification for postponement of action. It was suggested that we should be unreasonable and ungenerous if while we were advising France to modify her reparation demands we at the same time insisted upon

payment of all that was due ourselves. But cancellation was not widely favored, though there was willingness to accept a reduction. Many seemed to feel that it would be advisable to encourage the French government to recognize the debt officially and formally and state her intention of paying it, and perhaps begin the payment of the overdue and accumulating interest. French loans to Poland and to states of the Little Entente were questioned on the ground that "a debtor who can't pay and can lend is an anomaly." Bernard Baruch argued that loans for permanent improvements or afterwar expenditures should in no case be subject to cancellation, and warned against establishing a belief in Europe that the United States could be expected to subsidize all wars. But "we won't play Shylock," said various editors. Reduction of the amount to be paid, a generous moratorium, funding on favorable terms, all would be favored; but cancellation was deemed unwise, as establishing a dangerous precedent. Little change is to be observed in this attitude during 1923 and 1924, and discussion of the subject was not active.⁹²

The success of the French in breaking "passive resistance" in the Ruhr in the fall of 1923 was hailed with satisfaction, and declared to be proof, especially in view of the contract with the German industrialists which followed, that the French procedure had been well chosen, and that the occupation could bring about both reparations and security. Soon after this, also, earlier suggestions emanating largely from the United States bore fruit in the Commission of Economic Experts, with the generally-accepted Dawes Plan as the result of their deliberations. General Dawes was quoted as having said that without the presence of the French in the Ruhr there would have been no possibility of attaining a settlement, and popular opinion seemed not to dissent definitely from this. The *Annals* of the American Association of Political and Social Science in its July issue contained a Round Table discussion which appears to represent American opinion at this time. In this, Pierrepont B. Noyes criticised France's recent actions, charging her with the purpose of separating the Rhineland and Ruhr districts permanently from Germany, and of attempting to secure the hegemony of Europe through militarism. He said that this policy had resulted in feverish international bargainings among the small states, in the blocking of needed political and economic settlements, and in creating a danger of bankruptcy or of war throughout the European world. Bruce Bliven thought France was beginning to see that she was not wise in alienating all other powers in her attempt to keep Germany weak. But other writers in the group, among them Oscar T. Crosby, Frederick H. Allen, and Congressman John Jacob Rogers, stoutly defended the French.⁹³ Argument on the subject in 1925 followed the same lines. The apparent neces-

sity of the invasion was emphasized, on the ground of French needs and dangers, and this view was declared to have been vindicated by the adoption of the Dawes Plan. As the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* put it, the Ruhr occupation hurt the world, hurt France, but hurt Germany worst of all, and therefore, though regrettable, was worth the cost.⁹⁴

The Syrian venture at no time came so near to receiving popular approval. The grievances of the Syrian people under French rule roused the sympathy of outsiders, and the bombardment of Damascus, in particular, caused the sternest condemnation. While evacuation of the district by the French was recognized as open to serious difficulty, her administration of the mandate was considered in need of radical reform, and it was thought that an extended period of just and unselfish administration would be required to undo the bad impression which had been created.⁹⁵

From the early stages of the Turkish Nationalist movement there had been recognition of the evils due to the intrigues of the great powers. Both France and Spain were condemned for their part in the Moroccan disturbances. On the other side may be set the unqualified approval elicited by the consummation of the Locarno Treaties, with all that they connote of patience, wisdom, and conciliation, and also, after the flurry over the question of permanent seats in the League Council, by the generous welcome accorded by France to Germany on the occasion of the admission of the Reich to membership in the League.⁹⁶

Meantime, however, the revisionist controversy took on far greater proportions than at first seemed probable, and came to engage the attention of many thoughtful students of international affairs. The constant accretions of new documentary evidence, not available when the war began, have made the arguments on the subject of war guilt very complex, and produced sharp differences of opinion. It would be impossible even to summarize here the various aspects of this inquiry. What is most relevant to the subject of Franco-American relations is the marked tendency to depart from the accepted canons of the period of the war, and to lay upon the shoulders of French leaders, and especially upon Poincaré, much blame formerly accredited to the Kaiser. Prominent among those who have been investigating this field are Sidney B. Fay, whose earlier writings on the subject have been added to from time to time by careful analyses of different phases of the question, and Bernadotte E. Schmitt, who has contributed several discriminating articles. Harry Elmer Barnes, whose recent book, *The Genesis of the World War*, represents the fullest and most thoroughly documented summary yet available, appears as departing most definitely from the earlier judgment of French motives and behavior.

"We may thus say that the main, in fact the only, direct and immediate responsibility for the general European War falls upon Russia and France. It is difficult to say which should be put in the first place. . . .

"One of the persistent, and yet one of the most insidious phases of the Entente propaganda since the War has been the constant reiteration that the security of Europe and the world is identical with the security of France. Our present knowledge of the French part in the War of 1870, the menacing French spirit of revenge following 1871, the French diplomatic intrigues and aggressive aims in the Franco-Russian Alliance, the relatively unparalleled French militarism and military expenditures in 1914, the prominent part played by France in precipitating the War, and the domination of Europe by French aggression and militarism since 1918 should be sufficient to convince even the most biased Francophile Americans that we cannot found the slightest expectation of European peace upon any plan which gives France either security or ascendancy in Europe at the expense of other countries." 97

Early in 1925 the French debt question was brought definitely into the foreground. There had been a slowly growing desire to see all debts adjusted and books balanced. It was felt that a sufficient period had elapsed since the war to admit of this, and that it would contribute to international stability. France showed little disposition to cooperate with this desire, though other powers responded favorably. Clementel's budget plan, issued in December, 1924, made no provision for the American debt, and the Herriot ministry seemed on the verge of repudiating it. Stung by this attitude, American sentiment registered a sharp change, and took on an acerbity hitherto entirely lacking. In Congress and in the press appeared warnings that the United States would insist on payment. Said the *St. Louis Star*:

"Paris and European statesmen generally have been lying awake nights trying to figure out some feasible scheme whereby rich Uncle Sam could be bamboozled into shouldering the lion's share of the expense of whipping Germany." 98

Various attempts at negotiating a settlement followed, but the accompanying discussions did not clear the air or ease the tension. The French declared their conviction that the demands of the United States were harsh and unjust. They recalled the American delay in entering the war, and cited the words of American leaders, both official and unofficial, and the phrasing of the acts providing for the Liberty Loans, to the effect that the loans were but a substitute for men and munitions which we were at that time unable to furnish. They were antagonized by the American tendency to instruct the French upon their financial policy, by our insistence upon the stabilization of their domestic situation and the cutting down of expenditures for military purposes, and by our frequent warnings against undue severity toward Germany and against militaristic enterprises in general. They professed to fear American financial domination and tutel-

age which should threaten the independence of their country. This exasperation on the part of the French had its most striking manifestation in the letter sent to President Coolidge in August, 1926, by the aged ex-Premier Clemenceau, emerging from a six-year retirement to show a flash of the vigor, the impulsiveness, and the audacity, which characterized the "Tiger" in his prime. Wrote Clemenceau:—

"If nations were but business houses, bankers' accounts would settle the fate of the world. . . . You know, as we do, that our Treasury is empty. In such a case the debtor must sign promissory notes, and that is just what you are asking us to do. . . . It is an open secret that in this affair there are only imaginary dates of payment, which will lead up to a loan with solid security in the shape of our territorial possessions, as was the case for Turkey. Such a thing, Mr. President, I am bound to tell you, we shall never accept.

"France is not for sale, even to her friends. Independent she came to us; independent we shall leave her. Ask yourself whether, according to President Monroe, you would feel otherwise about the American continent. . . .

"Wherein have we failed to fulfil all the demands of duty? Ought we to have surrendered our fortresses to Germany when she demanded them from us under penalty of a declaration of war? . . . Does Verdun prove we have fought badly?

"Yes, we have thrown everything into the abyss—blood and money—as England and the United States did on their side, but it was France's territory that was devastated scientifically. For three deadly years we waited this declaration from America, 'France is the frontier of liberty'—three years of blood and money oozing from every pore.

"Come to our villages and read the endless lists of their dead and make comparisons, if you will. Was this not a 'bank account,' the loss of this vital force of youth?

"As Russia did at Brest-Litovsk, America has made a separate peace with Germany without even the slightest suggestion of an adjustment with her comrades in arms.

"That was the blood truce with the common enemy. To-day a money peace between the Allied and Associated Powers is being devised.

"How is it we failed to foresee what is now happening? Why did we not halt under the shells and convoke a board meeting of profiteers to decide the question whether it would allow us to continue in defense of the finest conquest in the finest histories? Must the myth of German reparations lead up to American cash collections?"⁹⁹

The Clemenceau letter was received in the United States with surprise and regret. President Coolidge preserved his calmness, and did not permit himself to be stampeded into any excited utterances. The letter, which had been sent as an open communication through the press, and not as a personal one, was officially ignored, but the "spokesman for the White House" let it be understood that the Mellon-Berenger agreement, reached in April, and awaiting ratification, was deemed final, that its terms were considered generous, and that the Administration felt no need and no disposition to apologize for them.¹⁰⁰ Much unfriendly press comment was directed toward Clemenceau, and the incident, together with some unfortunate occurrences involving American tourists in France, tended to stiffen the resistance of

those opposed to cancellation of the debt. Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, accepted the challenge, and replied to the "Tiger":—

"The statement that we are trying to undermine the independence of France, or that somebody wants to buy France, approaches the absurd. If they want to cancel their debts let them include all debts and all reparations and show that benefit of the cancellation will go to humanity and to betterment of the masses of Europe and not to the benefit of the imperialistic schemes which are now crushing the life out of people who are in no way responsible for this war. This constant charge of injustice and usury on the part of the United States is simply not only unfounded in fact, but dishonest in purpose. . . .

"We have been charged with being rapacious and usurious, but when the history of the world war is written the generosity of the United States will have no parallel in the history of the world. . . .

"While no one desires to diminish the heroic efforts of the allies prior to our entrance, the fact remains that without the American boy the nations now criticising us so severely would be the defeated rather than the victor nations." ¹⁰¹

Mr. C. W. Barron, editor of the Wall Street Journal, declared:—

"If France can not afford to pay for what she borrowed after the armistice, it is because her people have refused to support their own government by payment of taxes, and her statesmen have elected to tax them by depreciation of the franc issued to pay government deficits after the fashion of the Germans in sacrifice of their mark currency. . . .

"The United States is not responsible for the European diplomacy or international treaties that brought on the war. The United States is not responsible for the French fiscal policy or for the cutting of production and hours of labor in France." ¹⁰²

With these criticisms many would agree. Yet many also would be willing to say of Clemenceau,—“He is a very old man, and he loves his country”; or of France,—“She has suffered much, and may be forgiven much”; of the debts,—

"These advances were not regarded at the time as ordinary borrowings. They were virtually our only substantial contribution to the carrying on of our war during nearly three-quarters of the period of our participation. They were the means of saving for us vastly greater expenditure and of sparing hundreds of thousands of American lives. We can no more consider to-day those advances as mere business dealings between borrowers and lenders than did those who authorized them nine years ago." ¹⁰³

Others, too, believe that collection of the debts would involve such depression of the standard of living abroad, and such economic dislocation at home and abroad as to be inadvisable for purely practical reasons.

For the sake of both France and the United States, and for that of the world at large, it is to be hoped that a solution may be found for this question which will demonstrate clearly and conclusively that "France wishes to meet every honorable obligation, and the United States wishes to uphold a well-earned reputation for generosity as well as for fair play."¹⁰⁴

And so for a dozen years the United States and France have been intimately associated. We have fought together against a common foe. We have rejoiced and we have sorrowed together. We have criticised one another's shortcomings and praised one another's virtues. We find ourselves still far from the millennium of perfect harmony. Yet this period of close contact, which we cannot forget if we would, has stirred within us a mutual interest, has taught us much in regard to each other's characteristics, and has created bonds which cannot lightly be disregarded. Considered in sincerity and in open-mindedness the experiences which we have shared may prove most useful in the development of an understanding amity.

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- ³⁸ *Outlook*, Sept. 20, 1916. See also, Robert Bacon, *Life and Letters*, James Brown Scott, ed.; Leslie Buswell, *Ambulance No. 10* (1915); *Friends of France, The Field Service of the American Ambulance described by its members* (1916); Dallas D. L. McGrew, "French Character under Test," *Review of Reviews*, LII: 468-472, Oct., 1915; Robert Grant, *Their Spirit*, (1916); Arthur Gleason, *Our Part in the Great War*, (1917) and *Golden Lads*, (1916); Herbert Adams Gibbons, *Paris Reborn*, (1916); *War Letters from France*, Frederic R. Coudert, ed., (1916); Gertrude Atherton, *Life in the War Zone* (1916); Frances Wilson Huard, *My Home in the Field of Honour* (1916).
- ³⁹ Elihu Root, *The United States and the War. Russian and Political Addresses*. Address to Mass Meeting in New York, Mar. 22, 1917.
- ⁴⁰ *New York Times Current History*, VI: 389-405, June 17, 1917; *Review of Reviews*, LV: 566-7, 490-492; *Independent*, XC: 313-14, May 19, 1917; *Nation*, CIV: 520, May 3, 1917; *New Republic*, XI: 6-7, May 5, 1917; *Literary Digest*, LIV: 1314-1315, May 5, 1917; *Philadelphia North American*, Apr. 13, 1917; Nicholas Murray Butler, *A World in Ferment*. Address to French envoys, April 21, 1917.
- ⁴¹ Robert Underwood Johnson, *Collected Poems*. "The Sword of Lafayette," 24. Other poems of the same period, 444, 451.
- ⁴² Franklin K. Lane, *The American Spirit* (1918), 49. Courtesy of Frederick A. Stokes Co., Publishers, New York.
- ⁴³ Brand Whitlock, "Address at the Tomb of Lafayette," July 4, 1917, cited in *The World War*, by Members of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, 70-73.
- ⁴⁴ *New York Herald*, cited in *Literary Digest*, LIV: 1314-1315, May 5, 1917.
- ⁴⁵ Studies of the war and its causes, at this time, are practically unanimous in placing responsibility largely upon Germany, and considering France as peaceful in desire. Familiar examples are: Oliver P. Chitwood, *Immediate Causes of the Great War* (1917); Harry H. Powers, *The Things Men Fight For* (1917); Willis Fletcher Johnson, *America and the Great War for Humanity and Freedom* (1917); A. E. McKinley, *Collected Materials for the Study of the World War* (1917); A. B. Hart and A. O. Lovejoy, *Handbook of the War* (1917), with later editions revised by C. C. Pearson and A. L. Frothingham. An address by Elihu Root, Sept. 14, 1917, before the National Security League at Chicago may also be noted in this group. Cited in *World War*, American Academy of Arts and Letters.
- ⁴⁶ *New Republic*, II: 92-94, May 26, 1917; *Review of Reviews*, LV1: 227.
- ⁴⁷ Lothrop Stoddard, *Present Day Europe* (1917).
- ⁴⁸ Senator Borah, Speech in the Senate, July 26, 1917; *Current History*, VI: 402-3.
- ⁴⁹ H. A. Gibbons, *Century*, XCIV: 527-32, Aug., 1917; E. S. Sergeant, *New Republic*, XIII: 240-243, Dec. 29, 1917.
- ⁵⁰ Charles Downer Hazen, "Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule" (1917); *Review of Reviews*, LVI: 7, 233, 346; in agreement with this position, Norman Angell, *New Republic*, XII: 150-151, 153; *New Republic*, VIII: 132, Sept., 1916; *Outlook*, CXVIII: 11, Jan. 2, 1918; *Independent*, XCV11: 45-6, July 14, 1917; Theodore Roosevelt, *Metropolitan Magazine*, cited in *Review of Reviews*, LVI: 89; Ruth Putnam, *Alsace-Lorraine* (1915); David S. Jordan, *Alsace-Lorraine* (1916); *House*, I: 363.
- ⁵¹ Henry Cabot Lodge, *Scribner's*, LXIV: 620-624. For return of the Provinces, Theodore Roosevelt, "All stand unalterably and unequivocally with the President in this

pledge," *Current History*, VIII: 246; H. H. Powers, *The Great Peace* (1918), 175-90; H. A. Gibbons, *Century*, XCV: 732-42; W. S. Davis and others, *Roots of the War* (1918), 19-23; *New Republic*, XVI: 347; A. O. Lovejoy, *New Republic*, XVI: 257-8; *Outlook*, CXVIII: 526; C. D. Hazen, *World's Work*, XXXVII: 188-202; for plebiscite, *New Republic*, XVII: 47.

⁵² William Howard Taft, *Win the War for Permanent Peace* (1918), 206; Secretary Lansing, June 5, 1918, Address at Columbia University, in *Prussia's War and America's Peace*; Brander Matthews, *Munsey's Magazine*, cited in *World War*, American Academy of Arts and Letters, 36; *Outlook*, CXIX: 403, 477-8; *Current History*, VIII: 244-6; *Nation*, CVI: 585-6; *Independent*, XCVI: 309.

⁵³ Typical books on the causes and responsibility of the war, of this period, are:—Christian Gauss, *Why We Went to War* (1918), emphasis on German *Schrecklichkeit*; W. S. Davis and others, *Roots of the War*, Chapter VII, by Wm. Anderson, especially pro-French; Wm. Herbert Hobbs, *The World War and its Consequences* (1918), with Preface by Theodore Roosevelt, praising it as the best book issued on the subject, bringing out "exactly what the conditions are that have made Germany a menace and a horror to the whole world."; the Columbia University *Course on the Issues of the War*, by Prof. Howard Lee McBain; a similar outline prepared for the Michigan Department of Education by G. N. Fuller; J. B. McMaster, *The United States in the World War* (1918).

⁵⁴ *Nation*, CVII: 792-3.

⁵⁵ John Spencer Bassett, *The Lost Fruits of Waterloo* (1918), 188-189, 200-203; *Review of Reviews*, LVIII: 3-4, July, 1918; *New Republic*, XVII: 211-12, Dec. 21, 1918; Will Durant, *The Dial*, Apr. 11, 1918.

⁵⁶ *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, 11: 218; Powers, *The Great Peace*, 325-6.

⁵⁷ *Nation*, CVII: 543. Nov. 9, 1918.

⁵⁸ *New Republic*, XVII: 87-89, Nov. 23, 1918.

⁵⁹ *Seattle Times*, cited in *Literary Digest* discussion of the American point of view, Jan. 11, 1919.

⁶⁰ *Cincinnati Enquirer*, Jan. 1, 1919; *New Republic*, XVII: 262, 297, 354; XVIII: 14-17, Jan. 4, 11, 25, Feb. 1, 1919; *Nation*, CVIII: 269, Feb. 22, 1919.

⁶¹ *Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 4, 1919.

⁶² Simonds, in *Review of Reviews*, LIX: 258-64. Apr., 1919; Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, 258-9; Strunsky, cited in *Literary Digest*, LXI: 62-4, Apr. 5, 1919. See also H. A. Gibbons, *France and Ourselves* (1920), Ch. VI.

⁶³ *Outlook*, CXXII: 464-6, July 23, 1919; *New Republic*, XIX: 106-10, May 24, 1919; *Ib.*, XIX: 198-9, June 14, 1919; *Nation* CVIII: 778-780, May 17, 1919; *Ib.*, 972, June 21, 1919; *Literary Digest*, LXI: 15-16, May 31; *Ib.*, 9-17, May 24, 1919; *World's Work*, XXXVIII: 235-6, July, 1919. Ambassador Hugh C. Wallace's speeches are all very warmly and openly pro-French, and quite as undiplomatic sometimes as any of Page's. (*Speeches of Ambassador Wallace*, 1919-1921.)

⁶⁴ Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, 156, 367.

⁶⁵ *Independent*, XCIX: 83-4, July 19, 1919; C. D. Hazen, Burton J. Hendrick, *World's Work*, XXXVIII: sup. 1-9, June, 1919; *Outlook*, CXXII: 424-5, July 16; *Ib.*, 525, Aug. 6, 1919; *The Review*, 1: 179-80, July 12, 1919; *New York World*, *New York Tribune*, *New York Evening Post*, *Philadelphia Record*, *Chicago Daily News*, *New York Herald*, *Philadelphia North American*, etc., cited in *Literary Digest*, LXI: 20, May 3; LXII: 12, July 19; LXII: 10, Aug. 9, 1919.

⁶⁶ *Baltimore Sun*, July 15, 1919; Wm. S. Culbertson, *Yale Review*, IX: 298-313, Oct., 1919; Lodge, *Senate and League of Nations*, 154, 366-7, 368, 372-3; Harry Hansen, *The Adventures of the Fourteen Points* (1919), 376-378; *Review of Reviews*, LX: 241, Sept., 1919; *Current History*, X: 274, Aug., 1919; *New York Sun*, *Boston Transcript*, *Springfield Republican*, *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, *Seattle Times*, etc., cited in *Literary Digest*, LXI: 20, May 3; LXII: 12, July 19; LXII: 10, Aug. 9, 1919; *New Republic*, XIX: 106-10, May 24; XIX: 139-40; May 31; XIX: 1, 339-41, July 16; XX: 43-44, Aug. 13, 1919.

⁶⁷ David Carb, *Century*, XCVIII: 455-463, Aug., 1919; Alex. Woolcott, *North American Review*, CCX: 490-498, Oct., 1919; W. T. Larned, *Review*, 1: 102, June, 1919; Stoddard Dewey, *Ib.*, 383-4, Sept., 1919; Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, *Leaves from a War Diary* (1925), 214, 299-302; Robt. Lee Bullard, *Personalities and Reminiscences of the War* (1925), 52-57, 244, 329-335; Elbert J. Baldwin, *Outlook*, CXXII: 635-6; *New Republic*, XVIII: 104-5, Feb. 22, *Ib.*, XIX: 78-81, May 17; 217, June 14, (Roger B. Hull); *Baltimore Sun*, Jan. 3, 1919; *Literary Digest*, LXI: 47-51, June 28, 1919.

⁶⁸ Simonds, *Review of Reviews*, LXI: 492-500, May, 1920; *Review of Reviews*, LXI: 355, Apr., 1920; *Independent*, CII: 136-7; *Literary Digest*, LXV: 44, Apr. 17; LXV: 9-10, Apr. 24, 1920.

⁶⁹ *Review of Reviews*, LXI: 349-50, Apr., 1920.

⁷⁰ W. MacDonald, *Nation*, CX: 650-651, May 15, 1920; James Westfall Thompson, *Nation*, CXI: 513-16, Nov. 3, 1920; *Literary Digest*, LXV: 9-10, Apr. 24, 1920; *Current History*, XII: 231-4, May, 1920; *New Republic*, XXII: 193, Apr. 14, 1920; *Nation*, CX: 448, Apr. 10; 502-3, Apr. 17, 1920.

⁷¹ Bernard M. Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (1920), 2-5; and passim; Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (1920), 31-3, 150, 288; John Foster Bass, *The Peace Tangle* (1920), Ch. 11, Ch. VII.

⁷² Ray Stannard Baker, *What Wilson did at Paris* (1920), 32, 54-55, 70-71, 73.

⁷³ Cited by Myron M. Johnson, *New Republic*, XXII: 349-50, May 12, 1920.

⁷⁴ *Nation*, CXI: 342, Sept. 25, 1920. Cf. also *New Republic*, XXIV: 53-54, 71-72, Sept. 15; Felix Frankfurter, *New Republic*, XXIV: 138-40, Oct. 6, 1920; *Nation*, CX: 572-3, May 1; *Ib.*, 609, May 8; CXI: 464, Oct. 27, 578, Nov. 24, 1920; Reply to Prof. Frankfurter, Henry W. Bunn, *Weekly Review*, III: 468-9; Paxton Hibben, *Nation*, 287-289, Feb. 23, 1921.

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⁷⁶ Sidney B. Fay, "New Light on the Origins of the World War," *American Historical Review*, July, Oct., 1920, Jan., 1921.

⁷⁷ Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations* (1921); *Ib.*, *The Big Four and Others*

of the Peace Conference (1921); *What Really Happened at Paris*, by American Delegates, E. M. House and C. Seymour, eds. (1921); Joseph P. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him* (1921). Contributory also, Frederick L. Paxson, *Recent History of the United States* (1921); Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Brief History of the Great War* (1921); C. Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great War* (1921).

⁷⁸ *Literary Digest*, LXIV: 22, Mar. 27, 1920.

⁷⁹ Pierrepont B. Noyes, *While Europe Waits for Peace* (1921), 89-90; Chs. IV, VII, VIII, XIII; *Outlook*, CXXVI: 634-5, Dec. 8, 1920; Simonds, *Nation*, CXII: 214, Feb. 9, 1921; *Washington Herald*, cited in *Literary Digest*, LXVIII: 7-9, Feb. 19, 1921; C. E. McGuire, *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, XCV: 290-305, May, 1921.

⁸⁰ *Literary Digest*, LXVIII: 16, Feb. 19, 1921; *Nation*, CXII: 282, Feb. 9, 1921.

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⁸² Glenn Frank, *Century*, CI: 536-7, Feb., 1921; *New Republic*, XXVI: 133-5, Mar. 30, 1921; *Nation*, CXII: 680, May 11, 1921.

⁸³ H. A. Gibbons, *Century*, CII: 622-29, Aug., 1921; Paul Lambert White, *Weekly Review*, IV: 241-2, Mar. 16, 1921; Paul Scott Mowrer, *Balkanized Europe* (1921), 310-316; *Literary Digest*, LXVIII: 9-11, Mar. 19; 14, Mar. 12; LXIX: 5-8, Apr. 16, 1921; *Outlook*, CXXVII: 363, Mar. 9; 407, Mar. 16; CXXVIII: 50-51, May 11, 1921; Simonds, *Review of Reviews*, LXIII: 371-387, Apr., 1921; *Ib.*, 597-606, June, 1921; John Foster Dulles, *New Republic*, XXVI: 133-5, Mar. 30, 1921.

⁸⁴ John Foster Bass and Harold G. Moulton, *America and the Balance Sheet of Europe* (1921).

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⁸⁷ Frank A. Vanderlip, *What Next in Europe?* (1922) Ch. V, Ch. VIII; Similar criticisms: C. A. Beard, *Cross Currents in Europe To-day* (1922); H. A. Gibbons, *Introduction to World Politics* (1922); R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (1922); Pamphlets,—*Europe in March, 1922*, Mortimer L. Schiff; *The Vacant Place at the Council Table of the World*, Ivy L. Lee; *What of Germany, France and England?* Hubert Bayard Swope; *New Republic*, XXXIII: 3-5, Nov. 29, 1922; *New York Times*, cited in *Literary Digest*, LXXV: 7, Oct. 7, 1922.

⁸⁸ *Literary Digest*, LXXV: 7-9, Dec. 2, 1922; 13-14, Dec. 9, *New Republic*,

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⁸⁹ Frederick Bausman, *Let France Explain* (1922), 5-6; John Kenneth Turner, *Shall It Be Again?* (1922) is also concerned with a fresh evaluation of the war responsibility and the war settlements. J. H. Latané, *From Isolation to Leadership* (1922) is an example of the unchanged point of view on war guilt.

⁹⁰ *World's Work*, XLV: 457-8, Mar., 1923; 574-576, Apr., 1923; *Literary Digest*, LXXVI: 7-11, Jan. 27; 7-10, Feb. 24; LXXVIII: 7, July 28, 1923; *Outlook*, CXXXIII: 160-161, Jan. 24; 205-6, 210-12, Jan. 31; 478-480, Mar. 14; 670-3; Apr. 11, 1923; *Independent*, CX: 40-41, Jan. 20; 80-81, 93-4, Feb. 3; 109-10, Feb. 17; 412, July 7, 1923.

⁹¹ Some of these criticisms brought out in preceding references. Especially unfavorable, *Nation*, CXVI: 30, Jan. 10; 111, Jan. 31; 288-290, Mar. 14, debate between Major-General O'Ryan, in favor of, Pierrepont B. Noyes, against, the occupation; 406, Apr. 11, 1923; *New Republic*, XXXIII: 308-10, Feb. 14; XXXIV: 4-5, Feb. 28; 99, Mar. 21, 1923; Pamphlet, *Letter* (Feb. 26), to President Harding, from Willard Straight Post, American Legion, New York County Chapter.

⁹² Bernard Baruch, in *These Eventful Years*, I: 406-410; Ralph Barton Perry, *New Republic*, XXXIV: 97, Mar. 21, 1923; *Literary Digest*, LXXIX: 14-15, 1923; Pamphlet, Address by Benjamin M. Anderson, Apr. 26, 1923.

⁹³ *Annals*, CXIV: 25-48, July, 1924.

⁹⁴ Nicholas Roosevelt, *Foreign Affairs*, IV: 112-122, Oct., 1925; Buell, *International Relations*, 510-511; *Literary Digest*, LXXXVI: 11, Aug. 8, 1925.

⁹⁵ *Outlook*, CXXLI: 374-5, Nov. 11, 1925; *Nation*, CXXI: 501, Nov. 4, 1925; *Literary Digest*, LXXXVII: 7-9, Nov. 14, 1925; W. H. Scheifley, *Current History*, XXIII: 484-490, Jan., 1926; *Ib.*, 490-491; Quincy Wright, *Ib.*, 687-693, Feb., 1926; *Ib.*, XXIV: 223-228, May, 1926.

⁹⁶ *Outlook*, CXXLI: 547: Dec. 9, 1925; Frank H. Simonds, *Review of Reviews*, LXXII: 593-605, Dec., 1925; George Wharton Pepper, Norman H. Davis, William MacDonald, *Current History*, XXI: 312-323, Dec., 1925; Manley O. Hudson, *Independent*, CXV: 517, Nov. 7, 1925.

⁹⁷ Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War* (1926), 434, 699-700. The revisionist discussions are illustrated by the following examples: Bernadotte E. Schmitt, *American Historical Review*, XXIX: 449-473, Apr., 1924; Harry Elmer Barnes, Albert Bushnell Hart, *Current History*, XX: 171-196, May, 1924; Symposium on War Blame, *Current History*, XX: 452-463, June, 1924; Sidney B. Fay, *New Republic*, XLIV: 197-200, Oct. 14, 1925; S. B. Fay, *Current History*, XXIII: 41-48, Oct., 1925; *Ib.*, 196-207, Nov., 1925; H. E. Barnes, *Christian Century*, Nov. 5-26, 1925, A. H. Putney, R. C. Binkley, *Current History*, XXIII: 525-533, Jan., 1926; Jas. W. Gerard, B. E. Schmitt, *Ib.*, XXIII: 793-803, Mar., 1926; Charles Altschul, *Ib.*, XXIV: 391-398, June, 1926; Charles E. Beard, *Ib.*, 730-35, Aug., 1926; E. F. Henderson, *Ib.*, 8-10; B. E. Schmitt, *Foreign Affairs*, V: 132-147, Oct., 1926.

⁹⁸ *St. Louis Star*, *New York Herald and Tribune*, *Los Angeles Express*, *Wall Street News*, cited in *Literary Digest*, LXXXIV: 5-7, Jan. 17, 1925.

⁹⁹ *Literary Digest*, Aug. 21, 1926, 12.

¹⁰⁰ *Boston Post*, Aug. 10, 1926.

¹⁰¹ *Boston Herald*, Aug. 12, 1926; *New Republic*, Aug. 25, 1926.

¹⁰² Cited in *Business Conditions Weekly*, New York, Dec. 25, 1926.

¹⁰³ Congressman A. Piatt Andrew, *Congressional Record*, 69th Congress, First Session, Jan. 13, 1926.

¹⁰⁴ Very much has been written in recent months upon the question of the French debt. The varying points of view, and the most important arguments, are illustrated in the following references. Moulton and Lewis, *The French Debt Problem*; J. H. Latané, Carrie Chapman Catt, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, July, 1926, 46-50; Denys P. Myers, *Current History*, May, 1925, 188-198; Frank Simonds, *Review of Reviews*, 154-163, Feb., 1925; 383, Oct., 1925; 521-2, Nov., 1925; 417-418, Apr., 1926; 269-273, Sept., 1926; 408-412, Oct., 1926; *World's Work*, 237-239, Jan., 1926; *Outlook*, 14, Jan. 14, 1925; 218-19, Oct. 14, 1925; *Independent*, 57-58, Jan. 17, 1925; 145, Feb. 7, 1925; 434, Oct. 17, 1925; 723, Dec. 26, 1925; *Review of Reviews*, 349-50, Oct., 1925; 350-352, Apr., 1926; 467, May, 1926; *New Republic*, 296-7, Feb. 11, 1925; 29-31, Mar. 4, 1925; 264, July 28, 1926; 288-290, Apr. 28, 1926; 344-5, May 12, 1926; 4-6, Aug. 12, 1926; *Nation*, 369, Oct. 7, 1925; 723-4, Dec. 23, 1925; 77-78, July 26, 1926; *Literary Digest*, 10-11, Sept. 12; 5-6, Oct. 10; 10, Nov. 28, 1925; 5-7, July 31, 12-14, Aug. 21, 1926.

CONCLUSION

AS we consider the whole story of American opinion of France throughout this century and a half of varied contacts, it is clear that the influence of those intangible currents which are governed by community of thought and ideals has been exceedingly great. When French thought marched with ours, we have been inclined to be friendly. When France seemed, in character and action, to challenge our ideals, we have become suspicious of her. In the period just after the Revolutionary War, and at the time of the War of 1812, we were injured, and we properly resented the fact, by encroachments upon our sovereignty and our material prosperity. But much of our prejudice at the time was based upon our disapproval of the excesses of the Revolution and the First Republic, and of the dictatorship of Napoleon. We disliked and distrusted Bourbon and Orleanist, and the second Napoleon, not so much because of any actual harm that they might do us, but because they interfered with liberty of thought and action, and with the free development of the democratic form of government which we idealized. We loved Lafayette, not only because he gave generous aid to us in our time of need, but because he stood for the liberty which we loved, first serving its cause with us, then defending it against a reactionary government.

Paris,—and to us Paris has frequently typified France—we held to be immoral, frivolous, and irreligious, and therefore decadent. French rule was characterized by violent overturnings at home and militarism abroad, and this antagonized us. We asserted the Monroe Doctrine in South America, in the case of Maximilian in Mexico, and in the Caribbean, as well to protect the liberties of others as for our own safety. Anything savoring of persecution alienates us whether it be directed against political or religious opponents or against the people of a colonial mandate. The Dreyfus case, with its revelations of intolerance, of corruption, of militarism, did France more harm in American eyes than the French spoliations which touched our rights and our pockets, or the French scheme to build the Panama Canal, which might have done incalculable damage to our commercial interests. Yet the Dreyfus case could never have affected us directly. If France seems atheistic, we are cold to her; if she is radical, we distrust her; if she changes her government overnight, we smile at her; but

CONCLUSION

if the new government shows itself generous, sane, democratic, we praise it. The violence of the June Days and of the Commune repelled us. We scorned the plebiscite which endorsed the arbitrary rule of the second Napoleon. The sins of Napoleon III and his counselors led us to condemn France at the opening of the Franco-Prussian War, but after the Republic was proclaimed, and when the French were heroic in the defence of their capital, courageous and wise in reconstruction, self-sacrificing and scrupulous in the payment of the indemnity exacted by their conquerors, we swung over to faith, respect, and friendliness toward the young Republic which seemed to be struggling to maintain the ideals which we ourselves valued.

Henry Van Dyke, in his *Spirit of America*, published in 1910, said that true friendship between France and the United States could not exist so long as the French looked upon America as the "country of the Sky-scraper and the Almighty Dollar" and America considered France merely the "home of the Yellow Novel and the Everlasting Dance." Archibald Cary Coolidge, who knows well both his France and his America, said, speaking of the impression in America that France is morally and politically decadent,—

"This impression is based upon doubts as to the stability of the government, on the fact that the population is stationary, and still more on the impression of moral corruption which French literature has spread abroad. It is hard for a foreigner, especially at a distance, to appreciate the extraordinary vitality and power of achievement which, though not always evident on the surface, are inherent in the French nation."

Both Americans and French, said Coolidge, think they lead in civilization, and are inclined to condescend to one another. But to the Frenchman, civilization suggests art and literature, to the everyday American "efficient telephone service and improved plumbing."¹

Theodore Roosevelt, lecturing in France, and preaching to the French justice, moderation, and tolerance wrote in his diary:—

"It shows my own complacent Anglo-Saxon ignorance that I had hitherto rather looked down upon French public men, and have thought of them as people of marked levity. When I met them I found that they had just as solid characters as English and American public men, although with the attractiveness which to my mind makes the able and cultivated Frenchman really unique. . . . In talking with these French republicans, who are absorbed in the questions that affect all of us under popular government, I had a sense of kinship that it was impossible to feel with men, however highminded and well-meaning, whose whole attitude toward these problems was different from mine."²

There must be a mutual tolerance, a willingness to understand one another. We on our part have perhaps too much desired France to be a

mirror, in which is reflected our own likeness, forgetting that centuries of other history, other customs, other law, have made her what she is, and that we cannot change this individuality if we should attempt it, any more than foreign criticism can change the foundations of American character. But we are within our rights, and we do not overstep the bounds of courtesy, when we say to France that the faith and confidence she asks of us can be given only as we recognize in her the simple virtues which in our moments of heart-searching we ask of ourselves,—honesty, sincerity, unselfishness, a sense of spiritual values, and an earnest will for peace. We would not be pharisaical. We have done the things that we ought not to have done, and we have left undone the things that we should have done,—but we hold to the faith, and we honor most those who join us in the search for the Grail.

In the events of the last few years, the people in this country have found their sense of right challenged. We are a peaceful people, the more so as we come to realize the waste and horror and futility of war. Popular American support of the Allied cause was based on popular belief that responsibility for the war rested upon the Central Powers, and that the Allies were defending the great principles of right, justice, and liberty. In this faith the sons of America went out to give their lives. In this faith mothers and fathers reconciled themselves to the sacrifice, and the whole people joined in the prosecution of the war. Revelations of guilt where we believed there was none, of ugly misuse of the splendid power of youth, of unnecessary suffering and of unjust bargaining have shocked and disillusioned us, but they have also clarified and made more intense the demand that mankind shall be served and not betrayed, that wisdom and truth, not chicanery, shall govern the relations of nation with nation, of man with man.

To France Americans would say, with Robert Underwood Johnson, in his *Wish for New France*, written before the Great War:—

“For her no backward look
 Into the bloody book
 Of kings. Thrice-rescued land,
 Her haunted graves bespeak
 A nobler fate: to seek
 In service of the world again the world’s command.

She, in whose skies of peace
 Arise new auguries
 To strengthen, cheer, and guide . . .
 When nations in a horde
 Draw the unhallowed sword,
 O Memory, walk a warning specter at her side!”³

CONCLUSION

And for America there is sane counsel in the words of Dr. George H. Blakeslee, in his lately published study *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*.—

“The American Government, in its efforts to carry out wisely and effectively the increasingly close coöperation which will take place with other nations for the advancement of world peace, will need the support of a public, not intent upon selfish national gain, timorous for fear of making a false step, willing to follow at a distance the advance of other nations less qualified for leadership; but, rather, a public insistent that war as an institution shall be destroyed, afraid not so much of making a false move as of making inadequate effort, conscious of the difficulty of the task but with faith that it can be done, seeking less national advantage than the accomplishment of a great service to the world as a whole.”⁴

NOTES AND SOURCES

¹ Archibald Cary Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power*, 194-5.

² Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt*, II: 232-233.

³ Robert Underwood Johnson, *Poems. St. Gaudens, an Ode, and other Verse*, 77.

⁴ George H. Blakeslee, *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*, 361.



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INDEX

- ADAMS, HENRY, 136.
- ADAMS, JOHN, xiii; opposes allied control in France, 27.
- ADAMS, JOHN QUINCY, United States Minister in Russia, 5; fears result of Napoleon's fall, 25; praises De Neuville, 37; critical of the Bourbons, 40; confers with De Neuville on the Florida Purchase, 54-57; requests him to postpone his departure in order to continue informal mediation, 58; messages on French spoliations, 69; condemns French intervention in Spain, 73; welcomes Lafayette, 82; instructs the commander of the Brandywine, 84; advises Lafayette to be cautious in his revolutionary activities, 85; Message, 87; opinion of French Revolution of 1830, 88; on French spoliations, 103-106; opinion of the French, 124.
- ALCOTT, LOUISA MAY, on the Franco-Prussian War, 179.
- ALEXANDER I OF RUSSIA, 18, 22, 23, 36.
- ALLEN, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 116; sympathetic with French Revolution of 1848, 122.
- ALLIED CONTROL OF FRANCE, after the fall of Napoleon, criticised, 27-31.
- ALLIGATOR, 66.
- ALSACE-LORRAINE, 184; seizure condemned, 190, 191, 200; a cause of friction, 270-271, 274; restoration to France, 279-282.
- AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR FRANCE, 275-278, 284-285, 293.
- AMERICAN TOURISTS IN FRANCE, 243-246.
- ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE, in the Crimean War, 143-144.
- ANNAPOLIS, Memorial to French Soldiers, 231.
- ANTI-CLERICAL LEGISLATION IN FRANCE, 257; American sentiment on the subject, 257-260.
- APOLLON, 66, 68.
- ARMS, sold to France, 212.
- ARTHUR, PRESIDENT, address at centenary of Battle of Yorktown, 226; interest in the Statue of Liberty, 228.
- BACON, ROBERT, and American Ambulance Service, 276.
- BAGOT, SIR CHARLES, to Sneyd, on French exiles in America, 44-45.
- BAKER, RAY STANNARD, on the Peace Conference, 287.
- BALKAN CRISIS, 268.
- BANCROFT, GEORGE, United States Minister at Berlin, pro-Prussian, 174-175, 185.
- BARBOUR, GOVERNOR, of Virginia, on the War of 1812, 6.

INDEX

- BARNES, HARRY ELMER, on war guilt, 298-299.
- BARRON, CLARENCE W., on French debts, 301.
- BARTHOLDI, sculptor of Statue of Liberty, 301.
- BARTON, United States chargé in Paris, instructed to leave if indemnity not paid, 107; returns to the United States, 108.
- BARUCH, BERNARD, 286, 297.
- BASS, JOHN FOSTER, on the "Peace Tangle," 287; and MOULTON, H. G., on the economic situation in Europe, 291.
- BAYARD, SENATOR, to Clay, 25; quoted, 220.
- BAUSMAN, JUDGE, on French war guilt, 295.
- BECK, JAMES M., 274.
- BELGIAN NEUTRALITY, 270, 272-273.
- BENJAMIN, JUDAH P., letter to Slidell, on Louis Napoleon, 150; on French activities in Texas, 156.
- BERTHEMY, French Minister in the United States, 174, 182, 184.
- BISMARCK, 180, 188, 190, 202, 210, 271.
- BLAINE, JAMES G., Secretary of State, on the French quarrel with Venezuela, 217; on the Panama Canal, 219.
- BLAKESLEE, GEORGE H., on the foreign policy of the United States, 313.
- BLAIR, FRANCIS, suggests armistice, 165.
- BONAPARTE, JOSEPH, refugee in the United States, 45, 46; supposed plots in his behalf, 46-48.
- BONAPARTIST EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES, 44-48; press criticism of, 48-49.
- BONAPARTIST PARTY, interested in Canal schemes, 218.
- BORAH, SENATOR, on war aims of the United States, 279; on the guaranty treaty for France, 284; on the occupation of the Ruhr, 296; on the French war debts, 300.
- BOULANGER EPISODE, 249
- BOURBONS, restored, 24, 26; lack of enthusiasm for, 28, 29; prejudice against, 37-40; at the time of Lafayette's visit to the United States, 81-84; satisfaction over downfall, 85, 86; disapproval of character, 87, 88.
- BOUTWELL, Secretary of the Treasury, 179.
- BRIAND, 292, 294.
- BRYAN, Secretary of State, 268.
- BRYANT, WILLIAM CULLEN, 191.
- BUCHANAN, JAMES, on French spoliations, 102, 108; to King, on French intrigues in Texas, 112; favors Revolution of 1848, 122.
- BUELL, RAYMOND L., on international relations, 288.
- BULLARD, ARTHUR, 273; on France as an ally, 275.
- CALHOUN, JOHN C., Speech on Embargo, 4; favors war with Britain, 7; debate on New Army Bill, 15; and Milan and Berlin Decrees, 17; on "French influence,"

INDEX

- 25; on French intervention in Spain, 74; on French spoliations, 102, 103; called pro-French, 110; to King, on Texas, 112; on French Revolution of 1848, 122; interpretation of Monroe Doctrine, 116.
- CAMBON, French Ambassador at Washington, 225, 229.
- CAMBRELENG, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 103; on French spoliations, 104-106.
- CARIBBEAN INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 135, 142.
- CARNEGIE, ANDREW, on Franco-American relations, 261.
- CARNOT, PRESIDENT, assassinated, 250-251.
- CARROLL, CHARLES, of Carrollton, 20.
- CARY, SAMUEL, 20.
- CASS, LEWIS, United States Minister to France, 110; upholds Monroe Doctrine, 117; expansionist, 140; resents European interference, 143.
- CASTLEREAGH, LORD, 31.
- CATHOLIC SENTIMENT, 182; on anti-clerical legislation in France, 257-259.
- CHAMP D'ASILE, French refugee enterprise in the Gulf of Mexico, 47-48.
- CHAMPLAIN, SAMUEL, tercentenary celebration, 231; memorials at Crown Point and Plattsburg, 231.
- CHANNING, WILLIAM ELLERY, sermon, 21.
- CHAPMAN, VICTOR, 276.
- CHARLES X, 69, 83, 84, 85, 86.
- CHEVES, LANGDON, "war hawk," favors war with Great Britain, 7; debate on New Army Bill, 15.
- CHILD, LYDIA MARIA, 113.
- CHOATE, JOSEPH H., sympathy with French, 187.
- CLARENDON, LORD, 143.
- CLAY, HENRY, Speech on the Embargo, 4; Speaker of the House, 7; member of Peace Commission, 15; criticism of France, 16; will make a democrat of Napoleon, 31; critical of Bourbons, 38; on French intervention in Spain, 74; on spoliations, 101-102; Report of Foreign Relations Committee, 106; called pro-French, 110, 111; on French blockade in the Gulf of Mexico, 111.
- CLAYTON, on French spoliations, 102, 103, 104.
- CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY, 218.
- CLEMENCEAU, at the Peace Conference, on the balance of power, 282; obstructionist at Peace Conference, 288; visit to America, 294; on French war debts, 300-301.
- CLEVELAND, PRESIDENT, Message, on Liberian affairs, 215; case of J. L. Waller, 217; at unveiling of Statue of Liberty, 219; Message, 229; on death of President Carnot, 250.
- COLOMBIA, in relation to Cuban independence, 77, 220.
- COMBES, French Premier, and anti-clerical legislation, 258.
- COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH FRANCE, 67.

- COMMUNE, 208-209.
- CONFEDERACY, European sympathy with, 146.
- CONFEDERATE OPINION, on French intervention in the Civil War, 148-150; on French activities in Mexico, 155-156, 163, 164, 165.
- CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, 292-293; French attitude, 292-293.
- CONGRESS, debate on French spoliations, 102-104; debate on Revolution of 1848, 122-3; sentiment on French in Mexico, 157-158; on the Franco-Prussian War, 198-199.
- CONNECTICUT LEGISLATURE, on War of 1812, 8.
- CONVENTION OF 1803, with France, 60, 65.
- COOLIDGE, ARCHIBALD CARY, on Franco-American relations, 226; on French character, 311.
- COOLIDGE, PRESIDENT, 300.
- CRAWFORD, to Clay, 25; to Gallatin, 56; critical of Administration, 68.
- CRITTENDEN, acting Secretary of State, on Lopez incident, 136.
- CUBA, rumored cession to England or France, 75, French designs questioned, 76, 77, 78; Daniel Webster on, 76; interest of Mexico and Columbia in, 77; British or French occupation rumored, 114; United States interest in, 135; filibustering expeditions, 136; plan for tripartite treaty concerning, 137; Mason favors annexation, 140; European interest in, 143; and Spanish-American War, 224.
- CURTIS, GEORGE WILLIAM, on French militarism, 247.
- CUSHING, CALEB, resolution on French blockade of Mexico, 111; objects to French intervention in Uruguay, 116.
- DACIA*, 273
- DANA, CHARLES A., on Louis Napoleon, 123, 133.
- DANA, DANIEL, Fourth of July Address, 20.
- DAVIS, H. W., Resolutions in regard to French in Mexico, 158-161.
- DAVIS, J. C. B., Assistant Secretary of State, 174; on Franco-Prussian War, 184; to Bancroft, on American policy, 185.
- DAVIS, JEFFERSON, 149; bitter over European neutrality, 150; on Mexican affairs, 165; refuses to meet Napoleon III, 173.
- DAVIS, RICHARD HARDING, on Louvain, 270.
- DAWES PLAN, 297.
- DAYTON, United States Minister in Paris, 158; to Seward, 159, 165.
- DE BACOURT, French Minister in Washington, 110.
- DE BEAUMARCHAIS, CARON, claims, 66.
- DE BOULBON, RAOUSSET, French adventurer, 138.
- DE HEGERMANN-LINDENCRONE, MME., 225.
- DE LESSEPS, FERDINAND, and the Panama Canal, 218-223; on Committee for the Statue of Liberty, 228-229.

INDEX

DELCASSÉ, 261.

DE ONIS, SEÑOR, Spanish Minister to the United States, friction with John Quincy Adams, 53; signs treaty for sale of Florida, 54.

DEMOCRATS, expansionist, 139-140, 142.

DEMOCRATS, pro-French at time of Franco-Prussian War, 181, 183.

DE MENO, COUNT, 110.

DE NEUVILLE, HYDE, appointed French Minister to the United States, 36; qualifications, 37; and the "affair of the Postmaster," 42; strives for friendly relations, 44; anxious over Napoleonic exiles, 44-48; to Richelieu, 51, 52; gaining in popularity in the United States, 52; informal mediation in negotiations for purchase of Florida, 52-56; plans return to France, 56; requested by State Department to remain to assist in discussions with Spain, 58; conclusion of services, 60; importance of personality, 61; return to America, 67; unable to arrange commercial treaty, 67.

DICKERSON, MAHLON, Governor of New Jersey, 38.

DIX, MAJOR-GENERAL, American Minister to France, 175.

DOUGLAS, STEPHEN A., on French Revolution of 1848, 122.

DREYFUS CASE, 251-256, 260.

DROUHYN DE L'HUYS, 154, 159.

DUTY ON FRENCH VESSELS IN AMERICAN PORTS, 60.

ECUADOR, warned by French against United States, 143.

ELIOT, CHARLES W., proposes American intervention, 272.

EMERSON, RALPH WALDO, on Louis Philippe, 119, 121; opinion of the French, 124; criticism of Napoleon III, 144; letter to Grimm, pro-Prussian sentiment, 193.

ERVING, United States Minister to Spain, 51.

EUROPEAN ALLIANCES, 269.

EVARTS, W. M., Secretary of State, defends Liberian interests, 215; warns French in Venezuela case, 217; speech on "The French Alliance," 226; and Bartholdi statue, 227-228.

EVERETT, EDWARD, Gallatin to, 96; and chairmanship of Foreign Relations Committee, 103; on French spoliations, 104, 105; on tripartite treaty for Cuba, 137; refuses treaty, 141.

EXCHANGE PROFESSORSHIPS, 238-239.

FAVRE, 184; Circular, 190, 196.

FAY, SIDNEY A., on Origins of the War, 288-289; 298.

FEDERALISTS, oppose war with England, 10; celebrate downfall of Napoleon, 23; criticise Jefferson's French proclivities, 27; abuse of Napoleon, 29.

FILLMORE, PRESIDENT, 130.

FISH, HAMILTON, Secretary of State, 174, 185.

- FLORIDA, disorders in, 49; unsettled boundaries, 49-51; treaty for purchase from Spain, 54; delay in ratification, 57; danger of war with Spain, 58, 59.
- FORSYTH, Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Relations, 68.
- FORTIFICATIONS BILL, 106.
- "FOURTEEN POINTS," 280.
- FRANCE, gratitude toward, 177, 194, 198.
- FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE, 249.
- FRANKLIN MEDAL, 230.
- FRANZ FERDINAND, 268.
- FRELINGHUYSEN, Secretary of State, on Liberia, 215; on Venezuela, 217.
- FRENCH AFTER-WAR PSYCHOLOGY, 294.
- FRENCH ART, 242.
- FRENCH CHARACTER, American opinion of, 133-135, 209-211, 213, 245-246, 272, 273, 282-283, 285.
- FRENCH DEBT TO THE UNITED STATES, 281, 289, 290, 296, 299-301.
- "FRENCH INFLUENCE," 6, 11, 25.
- FRENCH INSTITUTIONS, 246-247.
- FRENCH LITERATURE, 239-242.
- FRENCH MILITARISM, 247, 289, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298.
- FRENCH MUSIC, 242.
- FRENCH POLITICS, 247-249.
- FRENCH REVOLUTION, xiv.
- FRENCH SCIENTISTS, 239.
- FRENCH SPOILIATIONS, indemnity desired for, 60, 65; difficulties in obtaining indemnity, 65, 66; French counter-claims, 60, 66, 67; treaty negotiated by Rives, 67, 68; appropriations not made, 69; friction due to this, 69; press comment, 70, 71; belief that Louis Philippe would bring about payment, 71; disappointment, 71; serious difficulties over, 94-109; Chamber refuses appropriations, 94; subject of party dissensions in the United States, 96, 107; press comments, 96, 100, 105-109; France demands apology from Jackson, 107; British mediation accepted, 109; settlement delayed, 214.
- FRENCH UNIVERSITIES, restrictions upon foreign students, 235.
- FRICTION WITH FRANCE, colonial period, xii.
- GALLATIN, ALBERT, attack upon, 13; letter to Clay, 25; appointed United States Minister in Paris, 35; reluctant to accept, 35; letter to Jefferson, 35; reports French coolness toward Americans in France, 41; letter to Monroe, 44; to John Quincy Adams, 52; attempts to obtain indemnity for French spoliations, 60; unable to arrange for it, 66-67; critical of Administration policy, 68; to Everett, on spoliations, 96.
- GARFIELD, PRESIDENT, on Panama Canal, 219.

INDEX

- GERMAN-AMERICANS, in Civil War, 179-180, 198.
- GERMAN REPARATIONS, 286, 290, 291, 294, 295, 296.
- GERMAN UNIVERSITIES, welcome American students, 235.
- GERMANY, distrusted in the United States, 260-261.
- GEROLT, BARON, German Minister to the United States, 174, 182, 184, 185.
- GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS, 279.
- GILMAN, GOVERNOR, of New Hampshire, 11.
- GORE, SENATOR, of Massachusetts, 22.
- GRANT, ULYSSES S., 166; pro-Russian, 174; and pro-French sympathy in the South, 180; Message, 198; interest in trans-oceanic waterway, 218, 220; and Bartholdi statue, 227.
- GREAT BRITAIN, infractions of neutrality, War of 1812, 1-2; mediation refused in matter of Florida boundary, 51; mediation accepted in dispute over French spoliations, 109; intrigues in Texas, 112-113; activities in Liberia, 215-216; and responsibility in 1914, 273.
- GREEK REVOLUTION, French intervention criticised, 78, 79.
- GREELEY, HORACE, 147.
- GROUCHY, MARSHAL, French refugee in the United States, 45, 46.
- GRUNDY, FELIX, speech on the Embargo, 4; favors war with Britain, 7; and Milan and Berlin Decrees, 17.
- GUARANTY TREATIES FOR FRANCE, 283, 284, 294.
- GUIZOT, advocates balance of power in America, 113, 114, 117.
- GWIN, SENATOR, of California, 141; on Hawaii, 145; plan to colonize Sonora, 166.
- HAGUE CONFERENCES, 225.
- HAITI, independent of France, 78; French sincerity doubted, 78; European intervention favored by French, 114; United States in tripartite intervention, 137; civil war in, 137-138; French intrigues, 141-142; European influence in, 143-144.
- HANOTAUX, GABRIEL, 231.
- HARPER, ROBERT GOODLOE, 18.
- HARRISON, PRESIDENT, 110.
- HASKINS, CHARLES HOMER, on education in France, 237; on the Peace Treaties, 287.
- HAWAII, French activities in, resented, 118, 119; European aggression in, 144, 145; accepted by the United States, 225.
- HAWKINS, GOVERNOR, of North Carolina, on "French influence," 6, 7.
- HAY, JOHN, on Louis Napoleon, 172, 173; Treaties of 1904, 225.
- HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY, 218.
- HAYES, PRESIDENT, on the Panama Canal, 219; political weakness, 222.
- HAZEN, CHARLES DOWNER, on Alsace-Lorraine, 279.
- HENDERSON, ERNEST F., defends Germany, 271.
- HOLLAND, J. G., quoted, 195.

- HOLT, HAMILTON, on United States debt to France, 284.
- HOUDIN STATUE OF WASHINGTON, replica presented to France, 231.
- HOUSE, COLONEL, European mission, 268.
- HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Report, October, 1812, 4; Report on French spoliations, 68-69; Report on same subject, written by Clay, 101.
- HOWE, FREDERIC C., on war causes, 274.
- HOWE, JULIA WARD, on the Franco-Prussian War, 191; on the Commune, 208.
- HUGHES, THOMAS EVANS, Secretary of State, on German reparations, 291; on disarmament, 292.
- HUGINS, ROLAND, pro-German, 276.
- HYDE, JAMES HAZEN, and exchange professorships, 238; on French literature, 241.
- INTELLECTUAL CONTACTS WITH FRANCE, 238, 239.
- INTER-OCEANIC WATERWAY, plans for, 138.
- JACKSON, ANDREW, PRESIDENT, policy on French spoliations, 67; Messages, 69, 70; draws on French treasury for indemnities, 94; resents delay in payment, 95; Message on spoliations, 95; press comment on Message, 97-101; advises reprisals, 105; more pacific message, 107; breaks diplomatic relations, 108; proposes cessation of commercial intercourse, 108; accepts British mediation, 109.
- JAMES, HENRY, 173.
- JAY, JOHN, xiii, 23; opinion of the French, 124.
- JEFFERSON, THOMAS, letter to Kosciusko, 2; favors war with Britain, 2; condemns Napoleonic aggressions, 2; critical of Napoleon, 27; called pro-French, 27; letter to Leiper, on the Coalition and Napoleon, 29; to John Adams, on the same subject, 30; to Gallatin, on his appointment as Minister to France, 36; critical of the Bourbons, 40; to Leiper, on the Spanish Revolution of 1820, 73, 74; to Richard Rush, on Lafayette's visit to the United States, 81; favors gift to Lafayette, 85.
- JEUNE EUGENIE*, 66.
- JOFFRE, in the United States, 277.
- JOHNSON, ROBERT UNDERWOOD, "The Keeper of the Sword," 254; "To Dreyfus Vindicated," 256; "Rheims," 270; "The Sword of Lafayette," 278; "Wish for New France," 312.
- JONES, JOHN PAUL, body returned to the United States, 230.
- JORDAN, DAVID STARR, on Belgian neutrality, 260-261.
- JUAREZ, ruler of Mexico, 151, 156.
- JUSSERAND, J. J., Ambassador from France to the United States, receives Franklin medal, 230; at memorial service for John Paul Jones, 230.
- KENDALL, AMOS, 8.

INDEX

- KING, RUFUS, favors war with France, 9; hopes for fall of Napoleon, 20; rejoices over Napoleon's defeat, 23; critical of Bourbons, 29.
- KNOX, PHILANDER, Secretary of State, 216.
- LAFAYETTE, visit to America, 79-85; welcome, 79; representative of the idea of democracy, 79; occasion for demonstrations against reactionary policies of the Bourbons, 80, 81; attitude of French government toward the visit, 82, 84; American anxiety over future safety, 84; statue presented to France, 229; memory of, 275; memorials in America, 277.
- LAFAYETTE FLYING CORPS, 276.
- LAFITTE, pirate, coöperating with Bonapartist exiles, 47.
- LAKANAL, JOSEPH, refugee in United States, 45, 46.
- LALLEMAND BROTHERS, French refugees, 45; concerned in Bonapartist activities, 46-48.
- LANE, FRANKLIN K., pro-French sentiments, 278.
- LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Covenant, 283; and guaranty treaty for France, 284; needed for European relief, 290, 291.
- LEFEBVRE-DESNOUETTES, GENERAL, French refugee, 42; in refugee enterprises, 45, 46.
- LIBERIA, French and British activities in, 214-216.
- LIBERTY, STATUE OF, 226-229.
- LINCOLN, elected, 145; unwilling to coerce French in Mexican affair, 157; re-nominated, 161; delays action on Mexican question, 162; discusses it with Confederate commissioners, 165.
- LIVERPOOL, LORD, 31.
- LIVINGSTON, American Minister in France, instructed to withdraw if indemnity not paid, 105; returns to the United States, 107-108.
- LOCARNO TREATIES, 298.
- LODGE, HENRY CABOT, on the Morocco question, 261; on guaranty treaty for France, 284; on the World War, 269; on Alsace-Lorraine, 280; on peace terms, 282.
- LONGFELLOW, HENRY WADSWORTH, to C. E. Norton, 187.
- LOPEZ INCIDENT, 136.
- LORD, ROBERT E., on Peace Treaties, 287.
- LOUIS XV111, appoints De Neuville as Minister to the United States, 36; official relations with the United States friendly, 61; end of reign, 72, 73; death, 85.
- LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 49, 50, 60.
- LOUIS NAPOLEON, candidate for the French Presidency, 123, 124; coup d'état, 130; American criticism, 130-132; "Napoleonic ideas," 133; inter-oceanic waterway plans, 138.
- LOUIS PHILIPPE, accession favored in the United States, 88; early diplomatic relations friendly, 94; factional disturbances in legislature, 94; unable to obtain appropriation for spoliations indemnity, 94; promises fulfilment of treaty, 95;

INDEX

- praised by Clay, 111; and Oregon boundary, 118; American opinion on downfall, 119-121; and inter-oceanic waterway, 138.
- LOWELL, JAMES RUSSELL, "Ode to France," 120; "Villa Franca," 132; "Biglow Papers," 133; Letter to Norton, 178; to Thomas Hughes, 197; opinion of the French, 211.
- MCCORKLE, REPRESENTATIVE, of California, on Hawaii, 144.
- MCDUGAL, SENATOR, of California, on the French in Mexico, 157, 162.
- MCKINLEY, PRESIDENT, 225.
- MCLANE, Secretary of the Treasury, 94.
- MACON, NATHANIEL, 1; debate on New Army Bill, 15.
- MACVEIGH, WAYNE, on France, 273.
- MADISON, PRESIDENT, Message, 1; letter to Jefferson, 2; Message, 4-5; sermon against, 9; accused of pro-French bias, 9, 19; unable to obtain redress from France, 11; cool toward the Bourbons, 41; resents "affair of the postmaster," 42; on Clay's Report, 106.
- MARQUESAS ISLANDS, taken by French, 119.
- MASON, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 140; objects to European interference, 143; Confederate commissioner, 145.
- MARTIN, E. S., on France, 271.
- MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE, and War of 1812, 8.
- MAXIMILIAN IN MEXICO, 152-166.
- MELLON-BERANGER AGREEMENT, 300.
- MENOCAL, LIEUT., report on Panama Canal route, 219.
- MEXICO, and Cuban affairs, 77; blockaded by the French, 111; and Raousset de Boulbon's enterprise, 138; French intrigues in, 141-142; disorders in, 150-151; European intervention, 151; attitude of the United States, 151-152; withdrawal of British and Spanish, 152; Maximilian's enterprise, 152-157; French occupation, 174.
- MILAN DECREE, debate on, 16-17.
- MONROE, JAMES, letter to Joel Barlow, 5; letter to John Quincy Adams, 5; denies "French influence," 14; letter to Gallatin, 35; displeased by "affair of the postmaster," 42; refuses British mediation on Florida question, 51; refuses French mediation, 52; Message on Florida question, 58; requests De Neuville to continue informal mediation, 58; praises De Neuville, 60; on French spoliations, 68; Message, 69; issues Monroe Doctrine, 75.
- MONROE DOCTRINE, announced, 75; immediate effect, 76; incidents connected with, 111-118, 135-140; and European intervention in Mexico, 151, 153, 157-159; endorsed by political parties, 161-162; France not inimical to, 213; ignored in the Caribbean, 217; applied in Venezuela, 217; in relation to Panama Canal, 219-221.
- MOULTON, H. G., on European economic conditions, 291.
- "MR. DOOLEY," on the Dreyfus case, 254.

INDEX

- MOROCCO QUESTION, 260-262, 298.
- MORRIS, GOUVERNEUR, letter to H. G. Otis, 18; oration on the Bourbon restoration, 23-24; critical of Bourbons, 29.
- MORTON, LEVI P., United States Minister to France, 228.
- MOTLEY, JOHN LOTHROP, to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 147; on Louis Napoleon, 173; to Bismarck, 187, 188; to O. W. Holmes, 210.
- MOTT, LUCRETIA, 191.
- NAPOLEON I, attacks on neutral commerce, 1, 2; considered a despot, 6; evades payment of reparations, 10; detestation for, in the United States, 7, 13, 16; retreat from Moscow, 18; celebration of downfall, 19, 21-24; banishment to Elba, 25; condemned by American leaders, 27; return from Elba, 28; character considered altered, 29; called legitimate ruler of France, 30, 31; restoration favored in the United States, 60.
- NAPOLEON III, criticised, 139, 140-141; allied with England, 143; anxious to check United States expansion, 144; favors the Confederacy, 146; likely to intervene, 147; proposes mediation, 149; Northern and Confederate reception of plan, 148; no active intervention, 149; policy in Mexico, 152-166; insecure position, 172; responsible for Franco-Prussian War, 175-178, 182, 184, 188-190; American sentiment, 191-193; interest in trans-oceanic waterway, 217.
- NAPOLEONIC CONSPIRACIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 45.
- NAST, THOMAS, cartoons, 176, 193.
- NELSON, United States Minister to Spain, 74.
- NEW ARMY BILL, debate on, 14.
- NEW ENGLAND, prejudice against France, 7.
- NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, and the War of 1812, 8.
- NICARAGUA, canal route, 218, 219, 220.
- NORTON, CHARLES ELIOT, on the French Republic, 211.
- NOTES AND SOURCES, 32-34, 61-64, 88-93, 125-129, 166-171, 202-207, 231-234, 262-267, 302-309, 313.
- NOYES, E. F., American Minister in France, 215.
- NOYES, PIERREPONT B., on post-war Europe, 289; on Ruhr occupation, 297.
- OGG, FREDERICK A., on government in France, 247.
- OHIO LEGISLATURE, and War of 1812, 6.
- OREGON BOUNDARY, and French intrigue, 118.
- ORTH, SAMUEL P., as author, 274.
- OTIS, HARRISON GREY, 18, 121.
- PAGE, AMBASSADOR, 273, 281.
- PAGEOT, 110.

INDEX

- PANAMA CANAL, undertaken by the French, 218-223; Monroe Doctrine in relation to, 219-221; deemed impracticable by Americans, 222; discussed in Congress, 223; built by the United States, 225.
- PANAMA SCANDAL, 250.
- PARIS, Peace of, xii; Declaration of, 146; siege of, 199-200; occupied by Germans, 209; deemed immoral, 134, 210; American colony in, 229; new appreciation for, 244, 246.
- PARIS EXPOSITION, 173, 225.
- PEACE CONFERENCE, 281, 282; French desires, 287.
- PHILLIPS, WENDELL, 208.
- PICKERING, TIMOTHY, critical of Administration, 12; celebrates fall of Napoleon, 18.
- PIERCE, PRESIDENT, 130, 140.
- PLUMER, GOVERNOR, of New Hampshire, 2.
- POINCARÉ, 236, 298.
- POLK, PRESIDENT, Message, 113; Revolution of 1848, 120, 122.
- PONTOIS, 110.
- PORTER, GENERAL HORACE, American Ambassador to France, 225; address at presentation of Statue of Liberty, 228; instrumental in restoring the body of John Paul Jones to the United States, 230.
- PORTO RICO, reported cession to England or France, 75; interest of Mexico and Colombia in, 77; French designs in, 77, 78.
- POSTMASTER, affair of, 42-44.
- POWERS, H. H., on Alsace-Lorraine, 280; on French war debt, 281.
- PRINCE, NORMAN, 276.
- PRUSSIA, praised, 178-179; criticised, 181-182; militarism, 188-201.
- QUINCY, JOSIAH, 4.
- RANDOLPH, JOHN, speech on the Embargo, 4; opposed to war with Britain, 13.
- REID, WHITELAW, American Ambassador to France, and tariff difficulties, 222; and Lafayette statue, 229.
- REPARATIONS COMMISSION, 295.
- REPPLIER, AGNES, on war guilt, 272.
- REPUBLICANS, pro-Prussian, 183.
- REVISIONIST CONTROVERSY, 288, 289, 298, 299.
- REVOLUTION OF 1830, France, 67; favored in the United States, 85; success celebrated, 86, 87; fails to unify France, 94.
- REVOLUTION OF 1848, France, American opinion on, 120, 121, 123.
- REVOLUTIONARY WAR, xiii.
- RHINE FRONTIER, 283, 288.

INDEX

- RIBOT, 223.
- RICHELIEU, duke de, French foreign Minister, 36; resents "affair of the postmaster," 43; De Neuville to, on Spanish-American relations, 45; declines to indicate boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase, 50; to De Neuville, 51; suggests mediation on Florida question, 52.
- RIVÈS, WILLIAM C., United States Minister to France, negotiates treaty on French spoliations, 67, 68; unwise remarks upon treaty, 94; delays recognition of Louis Napoleon, 130.
- ROCHAMBEAU, statue of, 229.
- ROCKWELL, KIFFIN, 276.
- RODIN, "La France," 231.
- ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENT, interest in Liberia, 216; and memorial service for John Paul Jones, 230; favors French in Morocco, 261; on responsibility for the World War, 270; on the heroism of France, 275; on the French, 311.
- ROOT, ELIHU, Secretary of State, on Liberia, 216; address in honor of M. Cambon, 229; address at presentation of Franklin medal, 230; on the death of President Carnot, 250; pro-French utterances, 277.
- RUHR VALLEY, French occupation, 285-286; allied occupation, 291, 295-296, 297, 298.
- RUSH, RICHARD, United States Minister to France, recognizes Second Republic, 121.
- RUSSIA, 143, 144, 146.
- ST. BARTHÉLEMI, bought by France, 217.
- SAAR VALLEY, 282, 288.
- SAMANA BAY, French interest in, 138, 139, 142.
- SAMOAN ISLANDS, United States interest in, 225.
- SANDWICH ISLANDS, 143, 144, 145.
- SAN FRANCISCO MEDAL, presented by the French, 230.
- SARAJEVO INCIDENT, 268.
- SCHIEBER, CLARA E., on American sentiment toward Germany, 260, 261.
- SCHOFIELD, 166.
- SCHMITT, BERNADOTTE E., on war guilt, 298.
- SCHURZ, CARL, criticised, 180, 181.
- SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS, to discuss canal routes, 218, 219.
- SECRET TREATIES, 295.
- SEDAN, 184.
- SEEGER, ALAN, 276.
- SEMINOLE WAR, 51.
- SERRURIER, French Minister to the United States, 36, 105, 110.
- SEWARD, WILLIAM H., on Caribbean questions, 141; Secretary of State, 145; to Dayton, on French mediation, 147; reported friction with French Minister, 149; on

INDEX

- European intervention in Mexico, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159; press opinion on his "apology," 159-161; rebuked in party platforms, 161; dislodges French from Mexico, 166; visits Paris, 211.
- SEYMOUR, CHARLES E., as author, 273.
- SHERIDAN, GENERAL, 166; observer with Prussian army, 175.
- SHERMAN, JOHN, financier, 173.
- SHERMAN, W. T., General, on French intervention in Mexico, 153.
- SIMONDS, FRANK, on France, 271; on peace terms, 282.
- SLIDELL, Confederate commissioner, 145, 150; seeks French alliance, 155, 156, 165.
- SLOANE, W. A., on Alsace-Lorraine, 271.
- SNELL, THOMAS, oration by, 18.
- SNYDER, SIMON, Governor of Pennsylvania, 38.
- SOCIETY FOR THE CULTIVATION OF THE VINE AND THE OLIVE, 46.
- SONORA, French intrigues in, 138-142, 151.
- SOULÉ, would take Cuba, 140.
- SOUTH, sympathetic with France, in Franco-Prussian War, 180-181.
- SPANISH-AMERICAN COLONIES, United States interest in, 49; revolutions in, 74; United States attitude toward independence, 74; criticism of French policy toward, 74-75; and Monroe Doctrine, 75.
- SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, and French hostility, 224-225.
- SPANISH REVOLUTION OF 1820, sympathy in the United States, 72; French intervention condemned, 72-74.
- STILLMAN, W., 175.
- STODDARD, LOTHROP, 279.
- STOWELL, ELLERY C., on French war guilt, 272.
- STRONG, CALEB, Governor of Massachusetts, 9; anti-French, 20.
- STUART, GRAHAM H., 288.
- SUMNER, CHARLES, 110; on Louis Napoleon, 155; on French in Mexico, 157; on Franco-Prussian War, 191-193, 198; resolution on the sale of arms, 212.
- SUEZ CANAL, 219, 220.
- SYRIA, French occupation, 298.
-
- TAFT, PRESIDENT, on Liberia, 216.
- TAHITI, seized by France, 118, 119.
- TALLEYRAND, on boundaries of Louisiana Purchase, 50.
- TARIFF DIFFICULTIES, with France and Germany, 223-224.
- TEXAS, benefited by French blockade of Mexico, 111; French intrigues in, 112; Polk on annexation, 113; French intrigues, 156.
- THIERS, 208, 211.
- THIRD REPUBLIC, recognized by the United States, 184; welcomed by Americans,

INDEX

- 186, 187; sympathy with, 188-190; stability doubted, 196; confidence in, 199-200; diplomacy, 213.
- TICKNOR, FRANCIS, 193.
- TICKNOR, GEORGE, on French Revolution of 1848, 121.
- TOASTS, Fourth of July, 2, 6, 38, 42.
- TRANS-OCEANIC WATERWAY, discussed, 217; interest of Napoleon III, 218; to be built by De Lesseps Company, 220; and the Monroe Doctrine, 219, 220.
- TRENT AFFAIR, 152.
- TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 268.
- TRIPLE ENTENTE, 268.
- TUCKER, ALLEN, 275.
- TUTTLE, HERBERT, 247.
- TURKEY, intrigues of the Powers, 298.
- TURNER, E. R., on war causes, 272.
- TURREAU, French Minister in the United States, 11.
- TYLER, PRESIDENT, 110.
- URUGUAY, Revolution in, 114-118; European countries involved, 114; American opinion, 115; protest by United States chargé at Buenos Ayres, 116; discussed in Congress, 116; press comment, 117-118.
- VAN BUREN, PRESIDENT, 110; favors French Revolution of 1848, 120.
- VANDERLIP, FRANK, on anti-clerical legislation in France, 261; on French after-war psychology, 294.
- VAN DYKE, HENRY, "The Name of France," 275; and Franco-American friendship, 311.
- VAN NORMAN, LOUIS E., on war responsibility of France, 271.
- VENEZUELA, quarrel with France, 217.
- VERSAILLES TREATY, 283, 295.
- VIVES, GENERAL, Spanish commissioner to the United States, and the Florida Purchase, 58-60.
- VIVIANI, 277.
- WALLER, JOHN L., imprisoned in Madagascar, 217.
- WAR GUILT OF EUROPEAN POWERS, 270-275, 288-289, 298-299.
- WAR OF 1812, 1-28; British and French infractions of neutrality, 1; bitterness toward both, 2-6; reasons for declaration of war against England and not France, 2-4; popular demonstrations against France, 5, 6; sermons on the war, 9, 10; Peace Commissioners, 28.
- WASHBURNE, ELIHU B., United States Minister in France, 174, 175; and the Third Republic, 184, 185; in Paris during the Commune, 208.

INDEX

- WAYNE, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee, 103.
- WEBSTER, DANIEL, resolution concerning the Milan and Berlin Decrees, 16; debate on Ways and Means Committee, 17; stresses importance of Cuba to the United States, 76; condemns French intervention in Spain, 79; on French spoliations, 102; called pro-French, 110; on Revolution of 1848 in France, 121; cool toward Louis Napoleon as Emperor, 130; on Lopez incident, 136; on Hawaii, 144.
- WEED, THURLOW, to Seward, on the Mexican question, 152; to *Albany Journal*, 162.
- WELLES, GIDEON, 154.
- WELLINGTON, Duke of, 36.
- WENDELL, BARRETT, on education in France, 237; on religion in France, 259.
- WHARTON, EDITH, and American Hostels for French Refugees and Children, 276.
- WHIGS, anti-expansionist, 139; Seward wing, 139.
- WHITE, ANDREW D., 237.
- WHITTIER, JOHN GREENLEAF, "The Peace of Europe," 132.
- WHITLOCK, BRAND, on Belgium, 270; pro-ally sentiment, 278.
- WILLIAM I, 182, 187, 188, 189, 190, 195.
- WILSON, PRESIDENT, 272, 280; and Versailles Treaty, 283; and League of Nations, 283; and guaranty treaty for France, 283-284; and Ruhr occupation, 286; idealism, 287; at Peace Conference, 287, 288.
- WIRT, WILLIAM, 24.
- YORKTOWN, BATTLE OF, centenary celebrated, 226.

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